ML20137B105

Forwards AEOD Engineering Evaluation Rept Re HPCS Sys Relief Valve Failures.Requests That Region IV Be Notified of Potential for Valve Failures at River Bend 1

ML20137B105
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend, LaSalle, 05000000
Issue date:	09/16/1985
From:	Salah S NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To:	Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
Shared Package
ML20136E841	List: IR 05000117/2004015 ML20136E837 ML20136E964 ML20136F664 ML20136F774 ML20136F970 ML20136F977 ML20136G052 ML20137A749 ML20137A929 ML20137A955 ML20137B013 ML20137B042 ML20137B092 ML20137B105 ML20137B123
References
FOIA-85-668 NUDOCS 8511260187
Download: ML20137B105 (1)

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September 16, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Karl V. Seyfrit, Chief AEOD/E513 Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation

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of Operational Data THRU:

Stuart D. Rubin, Chief i

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Reactor Systems Section 1 Reactor Operations Analysis ranch t

Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data FROM:

Sagid Salah, Engineer Reactor Systems Section 1 Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE FAILURES i

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Forwarded herewith is the subject Engineering Evaluation report for your i nformation. The results of this review indicated that excessive hydraulic forces (back pressure) from the discharge side of the HPCS discharge relief valve caused the relief valve's internal bellows seal assembly to fail at LaSalle 1 and 2.

To correct these problems, the licensee has modified the HPGS relief valve discharge path.

It is expected that this modification will eliminate the potential for HPCS relief valve bellows seal assembly failures. From a review of the other BWRs with a HPCS system, it is concluded that River Bend Unit 1 is the only other BWR potentially suscep-tible to the kind of relief valve failures which occurred at LaSalia. Both plants utilize similar relief valve discharge piping arrangements and Crosby relief valves with an internal bellows seal.

The other BWRs have sufficiently different HPCS system relief valve designs and/or discharge arrangements to rule out the potential for such valve failures at these pl ants.

River Bend Unit 1 is currently loading fuel into the core in 4

preparation for low power testing.

It is suggested, therefore, that AEOD alert Region IV of the potential for HPCS relief valve failures at River Bend similar to those which occurred at LaSalle.

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Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

Enclosure:

As stated 8511260187 851031 PDR FOIA SHOLLYS5-668 PDR vA-an ow. e m...--og,.

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