05000482/FIN-2011005-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.22 | ||
| Inspector = R Deese, G Guerra, P Elkmann, L Willoughby, N O,' | | Inspector = R Deese, G Guerra, P Elkmann, L Willoughby, N O, 'Keefec Long, C Peabody, C Steely, D Strickland, N Makris | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = On November 14, 2011, the inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for pre-conditioning of the 480 Vac breaker for the containment cooling fan D prior to performance of the periodic functional test to satisfy Technical Requirements Manual Surveillance 3.8.11.3. Testing consisted of injecting a current in excess of the breakers setpoint and measuring the response time. The licensee was observed to perform preventive maintenance activities consisted of cleaning, lubricating, inspecting, and calibrating the circuit breakers, then performed as-left surveillance testing. The inspectors concluded that the preventive maintenance activities were likely to positively impact the surveillance test results. The inspectors identified that the practice had occurred with other 480 Vac breakers because Wolf Creek personnel believed that the performance of as-left testing after preventive maintenance constituted a surveillance test. The inspectors determined that mixing preventive maintenance and surveillance testing such that the containment cooling fan breaker was preconditioned was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it could become a more safety significant concern if left uncorrected. Specifically, the programmatic practices could mask safety-related circuit breaker degradation. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the barrier integrity cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding had very low safety significance. Specifically, the finding does not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool; or represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere; and does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment; or a heat removal component. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control. Specifically, the work order and procedures were performed with competing requirements such that workers had to choose the correct sequence of activities [H.3(b)] | | description = On November 14, 2011, the inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for pre-conditioning of the 480 Vac breaker for the containment cooling fan D prior to performance of the periodic functional test to satisfy Technical Requirements Manual Surveillance 3.8.11.3. Testing consisted of injecting a current in excess of the breakers setpoint and measuring the response time. The licensee was observed to perform preventive maintenance activities consisted of cleaning, lubricating, inspecting, and calibrating the circuit breakers, then performed as-left surveillance testing. The inspectors concluded that the preventive maintenance activities were likely to positively impact the surveillance test results. The inspectors identified that the practice had occurred with other 480 Vac breakers because Wolf Creek personnel believed that the performance of as-left testing after preventive maintenance constituted a surveillance test. The inspectors determined that mixing preventive maintenance and surveillance testing such that the containment cooling fan breaker was preconditioned was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it could become a more safety significant concern if left uncorrected. Specifically, the programmatic practices could mask safety-related circuit breaker degradation. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding under the barrier integrity cornerstone using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, and determined that the finding had very low safety significance. Specifically, the finding does not represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool; or represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or a toxic atmosphere; and does not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment; or a heat removal component. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work control. Specifically, the work order and procedures were performed with competing requirements such that workers had to choose the correct sequence of activities [H.3(b)] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2011005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Deese G Guerra P Elkmann L Willoughby N O 'Keefec Long C Peabody C Steely D Strickland N Makris |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |