ML21095A230

Shine Medical Technologies, LLC, Revisions to Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 8, Electrical Power Systems

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS tion Title Page IRRADIATION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .......................... 8a2.1-1

.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ..................................... 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.1 DESIGN BASIS ............................................................................. 8a2.1-1 8a2.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION ............................... 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION .............................................................................. 8a2.1-2 8a2.1.4 GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION .......................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.5 RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING ............................................. 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.6 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER ....................................................... 8a2.1-4 8a2.1.7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .................................................... 8a2.1-6

.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .......................................... 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.1 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS .............................................................. 8a2.2-1 8a2.2.2 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS ........................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ............................................................... 8a2.2-2 8a2.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS ..................... 8a2.2-5 8a2.2.5 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS ................................................................................. 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ..................... 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.7 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION ..... 8a2.2-6 8a2.2.8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .................................................... 8a2.2-7

.3 REFERENCES ................................................................................................. 8a2.3-1 NE Medical Technologies 8-i Rev. 0

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TABLE OF CONTENTS tion Title Page RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................... 8b.1-1 1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .................................................... 8b.1-1 2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ............................................ 8b.2-1 NE Medical Technologies 8-ii Rev. 0

mber Title

.2-1 UPSS Load List

.2-2 UPSS Battery Sizing NE Medical Technologies 8-iii Rev. 0

mber Title

.1-1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)

.2-1 Uninterruptible Power Supply System NE Medical Technologies 8-iv Rev. 0

onym/Abbreviation Definition alternating current bus train AS criticality accident alarm system MS continuous air monitoring system direct current electromagnetic interference FAS engineered safety features actuation system CS facility data and communications system S facility fire detection and suppression 4 facility ventilation zone 4 FD hot cell fire detection and suppression system AC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning hertz E Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers irradiation unit kilovolt NE Medical Technologies 8-v Rev. 1

onym/Abbreviation Definition OP loss of off-site power PS molybdenum extraction and purification system S nitrogen purge system AS neutron driver assembly system PA National Fire Protection Association DS neutron flux detection system SS normal electrical power supply system S process integrated control system VS process vessel vent system MS radiation area monitoring system radio frequency interference WI radioactive liquid waste immobilization WS radioactive liquid waste storage F radioisotope production facility Z1 radiological ventilation zone 1 Z1e radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem NE Medical Technologies 8-vi Rev. 1

onym/Abbreviation Definition Z2 radiological ventilation zone 2 Z2e radiological ventilation zone 2 exhaust subsystem Z2s radiological ventilation zone 2 supply subsystem C secondary enclosure cleanup S standby generator system M stack release monitor MS stack release monitor system tritium purification system GS TSV off-gas system PS TSV reactivity protection system target solution vessel utility power SS uninterruptible electrical power supply system volts C volts - alternating current NE Medical Technologies 8-vii Rev. 1

onym/Abbreviation Definition C volts - direct current vacuum transfer system NE Medical Technologies 8-viii Rev. 1

.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ngle overall electrical power system serves the main production facility, including both the diation facility and the radioisotope production facility, as well as the site and support dings. The normal electrical power supply system (NPSS) for the SHINE facility consists of normal power service entrances from the electric utility and a distribution system providing e utilization voltages, 480Y/277, 400Y/230, and 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC),

hase, 60 hertz. Grounding and lightning protection is provided.

NPSS receives off-site power service from the local utility, Alliant Energy, at 480Y/277 VAC ugh five separate transformer feeds. Portions of the NPSS that comprise the emergency trical power system can also receive power from the standby generator system (SGS). The SS is used for normal operation and normal shutdown of the facility.

NPSS is sized for safe operation of the facility. The largest loads on the NPSS are the cess chilled water system (PCHS), neutron driver assembly system (NDAS), and the facility ed water system (FCHS); however, those loads are not required for safe shutdown of the lity. Refer to Section 8a2.2 for a tabulation of emergency electrical load requirements.

mplified diagram of the overall electrical power system is provided in Figure 8a2.1-1.

.1.1 DESIGN BASIS design of the NPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, ection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design ria are described in Section 3.1.

design of the NPSS provides sufficient, reliable power to facility and site electrical equipment equired for operation of the SHINE facility and to comply with applicable codes and dards. The NPSS is designed such that it:

• Does not prevent the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions;

• Provides for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related instrumentation and control functions;

• Fails to a safe configuration upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP);

• Provides the normal source of power supply to the safety-related electrical buses;

• Provides the safety-related function of removing power from select components when demanded by the safety-related engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) or target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS); and

• Is able to be inspected, tested, and maintained to meet the above design bases.

following codes and standards are used in the design of the NPSS:

• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-1 Rev. 2

and separation of nonsafety-related circuits from safety-related circuits, as described in Subsections 8a2.1.3 and 8a2.1.5.

• IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003), invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3.

• IEEE Standard C.37.13-2015, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures (IEEE, 2015a); invoked for ensuring reliability of safety-related breakers, as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3.

.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION SHINE facility is connected to two single power circuits from the off-site transmission electric work. The power circuits are shared with other utility customers. The two power circuits feed local outdoor 12.47 kilovolt (kV) - 480Y/277 VAC 3-phase transformers. The 12.47 kV ders originate from the Alliant Energy Tripp Road substation, about 2.8 circuit miles from the NE facility, and the Alliant Energy Venture substation, about 2.3 circuit miles from the SHINE lity.

transformers are each connected to one of the SHINE facility's two main 480 VAC chgear buses. Figure 8a2.1-1 depicts the off-site connections to the SHINE facility.

.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION NPSS operates as five separate branches, each receiving utility power at 480Y/277 VAC.

branches automatically physically disconnect from the utility by opening the associated utility er (UP) supply breaker (UP BKR 1, UP BKR 2, UP BKR 3, or UP BKR 4) on a loss of phase, se reversal, or sustained overvoltage or undervoltage as detected by protection relays for h utility transformer. This function is not required for safe shutdown, as described in section 8a2.1.6. UP BRK 5, which provides isolation for the resource building, provides rcurrent and surge protection. UP BKR 5 disconnecting from the utility is not required for safe tdown since it does not impact safety-related equipment in the main production facility.

two branches, serving loads in the main production facility and the nitrogen purge system PS) structure, can be cross-connected by manually opening one of the UP breakers and nually closing both bus tie (BT) breakers (BT BKR 1 and BT BKR 2) in the event of the loss of ngle utility 480Y/277 VAC feed. This cross-connection would be administratively controlled to ure the remaining utility feed is not overloaded.

distribution system serving the main production facility and the N2PS structure consists of line-ups of 480 volts (V) switchgear, two emergency 480 V buses (that are supported by the dby generator), and isolation and cross-tie breakers. The two switchgear line-ups each feed ndividual emergency bus and the single SGS switchgear. The two emergency 480 V buses nonsafety-related, but each provides power to a safety-related uninterruptible electrical er supply system (UPSS) division via division-specific battery chargers and bypass sformers. The SGS and the UPSS are further described in Section 8a2.2.

distribution system serving the material staging building, storage building, and facility chillers sists of two 480 V switchgear with isolation and bus tie breakers (BT BKR 3 and BT BKR 4).

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-2 Rev. 2

ge protection is provided at each electrical service entrance to limit voltage spikes and trical noise. The electrical services are monitored for voltage, frequency, and loss of phase.

en an electrical service exceeds prescribed limits, the facility is disconnected from the utility to vent damage.

s of phase protection is provided by use of a negative sequence relay. The NPSS monitors h phase and disconnects from utility power on a loss of any one of the three incoming ses. Refer to Section 8a2.2 for further discussion of facility response to transient events.

