ML20247D724

Insp Repts 50-324/89-22 & 50-325/89-22 on 890724-28.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Open Items,Especially Issue of Svc Water Lube Water Support Operability

ML20247D724
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	09/06/1989
From:	Blake J, Robert Carrion NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247D711	List: ML20247D706 ML20247D724
References
50-324-89-22, 50-325-89-22, NUDOCS 8909150053
Download: ML20247D724 (6)

See also: IR 05000324/1989022

Text

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. UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

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,101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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Report Nos.: 50-325/89-22 and 50-324/89-22-

Licensee: Carolina Power.and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

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Raleigh, NC 27602-

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. Docket.Nos.:

50-325'and'50-324

License Nos.:

DPR-71 and DPR-62

Facility Name: Brun swi ck :1' and ' 2 -

~ Inspection Co ucted: July 24-28, 1989

Inspector:

1. # '87 -

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Date Si

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Approved by:

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J Jf. Blake, Chief

Date Signed

aprials and Processes Section

ngineering Branch

Division of Reactor' Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine announced inspection was conducted in the areas of open items,

especially the issue of Service Water Lube Water Support Operability. A total

of eight open items were reviewed.

Results:

In the areas' inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

Of .the open items reviewed, none were closed. However, the technical aspects

of the Service Water Lube Water Support Operability issue were satisfactorily

resolved.

The corrective action / management response to the issue will be

- addressed by the Resident inspector in a forthcoming report

8909150033 890907

PDR

ADOCK 05000324

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PDC

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' REPORT DETAILS

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11.

Persons Contacted?

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. Licensee Employees

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• C. F. Blackmon, Manager of Operations

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S. Boyce, Project Engineer for ECCS

• A.1G..Cheatman, Manager - E&RC

R. Cowen, Structural Engineer

• W. J. Dorman,' Supervisor - Quality Assurance

• J. L. Harness, General Manager.

• W. ' Rt Hatcher . Supervisor of _ Security

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• R. E. .Helme, Manager of. Technical Support

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L. E.' Jones, Director of QA/QC

. H. A. Jones, Director af On-Site Nuclear Safety

R. :Knott, Senior Engineer (LED-Civil)

J. A. McKee,_ Quality Control Supervisor

• W. G. Monroe, Principal Engineer (NED)

• J. O'Sullivan, Manager of Training

M. J. Pastva,' Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• R. M. Poulk, . Project Specialist - Reguitory Compliance

• R. 'L. Warden, Manager of Maintenance

A. Washburn, System Engineer for_ Service Water

H. L. Williams, Principal Engineer (NED)

A. Woods, Service Water Engineering for Outage Management Interrated

Scheduling Section_(0MISS)

A. M. Worth, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support

Other ' licensee employees contacted during this inspection included

security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

- NRC Resident Inspectors

• W. Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector

W. Levis, Resident Inspector

D. Nelson, Resident Inspector

'* Attended exit interview-

2.

Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

e.

Followup on Licensee Identified Violations (LIVs)

(1)

(0 pen) LIV 50-325, 324/88-24-05:

" Failure to Maintain

RHR SW Piping Temperature Below 120 F"

The 120 F limit was based on the original stress analysis for

the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water (SW) piping

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downstream of the RHR heat exchanger. Because the temperature

peaked at 215 F, the licensee. prepared Engineering Evaluation

Report 88-0365 and re-evaluated. the pipe stress model for -the

elevated

temperature

to

determine

piping

operability.

Additional analysis was done to determir.e. if the piping would

have remained operable at 215 F during a Design Basis Earth-

quake.

Also, a re-analysis of the pipe supports associated

with the affected piping was completed to qualify them as

operable .during a Design Basis Earthquake coincident with an

. operating temperature of 215 F.

The inspector reviewed Calculation No. 2SW-261-02, Revision F-0,

entitled . "Re-analysis of Pipe . Supports on Service Water ISO's

D-2846,. Sheets 261, 262, 263, 266, and 267." This calculation

includes 32 attachments which contain ' load summaries and other

pertinent:informat % as well as individual support evaluations.

However, the pipe senss re-analysis was not available for.

review and there vie no way to verify the loads shown on the

summary sheets. Therefore, the pipe stress calculations must be

reviewed during a future . routine inspection to evaluate this

issue fully. This item remains open.

b.

Followup on Unresolved Items (UNRs)

(1) (0 pen) UNR 50-324/88-13-01:

"As-Building Drawing

Discrepancies for Torus External Piping Systems"

The inspector requested a status report on this item from the

cognizant licensee engineer and was told that the referenced

discrepancies would most probably be resolved in the Phase II

As-Built Piping System Walkdown Verification Program, rather

than doing it as a separate " stand-alone" effort. This would

allow the most ef ficient use of resources.

However, it also

means that this item will not be closed until the completion of

the Walkdown Verification Program, scheduled to be finalized in

1992. Therefore, this item remains open.

(2) (0 pen) UNR 50-325,324/88-36-01:

" Suppression Pool

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Temperature Monitoring System Adequacy"

The inspector held discussions with the cognizant licensee

engineer concerning this issue because the information presented

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for review was insufficient to close the item.

The inspector

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and the engineer agreed on what information is still needed and

the engineer began an effort to procure it.

This item

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remains open.

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'(3)

(0 pen) UNR 50-325,'324/88-36-04: " Accuracy of As-Built Phase 'II

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Piping Walkdown Verification"

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The inspector monitored the progress of the Walkdown

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Verification' Program.

This effort is the result of modifying

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earlier programs 'and is designed to accurately reflect the

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as-installed configuration of the safety-related piping and

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supports. The Quality Control Supervisor informed the inspector

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that the program is on schedule..with over 40%.of .the walkdowns.

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complete.

Virtually a'11 of the walkdowns outside the drywells

have been completed and currently none are in_ progress.

They

.will resume with the upcoming Unit- 2 outage in September.

Therefore, this item remains open.

(4)

(0 pen)UNR 50-325,324/89-07-02:

" Service Water Lube' Water

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Operability"

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Upon arriving at the site, the inspector reviewed the referenced

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piping and supports to become familiar with the actual physical

configuration.

All ten of the Lube Water Piping Supports had

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been repaired by cutting away the corroded portions and

replacing 'them with new material.

This new material was then

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covered by a Belzona surface treatment to act as a corrosion

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barrier against future deterioration.

The inspector was told

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that this is a temporary fix until Plant Modifications 83-220L

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and 82-221-L are implemented.

These modifications will convert

the Service Water Pumps to " product-lube" pumps, i.e. internal

self-lubrication by the fluid being pumped, water in this case.

This conversion will allow the removal of all lube water piping,

valves, cyclone separators, lube water pumps, and existing

support structure.

Only two small (less than 1" d) lines, for

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the motor cooler supply line and its return, will remain to be

supported.

The new supports are to be " Christmas Tree" type, a

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vertical tube steel " trunk" with " branches" consisting of

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structural angles to support the lines.

The tube steel is

welded to base plates which are situated on 1" grout pads. The

grout pads are utilized to elevate the supports above the

general floor level, reducing their exposure to the corrosive

environment.

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The inspector reviewed Engineering Evaluation Report No.

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89-0128, which detailed the test done to determined if a short

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run of Lube Water piping at the Service Water Pump bearing could

withstand a deflection of plus of minus 1" for the duration of

Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) without failure, 12 seconds based

upon Section 3.7.1.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report

(FSAR).

The preliminary analysis results indicated that the

fundamental frequency of the system is about 4 Hz.

Therefore,

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the system could expect about 48 cycles during a DBE.

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actual test was conducted through 50 cycles. Also, the test

specimen was hydrostatically tested to 1-1/2 times

of the

system's design pressure. The 225 psi hydro produced some slow

seepage around the threaded connection at the assembly but none

of the other joints showed any signs of leakage.

Upon

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completion of the test, the specimen was re-examined.

The

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seepage around the threaded connection was slightly increased

while the other joints remained water tight.

The inspector

judged the test to be an accurate, conservative representation

of the actual physical configuration under seismic loading

conditions.

Upon the successful

completion of the test, with its

conservative assumptions, a rigorous quantitative analysis,

Calculation 0-01534A-148, Revision

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was done.

A finite

element model which incorporated the worst conditions of all the

structures on the analyzed structure was used.

The model

included the attached piping, and an attached ladder in addition

to the pipe support structure itself. All sources of stiffness

were utilized, even though they may not have been originally

designed as part of the support systems, due to the urgency of

the situation.

As-found field data was gathered for the

corroded support legs, piping configuration, support attach-

ments, supports members and their configuration. This informa-

tion was used to established nodal coordinates, members sizes,

connection fixities, and other model properties.

Stiffness

associated with 1/2" ( pipe attached to the pump bearing was

determined from information from the previously-conducted test.

Stiffness associated with the cyclone separator nozzles was

determined based on tests conducted previously and documented in

Calculation 82-218A-01, Revision F1, dated August 14, 1986. The

purpose of that calculation was to seismically age the cyclone

separator and qualify it for piping loads.

The computer input was reviewed by the inspector, especially

noting and spot checking coordinates of nodes, member materials,

member beginning and ending nodes, member releases (as appropriate),

member properties, and support points.

The output was also

reviewed for madal information, especially frequency and related

displacements for a given mode, as well as member forces and

member stresses under the postulated seismic event. The natural

frequency of the analysis piping / support structural system was

5.8 Hz, while the deflection corresponding to the 1 inch assumed

deflection used in the laboratory simulation was 0.4 inch.

The

stress levels of some of the members proved to be well above

those nomally accepted as allowable, but they did remain in the

elastic range, indicating that no plastic deformation should be

expected even under the most severe postulated loading

conditions.

Therefore, from the strictly technical standpaint,

operability of the Service Water Pump Lube Water Piping and its

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associated support was maintained.

However, it must be

emphasized that its success was based on the ability to

incorporate structural properties of the piping itself and an

attached ladder into the analysis, which is rather unorthodox in

general, but most fortuitous in this particular case.

Corrective actions and management's response to this issue will

be addressed in an upcoming Resident Inspectors Report.

Therefore, this issue remains open.

c.

Followup on Inspector Following Items (IFIs)

(I) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-02:

" Final Safety Summary

Report For IEB 79-02"

(2) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-03:

"Hilti Anchor Bolt

Allowable Review and Justification Per IEB 79-02, NRC

Information Notices 86-94 and 88-25"

The inspector discussed these two open items with the cognizant

licensee engineer. The final summary report is being prepared

and will address the Hilti Anchor Bolt issues as well as those

of the original IEB 79-02. Therefore, pending completion of the

report, these two items remain open.

(3) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-05:

"QA Auditing of the Supports

in As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification Program

and the Modified Systems with QC Inspections"

This item is closely associated with UNR 50-325, 324/88-36-04

(See paragraph 2.b.(3)). The inspector spoke to the Director of

QA/QC and the QC Supervisor, who said that they preferred to use

the term " surveillance" rather than " audit" to describe their

on going efforts in reviewing the walkdown Verification Program

throughout is life. An audit is usually conducted after the

fact and is more formal in nature.

The surveillance is

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proceeding on schedule and no significant breakdowns of the

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program were cited. It is scheduled to be continued through the

end of the Walkdown Verification Program in 1992. Therefore,

this item remains open.

3.

Exit Interview

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The inspection scope and results were summarized on July 28, 1989, with

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those persons indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas

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inspected and discussed in detail the inspection re sul t s . Proprieta ry

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information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not

received from the licensee.

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