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{{#Wiki_filter:Approach to Physical Security for Non-Power Reactor Applicants
{{#Wiki_filter:Approach to Physical Security for Non-Power Reactor Applicants Beth Reed, Security Specialist Advanced Reactor Policy Branch April 13, 2023


Beth Reed, Security Specialist Advanced Reactor Policy Branch
Purpose Discuss the NRCs approach to the physical security requirements for non-power production utilization facility (NPUF) applicants planning on possessing, utilizing, or transporting Category ll or III quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This includes:
- Compliance with the current physical security regulations under 10 CFR 73.67
- The potential for issuing supplemental security measures as license conditions
*2


April 13, 2023 Purpose
SNM Categories
* The NRCs current approach to the physical protection of SNM is based on the quantity and type of the material (i.e., plutonium, U-233, or enriched U-235).
* There are three categories of SNM that the NRC regulates:
- Category I (formula quantity of strategic SNM),
- Category II (SNM of moderate strategic significance),
- Category III (SNM of low strategic significance)
*3
 
SNM Categories II & III
*4
 
Current NPUF Approach
* Regulatory Framework for Security at currently licensed NPUFs:
- Regulations
* 10 CFR 73
- Supplemental Security Measures
* Physical security
- Detect & Assess
- Delay
- Respond
- Orders
* Access Authorization Orders SSMs Regulations
*RTR Security
*Slide 5of 17


Discuss the NRCs approach to the physical security requirements for non-power production utilization facility (NPUF) applicants planning on possessing, utilizing, or transporting Category ll or III quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This includes:
Security Regulations 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
- Compliance with the current physical security regulations under 10 CFR 73.67
- SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA-06-203 (ML062350289)
- The potential for issuing supplemental security measures as license conditions
- Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59
* 2 SNM Categories
- Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA-07-074 (ML070750190)
* The NRCs current approach to the physical protection of SNM is based on the quantity and type of the material (i.e., plutonium, U-233, or enriched U -235).
- Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G
* There are three categories of SNM that the NRC regulates:
- Categor y I (formula quantity of strategic SNM),
- Categor y II (SNM of moderate strategic significance),
- Categor y III (SNM of low strategic significance)
* 3 SNM Categories II & III
* 4 Current NPUF Approach
* Regulatory Framework for Security at currently licensed NPUFs:
- Regulations
* 10 CFR 73 O rd e rs
- Supplemental Security Measures
* Physical security SSMs
- Detect & Assess
- Delay
- Respond Regulations
- Orders
* Access Authorization
* RTR Security *Slide 5of 17 Security Regulations
* 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
- SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA 203 (ML062350289)
- Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59
- Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA 074 (ML070750190)
- Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G
* Update to requirements: Effective April 13, 2023 with 300 day implementation period
* Update to requirements: Effective April 13, 2023 with 300 day implementation period
* New 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215
* New 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215
* https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/14/2023 -
* https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/14/2023-03944/enhanced-weapons-firearms-background-checks-and-security-event-notifications
03944/enhanced-weapons-firearms-background-checks-and-security-eve nt -notifications
*6
* 6 Security Regulations and Guidance (continued)
 
Security Regulations and Guidance (continued)
* 10 CFR 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
* 10 CFR 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
- Transportation:
- Transportation:
* Fresh fuel: 10 CFR 73.67
* Fresh fuel: 10 CFR 73.67
* Spent fuel: 10 CFR 73.37 and 38
* Spent fuel: 10 CFR 73.37 and 38
- Posting: 10 CFR 73.75
- Posting: 10 CFR 73.75
- Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060)
- Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060)
* 7 Developments of Supplemental Security Measures
*7
 
Developments of Supplemental Security Measures
* Post 9/11 additional security measures
* Post 9/11 additional security measures
* 2015 Regulatory Basis for proposed rule
* 2015 Regulatory Basis for proposed rule
- ML#14321A007
- ML#14321A007
- Risk informed and graded approach
- Risk informed and graded approach
* Commissioned approve SSMs for NPUFs producing Moly-99
* Commissioned approve SSMs for NPUFs producing Moly-99
- SECY-18-0063 (ML17333A161)
- SECY-18-0063 (ML17333A161)  
- Staff developed SSMs based on previous post 9/11 security measures and information from the Regulatory Basis
- Staff developed SSMs based on previous post 9/11 security measures and information from the Regulatory Basis
* RTR Security *Slide 8of 17 Additional Security Measures for NPUFs following the Events of 9/11
*RTR Security
*Slide 8of 17  
 