NPSS complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin apter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical); with Sections 6.1.2.1, 2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation; with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of tion 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation ween nonsafety-related circuits and safety-related circuits; and with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 5a) to ensure reliability of safety-related breakers.

mpliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) ensures sufficient reliability to minimize the probability sing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the site electric power system. Compliance with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017) also ensures adequate essibility to NPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.

mpliance with IEEE C.37.13 (IEEE, 2015a) guidance for ratings, functional components, perature limitations, classification of insulating materials, and testing procedures ensures that ty-related breakers in the NPSS have a high degree of reliability, the capacity, and the ability to perform their safety functions.

NPSS contains the following safety-related equipment:

• Two safety-related breakers are provided for each instance of the NDAS to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power.

• Two safety-related breakers per vacuum pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each vacuum pump in the vacuum transfer system (VTS).

• Two safety-related breakers per extraction feed pump to provide the redundant ability to disconnect power from each (of three) extraction feed pumps in the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS).

• Two safety-related breakers providing the redundant ability to disconnect power from the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust fans, radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust fans and RVZ2 supply air handling units.

safety functions performed by the specified breakers are related to preventing actions that ld initiate or increase the consequences of an accident. The equipment tied to these breakers s not perform an active safety function. Redundant breakers are provided to ensure that the ty function can still be performed in the event of a single active failure.

ety-related NPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh ironmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant g mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of NE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-3 Rev. 2

.1.4 GROUNDING AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION ipment ground conductors, driven electrodes, buried conductors, and ground bars provide a ductive connection between facility SSCs and earth. These components, when taken ether, provide intentional low impedance conductive paths for facility SSCs as required to ure personnel safety, equipment protection, proper component function, electrical noise uction and signal integrity.

facility grounding system complies with NFPA 70 (NFPA, 2017). The facility grounding ipment provides no safety-related function.

tning protection equipment provides low impedance paths to ground that minimize the cts of potential lightning strikes on personnel, equipment, and the facility structure. It provides afety-related function.

.1.5 RACEWAY AND CABLE ROUTING re are four separation groups for cables and raceways for the SHINE facility: Group A, up B, Group C, and Group N. Spatial separation between groups is in accordance with tion 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 8).

• Separation Group A contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division A and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division A.

• Separation Group B contains safety-related power circuits from UPSS Division B and safety-related control circuits from TRPS, NFDS, and ESFAS Division B.

• Separation Group C contains safety-related control circuits from TRPS and ESFAS Division C. For additional information on the Division C circuits see Section 7.4.

• Group N contains the facility nonsafety-related cables, including NPSS and SGS power circuits and process integrated control system (PICS) control circuits.

safety-related circuits are electrically isolated from safety-related circuits by isolation devices ccordance with Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008). See pter 7 for additional discussion of safety-related control systems.

.1.6 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER OOP is defined as zero voltage/power supplied by the utility, loss of a phase, phase reversal, tained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage. When there is loss of phase, phase reversal, tained overvoltage or sustained undervoltage, the facility automatically disconnects from the ty. For the plant equipment, all the scenarios result in zero voltage/power supplied by the y.

in Mode 0 (Solution Removed) are unaffected by the LOOP - the neutron driver is not rating and target solution is not present in the IU.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-4 Rev. 2

tron flux monitoring and safety-related protection systems will remain operational, powered the UPSS (see Section 8a2.2). If the SGS is available, the SGS will auto start to provide kup power to the TSV off-gas system (TOGS), allowing the TOGS to continue to operate and gate hydrogen generated by radiolysis from decay radiation in the target solution. If the SGS ot available, the TOGS will continue to operate for five minutes, powered by the UPSS. Three utes after loss of external power to the UPSS, before the TOGS blowers are unloaded from UPSS, TRPS will initiate an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge, and the N2PS will inject nitrogen into the dump tank to provide hydrogen control in the IU. The PCLS pumps are not powered by the SS or SGS; therefore, PCLS flow to the TSV will be lost. Loss of PCLS flow starts a three ute timer. If PCLS flow is not restored within the three minute duration, TRPS will initiate an Cell Safety Actuation, resulting in the TSV dump valves opening and the target solution ning from the TSV to the TSV dump tank. Once in the TSV dump tank, the decay heat is sively removed from the target solution via natural convection to the light water pool. See tion 7.4 for additional information about the TRPS. See Section 4a2.4 for additional ussion of the light water pool.

