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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13350A204
| number = ML003739976
| issue date = 06/30/1973
| issue date = 05/30/1980
| title = Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas
| title = (Task SG 909-4), Revision 1, Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Access Areas
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
Line 10: Line 10:
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = RG-5.007
| document report number = RG-5.007, Rev 1
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 10
| page count = 11
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:i U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
{{#Wiki_filter:Revision 1"
REGULATORY
                                                                                                                                          May 1980
DIRECTORATE
                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OF REGULATORY
                              REGULATORY GUIDE
STANDARDS Juno 1973 GuIDE REGULATORY  
                              OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
GUIDE 5.7 CONTROL OF PERSONNEL
                                                                REGULATORY GUIDE 57 (Task SG 909-4)
ACCESS TO PROTECTED  
                                          ENTRY/EXIT CONTROL FOR PROTECTED AREAS,
AREAS, VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS  
                                          VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Proposed amendments to the Commission regulations of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." 10 CFR Part 70. "Special Nuclear Material," and 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material," would, if adopted. require nuc..ures (I) for the protection against industrial sabotage of fuel reprocessing plants and certain facilities subject to tic provisions of 10 CFR Part 70 and (2) for tile protection of special nuclear mtaterial (SNM) against theft or diversion from certain licensed lacilities.
and entry/exit control systems and procedures for searching individuals, vehicles, and materials. Entry and exit control Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," of            procedures are used to provide assurance that only authorized Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, specifies perform                individuals are allowed access to protected areas (PAs), vital ance requirements for the physical protection of special                areas (VAs), and material access areas (MAAs). Entry search nuclear materials and associated facilities. Section 73.20,              procedures, in conjunction with other protection elements,
      "General Performance Requirements," describes the general                are used to provide assurance that firearms, explosives, and performance objective and requirements that must be met                  incendiary devices are not introduced into the subject areas.


One element of this protection is proper control of access of personnel to and from protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas. Searching persons and packages for tirearms.
through the establishment of a physical protection system.              Exit search procedures from material access areas are used Performance capabilities necessary to meet the requirements              to provide assurance that strategic special nuclear material of § 73.20 are described in § 73.45,"Performance Capabilities            (SSNM) is not being covertly removed.


explosives, and other devices which could aid in sabotage or theft of SNM is another element of physical protection.
for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems." While detec tion and control requirements are specified throughout the                  This guide describes measures the NRC staff considers capability statements, specific entry/exit control techniques            acceptable for implementing entry/exit control requirements are required under three capabilities. Paragraph 73.45(b)                at facilities subject to the above regulatory requirements.


This guide describes acceptable methods of searching personnel prior to entry into a protected area and upon exit from a material access area, and of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas.
specifies preventing "unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital                                       


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that (I) only persons authorized access to a protected area are permilled within that area and (2) that only individuals authorized access to vital equipment or special nuclear material will be allowed within vital areas or material access areas.The objective of searching individuals prior tc permitting entry into a protected area is to prevent illicit passage into tile protected area of objects such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices which could aid in industrial sabotage to the facility or in tile theft of special nuclear material.
areas." A physical protection system must achieve this by using entry controls, among other things. Paragraph 73.45(e)                The objective of controlling access to protected areas,
*Ipermits "removal of only authorized and confirmed forms                    vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that only and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from mate              authorized persons with legitimate need be allowed access rial access areas." The system must achieve this capability              to such areas. The objective of searching vehicles, personnel, by providing detection subsystems and procedures to detect,              or packages prior to entry into protected or material access assess, and communicate attempts at unauthorized removal.                areas is to prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, Paragraph 73.45(f) provides for ensuring only authorized                or incendiary devices that could be used to commit radio access to the protected area and requires, in part, the use of          logical sabotage or aid in the theft of SSNM. The objective entry controls to meet the capability. Finally, § 73.46,"Fixed          of searching all personnel and material exiting material Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements,                  access areas is to provide a means of detecting attempted Components, and Procedures," outlines typical specific safe              theft or diversion of concealed SSNM.


Searching individuals and packages for conce:;Ied special nuclear material at exit points from material access areas provides a means of detecting attempted theft or diversion of special nuclear material.Some meanis by which control of access can be accomplished include a key and lock system. a magnetic or electronic key-card system. an attendant guard or watchman, or a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) in conjunction with keys or key-cards.
guards measures that will often be included in an overall system that meets the requirements of Sections 73.20 and                    Entry control involves the following functions:
      73.45.


Of these means. the magnetic or electronic key-card system in conjunction with closed.circuit TV offers the greatest security with a ininimurn of personnel.
I. Identification and authorization check, A significant element of the physical protection system                  2. Entry to control point, is the control of the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles,                3. Weapons search, and material. This control includes personnel identification                  4. Explosive/incendiary device search,
                                                                                  5. Badge exchange, if used, and The substantial number of changes In this revision has made It          6. Admittance to area or denial and notification to Impractical to Indicate the changes with lines In the margin.                   security force of a problem.


The key-cards are mutch more difficult to duplicate tian keys and the locks cannot be "picked." Further, the control system can "read" the key-card and record the identity of the card (to whom it was issued)and the time of entry. A closed-cilcuit
USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES                                Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Regulatory Guide s are Issued to describe and make available to the     Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.
1V system would allow visual observation of the access point without requiring an attendant guard or watchman.


In fact, by use of closed-circuit TV several such access points can be maintained under observation by a single guard or watchman.
public methods acceptable to* the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech        The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions:
  niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu
    'led accidents or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulator          1.  Power Reactors uldes, are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliance wIth                                            6. Products Am Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set    2.   Research and Test Reactors     


Such a system would be especially useful at access points to remote or normally unoccupied vital areas or material access areas. In any case, visual observation, either directly or via CCTV, provides a positive neans of assuring that only individuals authorized access to an area pass through the access point into the area.Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of a hands-on search ("frisking").  
===7. Transportation===
or by means of devices which will detect the presence of weapons and explosives or SNM concealed on the individual, or by a combination of both. The search should be conducted in a manner which (I) provides as.surance that firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are not being carried into the protected area and that SNM is not USAEC REGULATORY
__,Jut in the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the     3.   Fuels and Materials Facilities a. Occupational Health findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or        4.   Environmental and Siting        9. Antitrust and Financial Review
GUIDES Copies ol published guides may be obtained by request Indicating the divisions desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commisston.
                                                                            5.  Materials and Plant Protection 10. General license by the Commission.


Wathinglon, D.C 240645, Regulatory Guides are issued to denoribe and rrake available to the public Attention:
Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are            Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate,    CHfIc divisions is available through the Government Printing Office.
Director of Regulatory Standerds.


Comments and suggestions for methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of Implementing specific parts of Improvements In theta guides are encouraged end should be sent to the Secretary the Commisson';
to accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or                Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may experience. This guide was revised as a result of substantive com        be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ments received from the public and additional staff review.              Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.
regulations, to delineate techniques used by the stafl In of the Commission.


US. Atomic Energy CommIsslon, Washington.
I I[


DC. 20545, evaluating probtems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to Attention:
The identity of an individual can be verified by determin                3. Escort means a member of the security organization ing something about an individual, such as facial features;              or other designated individual responsible for accompanying by determining something possessed by an individual, such                those personnel not allowed unescorted access within a as a coded badge; or by determining something known to                   protected area. An escort is not required to possess technica;
Chief. Public Proceedinmt Staff.applicants.
an individual, such as a numerical code. By using combina                knowledge of processes or equipment as is required by the".
tions of the above three identity verification processes,                two-man concept.


Regulatory Guidet are not substitutla for regulations and complIance with thenm is not reouired.
more reliable identity verification can be obtained. Such identification procedures can be accomplished by attendant                               


Methods and solutions different from those set out In The guides are Issued In the following lan broad divisions:
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
security personnel or by the use of identification equipment such as video comparator system


2. Poewerds and Teas Reactors 7. Traneportotlon I. Fuels and Matatials Facilities
====s.     ====
8. Occupt.lional Health Published guides will he revised periodically, at appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitruitt Review comments and to reflect new information or experience.


5. Materials and Plant Protection
===1. PROTECTED AREAS===
10. Geonwal I.I being transportcd out of a material access area and (2)nminimizcs inconvenience to the individuals being searched.
    Searching of incoming personnel or material can be                      a. Entry.Identificationand Authorization accomplished by a hands-on "pat-down" search, by-the use of devices that detect unauthorized materials, by the use of                 At each entry/exit control point (EECP) into a protected a "strip" search, or by a combination of all three. Entry                area, a means of establishing the identity and access autho searches that use equipment to perform the search function,              rization of incoming individuals should be provided. Accept such as metal or explosives detectors, are preferred as they              able means of identity verification are facial recognition minimize the imposition of a hands-on or strip search.                    and positive comparison to an authorized picture badge.


The use of equipment capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is usually the preferable form of searching, since the use of detection devices avoids the personal imposition of a hands-on search.An "airport type" weapon (me tal) detector located in a passageway arranged so that all individuals entering the protected area pass through the detector provides a convenient and effective means ofsearching for firearms.Devices capable of detecting dynanmite.
Such identity verification can be performed by attendant Exit searches, which are conducted to ensure that                    security personnel or by the use of remotely viewed closed concealed SSNM is not removed from material access areas,                 circuit television (CCTV) systems that display an acceptable should use both special nuclear material (SNM) detection                  image of the individual's face and compare it to an image of equipment and metal detection equipment to provide                        a picture badge or a stored image of that individual's face.


TNT, and other explosives can be used to search individuals for concealed explosives.
greater confidence that either shielded or unshielded                    The identification/verification procedure and confirmation material could be detected. All materials leaving the material            of entry authorization should be performed prior to any access area should undergo such a search.                                search function. To facilitate both identification and search functions, entry and exit traffic should be separated by Direct responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of          physical barriers, and employee and visitor traffic should be personnel, vehicles, and materials normally resides with                  processed separately.


Most explosive detectors commercialiy available at present are of the hand-held"sniffer" variety- hence an attendant guard or watchman must pass the detector over the individual being searched.
members of the security organization. They should be adequately trained in operation of entry/exit control and                    b. PersonnelSearch search equipment and procedures in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to                    A search of entering personnel for firearms, exploK..
10 CFR Part 73.                                                          sives, or incendiary devices should be conducted by use of both a firearms detector and an explosives detector. All Extensive discussions and descriptions of various alterna            incoming individuals not possessing a Department of tive equipment and procedures for use in controlling entry              Energy (DOE) material access authorization should undergo and exit and for conducting searches of personnel, vehicles,            such a search. DOE couriers engaged in the transport of and materials can be found in NUREG-0509, "Bibliography                  SSNM are exempt from such searches.


However, it is possible to locate an explosive detector in a passageway and to use the detector in the sanre manner that a fixed weapon detector is used.If a hand-held explosive detector is used, tIle explosive check is best made after the weapon detector has indicated that no weapon is concealed upon the individual.
of Technical Guidance for the Physical    1 Protection Upgrade Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites."'                                        A sample of all individuals possessing DOE material access authorizations should be searched. The sample rate For the purpose of this guide the following definitions              should be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected are provided:                                                            randomly from all entering personnel who possess the necessary authorizations.


This procedure affords greater protection to the attendant guard or watchman on the presumption that concealed explosives offer less of an immediate danger to the guard or watchman than a concealed firearm.One alternative approach to the hand-held explosive detector would be tile location of an explosive detector within a revolving-door frame. The rather small volume of air trapped in a section of the revolving door would be sampled by tile explosive detector and, as the isý)lation of the air volume by a revolving door section provides some concentration of vapors emitted by any explosives within that section, the 41fectiveness of the detector would be increased.
i. Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special                      In the event that search equipment indicates the presence nuclear material against theft and the protection of a plant              of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the following against radiological sabotage.                                           actions should be taken:
      2. Watchman means an individual, not necessarily                        1. The security personnel should request that the uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection                individual empty his or her pockets and again be tested by for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the              the search equipment. If the individual complies and after course of performing other duties.                                        the equipment no longer indicates the presence of firearms or explosives and the contents of the pockets have been verified as not including firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the individual may be allowed to pass into the
      1 NUREG-0509 is available for public inspection or copying for a protected area.


To further increase efficiency of thie explosive detector, the air in the door section might be flushed through the detector.Searching individuals for concealed SNM upon exit from material access areas can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For example, at facilities processing plutonium or uranium-233 the search for concealed SNM can be made in an attended air lock between change rooms. At areas where only highly enriched uranium is processed.
fee at the NRC's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW
  Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased directly from the NRe by writing to the Publications Sales Manager, Distribution Services          2. If, however, the equipment continues to indica!
  Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.           the presence of firearms or explosives, a physical searck..,
  20555 or the National Technical Information Service, Springfield.


the search can be carried nut by use of a doorway SNM monitor and a metal detector in conjunction with a clused-circiit TV (C"CTV) system.hence a guard om watchman need notl be alleirdattl, However, whether or not the access voint is Attended.the use of both an SNM .-ot;iitor ain ,I itetal de tIotl would seemn iiecessary to asstirr that eni iched rIrailrl.shielded or Li1lshieldcd, is niot tnecorlcealcd.
Virginia 22161.                                                          should be made by one unarmed security person, while at
                                                                    5.7-2


It addition, exit from any imaterial access area sNhould bu controlled to assure that all individuals and packages exiting from a material access area pass through the SNM check system.It is the facility guards and watchmen who are charged with the responsibility of assuring that firearms, explosives, and other similar items or devices are not transported into the protected area and that SNM is not removed from a material access area without authorization.
least one guard observes the search. An acceptable alterna        personnel, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior tive to a hands-on search is a "'strip search," which could be    to entry into the protected area. The search should include completed in the privacy of a separate searchroom and             the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo which should include the individual disrobing (except for          area. (Refer to NUREG/CR-0485, "Vehicle Access and underclothing) and submitting his or her clothing for              Search Training Manual," 2 for details. A level I search inspection.                                                        should be conducted as a minimum.) The use of vehicle sally ports (secure access passageways) is an acceptable way
    3. If an individual refuses to comply with either a           to facilitate identification, control, and search functions.


Hence, they should search any packages being carried into thc protected area or out of a material access area. No individual should be allowed to directly hand carry any package, valise, tool box, or similar hand-carriable item into the protected area or out ot" a material access area. Such objects should be handed to an attendant guard or watchman who will check them and pass them into the protectcd area or out of the material access area. To further reduce the possibility of concealment, where feasible, bulky outer clothing such as overcoats, raincoats, greatcodits, and ski jackets should be left in a cloak room provided outside the protected area and in any case should never be taken into a material access area. The licensee may wish to use several members of the security force to check packages, coats, etc.. during shift change to minimize tile delay encountered in gaining access. Unattended access points into the protected area can be used. provided observation of such points is maintained by CCTV to assure that packages are not being hand carried into the protected area at that point.Posting of a sign in a conspicuous location will inform individuals requesting access into the protected area that they will be searched, and that any packages, etc., they wish to take into the protected area will also be searched.Although the Commission regulations do not require searching of individuals entering a material access area, observation of access points provides a convenient method of ensuring that personnel do not carry weapons, explosives, and other similar items or devices into the material access area.In emergency situations, such as those which may require the evacuation of a material access area, the objectives of access control and search should not be allowed to compromise health and safety. Hence, the licensee should develop plans of action and provide areas and equipment for searching and controlling access under emergency conditions compatible with the objectives of both safety and security.
hands-on or strip search or if a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device is found, entry should be denied.                    All material or packages to be delivered into the PA
                                                                  are required to be identified and verified as an authorized
    4. If material of a suspicious and unknown nature is found,   delivery prior to entry. A sample of all such delivered entry should be delayed until responsible security personnel      packages or materials should be searched for firearms, are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature.    explosives, or incendiary devices, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with samples selected randomly from all When the initial search uses hand-held detectors or is a       such deliveries. Where size, weight, packaging, or other hands-on search, firearms should be searched for first, as it      characteristics prohibit an effective search by direct observa is presumed that a concealed firearm is a more immediate          tion, detection equipment, or X-ray, entry may be granted danger to the searcher than concealed explosives or incen          so long as:
diary devices.


Such emergency procedures will minimize the effectiveness of an emergency situation deliberately perpetrated to conceal theft of SNMN Admiinisirtaive controls, as well as physical barriers where applicable.
1. The material is escorted to its destination by a Entry into the protected area should be granted to            member of the security organization, individuals only after they have satisfactorily met the identification, authorization, and search requirements of 10          2. The material is not initially offloaded or unpack CFR Part 73. The opening to the last barrier to the PA            aged adjacent to a vital or material access area, and should be controlled by an individual isolated within a bullet-resisting structure. Acceptable means to accomplish            3. Offloading and unpackaging is observed by at least this are to provide a builet-resisting booth meeting UL            two authorized individuals, one of whom is a member Level IV standards at the last barrier of the EECP for the        of the security organization, for the purpose of ensuring individual who controls the opening to the PA or to have          that only authorized material has been delivered and that this opening controlled by the central alarm station (CAS)        there are no concealed firearms, explosives, or incendiary or secondary alarm station (SAS) operator or both.                devices.


