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{{#Wiki_filter:ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS tion                                          Title                                                                 Page IRRADIATION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .......................... 8a2.1-1
{{#Wiki_filter:Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Table of Contents CHAPTER 8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page SHINE Medical Technologies 8-i Rev. 0 8a2 IRRADIATION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.......................... 8a2.1-1 8a2.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM..................................... 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.1 DESIGN BASIS............................................................................. 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION............................... 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION.............................................................................. 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.4 GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION.......................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.5 RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING............................................. 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.6 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER....................................................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.................................................... 8a2.1-6 8a2.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.......................................... 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.1 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS.............................................................. 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.2 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS........................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION............................................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS..................... 8a2.2-5 8a2.2.5 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS................................................................................. 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION..................... 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.7 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION..... 8a2.2-7 8a2.2.8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.................................................... 8a2.2-7 8a
.1   NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ..................................... 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.1   DESIGN BASIS ............................................................................. 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.2   OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION ............................... 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.3   NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION .............................................................................. 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.4   GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION .......................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.5   RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING ............................................. 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.6   LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER ....................................................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.7   TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .................................................... 8a2.1-6
.2   EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .......................................... 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.1   UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS .............................................................. 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.2   UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS ........................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.3   UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ............................................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.4   STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS ..................... 8a2.2-5 8a2.2.5   STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS ................................................................................. 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.6   STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ..................... 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.7   EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION ..... 8a2.2-7 8a2.2.8   TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .................................................... 8a2.2-7
.3  REFERENCES ................................................................................................. 8a2.3-1 NE Medical Technologies                        8-i                                                                Rev. 0


ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS tion                                              Title                                                                  Page RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................... 8b.1-1 1    NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .................................................... 8b.1-1 2    EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ............................................ 8b.2-1 NE Medical Technologies                            8-ii                                                                Rev. 0
==2.3 REFERENCES==
................................................................................................. 8a2.3-1


mber                    Title
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Table of Contents CHAPTER 8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page SHINE Medical Technologies 8-ii Rev. 0 8b RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.......................................................................................................... 8b.1-1 8b.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.................................................... 8b.1-1 8b.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS............................................ 8b.2-1
.2-1 UPSS Load List
.2-2 UPSS Battery Sizing NE Medical Technologies  8-iii Rev. 0


mber                                    Title
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems List of Tables LIST OF TABLES Number Title SHINE Medical Technologies 8-iii Rev. 0 8a2.2-1 UPSS Load List 8a2.2-2 UPSS Battery Sizing
.1-1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)
.2-1 Uninterruptible Power Supply System NE Medical Technologies                 8-iv    Rev. 0


onym/Abbreviation        Definition alternating current bus train AS                        criticality accident alarm system MS                        continuous air monitoring system direct current electromagnetic interference FAS                        engineered safety features actuation system CS                        facility data and communications system S                        facility fire detection and suppression 4                        facility ventilation zone 4 FD                        hot cell fire detection and suppression system AC                        heating, ventilation, and air conditioning hertz E                          Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers irradiation unit kilovolt NE Medical Technologies 8-v                                          Rev. 1
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems List of Figures LIST OF FIGURES Number Title SHINE Medical Technologies 8-iv Rev. 0 8a2.1-1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified) 8a2.2-1 Uninterruptible Power Supply System


onym/Abbreviation       Definition OP                        loss of off-site power PS                        molybdenum extraction and purification system S                        nitrogen purge system AS                        neutron driver assembly system PA                        National Fire Protection Association DS                        neutron flux detection system SS                        normal electrical power supply system S                          process integrated control system VS                        process vessel vent system MS                        radiation area monitoring system radio frequency interference WI                        radioactive liquid waste immobilization WS                        radioactive liquid waste storage F                          radioisotope production facility Z1                        radiological ventilation zone 1 Z1e                        radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem NE Medical Technologies 8-vi                                      Rev. 1
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-v Rev. 1 AC alternating current BT bus train CAAS criticality accident alarm system CAMS continuous air monitoring system DC direct current EMI electromagnetic interference ESFAS engineered safety features actuation system FDCS facility data and communications system FFPS facility fire detection and suppression FVZ4 facility ventilation zone 4 HCFD hot cell fire detection and suppression system HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning Hz hertz IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IU irradiation unit kV kilovolt


onym/Abbreviation       Definition Z2                        radiological ventilation zone 2 Z2e                        radiological ventilation zone 2 exhaust subsystem Z2s                        radiological ventilation zone 2 supply subsystem C                          secondary enclosure cleanup S                          standby generator system M                          stack release monitor MS                        stack release monitor system tritium purification system GS                        TSV off-gas system PS                        TSV reactivity protection system target solution vessel utility power SS                        uninterruptible electrical power supply system volts C                          volts - alternating current NE Medical Technologies 8-vii                                        Rev. 1
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-vi Rev. 1 LOOP loss of off-site power MEPS molybdenum extraction and purification system N2PS nitrogen purge system NDAS neutron driver assembly system NFPA National Fire Protection Association NFDS neutron flux detection system NPSS normal electrical power supply system PICS process integrated control system PVVS process vessel vent system RAMS radiation area monitoring system RFI radio frequency interference RLWI radioactive liquid waste immobilization RLWS radioactive liquid waste storage RPF radioisotope production facility RVZ1 radiological ventilation zone 1 RVZ1e radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem


onym/Abbreviation       Definition C                        volts - direct current vacuum transfer system NE Medical Technologies 8-viii                  Rev. 1
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-vii Rev. 1 RVZ2 radiological ventilation zone 2 RVZ2e radiological ventilation zone 2 exhaust subsystem RVZ2s radiological ventilation zone 2 supply subsystem SEC secondary enclosure cleanup SGS standby generator system SRM stack release monitor SRMS stack release monitor system TPS tritium purification system TOGS TSV off-gas system TRPS TSV reactivity protection system TSV target solution vessel UP utility power UPSS uninterruptible electrical power supply system V
volts VAC volts - alternating current


.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ngle overall electrical power system serves the main production facility, including both the diation facility and the radioisotope production facility, as well as the site and support dings. The normal electrical power supply system (NPSS) for the SHINE facility consists of normal power service entrances from the electric utility and a distribution system providing e utilization voltages, 480Y/277, 400Y/230, and 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC),
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-viii Rev. 1 VDC volts - direct current VTS vacuum transfer system
hase, 60 hertz. Grounding and lightning protection is provided.
NPSS receives off-site power service from the local utility, Alliant Energy, at 480Y/277 VAC ugh five separate transformer feeds. Portions of the NPSS that comprise the emergency trical power system can also receive power from the standby generator system (SGS). The SS is used for normal operation and normal shutdown of the facility.
NPSS is sized for safe operation of the facility. The largest loads on the NPSS are the cess chilled water system (PCHS), neutron driver assembly system (NDAS), and the facility ed water system (FCHS); however, those loads are not required for safe shutdown of the lity. Refer to Section 8a2.2 for a tabulation of emergency electrical load requirements.
mplified diagram of the overall electrical power system is provided in Figure 8a2.1-1.
.1.1      DESIGN BASIS design of the NPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, ection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design ria are described in Section 3.1.
design of the NPSS provides sufficient, reliable power to facility and site electrical equipment equired for operation of the SHINE facility and to comply with applicable codes and dards. The NPSS is designed such that it:
* Does not prevent the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions;
* Provides for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related instrumentation and control functions;
* Fails to a safe configuration upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP);
* Provides the normal source of power supply to the safety-related electrical buses;
* Provides the safety-related function of removing power from select components when demanded by the safety-related engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) or target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS); and
* Is able to be inspected, tested, and maintained to meet the above design bases.
following codes and standards are used in the design of the NPSS:
* National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)
NE Medical Technologies                     8a2.1-1                                        Rev. 3


and separation of nonsafety-related circuits from safety-related circuits, as described in Subsections 8a2.1.3 and 8a2.1.5.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-1 Rev. 3 8a2 IRRADIATION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8a2.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM A single overall electrical power system serves the main production facility, including both the irradiation facility and the radioisotope production facility, as well as the site and support buildings. The normal electrical power supply system (NPSS) for the SHINE facility consists of the normal power service entrances from the electric utility and a distribution system providing three utilization voltages, 480Y/277, 400Y/230, and 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC),
* IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003), invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3.
3-phase, 60hertz. Grounding and lightning protection is provided.
* IEEE Standard C.37.13-2015, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures (IEEE, 2015a); invoked for ensuring reliability of safety-related breakers, as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3.
The NPSS receives off-site power service from the local utility, Alliant Energy, at 480Y/277 VAC through five separate transformer feeds. Portions of the NPSS that comprise the emergency electrical power system can also receive power from the standby generator system (SGS). The NPSS is used for normal operation and normal shutdown of the facility.
.1.2    OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION SHINE facility is connected to two single power circuits from the off-site transmission electric work. The power circuits are shared with other utility customers. The two power circuits feed local outdoor 12.47 kilovolt (kV) - 480Y/277 VAC 3-phase transformers. The 12.47 kV ders originate from the Alliant Energy Tripp Road substation, about 2.8 circuit miles from the NE facility, and the Alliant Energy Venture substation, about 2.3 circuit miles from the SHINE lity.
The NPSS is sized for safe operation of the facility. The largest loads on the NPSS are the process chilled water system (PCHS), neutron driver assembly system (NDAS), and the facility chilled water system (FCHS); however, those loads are not required for safe shutdown of the facility. Refer to Section8a2.2 for a tabulation of emergency electrical load requirements.
transformers are each connected to one of the SHINE facility's two main 480 VAC chgear buses. Figure 8a2.1-1 depicts the off-site connections to the SHINE facility.
A simplified diagram of the overall electrical power system is provided in Figure8a2.1-1.
.1.3    NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION NPSS operates as five separate branches, each receiving utility power at 480Y/277 VAC.
8a2.1.1 DESIGN BASIS The design of the NPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1.
branches automatically physically disconnect from the utility by opening the associated utility er (UP) supply breaker (UP BKR 1, UP BKR 2, UP BKR 3, or UP BKR 4) on a loss of phase, se reversal, or sustained overvoltage or undervoltage as detected by protection relays for h utility transformer. This function is not required for safe shutdown, as described in section 8a2.1.6. UP BRK 5, which provides isolation for the resource building, provides rcurrent and surge protection. UP BKR 5 disconnecting from the utility is not required for safe tdown since it does not impact safety-related equipment in the main production facility.
The design of the NPSS provides sufficient, reliable power to facility and site electrical equipment as required for operation of the SHINE facility and to comply with applicable codes and standards. The NPSS is designed such that it:
two branches, serving loads in the main production facility and the nitrogen purge system PS) structure, can be cross-connected by manually opening one of the UP breakers and nually closing both bus tie (BT) breakers (BT BKR 1 and BT BKR 2) in the event of the loss of ngle utility 480Y/277 VAC feed. This cross-connection would be administratively controlled to ure the remaining utility feed is not overloaded.
Does not prevent the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions; Provides for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related instrumentation and control functions; Fails to a safe configuration upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP);
distribution system serving the main production facility and the N2PS structure consists of line-ups of 480 volts (V) switchgear, two 480 V transfer buses (that are supported by the dby generator), two emergency breakers, and isolation and cross-tie breakers. The two chgear line-ups each feed an individual transfer bus and the single SGS switchgear. The two V transfer buses and associated emergency breakers are nonsafety-related, but each vides power to a safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS) division division-specific battery chargers and bypass transformers. The SGS and the UPSS are her described in Section 8a2.2.
Provides the normal source of power supply to the safety-related electrical buses; Provides the safety-related function of removing power from select components when demanded by the safety-related engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) or target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS); and Is able to be inspected, tested, and maintained to meet the above design bases.
NE Medical Technologies                    8a2.1-2                                        Rev. 3
The following codes and standards are used in the design of the NPSS:
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)


ngle distribution system serves the resource building. There are no safety-related loads ered from these distribution systems.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-2 Rev. 3 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 384-2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits (IEEE, 2008), invoked for isolation and separation of nonsafety-related circuits from safety-related circuits, as described in Subsections8a2.1.3 and 8a2.1.5.
ge protection is provided at each electrical service entrance to limit voltage spikes and trical noise. The electrical services are monitored for voltage, frequency, and loss of phase.
IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003), invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection8a2.1.3.
en an electrical service exceeds prescribed limits, the facility is disconnected from the utility to vent damage.
IEEE Standard C.37.13-2015, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures (IEEE, 2015a); invoked for ensuring reliability of safety-related breakers, as described in Subsection8a2.1.3.
s of phase protection is provided by use of a negative sequence relay. The NPSS monitors h phase and disconnects from utility power on a loss of any one of the three incoming ses. Refer to Section 8a2.2 for further discussion of facility response to transient events.
8a2.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION The SHINE facility is connected to two single power circuits from the off-site transmission electric network. The power circuits are shared with other utility customers. The two power circuits feed five local outdoor 12.47 kilovolt (kV) - 480Y/277 VAC 3-phase transformers. The 12.47 kV feeders originate from the Alliant Energy Tripp Road substation, about 2.8 circuit miles from the SHINE facility, and the Alliant Energy Venture substation, about 2.3 circuit miles from the SHINE facility.
NPSS complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin apter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical); with Sections 6.1.2.1, 2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation; with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of tion 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation ween nonsafety-related circuits and safety-related circuits; and with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 5a) to ensure reliability of safety-related breakers.
Two transformers are each connected to one of the SHINE facility's two main 480 VAC switchgear buses. Figure8a2.1-1 depicts the off-site connections to the SHINE facility.
mpliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) ensures sufficient reliability to minimize the probability sing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the site electric power system. Compliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) also ensures adequate essibility to NPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.
8a2.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The NPSS operates as five separate branches, each receiving utility power at 480Y/277 VAC.
mpliance with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 2015a) guidance for ratings, functional components, perature limitations, classification of insulating materials, and testing procedures ensures that ty-related breakers in the NPSS have a high degree of reliability, the capacity, and the ability to perform their safety functions.
The branches automatically physically disconnect from the utility by opening the associated utility power (UP) supply breaker (UP BKR 1, UP BKR 2, UP BKR 3, or UP BKR 4) on a loss of phase, phase reversal, or sustained overvoltage or undervoltage as detected by protection relays for each utility transformer. This function is not required for safe shutdown, as described in Subsection8a2.1.6. UP BRK 5, which provides isolation for the resource building, provides overcurrent and surge protection. UP BKR 5 disconnecting from the utility is not required for safe shutdown since it does not impact safety-related equipment in the main production facility.
NPSS contains the following safety-related equipment:
The two branches, serving loads in the main production facility and the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) structure, can be cross-connected by manually opening one of the UP breakers and manually closing both bus tie (BT) breakers (BT BKR 1 and BT BKR 2) in the event of the loss of a single utility 480Y/277 VAC feed. This cross-connection would be administratively controlled to ensure the remaining utility feed is not overloaded.
* Two safety-related breakers are provided for each instance of the NDAS to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power.
The distribution system serving the main production facility and the N2PS structure consists of two line-ups of 480 volts (V) switchgear, two 480V transfer buses (that are supported by the standby generator), two emergency breakers, and isolation and cross-tie breakers. The two switchgear line-ups each feed an individual transfer bus and the single SGS switchgear. The two 480 V transfer buses and associated emergency breakers are nonsafety-related, but each provides power to a safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS) division via division-specific battery chargers and bypass transformers. The SGS and the UPSS are further described in Section8a2.2.  
* Two safety-related breakers per vacuum pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each vacuum pump in the vacuum transfer system (VTS).
* Two safety-related breakers per extraction feed pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each (of three) extraction feed pumps in the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS).
* Two safety-related breakers providing the redundant ability to disconnect power from the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust fans, radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust fans and RVZ2 supply air handling units.
safety functions performed by the specified breakers are related to preventing actions that ld initiate or increase the consequences of an accident. The equipment tied to these breakers s not perform an active safety function. Redundant breakers are provided to ensure that the ty function can still be performed in the event of a single active failure.
NE Medical Technologies                      8a2.1-3                                      Rev. 3


g mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of tions 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental ameters provided in Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-3 Rev. 3 The distribution system serving the material staging building, storage building, and facility chillers consists of two 480 V switchgear with isolation and bus tie breakers (BT BKR 3 and BT BKR 4).
.1.4    GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION ipment ground conductors, driven electrodes, buried conductors, and ground bars provide a ductive connection between facility SSCs and earth. These components, when taken ether, provide intentional low impedance conductive paths for facility SSCs as required to ure personnel safety, equipment protection, proper component function, electrical noise uction and signal integrity.
A single distribution system serves the resource building. There are no safety-related loads powered from these distribution systems.
facility grounding system complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017). The facility grounding ipment provides no safety-related function.
Surge protection is provided at each electrical service entrance to limit voltage spikes and electrical noise. The electrical services are monitored for voltage, frequency, and loss of phase.
tning protection equipment provides low impedance paths to ground that minimize the cts of potential lightning strikes on personnel, equipment, and the facility structure. It provides afety-related function.
When an electrical service exceeds prescribed limits, the facility is disconnected from the utility to prevent damage.
.1.5    RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING re are four separation groups for cables and raceways for the SHINE facility: Group A, up B, Group C, and Group N. Spatial separation between groups is in accordance with tion 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 8).
Loss of phase protection is provided by use of a negative sequence relay. The NPSS monitors each phase and disconnects from utility power on a loss of any one of the three incoming phases. Refer to Section8a2.2 for further discussion of facility response to transient events.
* Separation Group A contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division A and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division A.
The NPSS complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (ChapterSPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical); with Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation; with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation between nonsafety-related circuits and safety-related circuits; and with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 2015a) to ensure reliability of safety-related breakers.
* Separation Group B contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division B and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division B.
Compliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) ensures sufficient reliability to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electric power system. Compliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) also ensures adequate accessibility to NPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.
* Separation Group C contains safety-related control circuits from TRPS and ESFAS Division C. For additional information on the Division C circuits see Section 7.4.
Compliance with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 2015a) guidance for ratings, functional components, temperature limitations, classification of insulating materials, and testing procedures ensures that safety-related breakers in the NPSS have a high degree of reliability, the capacity, and the capability to perform their safety functions.
* Group N contains the facility nonsafety-related cables, including NPSS and SGS power circuits and process integrated control system (PICS) control circuits.
The NPSS contains the following safety-related equipment:
safety-related circuits are electrically isolated from safety-related circuits by isolation devices ccordance with Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008). See pter 7 for additional discussion of safety-related control systems.
Two safety-related breakers are provided for each instance of the NDAS to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power.
.1.6    LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER OOP is defined as zero voltage/power supplied by the utility, loss of a phase, phase reversal, tained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage. When there is loss of phase, phase reversal, tained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage, the facility automatically disconnects from the ty. For the plant equipment, all the scenarios result in zero voltage/power supplied by the y.
Two safety-related breakers per vacuum pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each vacuum pump in the vacuum transfer system (VTS).
NE Medical Technologies                      8a2.1-4                                        Rev. 3
Two safety-related breakers per extraction feed pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each (of three) extraction feed pumps in the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS).
Two safety-related breakers providing the redundant ability to disconnect power from the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust fans, radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust fans and RVZ2 supply air handling units.
The safety functions performed by the specified breakers are related to preventing actions that could initiate or increase the consequences of an accident. The equipment tied to these breakers does not perform an active safety function. Redundant breakers are provided to ensure that the safety function can still be performed in the event of a single active failure.


filling operations for IUs in Mode 1 (Filling) will be stopped via the loss of power to the VTS, ch causes the VTS vacuum pumps to shut down and the VTS vacuum breaker valve to open.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-4 Rev. 3 Safety-related NPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh environmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant aging mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental parameters provided in Tables7.2-2 and 7.2-3.
tron flux monitoring and safety-related protection systems will remain operational, powered the UPSS (see Section 8a2.2). If the SGS is available, the SGS will auto start to provide kup power to the TSV off-gas system (TOGS), allowing the TOGS to continue to operate and gate hydrogen generated by radiolysis from decay radiation in the target solution. If the SGS ot available, the TOGS will continue to operate for five minutes, powered by the UPSS. Three utes after loss of external power to the UPSS, before the TOGS blowers are unloaded from UPSS, TRPS will initiate an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge, and the N2PS will inject nitrogen into the dump tank to provide hydrogen control in the IU. The PCLS pumps are not powered by the SS or SGS; therefore, PCLS flow to the TSV will be lost. Loss of PCLS flow starts a three ute timer. If PCLS flow is not restored within the three minute duration, TRPS will initiate an Cell Safety Actuation, resulting in the TSV dump valves opening and the target solution ning from the TSV to the TSV dump tank. Once in the TSV dump tank, the decay heat is sively removed from the target solution via natural convection to the light water pool. See tion 7.4 for additional information about the TRPS. See Section 4a2.4 for additional ussion of the light water pool.
8a2.1.4 GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION Equipment ground conductors, driven electrodes, buried conductors, and ground bars provide a conductive connection between facility SSCs and earth. These components, when taken together, provide intentional low impedance conductive paths for facility SSCs as required to ensure personnel safety, equipment protection, proper component function, electrical noise reduction and signal integrity.
h operating neutron driver for an IU in Mode 2 (Irradiation) will shut down due to loss of power he driver. Shutdown of the neutron driver will result in lowered neutron flux within the IU. This ses a Driver Dropout actuation on low neutron flux which results in opening the driver high age power supply breakers. Similar to the effect of a LOOP during Mode 1 operation, the et solution will be drained from the TSV to the TSV dump tank after a three minute delay via U Cell Safety Actuation occurs unless off-site power is restored. Also similar to Mode 1, an IU Nitrogen Purge will occur after three minutes if the NPSS or SGS is not available to power TOGS.
The facility grounding system complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017). The facility grounding equipment provides no safety-related function.
in Mode 3 (Post-Irradiation) will be provided hydrogen mitigation by TOGS, which is powered he UPSS for five minutes if the SGS is unavailable. TRPS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge r three minutes if power from the NPSS or SGS is not restored. If the SGS is available, these s are unaffected by a LOOP because active cooling is not provided in Mode 3.
Lightning protection equipment provides low impedance paths to ground that minimize the effects of potential lightning strikes on personnel, equipment, and the facility structure. It provides no safety-related function.
ally, with the exception of target solution transfer operations, which will be stopped via the of VTS, IUs in Mode 4 (Transfer to RPF) are affected by the LOOP identically to IUs in de 3.
8a2.1.5 RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING There are four separation groups for cables and raceways for the SHINE facility: Group A, GroupB, Group C, and Group N. Spatial separation between groups is in accordance with Section5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section5.1.4 of IEEE384 (IEEE, 2008).
itionally, a LOOP will result in the following conditions for the facility:
Separation Group A contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division A and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division A.
* If the SGS does not start, the process vessel vent system (PVVS) blowers shut down immediately and the TOGS blowers shut down after a five minute delay. N2PS valves open on loss of PVVS to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into process tanks in the RPF containing radioactive liquid to dilute hydrogen gas generated by radiolysis.
Separation Group B contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division B and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division B.
Separation Group C contains safety-related control circuits from TRPS and ESFAS Division C. For additional information on the Division C circuits see Section7.4.
Group N contains the facility nonsafety-related cables, including NPSS and SGS power circuits and process integrated control system (PICS) control circuits.
Nonsafety-related circuits are electrically isolated from safety-related circuits by isolation devices in accordance with Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008). See Chapter7 for additional discussion of safety-related control systems.
8a2.1.6 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER A LOOP is defined as zero voltage/power supplied by the utility, loss of a phase, phase reversal, sustained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage. When there is loss of phase, phase reversal, sustained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage, the facility automatically disconnects from the utility. For the plant equipment, all the scenarios result in zero voltage/power supplied by the utility.
 