h operating neutron driver for an IU in Mode 2 (Irradiation) will shut down due to loss of power he driver. Shutdown of the neutron driver will result in lowered neutron flux within the IU. This ses a Driver Dropout actuation on low neutron flux which results in opening the driver high age power supply breakers. Similar to the effect of a LOOP during Mode 1 operation, the et solution will be drained from the TSV to the TSV dump tank after a three minute delay via U Cell Safety Actuation occurs unless off-site power is restored. Also similar to Mode 1, an IU Nitrogen Purge will occur after three minutes if the NPSS or SGS is not available to power TOGS.

in Mode 3 (Post-Irradiation) will be provided hydrogen mitigation by TOGS, which is powered he UPSS for five minutes if the SGS is unavailable. TRPS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge r three minutes if power from the NPSS or SGS is not restored. If the SGS is available, these s are unaffected by a LOOP because active cooling is not provided in Mode 3.

ally, with the exception of target solution transfer operations, which will be stopped via the of VTS, IUs in Mode 4 (Transfer to RPF) are affected by the LOOP identically to IUs in de 3.

itionally, a LOOP will result in the following conditions for the facility:

• If the SGS does not start, the process vessel vent system (PVVS) blowers shut down immediately and the TOGS blowers shut down after a five minute delay. N2PS valves open on loss of PVVS to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into process tanks in the RPF containing radioactive liquid to dilute hydrogen gas generated by radiolysis.

N2PS valves open after a three minute delay to allow the introduction of nitrogen sweep gas into TSV dump tanks in the IF, preventing the accumulation of hydrogen beyond allowable limits.

• Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems shut down and ventilation dampers with a confinement function fail closed to ensure the confinement function is provided, and preventing uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-5 Rev. 2

function fail closed.

• Controlled releases of radioactive material continue using N2PS sweep gas through the carbon delay beds, which is monitored by the carbon delay bed effluent monitor. The carbon delay bed effluent monitor is powered by the UPSS with backup power from the SGS.

• The radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) and the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) systems fail safe upon a LOOP.

.1.7 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS tain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.

includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for omplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be d for the bases that are described in the technical specifications.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-6 Rev. 2

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System Figure 8a2.1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)

Alliant 12.47kV Utility Power Alliant 12.47kV CKT 2 Utility Power CKT 1 NORMARLLY DE - ENGERGIZED NORMARLLY DE - ENGERGIZED CONTROLLED BY UTILTITY CONTROLLED BY UTILTITY N.O. N.O.

N.O. N.O.

12.47kV UP UP UP UP UP 480Y/ XFMR 1 XFMR 2 SG XFMR 5 XFMR 3 XFMR 4 277VAC UP BKR 1 UP BKR 2 UP BKR 4 UP BKR 3 UP BKR 5 AC AC SG 480V SWGR A 480V SWGR B ISO 480V SWGR C BT BKR 3 BT BKR 4 480V SWGR D Loads BT BKR 1 BT BKR 2 Loads Resource Bldg BKR Service SAFETY NV BKR 2 SAFETY RELATED NV BKR 1 From SGS SWGR RELATED CHILLER Storage CHILLER Material SAFETY TYP (3) Outbuilding TYP (3) Staging SAFETY SGS SWGR RELATED Outbuilding RELATED TYP. 4 Transfer Bus A TYP. 4 Transfer Bus B NPSS NDAS SWGR SWGR NDAS To Transfer Bus A To Transfer Bus B Nonsafety-EMERG. BKR 1 EMERG. BUS-A EMERG. BKR 2 Related EMERG. BUS-B Equipment Serves Outbuildings NPSS NEC 700 NEC 701 NEC 702 UPSS BATT CHGR Bypass BATT CHGR Bypass Safety-XFMR XFMR BKR 1 BKR 1 BKR 2 BKR 2 Related BYPASS BYPASS BATT CHGR A XFMR A BATT CHGR B XFMR B Equipment BYPASS BYPASS 125VDC XFMR XFMR SEC. BRKR SEC. BKR DC Loads 125VDC UPSS A DC Loads 125VDC UPSS B BATT UPS BATT UPS BKR 1 BKR 1 BKR 2 BKR 2 Battery Battery A B 208Y/

