05000354/FIN-2010002-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified because the B control room chiller tripped when it was started on November 18, 2009. This reduced the cooling capability of the control area chilled water system. The inspectors determined that the cause of the trip was that PSEG did not identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with a safety-related breaker for the B control room chiller. Specifically, PSEG did not identify a loose wiring connection on the breaker during preventive maintenance inspections following refurbishment by a vendor. PSEG's corrective actions included repair of the affected breaker, inspections of other breakers, and a revision to a preventive maintenance procedure. The violation was entered into the corrective action program as notification20441285.The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The loose wiring connection affected the reliability and availability of the B control room chiller, which provides cooling for the main control room, emergency switchgear rooms, and the safety auxiliaries cooling system pump rooms. The inspectors performed a Phase I screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function because the A chiller was available, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because PSEG's breaker preventive maintenance procedure was not complete, accurate, and up-to-date. Specifically, the procedure did not include steps to check for loose wiring connections on key components. | | description = A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified because the B control room chiller tripped when it was started on November 18, 2009. This reduced the cooling capability of the control area chilled water system. The inspectors determined that the cause of the trip was that PSEG did not identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with a safety-related breaker for the B control room chiller. Specifically, PSEG did not identify a loose wiring connection on the breaker during preventive maintenance inspections following refurbishment by a vendor. PSEG\'s corrective actions included repair of the affected breaker, inspections of other breakers, and a revision to a preventive maintenance procedure. The violation was entered into the corrective action program as notification20441285.The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The loose wiring connection affected the reliability and availability of the B control room chiller, which provides cooling for the main control room, emergency switchgear rooms, and the safety auxiliaries cooling system pump rooms. The inspectors performed a Phase I screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function because the A chiller was available, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because PSEG\'s breaker preventive maintenance procedure was not complete, accurate, and up-to-date. Specifically, the procedure did not include steps to check for loose wiring connections on key components. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2010002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond J Schoppy B Welling J Furia C Bickett A Patel F Bower A Burritt |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |