Regulatory Guide 5.7

(Task SG 909-4), Revision 1, Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Access Areas

ML003739976
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Issue date:	05/30/1980
From:	Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
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RG-5.007, Rev 1
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Revision 1"

May 1980

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY GUIDE 57 (Task SG 909-4)

ENTRY/EXIT CONTROL FOR PROTECTED AREAS,

VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS

A. INTRODUCTION

and entry/exit control systems and procedures for searching individuals, vehicles, and materials. Entry and exit control Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," of procedures are used to provide assurance that only authorized Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, specifies perform individuals are allowed access to protected areas (PAs), vital ance requirements for the physical protection of special areas (VAs), and material access areas (MAAs). Entry search nuclear materials and associated facilities. Section 73.20, procedures, in conjunction with other protection elements,

"General Performance Requirements," describes the general are used to provide assurance that firearms, explosives, and performance objective and requirements that must be met incendiary devices are not introduced into the subject areas.

through the establishment of a physical protection system. Exit search procedures from material access areas are used Performance capabilities necessary to meet the requirements to provide assurance that strategic special nuclear material of § 73.20 are described in § 73.45,"Performance Capabilities (SSNM) is not being covertly removed.

for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems." While detec tion and control requirements are specified throughout the This guide describes measures the NRC staff considers capability statements, specific entry/exit control techniques acceptable for implementing entry/exit control requirements are required under three capabilities. Paragraph 73.45(b) at facilities subject to the above regulatory requirements.

specifies preventing "unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital

B. DISCUSSION

areas." A physical protection system must achieve this by using entry controls, among other things. Paragraph 73.45(e) The objective of controlling access to protected areas,

• Ipermits "removal of only authorized and confirmed forms vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that only and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from mate authorized persons with legitimate need be allowed access rial access areas." The system must achieve this capability to such areas. The objective of searching vehicles, personnel, by providing detection subsystems and procedures to detect, or packages prior to entry into protected or material access assess, and communicate attempts at unauthorized removal. areas is to prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, Paragraph 73.45(f) provides for ensuring only authorized or incendiary devices that could be used to commit radio access to the protected area and requires, in part, the use of logical sabotage or aid in the theft of SSNM. The objective entry controls to meet the capability. Finally, § 73.46,"Fixed of searching all personnel and material exiting material Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, access areas is to provide a means of detecting attempted Components, and Procedures," outlines typical specific safe theft or diversion of concealed SSNM.

guards measures that will often be included in an overall system that meets the requirements of Sections 73.20 and Entry control involves the following functions:

73.45.

I. Identification and authorization check, A significant element of the physical protection system 2. Entry to control point, is the control of the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, 3. Weapons search, and material. This control includes personnel identification 4. Explosive/incendiary device search,

5. Badge exchange, if used, and The substantial number of changes In this revision has made It 6. Admittance to area or denial and notification to Impractical to Indicate the changes with lines In the margin. security force of a problem.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Regulatory Guide s are Issued to describe and make available to the Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.

public methods acceptable to* the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions:

niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu

'led accidents or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulator 1. Power Reactors uldes, are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliance wIth 6. Products Am Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set 2. Research and Test Reactors

7. Transportation

__,Jut in the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities a. Occupational Health findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review

5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General license by the Commission.

Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, CHfIc divisions is available through the Government Printing Office.

to accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may experience. This guide was revised as a result of substantive com be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ments received from the public and additional staff review. Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.

I I[

The identity of an individual can be verified by determin 3. Escort means a member of the security organization ing something about an individual, such as facial features; or other designated individual responsible for accompanying by determining something possessed by an individual, such those personnel not allowed unescorted access within a as a coded badge; or by determining something known to protected area. An escort is not required to possess technica;

an individual, such as a numerical code. By using combina knowledge of processes or equipment as is required by the".

tions of the above three identity verification processes, two-man concept.

more reliable identity verification can be obtained. Such identification procedures can be accomplished by attendant

C. REGULATORY POSITION

security personnel or by the use of identification equipment such as video comparator system

1. PROTECTED AREAS

Searching of incoming personnel or material can be a. Entry.Identificationand Authorization accomplished by a hands-on "pat-down" search, by-the use of devices that detect unauthorized materials, by the use of At each entry/exit control point (EECP) into a protected a "strip" search, or by a combination of all three. Entry area, a means of establishing the identity and access autho searches that use equipment to perform the search function, rization of incoming individuals should be provided. Accept such as metal or explosives detectors, are preferred as they able means of identity verification are facial recognition minimize the imposition of a hands-on or strip search. and positive comparison to an authorized picture badge.