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-5 Rev. 3 IUs in Mode 0 (Solution Removed) are unaffected by the LOOP - the neutron driver is not operating and target solution is not present in the IU.
TSV filling operations for IUs in Mode 1 (Filling) will be stopped via the loss of power to the VTS, which causes the VTS vacuum pumps to shut down and the VTS vacuum breaker valve to open.
Neutron flux monitoring and safety-related protection systems will remain operational, powered via the UPSS (see Section8a2.2). If the SGS is available, the SGS will auto start to provide backup power to the TSV off-gas system (TOGS), allowing the TOGS to continue to operate and mitigate hydrogen generated by radiolysis from decay radiation in the target solution. If the SGS is not available, the TOGS will continue to operate for five minutes, powered by the UPSS. Three minutes after loss of external power to the UPSS, before the TOGS blowers are unloaded from the UPSS, TRPS will initiate an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge, and the N2PS will inject nitrogen into the TSV dump tank to provide hydrogen control in the IU. The PCLS pumps are not powered by the UPSS or SGS; therefore, PCLS flow to the TSV will be lost. Loss of PCLS flow starts a three minute timer. If PCLS flow is not restored within the three minute duration, TRPS will initiate an IU Cell Safety Actuation, resulting in the TSV dump valves opening and the target solution draining from the TSV to the TSV dump tank. Once in the TSV dump tank, the decay heat is passively removed from the target solution via natural convection to the light water pool. See Section7.4 for additional information about the TRPS. See Section4a2.4 for additional discussion of the light water pool.
Each operating neutron driver for an IU in Mode 2 (Irradiation) will shut down due to loss of power to the driver. Shutdown of the neutron driver will result in lowered neutron flux within the IU. This causes a Driver Dropout actuation on low neutron flux which results in opening the driver high voltage power supply breakers. Similar to the effect of a LOOP during Mode 1 operation, the target solution will be drained from the TSV to the TSV dump tank after a three minute delay via an IU Cell Safety Actuation occurs unless off-site power is restored. Also similar to Mode 1, an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge will occur after three minutes if the NPSS or SGS is not available to power the TOGS.
IUs in Mode 3 (Post-Irradiation) will be provided hydrogen mitigation by TOGS, which is powered by the UPSS for five minutes if the SGS is unavailable. TRPS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge after three minutes if power from the NPSS or SGS is not restored. If the SGS is available, these units are unaffected by a LOOP because active cooling is not provided in Mode 3.
Finally, with the exception of target solution transfer operations, which will be stopped via the loss of VTS, IUs in Mode 4 (Transfer to RPF) are affected by the LOOP identically to IUs in Mode3.
Additionally, a LOOP will result in the following conditions for the facility:
If the SGS does not start, the process vessel vent system (PVVS) blowers shut down immediately and the TOGS blowers shut down after a five minute delay. N2PS valves open on loss of PVVS to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into process tanks in the RPF containing radioactive liquid to dilute hydrogen gas generated by radiolysis.
N2PS valves open after a three minute delay to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into TSV dump tanks in the IF, preventing the accumulation of hydrogen beyond allowable limits.
N2PS valves open after a three minute delay to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into TSV dump tanks in the IF, preventing the accumulation of hydrogen beyond allowable limits.
NE Medical Technologies                      8a2.1-5                                        Rev. 3


provided, and preventing uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-6 Rev. 3 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems shut down and ventilation dampers with a confinement function fail closed to ensure the confinement function is provided, and preventing uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.
* Other systems throughout the facility, including tritium purification system (TPS), VTS, and all three cooling water systems shut down and isolation valves with a confinement function fail closed.
Other systems throughout the facility, including tritium purification system (TPS), VTS, and all three cooling water systems shut down and isolation valves with a confinement function fail closed.
* Controlled releases of radioactive material continue using N2PS sweep gas through the carbon delay beds, which is monitored by the carbon delay bed effluent monitor. The carbon delay bed effluent monitor is powered by the UPSS with backup power from the SGS.
Controlled releases of radioactive material continue using N2PS sweep gas through the carbon delay beds, which is monitored by the carbon delay bed effluent monitor. The carbon delay bed effluent monitor is powered by the UPSS with backup power from the SGS.
* The radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) and the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) systems fail safe upon a LOOP.
The radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) and the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) systems fail safe upon a LOOP.
.1.7   TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS tain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.
8a2.1.7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Certain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.
includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for omplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be d for the bases that are described in the technical specifications.
This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be used for the bases that are described in the technical specifications.
NE Medical Technologies                    8a2.1-6                                        Rev. 3


Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Normal Electrical Power Supply System Figure 8a2.1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-7 Rev. 3 Figure 8a2.1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)
Alliant12.47kV UtilityPower                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Alliant12.47kV CKT2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       UtilityPower
UPBKR1 UPBKR2 UP XFMR1 UP XFMR2 NVBKR1 NVBKR2 480VSWGRA 480VSWGRB BTBKR1 BTBKR2 EMERG.BKR1 EMERG.BKR2 BATT CHGR
CKT1 NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED                                                                                                                                                                 NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED
BKR1 BATT CHGR
CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY                                                                                                                                                                      CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY N.O.                                     N.O.
BKR2 Bypass XFMR BKR1 Bypass XFMR BKR2 125VDCUPSSA 125VDCUPSSB Battery A
N.O.                                           N.O.
Battery B
12.47kV UP                                                              UP                                                                                                    UP                      UP                                                    UP 480Y/                            XFMR1                                                           XFMR2                                                         SG                                    XFMR5                  XFMR3                                                XFMR4 277VAC                            UPBKR1                                                        UPBKR2                                                                                                                                                                            UPBKR4 UPBKR3 UPBKR5 SG AC               480VSWGRA                                                         480VSWGRB                 AC                               ISO                                                                480VSWGRC                                          480VSWGRD BTBKR1              BTBKR2                                      Loads                                                                                                                  BTBKR3              BTBKR4 Loads                                                                                                                                                  BKR                                    ResourceBldg
ACUPSSA ACUPSSB AC
Service SAFETY                          NVBKR1                          NVBKR2            SAFETY RELATED                                  FromSGSSWGR                                RELATED                                              SGSSWGR                                                  CHILLER          Storage                             CHILLER       Material
Loads NDAS AC
SAFETY TYP(3)       Outbuilding                            TYP(3)       Staging
Loads DCLoads AC
SAFETY RELATED                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Outbuilding RELATED TYP.4            TransferBusA                                                 TYP.4                        ToTransferBusA   ToTransferBusB TransferBusB
Loads AC
NPSS                        NDAS              SWGR SWGR NDAS EMERG.BKR1 Nonsafety EMERG.BKR2                                                                                                                                                Related
Loads Safety Related
ServesOutbuildings NPSS                                Equipment NEC700    NEC701    NEC702 UPSS                      BATT CHGR
Equipment 12.47kV 480Y/
Bypass                                                                                      BATT CHGR
277VAC 125VDC 208Y/
Bypass                                                                                                Safety XFMR                                                                                                        XFMR BKR1            BKR1                                                                                      BKR2          BKR2                                                                                              Related
120VAC BATTCHGRA BATTCHGRB BYPASS XFMRB BYPASS XFMRA UPSS NPSS Nonsafety Related
BYPASS                                                                                                          BYPASS BATTCHGRA                            XFMRA                                                                  BATTCHGRB                              XFMRB Equipment 125VDC 125VDCUPSSA                                              125VDCUPSSC                                      125VDCUPSSB BATT         UPS                                                                                           BATT     UPS
Equipment NEC700 NEC701 NEC702 SAFETY RELATED SAFETY RELATED NDAS SAFETY RELATED SAFETY RELATED TYP.4 TYP.4 UP XFMR5 UP XFMR3 UP XFMR4 UPBKR5 ResourceBldg
DISC1         DISC1                                                                                         DISC2    DISC2 DCLoads     Battery                                                          DCLoads                          DCLoads   Battery A                                                                                                            B 208Y/
Service UPBKR4 480VSWGRD UPBKR3 480VSWGRC BTBKR3 BTBKR4 CHILLER TYP(3)
120VAC                      ACUPSSA                                                ACUPSSC                                       ACUPSSB AC                                                      AC                                              AC
CHILLER TYP(3)
Loads                                                   Loads                                            Loads SHINE Medical Technologies                                                                                                                                                    8a2.1-7                                                                                                                                      Rev. 3
NPSS SG SG ISO BKR SGSSWGR TransferBusB
SWGR TransferBusA
SWGR FromSGSSWGR ToTransferBusA ToTransferBusB ServesOutbuildings N.O.
N.O.
N.O.
N.O.
NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED
CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED
CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY Alliant12.47kV UtilityPower
CKT1 Alliant12.47kV UtilityPower
CKT2 Storage
Outbuilding Material
Staging
Outbuilding UPS
DISC2 BATT
DISC2 UPS
DISC1 BATT
DISC1 DCLoads 125VDCUPSSC DCLoads ACUPSSC AC
Loads


emergency electrical power systems for the SHINE facility consist of the safety-related terruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS), the nonsafety-related standby generator tem (SGS), and nonsafety-related local power supplies and unit batteries. The UPSS vides reliable power for the safety-related equipment required to prevent or mitigate the sequences of design basis events. The UPSS consists of a 125-volt direct current (VDC) ery subsystem, inverters, bypass transformers, distribution panels, and other distribution ipment necessary to feed safety-related alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) s and select nonsafety-related AC and DC loads.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-1 Rev. 5 8a2.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The emergency electrical power systems for the SHINE facility consist of the safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS), the nonsafety-related standby generator system (SGS), and nonsafety-related local power supplies and unit batteries. The UPSS provides reliable power for the safety-related equipment required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events. The UPSS consists of a 125-volt direct current (VDC) battery subsystem, inverters, bypass transformers, distribution panels, and other distribution equipment necessary to feed safety-related alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) loads and select nonsafety-related AC and DC loads.
SGS consists of a single natural gas-driven generator, associated breakers, transfer ches, and distribution equipment. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for UPSS
The SGS consists of a single natural gas-driven generator, associated breakers, transfer switches, and distribution equipment. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for UPSS loads. Additionally, emergency power is provided by the SGS for facility physical security control systems and information and communications systems. Unit batteries provide power for egress and exit lights, switchgear control (station control batteries), and nonsafety-related local uninterruptible power supplies which provide back-up power for communications, data systems, and nonsafety-related control systems. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for the unit batteries and their associated loads.
: s. Additionally, emergency power is provided by the SGS for facility physical security control tems and information and communications systems. Unit batteries provide power for egress exit lights, switchgear control (station control batteries), and nonsafety-related local terruptible power supplies which provide back-up power for communications, data systems, nonsafety-related control systems. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for the batteries and their associated loads.
Nonsafety-related local power supplies for the process integrated control system (PICS) and the facility data and communications systems (FDCS) are described in Sections 7.6 and 9a2.4, respectively.
safety-related local power supplies for the process integrated control system (PICS) and the lity data and communications systems (FDCS) are described in Sections 7.6 and 9a2.4, pectively.
8a2.2.1 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS The design of the UPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1.
.2.1     UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS design of the UPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, ection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design ria are described in Section 3.1.
The purpose of the UPSS is to provide a safety-related source of power to equipment required to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events. Safe shutdown is defined in the technical specifications.
purpose of the UPSS is to provide a safety-related source of power to equipment required to ure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design is events. Safe shutdown is defined in the technical specifications.
The UPSS:
UPSS:
Provides power at a sufficient capacity and capability to allow safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions; Is designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed; Is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions; Is located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions; Has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure; Incorporates provisions to minimize the probability of failure as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the transmission network; and Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.
* Provides power at a sufficient capacity and capability to allow safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions;
* Is designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed;
* Is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions;
* Is located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions;
* Has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure;
* Incorporates provisions to minimize the probability of failure as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the transmission network; and
* Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.
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UPSS is designed in accordance with the following codes and standards:
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-2 Rev. 5 8a2.2.2 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS The UPSS is designed in accordance with the following codes and standards:
* National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)
* IEEE Standard 344 - 2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2013); invoked to meet seismic requirements, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
IEEE Standard 344 - 2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2013); invoked to meet seismic requirements, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 384 - 2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment &
* IEEE Standard 384 - 2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment &
Circuits (IEEE, 2008); invoked for separation and isolation of safety-related and nonsafety-related cables and raceways and for associated equipment, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 450-2010, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010a);
Circuits (IEEE, 2008); invoked for separation and isolation of safety-related and nonsafety-related cables and raceways and for associated equipment, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
invoked as guidance for the inspection of batteries, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 484-2002, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2002); invoked as guidance for the installation of batteries, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 485 - 2010, Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010b); invoked for battery sizing of UPSS loads, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003); invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 946-2004, Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations (IEEE, 2004); invoked as guidance for the design of the DC components, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015, Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear (IEEE, 2015b); invoked as guidance for the design of UPSS switchgear, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 While the UPSS is not classified as a Class 1E system, portions of Class 1E-related standards, as described in this section, are applied to the design of the UPSS in order to satisfy applicable SHINE design criteria.
* IEEE Standard 450-2010, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010a);
8a2.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The safety-related UPSS provides a reliable source of power to the redundant divisions of AC and DC components on the safety-related power buses. Each division of the UPSS consists of a 125 VDC battery subsystem, 125 VDC to 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC) inverter, rectifier (battery charger), bypass transformer, static switch and a manual bypass switch, 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC distribution panels. Each division of the UPSS provides 208Y/120VAC and 125 VDC power through automatic bus transfers and auctioneering to feed division C instrumentation and controls (I&C) system loads as described in Subsections7.4.3.4 and 7.5.3.3. Nonsafety-related loads powered from the safety-related buses are isolated from the safety-related portion of the system by breakers or isolating fuses which meet Section 6.1.2  
invoked as guidance for the inspection of batteries, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
* IEEE Standard 484-2002, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2002); invoked as guidance for the installation of batteries, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
* IEEE Standard 485 - 2010, Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010b); invoked for battery sizing of UPSS loads, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
* IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003); invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
* IEEE Standard 946-2004, Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations (IEEE, 2004); invoked as guidance for the design of the DC components, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
* IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015, Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear (IEEE, 2015b); invoked as guidance for the design of UPSS switchgear, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3 le the UPSS is not classified as a Class 1E system, portions of Class 1E-related standards, escribed in this section, are applied to the design of the UPSS in order to satisfy applicable NE design criteria.
.2.3     UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION safety-related UPSS provides a reliable source of power to the redundant divisions of AC DC components on the safety-related power buses. Each division of the UPSS consists of a VDC battery subsystem, 125 VDC to 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC) inverter, ifier (battery charger), bypass transformer, static switch and a manual bypass switch, Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC distribution panels. Each division of the UPSS provides Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC power through automatic bus transfers and auctioneering to feed sion C instrumentation and controls (I&C) system loads as described in Subsections 7.4.3.4 7.5.3.3. Nonsafety-related loads powered from the safety-related buses are isolated from the ty-related portion of the system by breakers or isolating fuses which meet Section 6.1.2 NE Medical Technologies                      8a2.2-2                                      Rev. 5