may be employed to gather evacuating individuals within a holding area. Such controls would serve both ro vetif' that to one has remained in 1he evacuated area and to ensure that an emergency 57.2
c. Package or MaterialIdentificationand Search                      e. Entry and Search Aids At PA EECPs, all hand-carried packages should be searched          The use of pedestrian and vehicle sally ports can provide by direct observation, by the use of firearms detectors or        an effective means of isolating, identifying, and searching explosives detectors, or by the use of X-ray equipment for        individuals in a controlled area prior to allowing entry into concealed firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other        the PA. By interlocking the first and second openings in the items that could be used for theft or sabotage purposes.          sally port so they cannot be opened simultaneously and by Packages carried by individuals who possess a DOE material        providing observation of entry, a positive means of prevent access authorization may be excepted unless that person is        ing "piggybacking" is available.
(0 situation will not successfully conceal an attempted theft of SNM.C. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose uf this guide (he following dve illilions
;lLe provided: I ."Guard'" incan.i in armed arid uniforiied individual whose primary ditty is thie protection of materials and property to the ,txlcnit that theft of SNM or sabotage of thie facility curl Id pose a threat to tile common defense arid security or result in a r:adiological hazard to public health and sal'ct y.2. "Walchilnlul" Illealls all tin arnd individual.


nto nieces.iarily uinifornied, who provides protection for nialerials and property in tile course of performing oilier duties.3. -Patrol watrman'" means an ainis-qualified individual whose primary duty, at lcast during threat or enmergency situations, is the protection
one of the sample selected randomly to'undergo an entry search, in which case any hand-carried packages should also            Firearms detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal be searched.                                                       variety, should be capable of detecting with at least an 85%
.,f material and property, arid hvlio is normally unarmed but who may be armed during emergency or threat situations.
                                                                  effective detection rate one of the following located any Hand-carried packages or materials that cannot be readily      where on an individual: (1) Colt .25 automatic, (2) Titan opened or otherwise cannot be effectively searched by              .25 automatic, (3) General Precision Model 20-.22 caliber, direct observation should be submitted to suitable detec          (4) CDM .22 short, or (5) the calibration source specified in tion equipment, which may include X-ray devices. If the            NILECJ-STD-0601.00, "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for nature of the packaging interferes with effective operation        Use in Weapons Detection." 3 The false alarm rate should of firearm or explosives detection equipment, X-ray should            2 NUREGXCR-0495 is available for public inspection or copying be used. Any item or material determined to be of a ques          for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW.,
tionable nature by search personnel should not be allowed          Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased for $4.75 directly from NRC by sending check or money order, payable to Superintendent into the protected area until responsible security personnel      of Documents, to the Director, Division of Technical Information are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature.    and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 205SS. GPO Deposit Account holders may charge their order by calling (301) 492-9530. Copies are also available for d. Vehicle and Cargo Entry and Search                          purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.


A patrol watchman may or may not be uniformed.
3 All vehicles except DOE vehicles engaged in the transport            National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Standard 0601.00, Stock Number GPO-2700-002S6,Is for sale for of SNM and emergency vehicles responding to emergency              65 cents per copy by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.


D. REGULATORY
conditions are required to be searched for unauthorized            Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
POSITION I. Protected Areas I. Identity and Authorization At each access point into a protected area, an identlity and access authorization check should be made ini conjunction willi a search for firearms and explosives'
Si.!,:], idenlitv and access authorization checks should be performied by an attendant guard or watchman or by nmeans of an electronic or magnetic key-card system and a closed-circuit TV systenm. Packages should be taken into the protected area only at access points attended by a guard or watchman.