120VAC AC UPSS A AC UPSS B AC AC Loads Loads SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-7 Rev. 2

emergency electrical power systems for the SHINE facility consist of the safety-related terruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS), the nonsafety-related standby generator tem (SGS), and nonsafety-related local power supplies and unit batteries. The UPSS vides reliable power for the safety-related equipment required to prevent or mitigate the sequences of design basis events. The UPSS consists of a 125-volt direct current (VDC) ery subsystem, inverters, bypass transformers, distribution panels, and other distribution ipment necessary to feed safety-related alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) s and select nonsafety-related AC and DC loads.

SGS consists of a single natural gas-driven generator, associated breakers, transfer ches, and distribution equipment. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for UPSS

s. Additionally, emergency power is provided by the SGS for facility physical security control tems and information and communications systems. Unit batteries provide power for egress exit lights, switchgear control (station control batteries), and nonsafety-related local terruptible power supplies which provide back-up power for communications, data systems, nonsafety-related control systems. The SGS provides an alternate source of power for the batteries and their associated loads.

safety-related local power supplies for the process integrated control system (PICS) and the lity data and communications systems (FDCS) are described in Sections 7.6 and 9a2.4, pectively.

.2.1 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS design of the UPSS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, ection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design ria are described in Section 3.1.

purpose of the UPSS is to provide a safety-related source of power to equipment required to ure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the consequences of design is events.

UPSS:

• Provides power at a sufficient capacity and capability to allow safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions;

• Is designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed;

• Is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions;

• Is located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions;

• Has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure;

• Incorporates provisions to minimize the probability of failure as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the transmission network; and

• Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-1 Rev. 3

UPSS is designed in accordance with the following codes and standards:

• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)

• IEEE Standard 344 - 2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2013); invoked to meet seismic requirements, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard 384 - 2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment &

Circuits (IEEE, 2008); invoked for separation and isolation of safety-related and nonsafety-related cables and raceways and for associated equipment, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard 450-2010, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010a);

invoked as guidance for the inspection of batteries, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard 484-2002, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2002); invoked as guidance for the installation of batteries, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard 485 - 2010, Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010b); invoked for battery sizing of UPSS loads, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003); invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard 946-2004, Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations (IEEE, 2004); invoked as guidance for the design of the DC components, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

• IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015, Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear (IEEE, 2015b); invoked as guidance for the design of UPSS switchgear, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3 le the UPSS is not classified as a Class 1E system, portions of Class 1E-related standards, escribed in this section, are applied to the design of the UPSS in order to satisfy applicable NE design criteria.

.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION safety-related UPSS provides a reliable source of power to the redundant divisions of AC DC components on the safety-related power buses. Each division of the UPSS consists of a VDC battery subsystem, 125 VDC to 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC) inverter, ifier (battery charger), bypass transformer, static switch and a manual bypass switch, Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC distribution panels, and a nonsafety-related 208Y/120 VAC bus tem isolated from the safety-related portion of the system by breakers or isolating fuses which et Section 6.1.2 requirements of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation devices, ensuring that a re of nonsafety-related loads does not impact safety-related loads.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-2 Rev. 3

tion 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE,

8) for physical separation.

mplified diagram of the UPSS is provided in Figure 8a2.2-1.

h division of UPSS is normally powered by an emergency 480 VAC NPSS bus via a division-cific battery charger. The emergency 480 VAC NPSS buses can also be powered by the S, providing an alternate source of power to the UPSS. The SGS is described in section 8a2.2.4.

UPSS is isolated from the NPSS and SGS by isolating breakers feeding the battery chargers the bypass transformers. These devices are identified as breakers BATT CHGR BRK 1, TT CHGR BKR 2, BYPASS XFMR BKR 1 and BYPASS XRMR BKR 2 in Figure 8a2.2-1. The akers monitor incoming power for voltage, phase, and frequency, and will trip when monitored ables are out of limits.

h battery charger supplies power to the safety-related 125 VDC bus for its division. The loads each DC bus consist of the following:

• Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)

• Target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS)

• TSV off-gas system (TOGS) recombiner heaters

• Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) solenoid valves

• TSV dump valves h 125 VDC bus supplies power to an associated 208Y/120 VAC bus via an inverter. The two Y/120 VAC buses can also each receive power directly from the associated emergency VAC NPSS bus through a bypass transformer. The safety-related loads on each AC bus sist of the following:

• ESFAS radiation monitors

• TRPS radiation monitors

• TPS tritium monitors

• Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) high voltage power supply breaker undervoltage hold circuits

• Vacuum transfer system (VTS) vacuum pump breaker undervoltage hold trip circuits

• Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) undervoltage hold trip circuits

• Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) exhaust fans, Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust subsystem (RVZ2e) exhaust fans, and RVZ2 supply subsystem (RVZ2s) air handling units undervoltage hold trip circuits

• TOGS blowers

• Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) power cabinets and detectors for the associated division arate distribution panels connected to the 208Y/120 VAC bus, isolated from the safety-ted portion of the bus by isolation overcurrent devices, provide power to nonsafety-related s important for providing alerts to facility personnel and for monitoring the status of the lity.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-3 Rev. 3

• Main facility stack release monitor (SRM)

• Process vessel vent system (PVVS) carbon delay bed effluent monitor

• TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers

• Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) ditional details about the UPSS loads are provided in Table 8a2.2-1.

n a loss of NPSS power and unavailability of SGS power, the AC and DC UPSS buses are ered by the safety-related battery bank for each division. Each UPSS division is located in a arate fire area in the safety-related, seismic portion of the main production facility. The UPSS quired to perform its safety function before, during, and after a seismic event, and is qualified ne of the testing methods described in Sections 8 and 9.3 of IEEE 344 (IEEE, 2013).

mpliance with NFPA 70-2017 (NFPA, 2017) ensures adequate accessibility to UPSS ponents to permit periodic inspection and testing.

components within the UPSS include the safety-related batteries, battery chargers, and DC chgear. These DC components are designed in accordance with Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004). Compliance with these portions of E 946 (IEEE, 2004) ensures DC components have sufficient testability and minimizes the bability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of er from the off-site electrical power system.

battery sizing for the UPSS loads is shown in Table 8a2.2-2, using the sizing guidance vided in Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE 485 (IEEE, 2010b).

mpliance with these sections of IEEE 485 ensures that the battery capacity and capability are icient to support UPSS loads. Batteries are vented lead-acid. Transfer of loads from the SS to the UPSS is automatic and requires no control power.

SS batteries are installed in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002).

mpliance with these sections of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002) ensures the batteries are properly alled and tested, and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a ult of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

tery maintenance will be performed in accordance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a).

mpliance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a) ensures the batteries are inspected ularly, and any identified issues are corrected, which minimizes the probability of losing tric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site trical power system.

SS switchgear is designed in accordance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b). Compliance IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b) ensures that the UPSS has a high degree of reliability, which imizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with loss of power from the off-site electrical power system. UPSS switchgear is designed with the ity to install a temporary load bank to perform required testing.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-4 Rev. 3

ally reserved for future needs that may be identified during the lifetime of the facility.

run time requirements in Table 8a2.2-1 are based on:

1) Equipment required to prevent hydrogen deflagration is powered for five minutes,

2) Equipment used to minimize transient effects on the facility due to short duration power loss is powered for five minutes,

3) Equipment used to provide alerts for facility personnel and monitor the status of the facility during immediate recovery efforts is powered for two hours, or

4) Defense-in-depth power for nonsafety-related equipment used to monitor and reduce the tritium source term in the tritium confinement is powered for six hours.