ribution wiring from each division of the UPSS is isolated and separated from the other sion per Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation and with tion 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE,
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-3 Rev. 5 requirements of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation devices, ensuring that a failure of nonsafety-related loads does not impact safety-related loads.
: 8) for physical separation.
Distribution wiring from each division of the UPSS is isolated and separated from the other division per Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation and with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation.
mplified diagram of the UPSS is provided in Figure 8a2.2-1.
A simplified diagram of the UPSS is provided in Figure8a2.2-1.
h division of UPSS is normally powered by a 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus via a division-cific battery charger. The 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses can also be powered by the SGS, viding an alternate source of power to the UPSS. The SGS is described in section 8a2.2.4.
Each division of UPSS is normally powered by a 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus via a division-specific battery charger. The 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses can also be powered by the SGS, providing an alternate source of power to the UPSS. The SGS is described in Subsection8a2.2.4.
UPSS is isolated from the NPSS and SGS by isolating breakers feeding the battery chargers the bypass transformers. These devices are identified as breakers BATT CHGR BRK 1, TT CHGR BKR 2, BYPASS XFMR BKR 1 and BYPASS XRMR BKR 2 in Figure 8a2.2-1. The akers monitor incoming power for voltage, phase, and frequency, and will trip when monitored ables are out of limits.
The UPSS is isolated from the NPSS and SGS by isolating breakers feeding the battery chargers and the bypass transformers. These devices are identified as breakers BATT CHGR BRK 1, BATT CHGR BKR 2, BYPASS XFMR BKR 1 and BYPASS XRMR BKR 2 in Figure8a2.2-1. The breakers monitor incoming power for voltage, phase, and frequency, and will trip when monitored variables are out of limits.
h battery charger supplies power to the safety-related 125 VDC bus for its division. The loads each DC bus consist of the following:
Each battery charger supplies power to the safety-related 125 VDC bus for its division. The loads on each DC bus consist of the following:
* Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)
Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)
* Target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS)
Target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS)
* TSV off-gas system (TOGS) recombiner heaters
TSV off-gas system (TOGS) recombiner heaters Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) solenoid valves TSV dump valves Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), vacuum transfer system (VTS), target solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches Each 125 VDC bus supplies power to an associated 208Y/120 VAC bus via an inverter. The two 208Y/120 VAC buses can also each receive power directly from the associated 480VAC NPSS transfer bus through a bypass transformer. The safety-related loads on each AC bus consist of the following:
* Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) solenoid valves
ESFAS radiation monitors TRPS radiation monitors TPS tritium monitors N2PS solenoid valves TOGS instruments Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) high voltage power supply breaker undervoltage hold circuits VTS vacuum pump breaker undervoltage hold trip circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) undervoltage hold trip circuits Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) exhaust fans, Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust subsystem (RVZ2e) exhaust fans, and RVZ2 supply subsystem (RVZ2s) air handling units undervoltage hold trip circuits TOGS blowers
* TSV dump valves
* Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), vacuum transfer system (VTS), target solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches h 125 VDC bus supplies power to an associated 208Y/120 VAC bus via an inverter. The two Y/120 VAC buses can also each receive power directly from the associated 480 VAC NPSS sfer bus through a bypass transformer. The safety-related loads on each AC bus consist of following:
* ESFAS radiation monitors
* TRPS radiation monitors
* TPS tritium monitors
* N2PS solenoid valves
* TOGS instruments
* Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) high voltage power supply breaker undervoltage hold circuits
* VTS vacuum pump breaker undervoltage hold trip circuits
* Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) undervoltage hold trip circuits
* Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) exhaust fans, Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust subsystem (RVZ2e) exhaust fans, and RVZ2 supply subsystem (RVZ2s) air handling units undervoltage hold trip circuits
* TOGS blowers NE Medical Technologies                    8a2.2-3                                      Rev. 5


safety-related loads important for providing alerts to facility personnel and for monitoring the us of the facility are connected to the 208Y/120 VAC bus and are isolated from the safety-ted portion of the bus by isolation overcurrent devices.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-4 Rev. 5 Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) power cabinets and detectors for the associated division Nonsafety-related loads important for providing alerts to facility personnel and for monitoring the status of the facility are connected to the 208Y/120 VAC bus and are isolated from the safety-related portion of the bus by isolation overcurrent devices.
se loads consist of:
These loads consist of:
* Main facility stack release monitor (SRM)
Main facility stack release monitor (SRM)
* TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers
TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS)
* Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) ditional details about the UPSS loads are provided in Table 8a2.2-1.
Additional details about the UPSS loads are provided in Table8a2.2-1.
n a loss of NPSS power and unavailability of SGS power, the AC and DC UPSS buses are ered by the safety-related battery bank for each division. Each division of the UPSS batteries cated in a separate fire area in the safety-related, seismic portion of the main production lity. The UPSS is required to perform its safety function before, during, and after a seismic nt, and is qualified by one of the testing methods described in Sections 8 and 9.3 of IEEE 344 E, 2013).
Upon a loss of NPSS power and unavailability of SGS power, the AC and DC UPSS buses are powered by the safety-related battery bank for each division. Each division of the UPSS batteries is located in a separate fire area in the safety-related, seismic portion of the main production facility. The UPSS is required to perform its safety function before, during, and after a seismic event, and is qualified by one of the testing methods described in Sections 8 and 9.3 of IEEE 344 (IEEE, 2013).
mpliance with NFPA 70-2017 (NFPA, 2017) ensures adequate accessibility to UPSS ponents to permit periodic inspection and testing.
Compliance with NFPA 70-2017 (NFPA, 2017) ensures adequate accessibility to UPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.
components within the UPSS include the safety-related batteries, battery chargers, and DC chgear. These DC components are designed in accordance with Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004). Compliance with these portions of E 946 (IEEE, 2004) ensures DC components have sufficient testability and minimizes the bability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of er from the off-site electrical power system.
DC components within the UPSS include the safety-related batteries, battery chargers, and DC switchgear. These DC components are designed in accordance with Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, 7.3, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004). Compliance with these portions of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004) ensures DC components have sufficient testability and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.
battery sizing for the UPSS loads is shown in Table 8a2.2-2, using the sizing guidance vided in Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE 485 (IEEE, 2010b).
The battery sizing for the UPSS loads is shown in Table8a2.2-2, using the sizing guidance provided in Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE 485 (IEEE, 2010b).
mpliance with these sections of IEEE 485 ensures that the battery capacity and capability are icient to support UPSS loads. Batteries are vented lead-acid. Transfer of loads from the SS to the UPSS is automatic and requires no control power.
Compliance with these sections of IEEE 485 ensures that the battery capacity and capability are sufficient to support UPSS loads. Batteries are vented lead-acid. Transfer of loads from the NPSS to the UPSS is automatic and requires no control power.
SS batteries are installed in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002).
UPSS batteries are installed in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002).
mpliance with these sections of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002) ensures the batteries are properly alled and tested, and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a ult of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.
Compliance with these sections of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002) ensures the batteries are properly installed and tested, and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.
tery maintenance will be performed in accordance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a).
Battery maintenance will be performed in accordance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a).
mpliance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a) ensures the batteries are inspected ularly, and any identified issues are corrected, which minimizes the probability of losing tric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site trical power system.
Compliance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a) ensures the batteries are inspected regularly, and any identified issues are corrected, which minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.
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imizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with loss of power from the off-site electrical power system. UPSS switchgear is designed with the ity to install a temporary load bank to perform required testing.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-5 Rev. 5 UPSS switchgear is designed in accordance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b). Compliance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b) ensures that the UPSS has a high degree of reliability, which minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system. UPSS switchgear is designed with the ability to install a temporary load bank to perform required testing.
required reserve for loads is listed in Table 8a2.2-2. 15 percent of the total is reserved to ommodate variations of power during equipment procurement and an additional 10 percent is ally reserved for future needs that may be identified during the lifetime of the facility.
The required reserve for loads is listed in Table8a2.2-2. 15 percent of the total is reserved to accommodate variations of power during equipment procurement and an additional 10 percent is initially reserved for future needs that may be identified during the lifetime of the facility.
run time requirements in Table 8a2.2-1 are based on:
The run time requirements in Table8a2.2-1 are based on:
: 1) Equipment required to prevent hydrogen deflagration is powered for five minutes,
: 1) Equipment required to prevent hydrogen deflagration is powered for five minutes,
: 2) Equipment used to minimize transient effects on the facility due to short duration power loss is powered for five minutes,
: 2) Equipment used to minimize transient effects on the facility due to short duration power loss is powered for five minutes,
: 3) Equipment used to provide alerts for facility personnel and monitor the status of the facility during immediate recovery efforts is powered for two hours, or
: 3) Equipment used to provide alerts for facility personnel and monitor the status of the facility during immediate recovery efforts is powered for two hours, or
: 4) Defense-in-depth power for nonsafety-related equipment used to monitor and reduce the tritium source term in the tritium confinement is powered for six hours.
: 4) Defense-in-depth power for nonsafety-related equipment used to monitor and reduce the tritium source term in the tritium confinement is powered for six hours.
UPSS is designed and tested to be resistant to the electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio uency interference (RFI) environment. When equipment (e.g., portable radios) poses risks to UPSS equipment or distribution wiring, administrative controls prevent the use of the ipment where it can adversely affect the UPSS.
The UPSS is designed and tested to be resistant to the electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio frequency interference (RFI) environment. When equipment (e.g., portable radios) poses risks to the UPSS equipment or distribution wiring, administrative controls prevent the use of the equipment where it can adversely affect the UPSS.
ety-related UPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh ironmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant g mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of tions 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental ameters provided in Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3.
Safety-related UPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh environmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant aging mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental parameters provided in Tables7.2-2 and 7.2-3.
.2.4       STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS design of the SGS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, ection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design ria are described in Section 3.1.
8a2.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS The design of the SGS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1.
purpose of the SGS is to provide a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to UPSS and selected additional loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.
The purpose of the SGS is to provide a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to the UPSS and selected additional loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.
SGS:
The SGS:
* Will provide for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related I&C functions;
Will provide for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related I&C functions; Will provide an alternate source of power for the safety-related electrical buses; Will provide an alternate source of power to systems required for life-safety or important for facility monitoring; Will automatically start and supply loads upon a loss of off-site power; and
* Will provide an alternate source of power for the safety-related electrical buses;
* Will provide an alternate source of power to systems required for life-safety or important for facility monitoring;
* Will automatically start and supply loads upon a loss of off-site power; and NE Medical Technologies                      8a2.2-5                                        Rev. 5