Additional Security Measures for NPUFs following the Events of 9/11
* From 2002 to 2003 (following the 9/11 attacks), NRC requested most NPUF licensees develop a site-specific compensatory measures implementation plan (CMIP) that addressed additional security measures.
* From 2002 to 2003 (following the 9/11 attacks), NRC requested most NPUF licensees develop a site-specific compensatory measures implementation plan (CMIP) that addressed additional security measures.
* The CMIPs were inspected and confirmed through the issuance of confirmatory action letters (CALs).
* The CMIPs were inspected and confirmed through the issuance of confirmatory action letters (CALs).
* In general, the CMIPs included enhancements such as vehicle barriers, personnel background checks, coordination and communication with local law enforcement, vehicle and personnel searches, and visitor escorting.
* In general, the CMIPs included enhancements such as vehicle barriers, personnel background checks, coordination and communication with local law enforcement, vehicle and personnel searches, and visitor escorting.
* 6 Developed to Support Rulemaking
*6
 
Developed to Support Rulemaking
* Regulatory Basis 2015 for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM
* Regulatory Basis 2015 for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM
- In ADAMS under ML14321A007
- In ADAMS under ML14321A007
* Rule was discontinued, but approach remains
* Rule was discontinued, but approach remains
- Graded approach
- Graded approach
- Risk informed
- Risk informed
- Based on the attractiveness of the material
- Based on the attractiveness of the material  
- Driven by the dilution of the material
- Driven by the dilution of the material
* Commission recently directed staff to submit options for enhanced security of SNM, one option is to restart rulemaking to include previously written security measure into the regulations
* Commission recently directed staff to submit options for enhanced security of SNM, one option is to restart rulemaking to include previously written security measure into the regulations
* 10 Security for NPUFs for Moly-99 Production
*10
* COMSECY 0008 (non-public)
 
- Staff request applying SSMs to NPUFs intending to produce Molly-99
Security for NPUFs for Moly-99 Production
* Staff develop[ed SECY 0063 in response to SRM-COMSECY 0008 (non-public)
* COMSECY-17-0008 (non-public)
- Staff developed SSMs and committed to using a site-specific graded approach (quantity of SNM and material attractiveness)
- Staff request applying SSMs to NPUFs intending to produce Molly-99
- The Commission approved the approach for NPUF applicants intending to produce Moly -99
* Staff develop[ed SECY-18-0063 in response to SRM-COMSECY-17-0008 (non-public)
- Staff developed SSMs and committed to using a site-specific graded approach (quantity of SNM and material attractiveness)
- The Commission approved the approach for NPUF applicants intending to produce Moly-99
* Staff intends to use the same approach for all NPUF applicants, to include material attractiveness
* Staff intends to use the same approach for all NPUF applicants, to include material attractiveness
* RTR Security *Slide 11of 17 Physical Security for NPUF Applicants
*RTR Security
*Slide 11of 17  
 
Physical Security for NPUF Applicants
* The staff intends to use the SSMs from SECY-18-0063
* The staff intends to use the SSMs from SECY-18-0063
* The regulator y framework remains appropriate at NPUFs because of the type of SNM and its location.
* The regulatory framework remains appropriate at NPUFs because of the type of SNM and its location.
* The material attractiveness approach will be used
* The material attractiveness approach will be used
- Pure, solid ingots
- Pure, solid ingots
- Fuel elements
- Fuel elements
- Aqueous fuel
- Aqueous fuel
* 13 What Could the SSMs Look Like
*13
 
What Could the SSMs Look Like
* Similar to what is in place now for licensed NPUFs
* Similar to what is in place now for licensed NPUFs
- Supplement the regulations
- Supplement the regulations
* Site specific
* Site specific
- Dependent on design, use, product, etc.
- Dependent on design, use, product, etc.
* Graded approach
* Graded approach
- Accounts for type and quantity of material used
- Accounts for type and quantity of material used
- Risk informed, consequence driven.
- Risk informed, consequence driven.
* RTR Security *Slide 13of 17 Potential Supplemental Security Measures
*RTR Security
 
*Slide 13of 17  
Cat I Cat I Mod DiluteCat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT Immediately detect Promptly detect Timely detect of theft and diversion attempts to remove of attempts to remove of attempts to remove of and radiological SNM and provide SNM and notify local SNM and notify LLEA sabotage sufficient delay law enforcement to recovery SNM through the use of agencies to allow Prevent the removal barriers and/or armed recovery of SNM.
of SNM and other responders to allow unauthorized activities LLEA to promptly involving SNM recover SNM
 
Diversion Path Analysis
 
Security Plan Physical Security PlanPhysical Security PlanPhysical Security Plan Physical Security Plan
 
Safeguards Cont. Safeguards Cont.
Plan Plan
 
Training & Qual. Plan Training & Qual. Plan
* 14 Cat I Cat I Mod DiluteCat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II Cat III Security Implement Program Implement Program Implement Program Implement Program Organization Management Management Management Management System System System System
 
Part 26 - except Subpart I & K
 
Part 26, Subpart I -
Manage Fatigue Physical Barrier OCA
 
Vehicle Barrier Vehicle Barrier System/blast System analysis
 
Isolation Zone Isolation Zone
 
Protected Area Protected Area
 
Vital Area
 
Material Access Controlled Access Controlled Access Controlled Access Area Area Area Area
 
Locked Processes Locked Processes Locked Processes
 
Vault Vault-type room Vault-type room
 
Hardened CAS Hardened CAS *15 Cat I Cat I Mod DiluteCat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Protected Area & Controlled Access Controlled Access Access Area Access Controlled Access Area Access Portals Area Access Portals Portals Area Access Portals
 
Limit unescorted Limit unescorted Limit unescorted Limit unescorted access access access access
 
Part 11 73.57 73.57 73.57
 
Photo Badges Photo Badges Photo Badges Photo Badges
 
Escort Requirements Escort Requirements Escort Requirements Escort Requirements
 
Search Programs OCA - vehicles None
 
Protected Area - Protected Area -
entry (contraband) & entry (contraband) &
exit (SNM - exit (SNM &
shielding) shielding)
 
Material Access Controlled Access Controlled Access Area - entry and exit Area - exit (SNM & Area - entry (SNM - shielding)shielding) (contraband) random exit (SNM &
Vault (weapons) shielding)
* 16 Cat I Cat I Mod DiluteCat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II Cat III Detection and Protected Area & Protected Area & Vault type room Assessment Material Access Vault type room Intrusion Detection Area Intrusion Intrusion Detection System with UPS Detection System System with UPS with UPS Video Capture Video Capture Central Alarm Central Alarm Central Alarm Station Station Station Secondary Alarm Secondary Alarm Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or Station (on-site or Station off-site) off-site)
 
Surveillance Surveillance Surveillance Surveillance Program - Program Program Program Protected Area &
unoccupied Material Access Area
 
Periodic Patrols of Periodic Patrols of Periodic Patrols of Periodic Patrols of outside areas outside areas outside areas outside areas
 
Two person rule in MAA
 
Three person rule in Vault
 
Illumination Illumination *17 Cat I Cat I Mod DiluteCat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way CAS/SAS two-way CAS/SAS two-way Two-way redundant redundant redundant redundant communication with communication with communication with communication with LLEA LLEA LLEA LLEA
 
Continuous Continuous Continuous Continuous communication communication communication communication between CAS/SAS between CAS/SAS between CAS and among security force and on-site and off-and on-site and off-on-site and off-site site response force site response force response force
 
Non-portable Non-portable Non-portable Non-portable equipment on UPS equipment on UPS equipment on UPS equipment on UPS Response 10 Tactical Response Team -
interrupt and neutralize
 
Deadly Force Deadly Force
 
Armed Security Armed Security Officers Officers - interrupt


LLEA Liaison LLEA Liaison LLEA Liaison LLEA Liaison
Potential Supplemental Security Measures Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT of theft and diversion and radiological sabotage Prevent the removal of SNM and other unauthorized activities involving SNM Diversion Path Analysis Immediately detect attempts to remove of SNM and provide sufficient delay through the use of barriers and/or armed responders to allow LLEA to promptly recover SNM Promptly detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify local law enforcement agencies to allow recovery of SNM.
Timely detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify LLEA to recovery SNM Security Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.
Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.
Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan
*14