If the access point is unattended, the individual monitoring.
5.7-3 II{


the access point via closed-circuit TV should carefully observe any individual requesting access at that point to ensure that no packages arc being carried into the protected area.b. Personnel Search If tile search of individuals is to be carried out by mezuis of detection equipment, a weapon (metal)detector anl(] an explosive detector should be used. An acceptable arrangement for the use of detection equipnmenI
not exceed 10% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to       verifying authorization is the use of a code intrinsic to the this detection level. The devices should be adjusted to          picture badge indicating that entry to MAAs is authorized.
in a secure access passageway is illustrated in Figure 1. The doors oil the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be sinniltaneously open, thus providing positive access control. An explicit enabling act should be required of a security individual, either attending the secure access passageway or in the central alarm station, to open the inner door.c. Metal Detector The metal detector located within (tie secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 200 grams of non-forrous metal placed anywhere on the body at a )0% conifidence limit. The false alarm rate should be a niaxi mnum of' I d. Explosive Detector The explosive detector, as a miliniumn.


hould be capable of' detecting dynaimite.
discriminate between typical firearm and non-firearm masses of metal. One example of a testing method for                At no time should a lone individual be allowed entry to demonstrating compliance with the detection rate is given        an MAA or a vault. As a minimum, entry to an unoccupied in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods              MAA requires at least two individuals to meet the intent of may be used if the methods are fully documented and              the two-man concept.


TNT. and similar nitrogen compounds in nminiimim amountsl of 200 gramis at a 90%-. confidence hinil, The false alarii rate should be a miaxinium of 1V,.. If deteclor is hand held rather than permanently fixed to a passageway or revolving door framle, lieice requiriing an attendanlt guard or watchlmaui, the search for explosives should be IerTornied after the search for firearms.
approved by the NRC.


An acceptable arrangi.ent is illustrated in Figure 2.e. Alarm Ani. niciation The alarins of tile weapon detector arid tile explosive detector should annunciate at the location of tile detectors, if attended, as well as in a centrad alarm station. The alarm annunciation at the location of tile detectors need not be aural.f. Alarm System The alarms of the weaponi (metal) detector and tihe explosive detector should be interfaced with (lie inner door lock so ihal. with aln alarm triggered.
b. Packageor MaterialIdentification and Search Explosives detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least a      All packages and materials entering a material access
90% effective detection rate dynamite, TNT, and similar          area should be searched for firearms, explosives, and nitrogen-containing compounds in a minimum amount of              incendiary devices. Search procedures and equipment, as
200 grams. One example of a testing method for demon              discussed previously, for use at protected area EECPs should strating compliance with the detection rate is given in the       be used. In the event that security search personnel are Appendix. Other testing methods may be used if the              suspicious of the nature of any searched packages or methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC.            material, entry should be delayed until the nature or The false alarm rate should not exceed 1%when the detector        identity of the package or material can be determined.


Ihe inner door cannot be opened from either side without a specific action by the individual manning the central alarm station acknowledging the alarm and enabling the inner door to be opened.2. Material Access Areas Containing Pu or U-233 a. Change Room Exit Checking for c on cealed plutoniumn or uranirim-233 at all exit point from a material access area into a protected area should be performed in an attended secure access passageway located between change rooms. An acceptable arrangement is shown in Figure 3. Unless exit is into a contiguous material access area, all individuals should exit from a nmatcrial access area, other than a vault, only via tie change rooms arid should be required to deposit all work clothing in tile inner change room. walk through tihe passageway, and dress in street clothing in (lie outer change room. The licensee should generally not allow packages to be transported out of the miaterial access area via tire change rooms. Showers, except those used exclusively for health plhysic.s, should be located in thie outer change room. A guard or watchman need not be altendant except when personnel are exiting from the material access area.b. SNM Detector An SNM detector should be located within the passageway.
sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. If the search for explosives is to be performed directly by security                c. Entry and Search Aids personnel, it should be performed only after a search for firearms has been made.                                               Entry and search aids discussed in the section on pro tected areas are also applicable to EECPs at MAA boundaries.


T1he detector should be capable of detecting 0.5 gram of plutonium or I gram of uraniun-233 shielded by 3 min of brass concealed anywhere on an individual at a 9Oi confidence limit. The false alarm rate on the detector should be less than 0.1%.5.7-3
A search dog may be capable of providing a satisfac          In addition, unmanned EECP doors should be alarmed and tory detection capability for firearms and explosives. If        annunciate in both the CAS and SAS.
0 c. Door Interlock The doors of tile attended secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. The doors should also be alarmed.so that an explicit action must be taken by either the attendant security individual or the individual manning the central alarm station to enable either door to open without triggering the alarm.d. Packages All packages.


including waste barrels and work clothes hampers, being transported out of a material access area should be checked by an attendani guard or watchman for concealed SNM, preferably at an exit point expressly provided for packages.
dogs are used, they should be individually tested to ensure their continued capability and reliability. As an animal may       


SNM packages should be checked for proper seals, identification, and transfer documentation.
====d. Exit Search for SSNM====
present unpredictable problems and weaknesses, a set of trained and tested backup individuals or other detection              Prior to exit from an MAA, all individuals, vehicles, devices or equipment should be immediately available to          packages, and other materials are required to be searched serve as a substitute in the event of a dog's illness or other    for concealed SSNM. This search should be conducted using sign of abnormal behavior. A dog should be used only if it        both metal detection and SNM detection equipment. The can be shown to detect firearms or explosives with equal or      metal detection system used to search for concealed shielded greater confidence than existing alternatives. A dog may be      SSNM should be capable of detecting with at least a 90%
particularly useful in the search of vehicles or oversize        effective detection rate a minimum of 100 grams of nonfer packages. As the duration of a dog's effectiveness for           rous metal (shielding) concealed anywhere on an individual.


e. Change Room Access Access by personnel into a material access area should he permitted only through the change rooms.Control of access should be accomplished either by a guard or watchman attending the secure access passageway between the change rooms, or by a combination of key-card and CCTV when the passageway is unattended.
performing search functions may be limited, it should be        One example of a testing method for demonstratinig com used only as a secondary aid.                                    pliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the Annunciation of metal and explosives detection equip        methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC.


f. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the control of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone indihidual is allowed within a material access area without some means to observe that individual's activities.
ment should be both aural and visual.                           The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% for that level of detection. SNM detection equipment should be capable of The EECP should be provided with one or more duress          detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched to alarms that annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. Such            90% in the uranium-235 isotope in accordance with the alarms should be placed in a concealed location that can        testing and operational requirements of Regulatory Guide generally be reached by attendant security personnel and        5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitor."
activated in an unobtrusive manner. An acceptable alterna tive to duress alarms that annunciate in the alarm stations is      Individuals should undergo two separate searches prior the use of duress alarms that are ,Worn or carried by atten      to exiting an MAA. An acceptable method of conduc dant security personnel and that can be activated unobtru        ting these searches is to require individuals to pass through sively. Such duress alarms should be worn or carried at all      two separate sets of metal and SNM detection equipment, times when security personnel attend an EECP.                    each set monitored by a different member of the security organization. For individuals exiting an area that contains
2. MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS                                        only encapsulated or alloyed SSNM, the second search may be made of a sampling of all individuals exiting the area, the a. Entry Identificationand Authorization                      sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly to undergo the search.


3. Material Access Areas Containing Highly Enriched Uranium, and Vaults Containing SNM a. Exit At material access area exit points, the check for concealed SNM should be carried out by means of an SNM doorway monitor and a metal detector.
Individuals desiring entry to material access areas should be verified as being on appropriate authorization schedules          If an SNM or metal detector is triggered by an individual  /'
and should be identified by comparison of facial features to    attempting to exit an MAA EECP, the individual should be an authorized picture badge. An acceptable method of             asked to remove all items from his or her pockets and again
                                                            3.74


A secure access passageway located at the exit point from the material access area should house the detection equipment.
Entry control should ensure use of the two-man concept pass through the detection equipment. If the detector still        during entry and access to vaults and should ensure that the triggers, a hands-on or strip search should be conducted. In        vault is monitored by CCTV in both alarm stations and at the event search personnel are unsure of the nature of an least one other continuously manned onsite location.


An attendant guard or watchman or a closed-circuit TV connected to the central alarm station should also be provided.
object or material uncovered during a search, the material or object should be confiscated and the individual's exit             


Administrative procedures should require the passage of packages only through attended exit points. The doors of the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. A suggested layout is illustrated in Figure 4.b. SNM Detector The SNM doorway monitor in the secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 3 grams uranium enriched to 90t10 in the uranium-235 isotope in 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an individual at a 50,7 confidence limit. The false alarm rate should not exceed 0. 1%, c. Metal Detector The metal detector in the secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 100 grams of non-ferrous metal (shielding)
===3. VITAL AREAS===
at a 90%confidence limit concealed anywhere on an individual.
delayed until a determination can be made that the object or material is not SSNM or does not contain SSNM.                       Entry to vital areas should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules Vehicles, materials, or packages, including trash, uncon are accomplished prior to entry into the area. Use of the taminated wastes, tools, and other equipment should two-man concept for entry control is recommended. The be searched with SNM and metal detection equipment where use of attendant security personnel, authorized escorts, or appropriate. This search should be conducted by a team of remotely viewed CCTV systems that compare a facial image at least two authorized and designated individuals who are to an authorized picture badge are all acceptable means of not normally allowed access to the material access area in          providing such control.


