ML20247N101

Forwards Safety Sys Functional Insp Team Rept 50-309/89-80 on 890109-0210.Util Found to Have Fragmented Approach to Safety Evaluations

ML20247N101
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	03/27/1989
From:	Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Frizzle C Maine Yankee
Shared Package
ML20247N107	List: IR 05000309/1989080 ML20247N101
References
NUDOCS 8904060196
Download: ML20247N101 (3)

See also: IR 05000309/1989080

Text

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MAR 2 71989

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Docket No. 50-309

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

ATTN: Mr. Charles D. Frizzle

President

83 Edison Drive

Augusta, Maine 04336

Gentlemen:

l

Subject: NRC Safety System Functional Inspection Team Report No. 50-309/89-80

This letter forwards the report of a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI)

performed by an NRC Team from January 9 through February 10, 1989, at Maine

Yankee Station.

The Team's

findings

and

preliminary

conclusions

were

summarized for you and members - of your staff at a meeting held on site on

February 10, 1989.

The SSFI ' objective was to assess 'the operational capability of the component

cooling water (CCW) system to perform its design basis safety functions. The

Team evaluated the adequacy of operational procedures, test practices, and

maintenance policies as they contributed to CCW system availability and relia-

bility. The Team also addressed the quality of design control and other man-

agement programs applied to the CCW system. An overall positive conclusion was

reached by the Team regarding your staf f's technical competence, attitudes

towards safety, ownership of the plant and approach to design basis reconstitu-

tion.

Despite this however, we found that you have a generally fragmented

approach to safety evaluations and this is complicated by uncertainties in the

design bases. The principal example involves the lack of a current comprehen--

sive CCW heat balance. As a result, the Team- was unable to assess the extent

of design margins for the CCW system and was therefore not able to confirm tho

capability of the system to perform all of its intended design basis safety

. functions.

In addition, as discussed at the exit meeting, certain Team findings warrant

your immediate attention to assure continued safe plant operation. First, the

operability and reliability of direct current (DC) power buses, particularly

your

operational

philosophy

for use

of cross-tie breakers,

should be

reconsidered in terms of safety, given the unclear direction provided by your

Technical Specifications as to the common mode failure implications for the

emergency diesel engines and residual heat removal (RHR) system in cold

shutdown.

Second, your progress towards completing a probabilistic risk

l

assessment (PRA) is notable; however, useful applications of that PRA can and

should be made in the short term to assure proper priority is assigned to

achieving improved DC inverter reliability, and effective corrective action in

solving RHR heat exchanger inlet valve reach rod design issues.

Finally, a

nonconservative pattern was identified in your use of component replacement

procedures to accomplish what were, in the Team's consideration, design

changes,

such

as

those

involving

battery

and

radiation

monitor

modifications.

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

MY 50-309/89-80 SSFI - 0001.0.0

_ 0904060196 890327

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03/28/89

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

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A written response is requested- for the weaknesses raised in Section 1

Executive Summary, of the enclosed report.

The priority and schedule for the

commitments made during the course of the SSFI also should be included in y

response. : Finally, and as a benchmark for your future self-initiated SSFI's

and continuing design basis efforts,

questioning attitude, beyond existing confidencethe Team recommends that a persisten

levels, be applied towards

reconfirmation of the adequacy of Maine Yankee's design bases.

Those issues identified which may result in enforcement action, will be

addressed separate from this report.

addressing the many

Your staff's attitude. and cooperation in

excellent, and your continued cooperation is appreciated. issues raised

Sincerely,

Origid S'8"'d D

William F. Kane, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

As stated'

cc w/ encl:

J. Randazza, Assistant Chairman of the Board

J.

Garrity, Vice President, Engineering and Licensing

Dr. E. Boulette, Vice President, Operations / Plant Manager

P. Anderson, Project Manager

G. Whittier, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

J. Ritsher, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)

J. Firth, Vice President, Public and Governmental Affairs

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P. Ahrens, Esquire

Public Document Room (PDR)

local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector

State of Maine

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

MY S0-309/89-80 SSFI - 0002.0.0

03/15/89

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

3

MAR 2 71989

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bec w/ encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)

W. Kane, DRP

S. Collins, DRP

J. Wiggins, DRP

L. Tripp, DRP

D. Limroth, DRP

P. Wilson, DRP

T. Martin, DRS

J. Durr, DRS

J. Strosnider, DRS

P. Eapen, DRS

T. Koshy, DRS

Team Members and Their Supervisors

R. Bores, DRSS

B. Clayton, EDO

B. Boger, NRR

C. Haughney, NRR

P. Sears, NRR

J. Milhoan, RIV

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

MY 50-309/89-80 SSFI - 0003.0.0

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03/15/89

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