Heightened Security Heightened Security Heightened Security
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Security Organization Implement Program Management System Part 26 - except Subpart I & K Part 26, Subpart I -
* 18 Cat I Cat I Mod DiluteCat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II Cat III Security Program Annually Bi-annually Bi-annually Bi-annually Review Management Management Management Management Review Review Review Review
Manage Fatigue Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Physical Barrier OCA Vehicle Barrier System/blast analysis Isolation Zone Protected Area Vital Area Material Access Area Locked Processes Vault Hardened CAS Vehicle Barrier System Isolation Zone Protected Area Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Hardened CAS Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Controlled Access Area
*15


CAP or event log CAP or event log CAP or event log CAP or event log
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access Part 11 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Protected Area &
Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Search Programs OCA - vehicles Protected Area -
entry (contraband) &
exit (SNM -
shielding)
Material Access Area - entry and exit (SNM - shielding)
Vault (weapons)
Protected Area -
entry (contraband) &
exit (SNM &
shielding)
Controlled Access Area - exit (SNM &
shielding)
Controlled Access Area - entry (contraband) random exit (SNM &
shielding)
None
*16


Maintenance & Required Required Required None Testing
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Detection and Assessment Protected Area &
Material Access Area Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station Surveillance Program -
Protected Area &
unoccupied Material Access Area Periodic Patrols of outside areas Two person rule in MAA Three person rule in Vault Illumination Protected Area &
Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)
Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Illumination Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)
Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas
*17


Compensatory In PSP In PSP In PSP In PSP Measures
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS Two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication among security force Non-portable equipment on UPS


Suspension of Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Security Measures
===Response===
10 Tactical Response Team -
interrupt and neutralize Deadly Force Armed Security Officers LLEA Liaison Heightened Security Deadly Force Armed Security Officers - interrupt LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison
*18


Records Required Required Required Required Alternative Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Measures
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III
* 19}}
*19 Security Program Review Annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Maintenance &
Testing Required Required Required None Compensatory Measures In PSP In PSP In PSP In PSP Suspension of Security Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Records Required Required Required Required Alternative Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed}}

Latest revision as of 02:45, 27 November 2024

Abilene Christian University, NRC Slides from April 13, 2023, Closed Meeting to Discuss Security Topics
ML23192A039
Person / Time
Site: 99902088, Abilene Christian University
Issue date: 04/13/2023
From: Beth Reed
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML23192A037 List:
References
Download: ML23192A039 (1)


Text

Approach to Physical Security for Non-Power Reactor Applicants Beth Reed, Security Specialist Advanced Reactor Policy Branch April 13, 2023

Purpose Discuss the NRCs approach to the physical security requirements for non-power production utilization facility (NPUF) applicants planning on possessing, utilizing, or transporting Category ll or III quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This includes:

- Compliance with the current physical security regulations under 10 CFR 73.67

- The potential for issuing supplemental security measures as license conditions

  • 2

SNM Categories

  • There are three categories of SNM that the NRC regulates:

- Category I (formula quantity of strategic SNM),

- Category II (SNM of moderate strategic significance),

- Category III (SNM of low strategic significance)

  • 3

SNM Categories II & III

  • 4

Current NPUF Approach

  • Regulatory Framework for Security at currently licensed NPUFs:

- Regulations

- Supplemental Security Measures

  • Physical security

- Detect & Assess

- Delay

- Respond

- Orders

  • Access Authorization Orders SSMs Regulations
  • RTR Security
  • Slide 5of 17

Security Regulations 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials

- SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA-06-203 (ML062350289)

- Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59

- Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA-07-074 (ML070750190)

- Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G

  • Update to requirements: Effective April 13, 2023 with 300 day implementation period
  • New 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215
  • 6

Security Regulations and Guidance (continued)

  • 10 CFR 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials

- Transportation:

- Posting: 10 CFR 73.75

- Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060)

  • 7

Developments of Supplemental Security Measures

  • Post 9/11 additional security measures
  • 2015 Regulatory Basis for proposed rule