Such identity verification can be performed by attendant Exit searches, which are conducted to ensure that security personnel or by the use of remotely viewed closed concealed SSNM is not removed from material access areas, circuit television (CCTV) systems that display an acceptable should use both special nuclear material (SNM) detection image of the individual's face and compare it to an image of equipment and metal detection equipment to provide a picture badge or a stored image of that individual's face.

greater confidence that either shielded or unshielded The identification/verification procedure and confirmation material could be detected. All materials leaving the material of entry authorization should be performed prior to any access area should undergo such a search. search function. To facilitate both identification and search functions, entry and exit traffic should be separated by Direct responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of physical barriers, and employee and visitor traffic should be personnel, vehicles, and materials normally resides with processed separately.

members of the security organization. They should be adequately trained in operation of entry/exit control and b. PersonnelSearch search equipment and procedures in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to A search of entering personnel for firearms, exploK..

10 CFR Part 73. sives, or incendiary devices should be conducted by use of both a firearms detector and an explosives detector. All Extensive discussions and descriptions of various alterna incoming individuals not possessing a Department of tive equipment and procedures for use in controlling entry Energy (DOE) material access authorization should undergo and exit and for conducting searches of personnel, vehicles, such a search. DOE couriers engaged in the transport of and materials can be found in NUREG-0509, "Bibliography SSNM are exempt from such searches.

of Technical Guidance for the Physical 1 Protection Upgrade Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites."' A sample of all individuals possessing DOE material access authorizations should be searched. The sample rate For the purpose of this guide the following definitions should be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected are provided: randomly from all entering personnel who possess the necessary authorizations.

i. Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special In the event that search equipment indicates the presence nuclear material against theft and the protection of a plant of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the following against radiological sabotage. actions should be taken:

2. Watchman means an individual, not necessarily 1. The security personnel should request that the uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection individual empty his or her pockets and again be tested by for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the the search equipment. If the individual complies and after course of performing other duties. the equipment no longer indicates the presence of firearms or explosives and the contents of the pockets have been verified as not including firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the individual may be allowed to pass into the

1 NUREG-0509 is available for public inspection or copying for a protected area.

fee at the NRC's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW

Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased directly from the NRe by writing to the Publications Sales Manager, Distribution Services 2. If, however, the equipment continues to indica!

Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. the presence of firearms or explosives, a physical searck..,

20555 or the National Technical Information Service, Springfield.

Virginia 22161. should be made by one unarmed security person, while at

5.7-2

least one guard observes the search. An acceptable alterna personnel, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior tive to a hands-on search is a "'strip search," which could be to entry into the protected area. The search should include completed in the privacy of a separate searchroom and the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo which should include the individual disrobing (except for area. (Refer to NUREG/CR-0485, "Vehicle Access and underclothing) and submitting his or her clothing for Search Training Manual," 2 for details. A level I search inspection. should be conducted as a minimum.) The use of vehicle sally ports (secure access passageways) is an acceptable way

3. If an individual refuses to comply with either a to facilitate identification, control, and search functions.

hands-on or strip search or if a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device is found, entry should be denied. All material or packages to be delivered into the PA

are required to be identified and verified as an authorized

4. If material of a suspicious and unknown nature is found, delivery prior to entry. A sample of all such delivered entry should be delayed until responsible security personnel packages or materials should be searched for firearms, are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. explosives, or incendiary devices, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with samples selected randomly from all When the initial search uses hand-held detectors or is a such deliveries. Where size, weight, packaging, or other hands-on search, firearms should be searched for first, as it characteristics prohibit an effective search by direct observa is presumed that a concealed firearm is a more immediate tion, detection equipment, or X-ray, entry may be granted danger to the searcher than concealed explosives or incen so long as:

diary devices.