.2.5     STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS SGS is designed in accordance with NFPA 70 - 2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA,
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-6 Rev. 5 Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.
: 7) as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative e, Electrical).
8a2.2.5 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS The SGS is designed in accordance with NFPA 70 - 2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017) as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical).
.2.6     STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SGS consists of a 480Y/277 VAC, 60 Hertz (Hz) natural gas-driven generator, a 480 VAC chgear, and transfer switches to allow the SGS switchgear to be connected to either or both VAC NPSS transfer buses. Upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP) (i.e., undervoltage or rvoltage sensed on utility service), the SGS automatically starts, both non-vital breakers BKR 1 and NV BKR 2) automatically open, and the transfer switches operate to provide er to the associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus. Upon a loss of normal power to any sfer switch, the SGS automatically starts, the associated non-vital breaker (NV BKR 1 or BKR 2) automatically opens, and the associated transfer switch operates to provide power to associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus.
8a2.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The SGS consists of a 480Y/277 VAC, 60 Hertz (Hz) natural gas-driven generator, a 480 VAC switchgear, and transfer switches to allow the SGS switchgear to be connected to either or both 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses. Upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP) (i.e., undervoltage or overvoltage sensed on utility service), the SGS automatically starts, both non-vital breakers (NVBKR 1 and NV BKR 2) automatically open, and the transfer switches operate to provide power to the associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus. Upon a loss of normal power to any transfer switch, the SGS automatically starts, the associated non-vital breaker (NV BKR 1 or NVBKR 2) automatically opens, and the associated transfer switch operates to provide power to the associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus.
loads supplied by the SGS include the loads supplied by the UPSS (see Table 8a2.2-1), as as the following facility loads:
The loads supplied by the SGS include the loads supplied by the UPSS (see Table8a2.2-1), as well as the following facility loads:
* Emergency lighting
Emergency lighting Facility data and communications system (FDCS) equipment Radiation area monitoring system (RAMS) detectors Continuous air monitoring system (CAMS) detectors Facility fire detection and suppression system (FFPS)
* Facility data and communications system (FDCS) equipment
Hot cell fire detection and suppression system (HCFD)
* Radiation area monitoring system (RAMS) detectors
PICS equipment Process vessel vent system (PVVS) equipment TPS SEC heaters Switchgear station batteries (NPSS, SGS)
* Continuous air monitoring system (CAMS) detectors
Facility access control system (FACS)
* Facility fire detection and suppression system (FFPS)
Facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) UPSS battery room and equipment room exhaust fans FDCS dedicated cooling systems FDCS equipment, PICS equipment, and the FFPS contain nonsafety-related unit batteries or local uninterruptible power supplies to provide power to span the time between the LOOP event and the start of the SGS.
* Hot cell fire detection and suppression system (HCFD)
Emergency lighting located inside the main production facility is provided with unit batteries capable of supplying 90 minutes of illumination.
* PICS equipment
Operation of the SGS is not required for any safety function at the SHINE facility. Natural gas for the operation of the SGS is supplied by an off-site utility.
* Process vessel vent system (PVVS) equipment
* TPS SEC heaters
* Switchgear station batteries (NPSS, SGS)
* Facility access control system (FACS)
* Facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) UPSS battery room and equipment room exhaust fans
* FDCS dedicated cooling systems CS equipment, PICS equipment, and the FFPS contain nonsafety-related unit batteries or l uninterruptible power supplies to provide power to span the time between the LOOP event the start of the SGS.
ergency lighting located inside the main production facility is provided with unit batteries able of supplying 90 minutes of illumination.
ration of the SGS is not required for any safety function at the SHINE facility. Natural gas for operation of the SGS is supplied by an off-site utility.
NE Medical Technologies                    8a2.2-6                                        Rev. 5


ctrical loads for the main production facility, site, and support buildings are normally supplied he NPSS, as described in Section 8a2.1. When the NPSS is in operation, it supplies power to UPSS battery chargers, which provide power to the loads on the 125 VDC bus and to the Y/120 VAC loads via the UPSS inverter. The battery charger is used to keep the battery bank charged and maintained at float charge.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-7 Rev. 5 8a2.2.7 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION Electrical loads for the main production facility, site, and support buildings are normally supplied by the NPSS, as described in Section8a2.1. When the NPSS is in operation, it supplies power to the UPSS battery chargers, which provide power to the loads on the 125 VDC bus and to the 208Y/120VAC loads via the UPSS inverter. The battery charger is used to keep the battery bank fully charged and maintained at float charge.
n a LOOP, the loads supplied via the 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC UPSS buses are omatically picked up by the UPSS battery banks. A single division of UPSS in operation is icient to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the sequences of design basis events.
Upon a LOOP, the loads supplied via the 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC UPSS buses are automatically picked up by the UPSS battery banks. A single division of UPSS in operation is sufficient to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events.
itional discussion of the LOOP event is provided in Section 8a2.1. Use of the UPSS during er design basis accidents is discussed throughout Chapter 13.
Additional discussion of the LOOP event is provided in Section8a2.1. Use of the UPSS during other design basis accidents is discussed throughout Chapter13.
ough not required by the accident analysis, the SGS is designed to automatically start and in step loading within one minute of and complete power transfers within five minutes of the OP. The SGS supplies power to the UPSS buses, re-charge the UPSS batteries, supply itional loads used for life-safety or facility monitoring, and allow operational flexibility while ponding to the LOOP.
Although not required by the accident analysis, the SGS is designed to automatically start and begin step loading within one minute of and complete power transfers within five minutes of the LOOP. The SGS supplies power to the UPSS buses, re-charge the UPSS batteries, supply additional loads used for life-safety or facility monitoring, and allow operational flexibility while responding to the LOOP.
r the end of transient events, loads supported by the SGS are manually transferred to normal er via an open (dead bus) transition. The SGS is then manually shutdown.
After the end of transient events, loads supported by the SGS are manually transferred to normal power via an open (dead bus) transition. The SGS is then manually shutdown.
.2.8     TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS tain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.
8a2.2.8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Certain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.
includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for omplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be renced by the bases that are described in the technical specifications.
This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be referenced by the bases that are described in the technical specifications.
NE Medical Technologies                      8a2.2-7                                        Rev. 5


Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 1 of 2) kVA Loads   kVA Loads Required Load Description                    UPS-A       UPS-B   Runtime get solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system GS)
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-8 Rev. 5 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 1 of 2)
Blowers                                           33.7         33.7     5 Min Recombiner heaters                                 20           20     5 Min nstruments                                          0.3         0.3     5 Min ogen purge system (N2PS) valves                   0.5         0.5     5 Min V dump valves                                     1.1         1.1     5 Min tron flux detection system (NFDS)               8.0         8.0     120 Min V reactivity protection system (TRPS)             1.5         1.5     120 Min PS radiation monitors                             0.6         0.6     120 Min ineered safety features actuation                 0.6         0.6     120 Min tem (ESFAS) radiation monitors tron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold         0.1          0.1    120 Min uits uum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits ybdenum extraction and purification tem (MEPS) pump hold circuits iological ventilation exhaust and supply s hold circuit FAS                                                0.5         0.5     6 Hrs um purification system (TPS) tritium             0.7         0.7     6 Hrs nitors critical assembly system (SCAS), VTS,             0.2          0.2      6 Hrs et solution preparation system (TSPS),
Load Description kVA Loads UPS-A kVA Loads UPS-B Required Runtime Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)
radioactive drain system (RDS) level ches icality accident alarm system (CAAS),             1.0         1.0     120 Min safety-related NE Medical Technologies                  8a2.2-8                          Rev. 5
Blowers 33.7 33.7 5 Min Recombiner heaters 20 20 5 Min Instruments 0.3 0.3 5 Min Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves 0.5 0.5 5 Min TSV dump valves 1.1 1.1 5 Min Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) 8.0 8.0 120 Min TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) 1.5 1.5 120 Min TRPS radiation monitors 0.6 0.6 120 Min Engineered safety features actuation system(ESFAS) radiation monitors 0.6 0.6 120 Min Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits Vacuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) pump hold circuits Radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold circuit 0.1 0.1 120 Min ESFAS 0.5 0.5 6 Hrs Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors 0.7 0.7 6 Hrs Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target solution preparation system (TSPS),
and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches 0.2 0.2 6 Hrs Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS),
nonsafety-related 1.0 1.0 120 Min


kVA Loads kVA Loads Required Load Description                  UPS-A    UPS-B  Runtime ck release monitoring system (SRMS),           0.0       1.0   120 Min safety-related S secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC)             1.6       0.8     6 Hrs wers, nonsafety-related e: Required charger kVA does not ude battery charging e: Division C loads are accounted for in h Division A and Division B loads, ere applicable Total:     70.4     70.6 Required Reserve:       7.0       7.1 Minimum Charger kVA:         77.4     77.7 NE Medical Technologies              8a2.2-9                        Rev. 5
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-9 Rev. 5 Stack release monitoring system (SRMS),
nonsafety-related 0.0 1.0 120 Min TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers, nonsafety-related 1.6 0.8 6 Hrs Note: Required charger kVA does not include battery charging Note: Division C loads are accounted for in both Division A and Division B loads, where applicable Total:
70.4 70.6 Required Reserve:
7.0 7.1 Minimum Charger kVA:
77.4 77.7 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 2 of 2)
Load Description kVA Loads UPS-A kVA Loads UPS-B Required Runtime


Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 1 of 2)
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-10 Rev. 5 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 1 of 2)
Amp-Hours Amp-Hours Load Description                      Battery A  Battery B get solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)
Load Description Amp-Hours Battery A Amp-Hours Battery B Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)
Blowers                                                       36       36 Recombiner heaters                                           19       19 Instruments                                                   0.4     0.4 rogen purge system (N2PS) valves                               1       1 V dump valves                                                 2       2 utron flux detection system (NFDS)                           206     206 V reactivity protection system (TRPS)                         34       34 PS radiation monitors                                         16       16 gineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)             15       15 iation monitors utron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits             3        3 cuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits lybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) mp hold circuits diological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold uit FAS                                                          34       34 ium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors               51       51 bcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target                 16      16 ution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive in system (RDS) level switches ticality accident alarm system (CAAS), nonsafety-             26       26 ated ck release monitoring system (SRMS), nonsafety-             0       26 ated NE Medical Technologies                8a2.2-10                          Rev. 5
Blowers 36 36 Recombiner heaters 19 19 Instruments 0.4 0.4 Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves 1
1 TSV dump valves 2
2 Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) 206 206 TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) 34 34 TRPS radiation monitors 16 16 Engineered safety features actuation system(ESFAS) radiation monitors 15 15 Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits Vacuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system(MEPS) pump hold circuits Radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold circuit 3
3 ESFAS 34 34 Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors 51 51 Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches 16 16 Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS), nonsafety-related 26 26 Stack release monitoring system (SRMS), nonsafety-related 0
26


Amp-Hours        Amp-Hours Load Description                        Battery A        Battery B S secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) subsystem, nsafety-related Blowers                                                   123               61 te: Total amp-hours include inverter efficiency, 15 percent reserve margin to account variations in equipment procurement, and 10 percent capacity margin for future eds te: Division C loads are accounted for in both Division A and Division B loads, where plicable Total:       582             546 Total with 1.25 aging factor:       728             683 NE Medical Technologies              8a2.2-11                                  Rev. 5
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-11 Rev. 5 TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) subsystem, nonsafety-related Blowers 123 61 Note: Total amp-hours include inverter efficiency, 15 percent reserve margin to account for variations in equipment procurement, and 10 percent capacity margin for future needs Note: Division C loads are accounted for in both Division A and Division B loads, where applicable Total:
582 546 Total with 1.25 aging factor:
728 683 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 2 of 2)
Load Description Amp-Hours Battery A Amp-Hours Battery B