UPSS is designed and tested to be resistant to the electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio uency interference (RFI) environment. When equipment (e.g., portable radios) poses risks to UPSS equipment or distribution wiring, administrative controls prevent the use of the ipment where it can adversely affect the UPSS.

ety-related UPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh ironmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant g mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of tions 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental ameters provided in Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3.

.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS design of the SGS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, ection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design ria are described in Section 3.1.

purpose of the SGS is to provide a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to UPSS and selected additional loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.

SGS:

• Will provide for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related instrumentation and control functions;

• Will provide an alternate source of power for the safety-related electrical buses;

• Will provide an alternate source of power to systems required for life-safety or important for facility monitoring;

• Will automatically start and supply loads upon a loss of off-site power; and

• Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-5 Rev. 3

SGS is designed in accordance with NFPA 70 - 2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA,

7) as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative e, Electrical).

.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SGS consists of a 480Y/277 VAC, 60 Hertz (Hz) natural gas-driven generator, a 480 VAC chgear, and transfer switches to allow the SGS switchgear to be connected to either or both ergency 480 VAC NPSS buses. Upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP) (i.e., undervoltage or rvoltage sensed on utility service), the SGS automatically starts, both non-vital breakers BKR 1 and NV BKR 2) automatically open, and the transfer switches operate to provide er to the associated emergency 480 VAC NPSS bus. Upon a loss of normal power to any sfer switch, the SGS automatically starts, the associated non-vital breaker (NV BKR 1 or BKR 2) automatically opens, and the associated transfer switch operates to provide power to associated emergency 480 VAC NPSS bus.

loads supplied by the SGS include the loads supplied by the UPSS (see Table 8a2.2-1), as as the following facility loads:

• Emergency lighting

• Facility data and communications system (FDCS) equipment

• Radiation area monitoring system (RAMS) detectors

• Continuous air monitoring system (CAMS) detectors

• Facility fire detection and suppression system (FFPS)

• Hot cell fire detection and suppression system (HCFD)

• PICS equipment

• PVVS equipment

• TPS SEC heaters

• Switchgear station batteries (NPSS, SGS)

• Facility access control system (FACS)

• Facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) UPSS battery room and equipment room exhaust fans

• FDCS dedicated cooling systems CS equipment, PICS equipment, and the FFPS contain nonsafety-related unit batteries or l uninterruptible power supplies to provide power to span the time between the LOOP event the start of the SGS.

ergency lighting located inside the main production facility is provided with unit batteries able of supplying 90 minutes of illumination.

ration of the SGS is not required for any safety function at the SHINE facility.

.2.7 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM OPERATION ctrical loads for the main production facility, site, and support buildings are normally supplied he NPSS, as described in Section 8a2.1. When the NPSS is in operation, it supplies power to UPSS battery chargers, which provide power to the loads on the 125 VDC bus and to the NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-6 Rev. 3

n a LOOP, the loads supplied via the 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC UPSS buses are omatically picked up by the UPSS battery banks. A single division of UPSS in operation is icient to ensure and maintain safe facility shutdown and prevent or mitigate the sequences of design basis events.

itional discussion of the LOOP event is provided in Section 8a2.1. Use of the UPSS during er design basis accidents is discussed throughout Chapter 13.

ough not required by the accident analysis, the SGS is designed to automatically start and in step loading within one minute of and complete power transfers within five minutes of the OP. The SGS supplies power to the UPSS buses, re-charge the UPSS batteries, supply itional loads used for life-safety or facility monitoring, and allow operational flexibility while ponding to the LOOP.

r the end of transient events, loads supported by the SGS are manually transferred to normal er via an open (dead bus) transition. The SGS is then manually shutdown.

