05000461/FIN-2016002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.01 | ||
| Inspector = C Phillips, E Sanchez | | Inspector = C Phillips, E Sanchez-Santiago, G Edwards, J Wojewoda, K Stoedter, L Smith, S Bell, S Mischke, T Bilik, W Schaup | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to ensure material placed within the transformer secured material zone, was secured as required by station procedure MAAA716026, Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program, Revision 14. Specifically, the inspectors identified unsecured scaffold poles and knuckles within the licensee established secure material zone. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as action request AR 02668245. The material was immediately removed from the secured zone by the licensee. The inspectors determined the licensees failure to ensure material within the secured material zone was adequately secured in accordance with procedure MAAA716026, Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, by not securing material in the vicinity of main power transformers, the material could become a missile and impact the transformers causing a potential reactor SCRAM. The finding was screened against the Initiating Events Cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of, or cause an initiating event and did not affect mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance in the aspect of field presence, where leaders are commonly seen in the work areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Specifically, since initial identification of the issue the inspectors have noted that while discussions on when to perform walkdowns took place, the supervisors or managers did not ensure sufficient field presence to reinforce the standards and expectations, leading to material continuing to be easily found by the inspectors. (H.2) | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to ensure material placed within the transformer secured material zone, was secured as required by station procedure MAAA716026, Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program, Revision 14. Specifically, the inspectors identified unsecured scaffold poles and knuckles within the licensee established secure material zone. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as action request AR 02668245. The material was immediately removed from the secured zone by the licensee. The inspectors determined the licensees failure to ensure material within the secured material zone was adequately secured in accordance with procedure MAAA716026, Station Housekeeping/Material Condition Program, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, by not securing material in the vicinity of main power transformers, the material could become a missile and impact the transformers causing a potential reactor SCRAM. The finding was screened against the Initiating Events Cornerstone and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of, or cause an initiating event and did not affect mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance in the aspect of field presence, where leaders are commonly seen in the work areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Specifically, since initial identification of the issue the inspectors have noted that while discussions on when to perform walkdowns took place, the supervisors or managers did not ensure sufficient field presence to reinforce the standards and expectations, leading to material continuing to be easily found by the inspectors. (H.2) | ||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 20:55, 20 February 2018
Site: | Clinton ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000461/2016002 Section 1R01 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Phillips E Sanchez-Santiago G Edwards J Wojewoda K Stoedter L Smith S Bell S Mischke T Bilik W Schaup |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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