ML20195G980

Notice Hereby Given That Petition Dtd 990524,T Judson Petitioner Requests That NRC Take Action with Re to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1 & Suspend Operating License Until NMPC Releases Most Recent Insp Data

ML20195G980
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	06/11/1999
From:	Zimmerman R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195G972	List: ML20195G966 ML20195G980
References
2.206, NUDOCS 9906160240
Download: ML20195G980 (5)

Text

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t-7590-01-P

. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-220 LICENSE NO. DPR-63 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION RECElPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that by Petition dated May 24,1999, Mr. Tim Judson (the Petitioner) on behalf of Citizens Awareness Network, Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wasto, Environmental Advocates, Greens of Greater Syracuse, Nuclear information and Resource Service, Oswego Valley Peace and Justice, Sierra Club (Iroquois Group), Student Environmental Action Coalition, Syracuse Anti-Nuclear Effort, Syracuse Peace Council, and Dr. Steven Penn, has requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take

. action with regard to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 (NMP1). The Petitioner requests that the NRC take enforcement action against Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

- (NMPC) by suspending its NMP1 operating license until (1) NMPC releases the most recent inspection data on the plant's core shroud; (2) a public meeting can be held in Oswego County, New York, to review this inspection data and the repair design to core shroud vertical welds V9 and V10; and (3) an adequate public review of the safety of the plant's continued operation is accomplished. The Petitioner bases this request upon the following issues and concems:

'1. Petitioner believes that the public cannot rely upon NMPC to accurately perform the data analysis necessary to calculate the extent and rate of cracking in the core shroud b

' ecause of problems with NMPC's previous testing and analyses that were identified in letters to the NRC from Dr. Penn.' Petitioner states that the NRC has not responded to

Dr. Penn's letters, and, therefore, Petitioner believes Dr. Penn's expressed concerns constitute unreviewed safety issues.

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2. - NMPC and NRC reported during the May 1999 inspection that cap screws in the bow spring mechanisms of the shroud tie rod assemblies were found to have suffered intergranular stress corrosion cracking, resulting in the fracture of one of the cap screws. Petitioner states that this problem, and the tie rod problem corrected during the 1997 outage, indicates that NMPC's designs warrant in-depth review by the public and closcr implementation scrutiny. Petitioner believes that NMPC's prior selection of poor cap screw material and the NRC staff's acceptance of it raises questions about the credibility of the NRC's approval of the vertical weld repair design and, thus, necessitates a public review of the level of safety before plant restart.

3. Data from the May 1999 inspection of the NMP1 core shroud are new and the NRC staff's review of the data will not be completed before plant restart. Petitioner states that previous NRC staff safety evaluations required future evaluations. Petitioner believes that subsequent NRC approval of an " unprecedented and unproven" repair design for vertical welds, issued before the inspection, does not preempt the previously determined need to assess the actual extent of cracking in the vertical welds and the structuralintegrity of the core shroud.

4.. NMPC has informed the NRC that supporting a meeting for public review of the core shroud inspection data during this refueling outage would place an undue regulatory burden on NMPC's manpower resources, and this burden could possibly compromise safety at NMP1. Petitioner considers inadequate licensee resources to be new

- information and an unreviewed safety issue. Petitioner contends that violations and a civil penalty issued against NMPC on November 5,1997, involving inadequate management oversight and failure to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance activities

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are "directly pertinent to failure of the tie rod installation (1995), faulty design of the bow spring modification (1997), flawed studies on core shroud boat samples (1998),

postponement of mid-cycle inspection (1998), and miscalibration of instruments for vertical weld inspection (May 1999)." Petitioner believes that, because the degree of cracking in the NMP1 shroud is precedent-setting, the question of regulatory burden is not relevant, as the NMP1 shroud requires the strictest regulatory oversight and a full public review. Petitioner states that postponing restart would eliminate this regulatory burden and ensure that outage work is properly reviewed.

The NRC staff has determined that the issues and concerns addressed in the Petition do not warrant deferring restart of NMP1. The NRC staff has also determined that a meeting to provide for public review of the shroud reinspection results need not be held before restart, in reaching this determination, the NRC staff has considered the following:

1. By letter dated May 28,1999, the NRC staff responded to Dr. Penn's letters dated

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December 3,1998; March 25,1999; and April 15,1999. In a letter dated April 30,1999, I NMPC has also responded to relevant concerns in Dr. Penn's letter of March 25,1999.