.2.8 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS tain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.

includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for omplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be renced by the bases that are described in the technical specifications.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-7 Rev. 3

Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 1 of 2) kVA Loads kVA Loads Required Load Description UPS-A UPS-B Runtime get solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system GS)

Blowers 75.2 75.2 5 Min Recombiner heaters 32.8 32.8 5 Min ogen purge system (N2PS) valves 0.5 0.5 5 Min V dump valves 0.4 0.4 5 Min tron flux detection system (NFDS) 12.0 12.0 120 Min V reactivity protection system (TRPS) 1.5 1.5 120 Min PS radiation monitors 7.7 7.7 120 Min ineered safety features actuation 7.7 7.7 120 Min tem (ESFAS) radiation monitors tron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold 0.1 0.1 120 Min uits uum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits ybdenum extraction and purification tem (MEPS) pump hold circuits iological ventilation exhaust and supply s hold circuit FAS 0.5 0.5 6 Hrs um purification system (TPS) tritium 2.4 2.4 6 Hrs nitors icality accident alarm system (CAAS), 0.8 0.8 120 Min safety-related ck release monitoring system (SRMS), 0.0 3.8 120 Min safety-related NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-8 Rev. 3

kVA Loads kVA Loads Required Load Description UPS-A UPS-B Runtime S secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) 1.6 0.8 6 Hrs wers, nonsafety-related e: Required charger kVA does not ude battery charging Total: 143.2 146.2 Required Reserve: 14.3 14.6 Minimum Charger kVA: 157.5 160.8 NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-9 Rev. 3

Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 1 of 2)

Amp-Hours Amp-Hours Load Description Battery A Battery B get solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)

Blowers 81 81 Recombiner heaters 32 32 rogen purge system (N2PS) valves 1 1 V dump valves 1 1 utron flux detection system (NFDS) 310 310 V reactivity protection system (TRPS) 34 34 PS radiation monitors 198 198 gineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) 198 198 iation monitors utron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits 3 3 cuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits lybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) mp hold circuits diological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold uit FAS 34 37 ium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors 186 140 ticality accident alarm system (CAAS), nonsafety- 21 21 ated ck release monitoring system (SRMS), nonsafety- 0 99 ated NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-10 Rev. 3

Amp-Hours Amp-Hours Load Description Battery A Battery B S secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) subsystem, nsafety-related Blowers 61 61 te: Total amp-hours include inverter efficiency Subtotal: 1163 1218 Subtotal with 1.25 aging factor: 1453 1522 Total with margin for future loads: 1671 1751 NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-11 Rev. 3

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-12 Rev. 3 E, 2002. Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid teries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 484-2002, Institute of Electrical and Electronics ineers, 2002.

E, 2003. Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, E 323-2003, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2003.

E, 2004. Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating tions, IEEE 946-2004, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2004.

E, 2008. Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, E 384-2008, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2008.

E, 2010a. Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented d-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, IEEE 450-2010, Institute of Electrical and ctronics Engineers, 2010.

E, 2010b. Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, E 485-2010, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2010.

E, 2013. IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating tions, IEEE 344-2013, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2013.

E, 2015a, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures, E C.37.13-2015, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2015.

E, 2015b. Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and w) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear, IEEE C37.20.1-2015, Institute for Electrical and ctronics Engineers, 2015.

PA, 2017. National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, National Fire Protection Association, 2017.

NE Medical Technologies 8a2.3-1 Rev. 1

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Systems 8b RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8b.1 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The SHINE facility has one common normal electrical power system. The common normal electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.1.

SHINE Medical Technologies 8b.1-1 Rev. 0

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems 8b.2 EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS The SHINE facility has one common emergency electrical power system. The common emergency electrical power system is described in Section 8a2.2.

SHINE Medical Technologies 8b.2-1 Rev. 0