1. The material is escorted to its destination by a Entry into the protected area should be granted to member of the security organization, individuals only after they have satisfactorily met the identification, authorization, and search requirements of 10 2. The material is not initially offloaded or unpack CFR Part 73. The opening to the last barrier to the PA aged adjacent to a vital or material access area, and should be controlled by an individual isolated within a bullet-resisting structure. Acceptable means to accomplish 3. Offloading and unpackaging is observed by at least this are to provide a builet-resisting booth meeting UL two authorized individuals, one of whom is a member Level IV standards at the last barrier of the EECP for the of the security organization, for the purpose of ensuring individual who controls the opening to the PA or to have that only authorized material has been delivered and that this opening controlled by the central alarm station (CAS) there are no concealed firearms, explosives, or incendiary or secondary alarm station (SAS) operator or both. devices.

c. Package or MaterialIdentificationand Search e. Entry and Search Aids At PA EECPs, all hand-carried packages should be searched The use of pedestrian and vehicle sally ports can provide by direct observation, by the use of firearms detectors or an effective means of isolating, identifying, and searching explosives detectors, or by the use of X-ray equipment for individuals in a controlled area prior to allowing entry into concealed firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other the PA. By interlocking the first and second openings in the items that could be used for theft or sabotage purposes. sally port so they cannot be opened simultaneously and by Packages carried by individuals who possess a DOE material providing observation of entry, a positive means of prevent access authorization may be excepted unless that person is ing "piggybacking" is available.

one of the sample selected randomly to'undergo an entry search, in which case any hand-carried packages should also Firearms detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal be searched. variety, should be capable of detecting with at least an 85%

effective detection rate one of the following located any Hand-carried packages or materials that cannot be readily where on an individual: (1) Colt .25 automatic, (2) Titan opened or otherwise cannot be effectively searched by .25 automatic, (3) General Precision Model 20-.22 caliber, direct observation should be submitted to suitable detec (4) CDM .22 short, or (5) the calibration source specified in tion equipment, which may include X-ray devices. If the NILECJ-STD-0601.00, "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for nature of the packaging interferes with effective operation Use in Weapons Detection." 3 The false alarm rate should of firearm or explosives detection equipment, X-ray should 2 NUREGXCR-0495 is available for public inspection or copying be used. Any item or material determined to be of a ques for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW.,

tionable nature by search personnel should not be allowed Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased for $4.75 directly from NRC by sending check or money order, payable to Superintendent into the protected area until responsible security personnel of Documents, to the Director, Division of Technical Information are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 205SS. GPO Deposit Account holders may charge their order by calling (301) 492-9530. Copies are also available for d. Vehicle and Cargo Entry and Search purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

3 All vehicles except DOE vehicles engaged in the transport National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Standard 0601.00, Stock Number GPO-2700-002S6,Is for sale for of SNM and emergency vehicles responding to emergency 65 cents per copy by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.

conditions are required to be searched for unauthorized Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

5.7-3 II{

not exceed 10% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to verifying authorization is the use of a code intrinsic to the this detection level. The devices should be adjusted to picture badge indicating that entry to MAAs is authorized.

discriminate between typical firearm and non-firearm masses of metal. One example of a testing method for At no time should a lone individual be allowed entry to demonstrating compliance with the detection rate is given an MAA or a vault. As a minimum, entry to an unoccupied in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods MAA requires at least two individuals to meet the intent of may be used if the methods are fully documented and the two-man concept.

approved by the NRC.

b. Packageor MaterialIdentification and Search Explosives detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least a All packages and materials entering a material access

90% effective detection rate dynamite, TNT, and similar area should be searched for firearms, explosives, and nitrogen-containing compounds in a minimum amount of incendiary devices. Search procedures and equipment, as

200 grams. One example of a testing method for demon discussed previously, for use at protected area EECPs should strating compliance with the detection rate is given in the be used. In the event that security search personnel are Appendix. Other testing methods may be used if the suspicious of the nature of any searched packages or methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. material, entry should be delayed until the nature or The false alarm rate should not exceed 1%when the detector identity of the package or material can be determined.

sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. If the search for explosives is to be performed directly by security c. Entry and Search Aids personnel, it should be performed only after a search for firearms has been made. Entry and search aids discussed in the section on pro tected areas are also applicable to EECPs at MAA boundaries.

A search dog may be capable of providing a satisfac In addition, unmanned EECP doors should be alarmed and tory detection capability for firearms and explosives. If annunciate in both the CAS and SAS.

dogs are used, they should be individually tested to ensure their continued capability and reliability. As an animal may

d. Exit Search for SSNM

present unpredictable problems and weaknesses, a set of trained and tested backup individuals or other detection Prior to exit from an MAA, all individuals, vehicles, devices or equipment should be immediately available to packages, and other materials are required to be searched serve as a substitute in the event of a dog's illness or other for concealed SSNM. This search should be conducted using sign of abnormal behavior. A dog should be used only if it both metal detection and SNM detection equipment. The can be shown to detect firearms or explosives with equal or metal detection system used to search for concealed shielded greater confidence than existing alternatives. A dog may be SSNM should be capable of detecting with at least a 90%

particularly useful in the search of vehicles or oversize effective detection rate a minimum of 100 grams of nonfer packages. As the duration of a dog's effectiveness for rous metal (shielding) concealed anywhere on an individual.

performing search functions may be limited, it should be One example of a testing method for demonstratinig com used only as a secondary aid. pliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the Annunciation of metal and explosives detection equip methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC.

ment should be both aural and visual. The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% for that level of detection. SNM detection equipment should be capable of The EECP should be provided with one or more duress detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched to alarms that annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. Such 90% in the uranium-235 isotope in accordance with the alarms should be placed in a concealed location that can testing and operational requirements of Regulatory Guide generally be reached by attendant security personnel and 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitor."

activated in an unobtrusive manner. An acceptable alterna tive to duress alarms that annunciate in the alarm stations is Individuals should undergo two separate searches prior the use of duress alarms that are ,Worn or carried by atten to exiting an MAA. An acceptable method of conduc dant security personnel and that can be activated unobtru ting these searches is to require individuals to pass through sively. Such duress alarms should be worn or carried at all two separate sets of metal and SNM detection equipment, times when security personnel attend an EECP. each set monitored by a different member of the security organization. For individuals exiting an area that contains

2. MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS only encapsulated or alloyed SSNM, the second search may be made of a sampling of all individuals exiting the area, the a. Entry Identificationand Authorization sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly to undergo the search.

Individuals desiring entry to material access areas should be verified as being on appropriate authorization schedules If an SNM or metal detector is triggered by an individual /'

and should be identified by comparison of facial features to attempting to exit an MAA EECP, the individual should be an authorized picture badge. An acceptable method of asked to remove all items from his or her pockets and again

3.74

Entry control should ensure use of the two-man concept pass through the detection equipment. If the detector still during entry and access to vaults and should ensure that the triggers, a hands-on or strip search should be conducted. In vault is monitored by CCTV in both alarm stations and at the event search personnel are unsure of the nature of an least one other continuously manned onsite location.

object or material uncovered during a search, the material or object should be confiscated and the individual's exit

3. VITAL AREAS

delayed until a determination can be made that the object or material is not SSNM or does not contain SSNM. Entry to vital areas should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules Vehicles, materials, or packages, including trash, uncon are accomplished prior to entry into the area. Use of the taminated wastes, tools, and other equipment should two-man concept for entry control is recommended. The be searched with SNM and metal detection equipment where use of attendant security personnel, authorized escorts, or appropriate. This search should be conducted by a team of remotely viewed CCTV systems that compare a facial image at least two authorized and designated individuals who are to an authorized picture badge are all acceptable means of not normally allowed access to the material access area in providing such control.

question. An acceptable means of accomplishing such searches for items too large to be accommodated in pedes

4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

trian EECPs is to provide a holding area within the MAA

that can be isolated from other MAA activities when search Emergency procedures should be developed to deal personnel are conducting authorized searches.

with the possibility of failure of entry/exit detection and assessment equipment or emergency evacuation.

e. Accounting for Individuals In MAAs a. Failureof Detection Equipment Procedures should be employed at MAA EECPs to account for the number and identity of individuals within Provisions should be made to use alternative EECPs the MAA. Manual or automated accounting procedures are or backup detection equipment or security personnel and equally acceptable so long as the procedures can determine provide for rapid repair of malfunctioning detection equip at any given time that no lone individual Is within the ment. Failure of detection equipment should not be allowed MAA. An attempted violation of the two-man concept to compromise the effectiveness of required search proce should be detectable at the EECP, CAS, and SAS (e.g., dures.

if one of two individuals alone within an MAA attempts to exit without the other).

b. Evacuation Procedures I. Vaults To the extent possible, and without compromising safety practices or considerations, procedures should be

.Entry to vaults should be controlled so that individ established to protect against the possibility of an emergency ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules evacuation being used to remove SSNM from the facility or are accomplished prior to opening the vault door. The use to gain unauthorized access to the facility. Such procedures of split-screen CCTV or CCTV and badge reader are accept should be part of the facility's contingency plan.

able means of establishing identification and authorization.

5.7-5 III

VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT

A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared proposed amendments was made available in the Commis for the revision to this regulatory guide. The changes were sion's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash made to make the guide consistent with the upgrade ington, D.C., at the time the proposed amendments were physical protection amendments to the regulations published published. This analysis is appropriate for the final amend in final form in the FederalRegister of November 28, 1979 ments as well as for the regulatory guide revisions appropri

(44 FR 68184). A value/impact analysis prepared for the ate to those amendments.

5.7-6

APPENDIX

1. BACKGROUND The performance criterion for firearms detectors is at least an 85% effective detection rate. The performance criterion The purpose of this appendix Is to provide an example for explosives and nonferrous metal detectors is at least a of a testing method for determining the detection capabil 90% effective detection rate. One example of a method for ity of firearms, explosives, and nonferrous metal detectors. detection rate testing Is outlined on the following pages.

This example should not be interpreted as a regulatory The testing methods for showing at least 85% and at least requirement. Other testing -methods for demonstrating 90% effective detection rates are similar, the only difference compliance with the detection rates may be used if fully being that more successful tests are required to demonstrate documented and approved by the NRC. The purpose the higher detection rate. The security personnel should of testing a detector is to ensure that the installed instru test each detector by having one of the members of the ment is operating according to one of the three performance security organization walk through the detector carrying criteria stated below. the appropriate test material.

I. Firearms Detectors - Regulatory Position C. L.e of this 2.1.1 Firearm.sDetectors guide' states, in part, that firearms detectors should be capable of detecting firearms with at least an 85% For firearms detectors, test each detector 30 times.

effective detection rate.

1. If 29 or 30 of the 30 tests result in successful detec

2. Explosives Detectors - Regulatory Position C. I.e of tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate this guide states, in part, that explosives detectors a detection rate of at least 85%, with 95% confidence in should be capable of detecting explosives with at least this statement.

a 90% effective detection rate.

2. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections

3. Nonferrous Metal Detect6rs - Regulatory PositionC.2.d of the test material, the detector should be checked for an of this guide states, in part, that the metal detection obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi system should be capable of detecting nonferrous tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in metals with at least a 90% effective detection rate. successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 38 successful

2. TESTING THE DETECTORS detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion. However, Uf only 9 out of the There are at least two types of testing that should 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.

be conducted on the detectors: detection rate testing and All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to operational testing. Detection rate testing should be con demonstrate compliance, since. the cumulative number of ducted quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is successful detections must be at least 47 out of 50 tests designed to determine whether the detector is operating in in order to demonstrate at least an 85% detection rate, with compliance with the appropriate performance criterion. 95% confidence.

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, preferably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed 3. If 27 of the 30 tests result in successful detections to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detec of the test material, the detector should be checked for an tion rate has not decreased to below the performance obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 addi criterion. Additionally, manufacturer's design specifi tional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all cation testing could be conducted quarterly. If the detector 20 tests result in successful detections, then the detec does not meet the minimum performance levels for the tion rate testing can be ended for this detector for this detection rate testing and the operational testing given in quarter.

the following two sections, then corrective actions should be taken. All tests, test results, and corrective actions 4. If 26 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful should be documented. The documentation will establish detections of the test material, compliance with the perform the performance history for each detector, and the test ance criterion is not demonstrated.

results should be available for inspection and analysis.

Table 1, given below, shows in summary form the

2.1 Detection Rate Testing minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and

50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on Detection rate testing should be conducted on each the detection rate is at least 85%. See the appendices to detector quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys designed to determine whether the detector is operating in tems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving compliance with the appropriate performance criterion. these confidence limits.

5.7-7

1_1

Table 1 2. If 29 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi RATE OF 85% tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be Statement: ended for this detector for this quarter, since 39 successful The detection rate detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the Total No. Minimum No. of is at least _%, with performance criterion. However, if only 9 out of the of ,ests Successful Detections 95% confidence 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.

All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since the cumulative number of

30 29 85.1 successful detections must be at least 48 out of 50 tests

40 38 85.1 in order to demonstrate at least a 90%detection rate, with

50 47 85.2 95% confidence.

If the minimum number of successful detections given in "3.If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of Table I is not met, compliance with the performance the test material, the detector should be checked for an criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20

be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required additional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10

level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, the adjusted, or replaced), the testing procedure should be detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance quarter.

with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests.

A table similar to Table 2 of this Appendix can be used for 4. If 27 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful recording the test results. detections of the test material, compliance with the per formance criterion is not demonstrated.

Table 2 Table 3, given below, shows in summary form the DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and

50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on Firearms Detector at (location) the detection rate is approximately 90%(at least 88%). See the appendices of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Quarter 198 Intrusion Alarm Systems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits.

Date:

"Time: Table 3 No. of Tests No. of Successful Detections SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION

RATE OF ABOUT 90%

30 - (if 29 or 30, testing complete)

Statement:

10 The detection rate Total No. Minimum No. of is at least J%, with of Tests Successful Detections 95% confidence Total 40 - (if 38, testing complete)

10 30 30 90.5

40 39 88.7 so 48 87.9 Total 50 - (if 47, testing complete)

If the minimum number of successful detections given in

2.1.2 Explosives DetectorsandNonferrourMetl Detectors Table 3 is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to For explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors, be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required test each detector 30 times. level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), then the testing procedure should be I. If 30 out of the 30 tests result in successful detec conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A

detection rate of at least 90%, with 95% confidence in this table similar to Table 4 can be used for recording the test statement. results.

5.7-8

Table 4 the detection rate has not decreased to below the perform ance criterion. One example of a method for operational DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS testing is outlined on the following pages. The testing meth od for operational testing is the same for firearms detectors, explosives detectors, and nonferrous metal detectors. The Explosives (or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (ocation)

security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through Quarter _, 198_

the detector carrying the appropriate test material.

Date:

The operational testing on each detector should result in

100% detections of the test material. The test results should Time: be documented on a success/failure basis. If the detector fails No. of Tests No. of Successful Detections to detect the test material on an operational test, corrective actions should be taken and documented. For example, if

30 S(if 30, testing complete) the test of the detector results in no alarm (no detection),

the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting and retested 4 more times during the

10

same shift if possible. If all 4 of these tests result in alarms, the detector should be tested 5 more times during the same

40 - (if 39, testing complete) shift on the next day. If all these 5 tests result in alarms, Total the daily or once-per-shift testing schedule can be resumed,

10 since the performance criterion (85% detection rate for firearms detectors or 90% detection rate for explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors) has been con (if 48, testing complete) firmed. If there were any failures to detect among the 9 Total 50 __

additional tests, the detector should not be used until after it has been thoroughly checked, repaired If necessary, and retested according to the detection rate testing method to

2.2 Operational Testing demonstrate that it is now detecting the test material at the rate specified by the appropriate performance criterion. A

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, pref table similar to Table 5 can be used for recording the test erably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is results.

designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that

5.7-9 II

Table S

OPERATIONAL TESTING RESULTS

(Success -I, Failure = 0)

Firearms (or Explosives or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (location)

Week beginning , 198, (in Quarter , 198_)

Date Tune Result 4 Retests S Retests Monday - Shift I I oro . . ,,.,

- Shift 2 . . .. - - -

- Shift 3 '- '

Tuesday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Wednesday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Thursday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Friday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Saturday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Sunday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3

5.7-10

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20555 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

OFFICIAL BUSINESS U.SL NUCLEAR REGULATORY

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 CoMMISSION

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