The responses indicate that testing and evaluations of the core shroud by NMPC and its contractors can be relied upon by the NRC with reasonable assurance as to their accuracy. Therefore, the issues in Dr. Penn's letters do not provide a sufficient basis to warrant suspension of the NMP1 operating license.

2. The bow spring modification to each of the four tie rod assemblies replaces the design function of the failed cap screw and other cap screws that have the potential for future failure. By letter dated May 28,1999, NMPC confirmed that no additional modifications are needed other than the bow spring modification addressed in the letter of

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May 21,1999. The function of the tie rod bow spring does not affect the tie rod's function of maintaining a predetermined compressive force ("preload") on the shroud -

during power operation.- In response to NMPC's letter dated May 21,1999, the NRC -

staff reviewed and approved the modifications as an alternative repair pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(l) by letter dated June 7,1999, and NMPC has implemented these modifications. With the NRC staff's review and approval of this modification, the NRC staff finds no basis to consider enforcement action to suspend the operating license.

3. During the current refueling outage, NMPC has implemented preemptive repairs of shroud vertical welds V9 and V10, as approved by the NRC staff in a letter dated April 30,1999. These repairs mechanically restore the vertical welds. NMPC has also verbally informed the NRC that the 1997 modifications to the tie rod assemblies have '

perfor~med satisfactorily and that the tie rod assemblies have applied the appropriate preload on the shroud throughout the last operating cycle. Since vertical welds V9 and V10 have been restored and the tie rods are satisfactorily performing their preload function, the need for NRC staff review of reinspection data before restart is obviated. l

4. NMPC will provide reinspection results and analyses to disposition these reinspection findings to the NRC within 30 days of completing the reinspection. This schedule is consistent with the guidelines established by the Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Intemals Project in its report BWRVIP-01, "BWR Core Shroud Inspection and Flaw Evaluation Guidelines," which the NRC staff reviewed and accepted by letter dated September 25,1994. The NRC staff, noting the results of inspections to date and that NMPC has followed the BWRVIP generic criteria for inspection, evaluation, and repair, does not believe a public meeting is warranted prior to restart. Also, during telephone i

discussions with the NRC, NMPC has indicated that a meeting on reinspection results before restart would require significant participation and preparation by NMPC, involving i

1 some of the same key employees and contractors involved in outage activities. The NRC staff recognizes the value of public meetings, ana to this end, a routinely.

- scheduled meeting to d:scuss recent plant performance et the NMP site is planned for August 1999. This meeting will discuss a variety of topics related to licensee performance. A brief discussion on the NMP1 core shroud activities will be one of the agenda topics.

The remaining issues in the Petition are being treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the

' Commission's regulations and have been referred to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. As provided by Section 2.206, appropriate action will be taken on this Petition within a reasonable time. >

i By letter dated June 11,1999 , the Director acknowledged receipt of the Petition. A copy of the Petition is available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20555-0001.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/ f' h-R . Zi rman, Acting Director

. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of June 1999 0

1-May 24,1999 l

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. Dr. William Travers

~ Executive Director of Operations

' Uniiad States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,DC 20555 '

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- Dear Mr. 7kavers; i

As provided under 10 CPR 2.206, Cidsens Awareness Network, Coalition on West Wiley Nuclear Waste Environmen- i '

g al Advocates, Greens of Orester Syracuse, Nuclear Infonnation and Resource Service, Oswego Valley Peace and i Justice, Sierra Club (Iroquois Group), Student En$1ronmental Action Coalition ($U/SUNY-ESP). Syracuse And- ,

Nuclear Effort, Syracuse Peace Council, and Dr. Steven Penn, Ph.D., peddon dm U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis- j l '

sion to suspend the operadng license of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) for the Nine Mile Point Unit -

One (NMPI) nuclear power generating station. He petidon calls !br suspension of the license until such time as NMPC teleases the most recent bMaa data on the plant's core shroud and an adequate public review of the plant's 9 g

safety is accomplished becaure of the following new and unreviewed infonnation and safety concerns:

