05000263/FIN-2006009-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | ||
| Inspector = A Dunlop, G O | | Inspector = A Dunlop, G O'Dwyer, M Munir, N Valos, S Burgess, C Baron, M Bielby, L Hajos | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, which had very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the licensee failed to complete a 50.59 evaluation for an operating procedure change that substituted remote manual operator actions for automatic actions during a station blackout. This procedure change directed the operators to control the reactor vessel water level by manually operating the high pressure core injection pump during a station blackout, bypassing the automatic injection controls. The licensee entered this performance deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution. The finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that these procedure changes would not have ultimately required prior approval from the NRC. This finding was categorized as Severity Level IV because the underlying technical issue for the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet. | | description = Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, which had very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the licensee failed to complete a 50.59 evaluation for an operating procedure change that substituted remote manual operator actions for automatic actions during a station blackout. This procedure change directed the operators to control the reactor vessel water level by manually operating the high pressure core injection pump during a station blackout, bypassing the automatic injection controls. The licensee entered this performance deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution. The finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that these procedure changes would not have ultimately required prior approval from the NRC. This finding was categorized as Severity Level IV because the underlying technical issue for the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet. | ||
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Latest revision as of 00:13, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2006009 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2006 (2006Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop G O'Dwyer M Munir N Valos S Burgess C Baron M Bielby L Hajos |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |