05000461/FIN-2008004-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | ||
| Inspector = D Melendez | | Inspector = D Melendez-Colon, D Reeser, B Kemker, A Barker, S Mischke, D Lords, N Feliz-Adomo, C Acosta, Acevedoe Coffman | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was self-revealed. The licensee failed to perform adequate preventive maintenance on shutdown service water system valve 1SX014A. This resulted in significant degradation of the valve body by corrosion due to prolonged exposure to raw service water that went undetected until gross seat leakage was discovered while attempting to establish conditions for surveillance testing. The licensee replaced the valve and established a preventive maintenance schedule for internal valve inspections. The finding would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected and was therefore more than a minor concern. Specifically, the failure to adequately perform preventive maintenance could reasonably result in significantly degraded or inoperable safety-related equipment. Because the shutdown service water system was primarily associated with long term decay heat removal following certain design basis accidents, the inspectors concluded that this issue was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue: (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system; (3) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance. Specifically, the licensees investigation determined that internal valve inspections were not performed because the component category was incorrectly classified. (IMC 0305 H.3(b)) (Section 1R12.b.3) | | description = A finding of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was self-revealed. The licensee failed to perform adequate preventive maintenance on shutdown service water system valve 1SX014A. This resulted in significant degradation of the valve body by corrosion due to prolonged exposure to raw service water that went undetected until gross seat leakage was discovered while attempting to establish conditions for surveillance testing. The licensee replaced the valve and established a preventive maintenance schedule for internal valve inspections. The finding would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected and was therefore more than a minor concern. Specifically, the failure to adequately perform preventive maintenance could reasonably result in significantly degraded or inoperable safety-related equipment. Because the shutdown service water system was primarily associated with long term decay heat removal following certain design basis accidents, the inspectors concluded that this issue was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue: (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system; (3) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance. Specifically, the licensees investigation determined that internal valve inspections were not performed because the component category was incorrectly classified. (IMC 0305 H.3(b)) (Section 1R12.b.3) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:35, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2008004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2008 (2008Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Melendez-Colon D Reeser B Kemker A Barker S Mischke D Lords N Feliz-Adomo C Acosta Acevedoe Coffman |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |