ENS 49902: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 03/12/2014 14:00 EDT | | event date = 03/12/2014 14:00 EDT | ||
| last update date = 03/12/2014 | | last update date = 03/12/2014 | ||
| title = Unanalyzed Condition Due | | title = Unanalyzed Condition Due to a Postulated Hot Short That Could Affect Safe Shutdown Equipment | ||
| event text = A review of industry operating experience (NRC Event Number 49889) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. | | event text = A review of industry operating experience (NRC Event Number 49889) regarding the impact of unfused Direct Current (DC) circuits has determined the described condition to be applicable to Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. | ||
In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The MPS2 Main Turbine Emergency Lube Oil pump control and indication circuits route to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage this cable and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. | In the postulated event, a fire induced hot short could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment. The MPS2 Main Turbine Emergency Lube Oil pump control and indication circuits route to the main control room. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage this cable and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cable and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:51, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Millstone  Connecticut (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
| LER: | 05000336/LER-2014-002 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.55 h-0.0646 days <br />-0.00923 weeks <br />-0.00212 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Todd Perkins 16:27 Mar 12, 2014 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Mar 12, 2014 |
| 49902 - NRC Website
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