Poweredby                                                                 Poweredby                  NonSafety
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-12 Rev. 5 Figure 8a2.2 Uninterruptible Power Supply System BATT CHGR
BKR1 BATT CHGR
BKR2 BYPASS XFMR BKR1 BYPASS XFMR SEC.BKR DCUPSSA DCUPSSB ACUPSSA ACUPSSB 480Y/277VAC 125VDC 208Y/
120VAC BATTCHGRA BATTCHGRB BYPASS XFMRA UPSS Safety
Related
Equipment NonSafety
Related
Equipment ACLoads
Safety Battery TrainA BYPASS XFMRB NPSS Poweredby
UtilityServiceA
UtilityServiceA
TransferBusA UtilityServiceB
TransferBusA DCUPSSC DCLoads
TransferBusB Related
Safety DCLoads
NPSS                                                                                                                                      Equipment 480Y/277VAC BATT                    BYPASS                                                  BATT              BYPASS CHGR                   XFMR                                                    CHGR              XFMR UPSS              BKR1                    BKR1                                                  BKR2            SEC.BKR Safety
DCLoads
BYPASS XFMRA BYPASS XFMRB Related
Safety Battery TrainB ACUPSSC ACLoads
BATTCHGRB BATTCHGRA                                                                                                                        Equipment 125VDC DCUPSSA                                        DCUPSSC                       DCUPSSB BATT       UPS                                                                 BATT        UPS
Safety BATT
DISC1     DISC1                                                                DISC2       DISC2 DCLoads DCLoads     Battery                                                  DCLoads DCLoads     Battery DCLoads
DISC1 UPS
NonSafety Safety      TrainA                                                  NonSafety  Safety        TrainB 208Y/
DISC1 BATT
120VAC ACUPSSA                                ACUPSSC                                            ACUPSSB ACLoads    ACLoads                      ACLoads                                        ACLoads        ACLoads
DISC2 UPS
NonSafety      Safety                          Safety                                          NonSafety          Safety NE Medical Technologies                                                   8a2.2-12                                                                          Rev. 5
DISC2 DCLoads
NonSafety ACLoads
NonSafety ACLoads
Safety ACLoads
NonSafety DCLoads
NonSafety Poweredby
UtilityServiceB
TransferBusB
 
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems References SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.3-1 Rev. 1 8a


E, 2002. Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid teries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 484-2002, Institute of Electrical and Electronics ineers, 2002.
==2.3 REFERENCES==
E, 2003. Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, E 323-2003, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2003.
IEEE, 2002. Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 484-2002, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2002.
E, 2004. Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating tions, IEEE 946-2004, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2004.
IEEE, 2003. Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, IEEE 323-2003, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2003.
E, 2008. Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, E 384-2008, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2008.
IEEE, 2004. Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations, IEEE 946-2004, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2004.
E, 2010a. Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented d-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 450-2010, Institute of Electrical and ctronics Engineers, 2010.
IEEE, 2008. Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, IEEE384-2008, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2008.
E, 2010b. Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, E 485-2010, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010.
IEEE, 2010a. Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 450-2010, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010.
E, 2013. IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating tions, IEEE 344-2013, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2013.
IEEE, 2010b. Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 485-2010, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010.
E, 2015a, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures, E C.37.13-2015, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015.
IEEE, 2013. IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, IEEE 344-2013, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2013.
E, 2015b. Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and w) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear, IEEE C37.20.1-2015, Institute for Electrical and ctronics Engineers, 2015.
IEEE, 2015a, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures, IEEEC.37.13-2015, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015.
PA, 2017. National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, National Fire Protection Association, 2017.
IEEE, 2015b. Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear, IEEE C37.20.1-2015, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015.
NE Medical Technologies                  8a2.3-1                                        Rev. 1
NFPA, 2017. National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, National Fire Protection Association, 2017.  


1   NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SHINE facility has one common normal electrical power system. The common normal trical power system is described in Section 8a2.1.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8b.1-1 Rev. 0 8b RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8b.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The SHINE facility has one common normal electrical power system. The common normal electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.1.
NE Medical Technologies                    8b.1-1                                Rev. 0


SHINE facility has one common emergency electrical power system. The common ergency electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.2.
Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8b.2-1 Rev. 0 8b.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The SHINE facility has one common emergency electrical power system. The common emergency electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.2.}}
NE Medical Technologies                  8b.2-1                              Rev. 0}}

Latest revision as of 15:52, 27 November 2024

Shine Technologies, LLC Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 8, Rev. 0, Electrical Power Systems
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Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Table of Contents CHAPTER 8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page SHINE Medical Technologies 8-i Rev. 0 8a2 IRRADIATION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.......................... 8a2.1-1 8a2.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM..................................... 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.1 DESIGN BASIS............................................................................. 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION............................... 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION.............................................................................. 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.4 GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION.......................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.5 RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING............................................. 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.6 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER....................................................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.................................................... 8a2.1-6 8a2.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.......................................... 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.1 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS.............................................................. 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.2 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS........................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION............................................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS..................... 8a2.2-5 8a2.2.5 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS................................................................................. 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION..................... 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.7 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION..... 8a2.2-7 8a2.2.8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.................................................... 8a2.2-7 8a

2.3 REFERENCES

................................................................................................. 8a2.3-1

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Table of Contents CHAPTER 8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page SHINE Medical Technologies 8-ii Rev. 0 8b RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.......................................................................................................... 8b.1-1 8b.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.................................................... 8b.1-1 8b.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS............................................ 8b.2-1

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems List of Tables LIST OF TABLES Number Title SHINE Medical Technologies 8-iii Rev. 0 8a2.2-1 UPSS Load List 8a2.2-2 UPSS Battery Sizing

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems List of Figures LIST OF FIGURES Number Title SHINE Medical Technologies 8-iv Rev. 0 8a2.1-1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified) 8a2.2-1 Uninterruptible Power Supply System

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-v Rev. 1 AC alternating current BT bus train CAAS criticality accident alarm system CAMS continuous air monitoring system DC direct current EMI electromagnetic interference ESFAS engineered safety features actuation system FDCS facility data and communications system FFPS facility fire detection and suppression FVZ4 facility ventilation zone 4 HCFD hot cell fire detection and suppression system HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning Hz hertz IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IU irradiation unit kV kilovolt

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-vi Rev. 1 LOOP loss of off-site power MEPS molybdenum extraction and purification system N2PS nitrogen purge system NDAS neutron driver assembly system NFPA National Fire Protection Association NFDS neutron flux detection system NPSS normal electrical power supply system PICS process integrated control system PVVS process vessel vent system RAMS radiation area monitoring system RFI radio frequency interference RLWI radioactive liquid waste immobilization RLWS radioactive liquid waste storage RPF radioisotope production facility RVZ1 radiological ventilation zone 1 RVZ1e radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-vii Rev. 1 RVZ2 radiological ventilation zone 2 RVZ2e radiological ventilation zone 2 exhaust subsystem RVZ2s radiological ventilation zone 2 supply subsystem SEC secondary enclosure cleanup SGS standby generator system SRM stack release monitor SRMS stack release monitor system TPS tritium purification system TOGS TSV off-gas system TRPS TSV reactivity protection system TSV target solution vessel UP utility power UPSS uninterruptible electrical power supply system V

volts VAC volts - alternating current

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 8-viii Rev. 1 VDC volts - direct current VTS vacuum transfer system

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-1 Rev. 3 8a2 IRRADIATION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8a2.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM A single overall electrical power system serves the main production facility, including both the irradiation facility and the radioisotope production facility, as well as the site and support buildings. The normal electrical power supply system (NPSS) for the SHINE facility consists of the normal power service entrances from the electric utility and a distribution system providing three utilization voltages, 480Y/277, 400Y/230, and 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC),

3-phase, 60hertz. Grounding and lightning protection is provided.

The NPSS receives off-site power service from the local utility, Alliant Energy, at 480Y/277 VAC through five separate transformer feeds. Portions of the NPSS that comprise the emergency electrical power system can also receive power from the standby generator system (SGS). The NPSS is used for normal operation and normal shutdown of the facility.

The NPSS is sized for safe operation of the facility. The largest loads on the NPSS are the process chilled water system (PCHS), neutron driver assembly system (NDAS), and the facility chilled water system (FCHS); however, those loads are not required for safe shutdown of the facility. Refer to Section8a2.2 for a tabulation of emergency electrical load requirements.

A simplified diagram of the overall electrical power system is provided in Figure8a2.1-1.

8a2.1.1 DESIGN BASIS The design of the NPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1.

The design of the NPSS provides sufficient, reliable power to facility and site electrical equipment as required for operation of the SHINE facility and to comply with applicable codes and standards. The NPSS is designed such that it:

Does not prevent the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions; Provides for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related instrumentation and control functions; Fails to a safe configuration upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP);

Provides the normal source of power supply to the safety-related electrical buses; Provides the safety-related function of removing power from select components when demanded by the safety-related engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) or target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS); and Is able to be inspected, tested, and maintained to meet the above design bases.

The following codes and standards are used in the design of the NPSS:

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-2 Rev. 3 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 384-2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits (IEEE, 2008), invoked for isolation and separation of nonsafety-related circuits from safety-related circuits, as described in Subsections8a2.1.3 and 8a2.1.5.

IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003), invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection8a2.1.3.

IEEE Standard C.37.13-2015, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures (IEEE, 2015a); invoked for ensuring reliability of safety-related breakers, as described in Subsection8a2.1.3.

8a2.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION The SHINE facility is connected to two single power circuits from the off-site transmission electric network. The power circuits are shared with other utility customers. The two power circuits feed five local outdoor 12.47 kilovolt (kV) - 480Y/277 VAC 3-phase transformers. The 12.47 kV feeders originate from the Alliant Energy Tripp Road substation, about 2.8 circuit miles from the SHINE facility, and the Alliant Energy Venture substation, about 2.3 circuit miles from the SHINE facility.

Two transformers are each connected to one of the SHINE facility's two main 480 VAC switchgear buses. Figure8a2.1-1 depicts the off-site connections to the SHINE facility.

8a2.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The NPSS operates as five separate branches, each receiving utility power at 480Y/277 VAC.

The branches automatically physically disconnect from the utility by opening the associated utility power (UP) supply breaker (UP BKR 1, UP BKR 2, UP BKR 3, or UP BKR 4) on a loss of phase, phase reversal, or sustained overvoltage or undervoltage as detected by protection relays for each utility transformer. This function is not required for safe shutdown, as described in Subsection8a2.1.6. UP BRK 5, which provides isolation for the resource building, provides overcurrent and surge protection. UP BKR 5 disconnecting from the utility is not required for safe shutdown since it does not impact safety-related equipment in the main production facility.

The two branches, serving loads in the main production facility and the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) structure, can be cross-connected by manually opening one of the UP breakers and manually closing both bus tie (BT) breakers (BT BKR 1 and BT BKR 2) in the event of the loss of a single utility 480Y/277 VAC feed. This cross-connection would be administratively controlled to ensure the remaining utility feed is not overloaded.

The distribution system serving the main production facility and the N2PS structure consists of two line-ups of 480 volts (V) switchgear, two 480V transfer buses (that are supported by the standby generator), two emergency breakers, and isolation and cross-tie breakers. The two switchgear line-ups each feed an individual transfer bus and the single SGS switchgear. The two 480 V transfer buses and associated emergency breakers are nonsafety-related, but each provides power to a safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS) division via division-specific battery chargers and bypass transformers. The SGS and the UPSS are further described in Section8a2.2.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-3 Rev. 3 The distribution system serving the material staging building, storage building, and facility chillers consists of two 480 V switchgear with isolation and bus tie breakers (BT BKR 3 and BT BKR 4).

A single distribution system serves the resource building. There are no safety-related loads powered from these distribution systems.

Surge protection is provided at each electrical service entrance to limit voltage spikes and electrical noise. The electrical services are monitored for voltage, frequency, and loss of phase.