1) The public canast rely upon NMPC to accurately perfbra the data analysis necessary to calculate the extent  !

and rate or cracking in the cure shroud. As demonstrated in two leuers to the NRC by Dr. Steven Penn (December  !

i 14,1998 and March 17,1999) the research s'.udies commissioned by Niagara Mohawk to estunate crack growtl. rates 3 i (COR) in thc core shroud were replete with procedural errors including selective omission of data and calibration i inconsistencies in electropotentiokinede remedvity (EPR) measurements used in calculadons of the CGR. In many , l instances, the studies neglected proper error analysis, m ,..sendog the accuracy with which the reported CUR was  ; I known and against which new data must be checked While we acknowledge that the issue of estimating the. CGR is ,

less relevant given the recent direct measurements of the CGR, the public sdll has no assurance that the calculations  ;  ;

and researeh being performed by NMPC and hs research contractors is being conducted in an accurate and unbiased j manner. Lingering public doubt over the research practices of NMPC necessitates a public review of the inspection . >

data to assess the true safety status of the core shroud. Furthct, the NRC has not evaluated Dr. Penn's lettars, and has a j stated it does not plan to seview Dr. Penn's second leurs until Fall 1999; NRC's refusal to assess these analyses poses  ; j an sateviewed safety innue. The most recent inspection data nuest be properly analyard andpublicly reviewedprior to l any potential resurr in order to assess the current state of the core shroud material and the stfety concerns of contin- l

, und operaden ofNMP1.

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'2) NMPC and NRC have reported in the May 1999 laspection that cap acrews lastaBed as a anodification to the j core shroud la 1997 suffered latergranular stress correston cracklag (AGSCC), resulting ta the fracture of at j least one of the esp screws. De cap screws were part of bow spring mechanisms designed to prevent tie rods from i

rubbies against the cose shroud. With the failure of one of the tie rods between 1995 and 1997 due to improper j inmattadna and the inferier material chosen for ele cap screws.NMPC's record on installing repairs to the core shroud, ,

and NRC's record on gyroving and overseeing them, indicate: (t) that NMFC's designs warrant in-depth soview by l the public; and (2) that the Imphraantadon of repairs requires closer scrutiny to assme safe operadon of NMP1. The ,

fact that the maserial chosen by NMFC and appsoved by NRC for the cap screws was so suscepdble to IGSCC, the j same mechanism by which the core shroud is believed so be

• E- .g, indicates a shocking lack of forethought on the part of the lleensee and a dismaying inadequacy of oversigla by the regulame. This new data concerning the cap

. screws;which har come so Itcht since NRC appround the repair designfor V9 and V-10, raises spry-signficant  :

quesdent about the credibility ofNRC's approval of the vertical weld repast design, and necessitates afkrtherpublic '

review of the design's adequacy in order e desermine the level of s$ty bqfore restart ofNMPl.

3) Data ikom the May 1999 laspection of the NMP1 ecre shroad is new and NRC staff review will not occur prior to restart of the reactor on the current refueling r,utage schedule. His data constitutes new informadon on a misndicant safety issue, and permitting restart of the reactor before the data is reviewed and a safety evaluation issued  !

consatodas an unreviewed safety issue. His laap-8aa was iniually scheduled for a mid<ycle outage aber 10,600 i hours of operadag cycle 13 (approximately Novernber 1998). He mid<ycle outage was required by NRC prior to I testart in 1997 because of the unprecedented enant of deterioration of the core shroud. Analysis of the irwpection data i and a safety evaluation were necessary to desarmine (1) the extent of cracking,(2) to assess the safety consequences of  ; ,

continued operales of NMP1 with a reverely cracked core shroud, and (3) so begin collecting empirical data on IGSCC i and eere shroud deterioration as part of an industry directive to morutor the age-related degradation of bolling water essetor internals.. However, NRC pangand inspection at NMPC's request since estimates of the CGR suggested the  ;

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cracks would not approa:h the next safei :.gnificant threshold until the end of the operating cycle. The NRC staff's ,

letter to NMPC approving postponetti d the mid cycle inspection states: "'1his approval of NMPC's request .

does not affect the NRC staff's earlier letter and SE dated May 8,1997." The approval of postponernent only deferred l

the necessary review of the status and level of safety of the core shroud. Therefore, a review of the most recent i inspeedon data to assess the current extent of cracking in the core shroud and a sqfety evaluation based on that  ;

assessment are necessary bqfore the reactor is allowed to restart, as would have been the case during the mid cycle ,

inspecdon. Subsequent NRC approval of an unprecedented and unproven repair designfor vertical welds. issued prior to the inspection and review of the May 1999 data, does not preenpt the previously determined need to assess the actualextent of cracking in the vertical welds and the structuralintegrity of the core shroud.

