ENS 48099
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
17:00 Jul 12, 2012 | |
| Title | 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 |
| Event Description | Around noon on July 12, 2012, workers noticed that a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)-controlled 5-gallon container, formally identified as a 'Field Container' being used as part of burial pit remediation at the Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project, looked unusual. Field Containers are white standard-size 5-gallon buckets with a locking lid and are supposed to be unique to other containers being used at the facility. Upon investigation, it was determined that the container was actually a 6-1/2-gallon container - white with a locking lid, almost identical to a Field Container except for height. The container was in the midst of being used to consolidate exhumed radiologically elevated soil, formally identified as a Hot Spot. One shovel's worth of dirt had been transferred into the 6-1/2-gallon container when the condition was noticed. The workers called their supervisor upon discovery. The supervisor issued a verbal stop work order, and went to investigate the condition in the field. The use of a 6-1/2-gallon container is a violation of an NCS Control (specifically, Safety Feature 01 of NSA-TR-09-15, Rev. 3).
NCS was called to assess the condition and direction was given to transfer the shovel's worth of soil from the 6-1/2-gallon container into an empty 5-gallon Field Container. The 6-1/2-gallon container, now empty, was destroyed. Other 6-1/2-gallon containers (the remaining 18 out of 20 containers that were identified as being purchased for different purposes) were removed and are under control pending their destruction. (It was confirmed that the one missing container of the purchase lot had been used for other non-NCS purposes.) The work crew on the other end of the burial pit remediation area was informed of the problem and cautioned to confirm the labeled volume capacity on the bottom of Field Containers to be used. The other areas where Field Containers are staged in the field and at the work site were inspected to confirm that no other 6-1/2-gallon containers were present. The consolidation points where these containers are staged when filled were also inspected to confirm that no 6-1/2-gallon containers were present. An investigation is under way to determine: 1) how the 6-1/2-gallon containers were inadvertently brought out to the burial pit, 2) how and why 6-1/2-gallon containers looking very similar to 5-gallon Field Containers were purchased and became available for misidentification as Field Containers, and 3) what actions need to be put in place to assure that future purchases of containers that may be mistaken for Field Containers do not occur. Westinghouse Hematite is undergoing decommissioning. The location of this event was at the burial pit remediation area. The licensee plans to also notify NRC Region 3 (Lafranzo) and NRC HQ (Hayes).
In the original report, Hematite stated that "the remaining 18 out of 20 (6-1/2-gallon) containers that were identified as being purchased...were removed and are under control..." (Parenthetical statement added for clarity.) During the destruction of the 6-1/2-gallon containers, it was noticed that 6 of the 18 quarantined containers were actually 5-gallon containers. A second search of all inventoried, staged, and used/in-process containers was conducted to find the missing six 6-1/2-gallon containers. None of the missing six 6-1/2-gallon containers were found. The complete facility was then searched in an effort to find the 6 missing 6-1/2-gallon containers; but, none were found. The identified 5-gallon containers, which were in the middle of a stack of 6-1/2-gallon containers, were taken directly from the original shipping pallet; and, as the 6 missing 6-1/2-gallon containers cannot be found, were, mostly likely, mistakenly shipped by the supplier as 6-1/2-gallon containers. At this point, all identified 6-1/2-gallon containers on site have been destroyed. The licensee will notify the NRC Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS (Silva). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Westinghouse Hematite Hematite, Missouri (NRC Region 3) | |
| License number: | SNM-33 |
| Reporting | |
| Response | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.88 h-0.0783 days <br />-0.0112 weeks <br />-0.00258 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Dennis Rechardson 15:07 Jul 12, 2012 |
| NRC Officer: | Bill Huffman |
| Last Updated: | Jul 16, 2012 |
| 48099 - NRC Website | |
Westinghouse Hematite with Response | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 492922013-08-20T16:15:00020 August 2013 16:15:00
[Table view]Response 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 ENS 480992012-07-12T17:00:00012 July 2012 17:00:00 Response 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 ENS 419232005-01-07T20:00:0007 January 2005 20:00:00 Response Bulletin 91-01 Report on Failure to Follow Criticality Controls 2013-08-20T16:15:00 | |