ML20246P016

Discusses Review of Three Advanced Reactor Conceptual Designs Re 350 Mwt HTGR,425 Mwt sodium-cooled Power Reactor Inherently Safety Module & 900 Mwt sodium-cooled Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor

ML20246P016
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/17/1988
From:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Garrish T ENERGY, DEPT. OF
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References
NUDOCS 8905220059
Download: ML20246P016 (2)

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ENCLOSURE TO QUESTION 5 1 of 5

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,,*****f AUG 171988 Mr.-Theodore J. Garrish Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585

Dear Mr. Garrish:

For approximately the past 18 months we have been reviewing, at the l Department's request, three advanced reactor conceptual designs, i.e. a 350 Mwt Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MNTGR), a 425 Mwt sodium- '

cooled Power Reactor Inherently Safety Module (PRISM) and a 900 Mwt sodium-cooled Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor.(SAFR).

This review is being conducted consistent with the Commission's Advanced Reactor Policy Statement with the purpose of providing preliminary guidance to the Departmerit, early in the design process, on the acceptability of these designs. - However, two issues have recently developed for which we need your response in order for us to complete our review.

The first of these issues is associated with the approach to containment utilized on the above designs. 'As proposed by the Department, these reactors would be sited at standard comercial reactor sites, even though none of these designs have a containm3nt structure similar to that required on current generation light water reactors and, in the case of the MHTGR, no containment structure. We are aware of the Department's recent decision to recomend, as one of the production reactor concepts, a reactor design which appears to us to be very close to the MHTGR design presented for our review. Our under-standing of this recommendation is that the production reactor would be

-located at the Department's remote Idaho site and would have a containment structure associated with it. This~ appears to us to represent a fundamental difference in approach for the two apparently similar MHTGR designs and raises the question of whether the Department is abandoning the containment position proposed in the NHTGR, PRISM and SAFR comercial designs. Prior to making a

-decision on the acceptability of the containment approach proposed for the DOE  !

conceptual designs provided for our review, I would like to' understand DDE's current position on this issue. Accordingly, I believe that it is essential that you provide the Department's rationa'e for the contrary views about containment requirements for the two apparently similar MHTGR designs and the

.. implications DOE foresees for the development of commercial advanced reactor Q designs without containment structures.

The second of these issues was raised by the recently received notification (letter D. Bunch to V. Stello, dated August 15,1988) regarding the Department's selection of the PRISM design over the SAFR design. Since the Department was able to make this decision without final input on licensability prospects from the Comission and the results of our safety evaluation of these designs including 8905220059 890502 PDR COMMS NRCC

[ CORRESPONDENCE PDC

Theodore Garrish- 2 the Commission's views on such fundamental issues as containment, we are unclear as to what additional review and guidance is required from the Department on its advanced reactor concepts. In order for us to plan our future work in this area and respond to your current needs, please clarify what guidance the Department still desires on the three advanced concepts currently under review, how the Department intends to use this guidance and when such guidance is needed.

I would be pleased to meet with you to discuss these issues if you so desire.

Sincerely, original W %

Victor Stello, Executive Director for Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission DISTRIBUTION: LETTER TO GARRISH/

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• ENCLOSURE TO QUESTION 5 2 of 5 erf.M 90 9903~

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• Department of Energy cys:stello Washington, DC 20585 Taylor

/ ' Hoyle Nat Taylor Murley SEP 111988 i

Mr. Victor Stello Executive Director for Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20695

Dear Mr. Stello:

This letter is in response to your letter dated August 17, 1988.

i We appreciate your comments on the apparent conflict between the approach to containment for the New Production Reactor (NPR) versus the system proposed for the standardized Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor (MHTGR) that_has been under review b the reasons set forth below,y the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). For we believe that these differences can reconciled. In any event we request that you issue as soon as possible a be report that documents the results of the NRC staff reviews to date.

The primary mission of the new production reactor capacity is to produce goal quantities of tritium at the ea.cliest possible date and in an assured, sustained, safe and environmentally and institutionally acceptable way.

Also, it is recognized that the new production reactor capacity will incorporate special target materials and that future missions could include t other materials in quantities and core configurations not yet identified.

These conditions represent changes from the civilian MHTGR plant. As such, the inclusion of the containment structure was prescribed by the Department of Energy (00E)/0ffice of Defense Programs as one of the criteria to be used by the program.- In addition, lio specific safety evaluation by the NRC staff of the MHTGR was in hand.

The MHTGR concept submitted for NRC staff review was intended to be one that would be used as a standardized pre-certified product. Similarly, the application did not prejudge a decision to locate the first unit at a remote site.

The MHTGR standardized design is intended to provide a substantial capability to protect against severe accidents and to be fully consistent with NRC's proposed policies related to advanced reactors. The passive systems are intended to provide optimum protection from a public health and safety standpoint and should be better than a set of active safety systems that comply with NRC requirements.

The NRC review of the MHTGR civilian reactor design should be completed based on its own merits against criteria appropriate for civilian nuclear power facilities. The feedback from the ,

NRC review on this matter will be most important and is needed input for the ongoing preliminary design development effort. If the NRC present view 1 j

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- is that special features should be included'in the first, or prctotype- y unit, it would be helpful .if. the. Safety- Evaluation Report (SER) dealt separately _with that topic.

Accordingly, we urge that the SER be-issued as soor, as possible.

With regard to the selection of the reference Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR),

we believe that our detailed interactions with NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards over the past 3-1/2 years provided us with sufficient input'to complete our selection. Licensability is one of the most important DOE criteria for the advanced LMR and, in this regard, the SER's for both Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) and Sodlum j

. Advanced Fast Reactor (SAFR) should be completed. Both SER's are nearly

- complete and, although the PRISM design was selected, we expect that many SAFR features will be considered in the PRISM design effort.

Continuing, interactions with the NRC regarding-safety reviews and licensability of the advanced reactor designs are essential to develop and deploy nuclear plants that meet future energy-needs. in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner. We appreciate your continuing efforts and look forward to early issuance of the SER's.

Sincerely, r

//

Theodore J. Garrish Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy t

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