When an electrical service exceeds prescribed limits, the facility is disconnected from the utility to prevent damage.

Loss of phase protection is provided by use of a negative sequence relay. The NPSS monitors each phase and disconnects from utility power on a loss of any one of the three incoming phases. Refer to Section8a2.2 for further discussion of facility response to transient events.

The NPSS complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (ChapterSPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical); with Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation; with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation between nonsafety-related circuits and safety-related circuits; and with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 2015a) to ensure reliability of safety-related breakers.

Compliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) ensures sufficient reliability to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electric power system. Compliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) also ensures adequate accessibility to NPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.

Compliance with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 2015a) guidance for ratings, functional components, temperature limitations, classification of insulating materials, and testing procedures ensures that safety-related breakers in the NPSS have a high degree of reliability, the capacity, and the capability to perform their safety functions.

The NPSS contains the following safety-related equipment:

Two safety-related breakers are provided for each instance of the NDAS to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power.

Two safety-related breakers per vacuum pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each vacuum pump in the vacuum transfer system (VTS).

Two safety-related breakers per extraction feed pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each (of three) extraction feed pumps in the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS).

Two safety-related breakers providing the redundant ability to disconnect power from the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust fans, radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust fans and RVZ2 supply air handling units.

The safety functions performed by the specified breakers are related to preventing actions that could initiate or increase the consequences of an accident. The equipment tied to these breakers does not perform an active safety function. Redundant breakers are provided to ensure that the safety function can still be performed in the event of a single active failure.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-4 Rev. 3 Safety-related NPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh environmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant aging mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental parameters provided in Tables7.2-2 and 7.2-3.

8a2.1.4 GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION Equipment ground conductors, driven electrodes, buried conductors, and ground bars provide a conductive connection between facility SSCs and earth. These components, when taken together, provide intentional low impedance conductive paths for facility SSCs as required to ensure personnel safety, equipment protection, proper component function, electrical noise reduction and signal integrity.

The facility grounding system complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017). The facility grounding equipment provides no safety-related function.

Lightning protection equipment provides low impedance paths to ground that minimize the effects of potential lightning strikes on personnel, equipment, and the facility structure. It provides no safety-related function.

8a2.1.5 RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING There are four separation groups for cables and raceways for the SHINE facility: Group A, GroupB, Group C, and Group N. Spatial separation between groups is in accordance with Section5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section5.1.4 of IEEE384 (IEEE, 2008).

Separation Group A contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division A and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division A.

Separation Group B contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division B and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division B.

Separation Group C contains safety-related control circuits from TRPS and ESFAS Division C. For additional information on the Division C circuits see Section7.4.

Group N contains the facility nonsafety-related cables, including NPSS and SGS power circuits and process integrated control system (PICS) control circuits.

Nonsafety-related circuits are electrically isolated from safety-related circuits by isolation devices in accordance with Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008). See Chapter7 for additional discussion of safety-related control systems.

8a2.1.6 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER A LOOP is defined as zero voltage/power supplied by the utility, loss of a phase, phase reversal, sustained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage. When there is loss of phase, phase reversal, sustained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage, the facility automatically disconnects from the utility. For the plant equipment, all the scenarios result in zero voltage/power supplied by the utility.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-5 Rev. 3 IUs in Mode 0 (Solution Removed) are unaffected by the LOOP - the neutron driver is not operating and target solution is not present in the IU.

TSV filling operations for IUs in Mode 1 (Filling) will be stopped via the loss of power to the VTS, which causes the VTS vacuum pumps to shut down and the VTS vacuum breaker valve to open.

Neutron flux monitoring and safety-related protection systems will remain operational, powered via the UPSS (see Section8a2.2). If the SGS is available, the SGS will auto start to provide backup power to the TSV off-gas system (TOGS), allowing the TOGS to continue to operate and mitigate hydrogen generated by radiolysis from decay radiation in the target solution. If the SGS is not available, the TOGS will continue to operate for five minutes, powered by the UPSS. Three minutes after loss of external power to the UPSS, before the TOGS blowers are unloaded from the UPSS, TRPS will initiate an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge, and the N2PS will inject nitrogen into the TSV dump tank to provide hydrogen control in the IU. The PCLS pumps are not powered by the UPSS or SGS; therefore, PCLS flow to the TSV will be lost. Loss of PCLS flow starts a three minute timer. If PCLS flow is not restored within the three minute duration, TRPS will initiate an IU Cell Safety Actuation, resulting in the TSV dump valves opening and the target solution draining from the TSV to the TSV dump tank. Once in the TSV dump tank, the decay heat is passively removed from the target solution via natural convection to the light water pool. See Section7.4 for additional information about the TRPS. See Section4a2.4 for additional discussion of the light water pool.

Each operating neutron driver for an IU in Mode 2 (Irradiation) will shut down due to loss of power to the driver. Shutdown of the neutron driver will result in lowered neutron flux within the IU. This causes a Driver Dropout actuation on low neutron flux which results in opening the driver high voltage power supply breakers. Similar to the effect of a LOOP during Mode 1 operation, the target solution will be drained from the TSV to the TSV dump tank after a three minute delay via an IU Cell Safety Actuation occurs unless off-site power is restored. Also similar to Mode 1, an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge will occur after three minutes if the NPSS or SGS is not available to power the TOGS.

IUs in Mode 3 (Post-Irradiation) will be provided hydrogen mitigation by TOGS, which is powered by the UPSS for five minutes if the SGS is unavailable. TRPS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge after three minutes if power from the NPSS or SGS is not restored. If the SGS is available, these units are unaffected by a LOOP because active cooling is not provided in Mode 3.

Finally, with the exception of target solution transfer operations, which will be stopped via the loss of VTS, IUs in Mode 4 (Transfer to RPF) are affected by the LOOP identically to IUs in Mode3.

Additionally, a LOOP will result in the following conditions for the facility:

If the SGS does not start, the process vessel vent system (PVVS) blowers shut down immediately and the TOGS blowers shut down after a five minute delay. N2PS valves open on loss of PVVS to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into process tanks in the RPF containing radioactive liquid to dilute hydrogen gas generated by radiolysis.

N2PS valves open after a three minute delay to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into TSV dump tanks in the IF, preventing the accumulation of hydrogen beyond allowable limits.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-6 Rev. 3 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems shut down and ventilation dampers with a confinement function fail closed to ensure the confinement function is provided, and preventing uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.

Other systems throughout the facility, including tritium purification system (TPS), VTS, and all three cooling water systems shut down and isolation valves with a confinement function fail closed.

Controlled releases of radioactive material continue using N2PS sweep gas through the carbon delay beds, which is monitored by the carbon delay bed effluent monitor. The carbon delay bed effluent monitor is powered by the UPSS with backup power from the SGS.

The radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) and the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) systems fail safe upon a LOOP.

8a2.1.7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Certain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.

This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be used for the bases that are described in the technical specifications.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-7 Rev. 3 Figure 8a2.1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)

UPBKR1 UPBKR2 UP XFMR1 UP XFMR2 NVBKR1 NVBKR2 480VSWGRA 480VSWGRB BTBKR1 BTBKR2 EMERG.BKR1 EMERG.BKR2 BATT CHGR

BKR1 BATT CHGR

BKR2 Bypass XFMR BKR1 Bypass XFMR BKR2 125VDCUPSSA 125VDCUPSSB Battery A

Battery B

ACUPSSA ACUPSSB AC

Loads NDAS AC

Loads DCLoads AC

Loads AC

Loads Safety Related

Equipment 12.47kV 480Y/

277VAC 125VDC 208Y/

120VAC BATTCHGRA BATTCHGRB BYPASS XFMRB BYPASS XFMRA UPSS NPSS Nonsafety Related

Equipment NEC700 NEC701 NEC702 SAFETY RELATED SAFETY RELATED NDAS SAFETY RELATED SAFETY RELATED TYP.4 TYP.4 UP XFMR5 UP XFMR3 UP XFMR4 UPBKR5 ResourceBldg

Service UPBKR4 480VSWGRD UPBKR3 480VSWGRC BTBKR3 BTBKR4 CHILLER TYP(3)

CHILLER TYP(3)

NPSS SG SG ISO BKR SGSSWGR TransferBusB

SWGR TransferBusA

SWGR FromSGSSWGR ToTransferBusA ToTransferBusB ServesOutbuildings N.O.

N.O.

N.O.

N.O.

NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED

CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED

CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY Alliant12.47kV UtilityPower

CKT1 Alliant12.47kV UtilityPower

CKT2 Storage

Outbuilding Material

Staging

Outbuilding UPS

DISC2 BATT

DISC2 UPS

DISC1 BATT

DISC1 DCLoads 125VDCUPSSC DCLoads ACUPSSC AC

Loads

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-1 Rev. 5 8a2.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The emergency electrical power systems for the SHINE facility consist of the safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS), the nonsafety-related standby generator system (SGS), and nonsafety-related local power supplies and unit batteries. The UPSS provides reliable power for the safety-related equipment required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events. The UPSS consists of a 125-volt direct current (VDC) battery subsystem, inverters, bypass transformers, distribution panels, and other distribution equipment necessary to feed safety-related alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) loads and select nonsafety-related AC and DC loads.

The SGS consists of a single natural gas-driven generator, associated breakers, transfer switches, and distribution equipment. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for UPSS loads. Additionally, emergency power is provided by the SGS for facility physical security control systems and information and communications systems. Unit batteries provide power for egress and exit lights, switchgear control (station control batteries), and nonsafety-related local uninterruptible power supplies which provide back-up power for communications, data systems, and nonsafety-related control systems. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for the unit batteries and their associated loads.

Nonsafety-related local power supplies for the process integrated control system (PICS) and the facility data and communications systems (FDCS) are described in Sections 7.6 and 9a2.4, respectively.

8a2.2.1 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS The design of the UPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1.

The purpose of the UPSS is to provide a safety-related source of power to equipment required to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events. Safe shutdown is defined in the technical specifications.

The UPSS:

Provides power at a sufficient capacity and capability to allow safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions; Is designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed; Is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions; Is located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions; Has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure; Incorporates provisions to minimize the probability of failure as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the transmission network; and Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-2 Rev. 5 8a2.2.2 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS The UPSS is designed in accordance with the following codes and standards:

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)

IEEE Standard 344 - 2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2013); invoked to meet seismic requirements, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 384 - 2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment &

Circuits (IEEE, 2008); invoked for separation and isolation of safety-related and nonsafety-related cables and raceways and for associated equipment, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 450-2010, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010a);

invoked as guidance for the inspection of batteries, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 484-2002, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2002); invoked as guidance for the installation of batteries, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 485 - 2010, Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010b); invoked for battery sizing of UPSS loads, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003); invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard 946-2004, Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations (IEEE, 2004); invoked as guidance for the design of the DC components, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015, Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear (IEEE, 2015b); invoked as guidance for the design of UPSS switchgear, as described in Subsection8a2.2.3 While the UPSS is not classified as a Class 1E system, portions of Class 1E-related standards, as described in this section, are applied to the design of the UPSS in order to satisfy applicable SHINE design criteria.

8a2.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The safety-related UPSS provides a reliable source of power to the redundant divisions of AC and DC components on the safety-related power buses. Each division of the UPSS consists of a 125 VDC battery subsystem, 125 VDC to 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC) inverter, rectifier (battery charger), bypass transformer, static switch and a manual bypass switch, 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC distribution panels. Each division of the UPSS provides 208Y/120VAC and 125 VDC power through automatic bus transfers and auctioneering to feed division C instrumentation and controls (I&C) system loads as described in Subsections7.4.3.4 and 7.5.3.3. Nonsafety-related loads powered from the safety-related buses are isolated from the safety-related portion of the system by breakers or isolating fuses which meet Section 6.1.2

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-3 Rev. 5 requirements of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation devices, ensuring that a failure of nonsafety-related loads does not impact safety-related loads.

Distribution wiring from each division of the UPSS is isolated and separated from the other division per Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation and with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation.

A simplified diagram of the UPSS is provided in Figure8a2.2-1.

Each division of UPSS is normally powered by a 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus via a division-specific battery charger. The 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses can also be powered by the SGS, providing an alternate source of power to the UPSS. The SGS is described in Subsection8a2.2.4.