- ML#14321A007

- Risk informed and graded approach

  • Commissioned approve SSMs for NPUFs producing Moly-99

- SECY-18-0063 (ML17333A161)

- Staff developed SSMs based on previous post 9/11 security measures and information from the Regulatory Basis

  • RTR Security
  • Slide 8of 17

Additional Security Measures for NPUFs following the Events of 9/11

  • From 2002 to 2003 (following the 9/11 attacks), NRC requested most NPUF licensees develop a site-specific compensatory measures implementation plan (CMIP) that addressed additional security measures.
  • The CMIPs were inspected and confirmed through the issuance of confirmatory action letters (CALs).
  • In general, the CMIPs included enhancements such as vehicle barriers, personnel background checks, coordination and communication with local law enforcement, vehicle and personnel searches, and visitor escorting.
  • 6

Developed to Support Rulemaking

  • Regulatory Basis 2015 for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM

- In ADAMS under ML14321A007

  • Rule was discontinued, but approach remains

- Graded approach

- Risk informed

- Based on the attractiveness of the material

- Driven by the dilution of the material

  • Commission recently directed staff to submit options for enhanced security of SNM, one option is to restart rulemaking to include previously written security measure into the regulations
  • 10

Security for NPUFs for Moly-99 Production

- Staff request applying SSMs to NPUFs intending to produce Molly-99

- Staff developed SSMs and committed to using a site-specific graded approach (quantity of SNM and material attractiveness)

- The Commission approved the approach for NPUF applicants intending to produce Moly-99

  • Staff intends to use the same approach for all NPUF applicants, to include material attractiveness
  • RTR Security
  • Slide 11of 17

Physical Security for NPUF Applicants

  • The regulatory framework remains appropriate at NPUFs because of the type of SNM and its location.
  • The material attractiveness approach will be used

- Pure, solid ingots

- Fuel elements

- Aqueous fuel

  • 13

What Could the SSMs Look Like

  • Similar to what is in place now for licensed NPUFs

- Supplement the regulations

  • Site specific

- Dependent on design, use, product, etc.

  • Graded approach

- Accounts for type and quantity of material used

- Risk informed, consequence driven.

  • RTR Security
  • Slide 13of 17

Potential Supplemental Security Measures Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT of theft and diversion and radiological sabotage Prevent the removal of SNM and other unauthorized activities involving SNM Diversion Path Analysis Immediately detect attempts to remove of SNM and provide sufficient delay through the use of barriers and/or armed responders to allow LLEA to promptly recover SNM Promptly detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify local law enforcement agencies to allow recovery of SNM.

Timely detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify LLEA to recovery SNM Security Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.

Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.

Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan

  • 14

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Security Organization Implement Program Management System Part 26 - except Subpart I & K Part 26, Subpart I -

Manage Fatigue Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Physical Barrier OCA Vehicle Barrier System/blast analysis Isolation Zone Protected Area Vital Area Material Access Area Locked Processes Vault Hardened CAS Vehicle Barrier System Isolation Zone Protected Area Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Hardened CAS Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Controlled Access Area

  • 15

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access Part 11 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Protected Area &

Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Search Programs OCA - vehicles Protected Area -

entry (contraband) &

exit (SNM -

shielding)

Material Access Area - entry and exit (SNM - shielding)

Vault (weapons)

Protected Area -

entry (contraband) &

exit (SNM &

shielding)

Controlled Access Area - exit (SNM &

shielding)

Controlled Access Area - entry (contraband) random exit (SNM &

shielding)

None

  • 16

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Detection and Assessment Protected Area &

Material Access Area Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station Surveillance Program -

Protected Area &

unoccupied Material Access Area Periodic Patrols of outside areas Two person rule in MAA Three person rule in Vault Illumination Protected Area &

Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)

Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Illumination Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)

Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas

  • 17

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS Two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication among security force Non-portable equipment on UPS

Response

10 Tactical Response Team -

interrupt and neutralize Deadly Force Armed Security Officers LLEA Liaison Heightened Security Deadly Force Armed Security Officers - interrupt LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison

  • 18

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III

  • 19 Security Program Review Annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Maintenance &

Testing Required Required Required None Compensatory Measures In PSP In PSP In PSP In PSP Suspension of Security Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Records Required Required Required Required Alternative Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed