ML20247N101
| ML20247N101 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1989 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Frizzle C Maine Yankee |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247N107 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904060196 | |
| Download: ML20247N101 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000309/1989080
Text
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MAR 2 71989
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Docket No. 50-309
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
ATTN: Mr. Charles D. Frizzle
President
83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336
Gentlemen:
l
Subject: NRC Safety System Functional Inspection Team Report No. 50-309/89-80
This letter forwards the report of a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI)
performed by an NRC Team from January 9 through February 10, 1989, at Maine
Yankee Station.
The Team's
findings
and
preliminary
conclusions
were
summarized for you and members - of your staff at a meeting held on site on
February 10, 1989.
The SSFI ' objective was to assess 'the operational capability of the component
cooling water (CCW) system to perform its design basis safety functions. The
Team evaluated the adequacy of operational procedures, test practices, and
maintenance policies as they contributed to CCW system availability and relia-
bility. The Team also addressed the quality of design control and other man-
agement programs applied to the CCW system. An overall positive conclusion was
reached by the Team regarding your staf f's technical competence, attitudes
towards safety, ownership of the plant and approach to design basis reconstitu-
tion.
Despite this however, we found that you have a generally fragmented
approach to safety evaluations and this is complicated by uncertainties in the
design bases. The principal example involves the lack of a current comprehen--
sive CCW heat balance. As a result, the Team- was unable to assess the extent
of design margins for the CCW system and was therefore not able to confirm tho
capability of the system to perform all of its intended design basis safety
. functions.
In addition, as discussed at the exit meeting, certain Team findings warrant
your immediate attention to assure continued safe plant operation. First, the
operability and reliability of direct current (DC) power buses, particularly
your
operational
philosophy
for use
of cross-tie breakers,
should be
reconsidered in terms of safety, given the unclear direction provided by your
Technical Specifications as to the common mode failure implications for the
emergency diesel engines and residual heat removal (RHR) system in cold
shutdown.
Second, your progress towards completing a probabilistic risk
l
assessment (PRA) is notable; however, useful applications of that PRA can and
should be made in the short term to assure proper priority is assigned to
achieving improved DC inverter reliability, and effective corrective action in
solving RHR heat exchanger inlet valve reach rod design issues.
Finally, a
nonconservative pattern was identified in your use of component replacement
procedures to accomplish what were, in the Team's consideration, design
changes,
such
as
those
involving
battery
and
radiation
monitor
modifications.
[/!
0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
MY 50-309/89-80 SSFI - 0001.0.0
_ 0904060196 890327
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03/28/89
' 9R
ADOCK 05000309
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
2~
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A written response is requested- for the weaknesses raised in Section 1
Executive Summary, of the enclosed report.
The priority and schedule for the
commitments made during the course of the SSFI also should be included in y
response. : Finally, and as a benchmark for your future self-initiated SSFI's
and continuing design basis efforts,
questioning attitude, beyond existing confidencethe Team recommends that a persisten
levels, be applied towards
reconfirmation of the adequacy of Maine Yankee's design bases.
Those issues identified which may result in enforcement action, will be
addressed separate from this report.
addressing the many
Your staff's attitude. and cooperation in
excellent, and your continued cooperation is appreciated. issues raised
Sincerely,
Origid S'8"'d D
William F. Kane, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
As stated'
cc w/ encl:
J. Randazza, Assistant Chairman of the Board
J.
Garrity, Vice President, Engineering and Licensing
Dr. E. Boulette, Vice President, Operations / Plant Manager
P. Anderson, Project Manager
G. Whittier, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing
J. Ritsher, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)
J. Firth, Vice President, Public and Governmental Affairs
'
P. Ahrens, Esquire
Public Document Room (PDR)
local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of Maine
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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
MY S0-309/89-80 SSFI - 0002.0.0
03/15/89
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
3
MAR 2 71989
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bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)
W. Kane, DRP
S. Collins, DRP
J. Wiggins, DRP
L. Tripp, DRP
D. Limroth, DRP
P. Wilson, DRP
T. Martin, DRS
J. Durr, DRS
J. Strosnider, DRS
P. Eapen, DRS
T. Koshy, DRS
Team Members and Their Supervisors
R. Bores, DRSS
B. Clayton, EDO
B. Boger, NRR
C. Haughney, NRR
P. Sears, NRR
J. Milhoan, RIV
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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
MY 50-309/89-80 SSFI - 0003.0.0
>
03/15/89
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