4) NMFC has infbreed NRC that a pubuc review of the tort shroud laspection data darlag this refheling ,

votage would place an " undue regulatory burden *' on NMPC manage nent and possibly compromise smerty at  ;

NMP1. NMPC management acknowledged that they have insufficient resources to respond to the regulatory process  ;

and the public on issues relevant to safe operadon of NMP1. This fhet in itself constitutes new information and an  !

unreviewed safety issue relating to the core shroud inspection and implementation of t 6s proposed core shtoud repair.

NMPC's record during the lav. 2 operating cycles and during this tefueling outage do not warrant that level of trust.

Moreover, there is precedent for increased concern about NMPC's ability to self-assess its safety performance at NMP1. In a civil penaky issued against NMPC on November 6,1997. NRC clied "significatu segulatory concern" with NMPC for violations at NMPI: the panel investigating the violations discovered, among other things, "inad-equate management oversight" and " fall [ure] to monitor the cifactivencas of maintenance activitics for safety-signifi-cast plant equipment in order to minimize the likelihood of failure and of events caused by the lack of effective maintenance" These are issues directly pertinent to the failure of the tie rod installation (1995), faulty design of the bow spring modification (1997), flawed studies on core shtoud boat samples (1998), postponement of mid-cylcic laspection (1998), and miscalibration of instruments for verdcal weld inspection (May 1999). Further, the core shroud  ;

at NMP1 is known to be "the worst case of ctacking in the nuclear industry" (Union of Concemed Scientists). The j question of " undue regulatory burden"is not relevant with a precedent setting case of reactor degradados. bot rather +

requires the suictest regulasory ovcesight and a full public review. Plaally, if the licensee cannot guarantee that

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cornpliance widt regulasory requirements can be met while protacing the public beakh and safety, this consd stas a j l violation of NMPC's operadng license. Thergore. NRC should suspend NMFC's operating licentefor NMF1 umil there has been a pubite review of the May 1999 inspection data and the proposed repair to Y9 and Y10 and the sqrty of condnued operation of the reactor tan be determined. Postponing restart of NMP1 would eliminate the issur of

" regulatory burtten" fbr NMFC management and ensure that the s<ety signQtcant work being conducted during this

- ngfkeling ouange is properly miewed.

Therefore, for all of the above stated contentions, the Petitioners call upon the NRC to suspend NMFC's operadng license for NMP1 by postponing the scheduled restart date until such dme as a public meeting can be held in Oswego  ;

County to review the most recent cose shroud inspeedon data and the proposed repair design to cose shroud welds V-9 and V 10.

Sincerely,

- Ilen Jodson syracuse peace Council 924 Durnet Ave.

Sytacuse,NY 132D3 Deborah Kats Eaecutive Divuctur Citiaans Awareness Network PO Boa R3 ,

ShelburnsPalls MA 01379 Kyle Mabin Envirumnental Advocasas 353 Ilamilton sonet Albany. NY 12210 1

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Howard Hawkins Orcens of Grentar Syracuse Paul Ounter .

l i Disecoor. Reecent Watchdog Project Nuclear Information & Rewuroc Service -

)l 142416th Satet NW, M04 '

Washington,DC 20036 11eidi Siegfried .

Oswego %11cy Peace & Justice Martha I. mew President Sierra Club. Iroquois Ocoup Duvid Radley Student Environmental Action Cnalition

' Wendy Hants Simon Morrin .

Syracust Anti-Necicar Esort 924 Bumet Ave. l Syracuse,NY t3203 Dr. Steven Penn. Ph.D.

Department of Physics i Synwuw University I

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