The UPSS is isolated from the NPSS and SGS by isolating breakers feeding the battery chargers and the bypass transformers. These devices are identified as breakers BATT CHGR BRK 1, BATT CHGR BKR 2, BYPASS XFMR BKR 1 and BYPASS XRMR BKR 2 in Figure8a2.2-1. The breakers monitor incoming power for voltage, phase, and frequency, and will trip when monitored variables are out of limits.

Each battery charger supplies power to the safety-related 125 VDC bus for its division. The loads on each DC bus consist of the following:

Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)

Target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS)

TSV off-gas system (TOGS) recombiner heaters Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) solenoid valves TSV dump valves Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), vacuum transfer system (VTS), target solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches Each 125 VDC bus supplies power to an associated 208Y/120 VAC bus via an inverter. The two 208Y/120 VAC buses can also each receive power directly from the associated 480VAC NPSS transfer bus through a bypass transformer. The safety-related loads on each AC bus consist of the following:

ESFAS radiation monitors TRPS radiation monitors TPS tritium monitors N2PS solenoid valves TOGS instruments Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) high voltage power supply breaker undervoltage hold circuits VTS vacuum pump breaker undervoltage hold trip circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) undervoltage hold trip circuits Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) exhaust fans, Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust subsystem (RVZ2e) exhaust fans, and RVZ2 supply subsystem (RVZ2s) air handling units undervoltage hold trip circuits TOGS blowers

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-4 Rev. 5 Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) power cabinets and detectors for the associated division Nonsafety-related loads important for providing alerts to facility personnel and for monitoring the status of the facility are connected to the 208Y/120 VAC bus and are isolated from the safety-related portion of the bus by isolation overcurrent devices.

These loads consist of:

Main facility stack release monitor (SRM)

TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS)

Additional details about the UPSS loads are provided in Table8a2.2-1.

Upon a loss of NPSS power and unavailability of SGS power, the AC and DC UPSS buses are powered by the safety-related battery bank for each division. Each division of the UPSS batteries is located in a separate fire area in the safety-related, seismic portion of the main production facility. The UPSS is required to perform its safety function before, during, and after a seismic event, and is qualified by one of the testing methods described in Sections 8 and 9.3 of IEEE 344 (IEEE, 2013).

Compliance with NFPA 70-2017 (NFPA, 2017) ensures adequate accessibility to UPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.

DC components within the UPSS include the safety-related batteries, battery chargers, and DC switchgear. These DC components are designed in accordance with Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, 7.3, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004). Compliance with these portions of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004) ensures DC components have sufficient testability and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

The battery sizing for the UPSS loads is shown in Table8a2.2-2, using the sizing guidance provided in Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE 485 (IEEE, 2010b).

Compliance with these sections of IEEE 485 ensures that the battery capacity and capability are sufficient to support UPSS loads. Batteries are vented lead-acid. Transfer of loads from the NPSS to the UPSS is automatic and requires no control power.

UPSS batteries are installed in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002).

Compliance with these sections of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002) ensures the batteries are properly installed and tested, and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

Battery maintenance will be performed in accordance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a).

Compliance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a) ensures the batteries are inspected regularly, and any identified issues are corrected, which minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-5 Rev. 5 UPSS switchgear is designed in accordance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b). Compliance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b) ensures that the UPSS has a high degree of reliability, which minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system. UPSS switchgear is designed with the ability to install a temporary load bank to perform required testing.

The required reserve for loads is listed in Table8a2.2-2. 15 percent of the total is reserved to accommodate variations of power during equipment procurement and an additional 10 percent is initially reserved for future needs that may be identified during the lifetime of the facility.

The run time requirements in Table8a2.2-1 are based on:

1) Equipment required to prevent hydrogen deflagration is powered for five minutes,
2) Equipment used to minimize transient effects on the facility due to short duration power loss is powered for five minutes,
3) Equipment used to provide alerts for facility personnel and monitor the status of the facility during immediate recovery efforts is powered for two hours, or
4) Defense-in-depth power for nonsafety-related equipment used to monitor and reduce the tritium source term in the tritium confinement is powered for six hours.

The UPSS is designed and tested to be resistant to the electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio frequency interference (RFI) environment. When equipment (e.g., portable radios) poses risks to the UPSS equipment or distribution wiring, administrative controls prevent the use of the equipment where it can adversely affect the UPSS.

Safety-related UPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh environmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant aging mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental parameters provided in Tables7.2-2 and 7.2-3.

8a2.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS The design of the SGS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1.

The purpose of the SGS is to provide a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to the UPSS and selected additional loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.

The SGS:

Will provide for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related I&C functions; Will provide an alternate source of power for the safety-related electrical buses; Will provide an alternate source of power to systems required for life-safety or important for facility monitoring; Will automatically start and supply loads upon a loss of off-site power; and

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-6 Rev. 5 Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.

8a2.2.5 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS The SGS is designed in accordance with NFPA 70 - 2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017) as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical).

8a2.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The SGS consists of a 480Y/277 VAC, 60 Hertz (Hz) natural gas-driven generator, a 480 VAC switchgear, and transfer switches to allow the SGS switchgear to be connected to either or both 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses. Upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP) (i.e., undervoltage or overvoltage sensed on utility service), the SGS automatically starts, both non-vital breakers (NVBKR 1 and NV BKR 2) automatically open, and the transfer switches operate to provide power to the associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus. Upon a loss of normal power to any transfer switch, the SGS automatically starts, the associated non-vital breaker (NV BKR 1 or NVBKR 2) automatically opens, and the associated transfer switch operates to provide power to the associated 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus.

The loads supplied by the SGS include the loads supplied by the UPSS (see Table8a2.2-1), as well as the following facility loads:

Emergency lighting Facility data and communications system (FDCS) equipment Radiation area monitoring system (RAMS) detectors Continuous air monitoring system (CAMS) detectors Facility fire detection and suppression system (FFPS)

Hot cell fire detection and suppression system (HCFD)

PICS equipment Process vessel vent system (PVVS) equipment TPS SEC heaters Switchgear station batteries (NPSS, SGS)

Facility access control system (FACS)

Facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) UPSS battery room and equipment room exhaust fans FDCS dedicated cooling systems FDCS equipment, PICS equipment, and the FFPS contain nonsafety-related unit batteries or local uninterruptible power supplies to provide power to span the time between the LOOP event and the start of the SGS.

Emergency lighting located inside the main production facility is provided with unit batteries capable of supplying 90 minutes of illumination.

Operation of the SGS is not required for any safety function at the SHINE facility. Natural gas for the operation of the SGS is supplied by an off-site utility.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-7 Rev. 5 8a2.2.7 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION Electrical loads for the main production facility, site, and support buildings are normally supplied by the NPSS, as described in Section8a2.1. When the NPSS is in operation, it supplies power to the UPSS battery chargers, which provide power to the loads on the 125 VDC bus and to the 208Y/120VAC loads via the UPSS inverter. The battery charger is used to keep the battery bank fully charged and maintained at float charge.

Upon a LOOP, the loads supplied via the 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC UPSS buses are automatically picked up by the UPSS battery banks. A single division of UPSS in operation is sufficient to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design basis events.

Additional discussion of the LOOP event is provided in Section8a2.1. Use of the UPSS during other design basis accidents is discussed throughout Chapter13.

Although not required by the accident analysis, the SGS is designed to automatically start and begin step loading within one minute of and complete power transfers within five minutes of the LOOP. The SGS supplies power to the UPSS buses, re-charge the UPSS batteries, supply additional loads used for life-safety or facility monitoring, and allow operational flexibility while responding to the LOOP.

After the end of transient events, loads supported by the SGS are manually transferred to normal power via an open (dead bus) transition. The SGS is then manually shutdown.

8a2.2.8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Certain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.

This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be referenced by the bases that are described in the technical specifications.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-8 Rev. 5 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 1 of 2)

Load Description kVA Loads UPS-A kVA Loads UPS-B Required Runtime Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)

Blowers 33.7 33.7 5 Min Recombiner heaters 20 20 5 Min Instruments 0.3 0.3 5 Min Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves 0.5 0.5 5 Min TSV dump valves 1.1 1.1 5 Min Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) 8.0 8.0 120 Min TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) 1.5 1.5 120 Min TRPS radiation monitors 0.6 0.6 120 Min Engineered safety features actuation system(ESFAS) radiation monitors 0.6 0.6 120 Min Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits Vacuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) pump hold circuits Radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold circuit 0.1 0.1 120 Min ESFAS 0.5 0.5 6 Hrs Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors 0.7 0.7 6 Hrs Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target solution preparation system (TSPS),

and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches 0.2 0.2 6 Hrs Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS),

nonsafety-related 1.0 1.0 120 Min

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-9 Rev. 5 Stack release monitoring system (SRMS),

nonsafety-related 0.0 1.0 120 Min TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers, nonsafety-related 1.6 0.8 6 Hrs Note: Required charger kVA does not include battery charging Note: Division C loads are accounted for in both Division A and Division B loads, where applicable Total:

70.4 70.6 Required Reserve:

7.0 7.1 Minimum Charger kVA:

77.4 77.7 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 2 of 2)

Load Description kVA Loads UPS-A kVA Loads UPS-B Required Runtime

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-10 Rev. 5 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 1 of 2)

Load Description Amp-Hours Battery A Amp-Hours Battery B Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)

Blowers 36 36 Recombiner heaters 19 19 Instruments 0.4 0.4 Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves 1

1 TSV dump valves 2

2 Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) 206 206 TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) 34 34 TRPS radiation monitors 16 16 Engineered safety features actuation system(ESFAS) radiation monitors 15 15 Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits Vacuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system(MEPS) pump hold circuits Radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold circuit 3

3 ESFAS 34 34 Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors 51 51 Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches 16 16 Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS), nonsafety-related 26 26 Stack release monitoring system (SRMS), nonsafety-related 0

26

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-11 Rev. 5 TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) subsystem, nonsafety-related Blowers 123 61 Note: Total amp-hours include inverter efficiency, 15 percent reserve margin to account for variations in equipment procurement, and 10 percent capacity margin for future needs Note: Division C loads are accounted for in both Division A and Division B loads, where applicable Total:

582 546 Total with 1.25 aging factor:

728 683 Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 2 of 2)

Load Description Amp-Hours Battery A Amp-Hours Battery B

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-12 Rev. 5 Figure 8a2.2 Uninterruptible Power Supply System BATT CHGR

BKR1 BATT CHGR

BKR2 BYPASS XFMR BKR1 BYPASS XFMR SEC.BKR DCUPSSA DCUPSSB ACUPSSA ACUPSSB 480Y/277VAC 125VDC 208Y/

120VAC BATTCHGRA BATTCHGRB BYPASS XFMRA UPSS Safety

Related

Equipment NonSafety

Related

Equipment ACLoads

Safety Battery TrainA BYPASS XFMRB NPSS Poweredby

UtilityServiceA

TransferBusA DCUPSSC DCLoads

Safety DCLoads

DCLoads

Safety Battery TrainB ACUPSSC ACLoads

Safety BATT

DISC1 UPS

DISC1 BATT

DISC2 UPS

DISC2 DCLoads

NonSafety ACLoads

NonSafety ACLoads

Safety ACLoads

NonSafety DCLoads

NonSafety Poweredby

UtilityServiceB

TransferBusB

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems References SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.3-1 Rev. 1 8a

2.3 REFERENCES

IEEE, 2002. Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 484-2002, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2002.

IEEE, 2003. Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, IEEE 323-2003, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2003.

IEEE, 2004. Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations, IEEE 946-2004, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2004.

IEEE, 2008. Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, IEEE384-2008, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2008.

IEEE, 2010a. Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 450-2010, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010.

IEEE, 2010b. Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 485-2010, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010.

IEEE, 2013. IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, IEEE 344-2013, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2013.

IEEE, 2015a, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures, IEEEC.37.13-2015, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015.

IEEE, 2015b. Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear, IEEE C37.20.1-2015, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015.

NFPA, 2017. National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, National Fire Protection Association, 2017.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8b.1-1 Rev. 0 8b RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8b.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The SHINE facility has one common normal electrical power system. The common normal electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.1.

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 8b.2-1 Rev. 0 8b.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The SHINE facility has one common emergency electrical power system. The common emergency electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.2.

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