The false alarm rate should not exceed 0.1%.d. Alarms The doors of the se. :tre access passageway should be alarmed and interfaced with the doorway monitor such that an individual can be detained for a sufficient time for the doorway monitor to operate. If an individual passes through without waiting for the proper period of time (perhaps indicated by a light) the alarm should sound. The doorway monitor and metal detector alarms and the door alarms should annunciate in the central alarm station and may also annunciate at the passageway.
question. An acceptable means of accomplishing such searches for items too large to be accommodated in pedes         


e. Access The exit points from the material access area should be used for access points as well. Control of access should be by either the attendant security individual or by a key-card CCTV system.f. Closed-Circuit TV Observation If observation of the passageway is accomplished by CCTV, the guard or watchman monitoring the passageway should carefully observe any individual widtin to ensure that no packages are being carried into or out of the access area.g. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the control of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone individual is allowed within a material access area without sonic means to observe that individual's activities.
===4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES===
trian EECPs is to provide a holding area within the MAA
that can be isolated from other MAA activities when search Emergency procedures should be developed to deal personnel are conducting authorized searches.


h. Vaults A key-card CCTV system should be employed to control access to and from a vault if such access and exit points do not open to or from material access areas contiguous to the vault. In addition, all individuals who transport SNM between material access areas or to or from a vault, should be escorted by a member of the facility's security force during any period of the transport that the SNM is not within a material access area.4. Vital Areas Control of access into vital areas should be accompli fl ither by an attendant guard or watchman, or by meiýn , i nagnetic or electronic key-card access in conjunctint:
with the possibility of failure of entry/exit detection and assessment equipment or emergency evacuation.
with closed-circuit TV. The identification checi: .,tid include either direct observation by an.attendant guard or watchman or observation by CCTV of each individual passing into the vital area, or some alternate means (e.g.. an escort) which will provide 5.7-4 pisitive asstrance that only individuals authorized access to the vital area are permitted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an Alarm The guard:; and patrol watchmen should be trained and prepared to protect the facility from sabot::ge and tihe SNM within from theft.a. Protected Area Access Point SIlion anlnunciatiot, ot all alarni from explosive Or Lea rt detectir tl eqtuirnment loc:ated at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman.a gtr:-rd 'hould lc dispatched iCnIlediatelV
to the access point oripinating the "d:rni. If the ac,:ess point is unaltellded.


two .,r: should h%, sent to thie access pointi. At the a,ces, poittil th,: 0ti'rd or watchmlan should!eLicsi t tha 11,Cividluafl'.  
e. Accounting for Individuals In MAAs a. Failureof Detection Equipment Procedures should be employed at MAA EECPs to account for the number and identity of individuals within Provisions should be made to use alternative EECPs the MAA. Manual or automated accounting procedures are              or backup detection equipment or security personnel and equally acceptable so long as the procedures can determine provide for rapid repair of malfunctioning detection equip at any given time that no lone individual Is within the             ment. Failure of detection equipment should not be allowed MAA. An attempted violation of the two-man concept                  to compromise the effectiveness of required search proce should be detectable at the EECP, CAS, and SAS (e.g.,              dures.
pockets be emptied and that the ilndividUal la.s arilin 1hioudi the detection cquiipmen'n.


I1 the i: dividu.al complies and if the alarms do inot register.
if one of two individuals alone within an MAA attempts to exit without the other).
                                                                        b. Evacuation Procedures I. Vaults To the extent possible, and without compromising safety practices or considerations, procedures should be
    .Entry to vaults should be controlled so that individ established to protect against the possibility of an emergency ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules      evacuation being used to remove SSNM from the facility or are accomplished prior to opening the vault door. The use          to gain unauthorized access to the facility. Such procedures of split-screen CCTV or CCTV and badge reader are accept          should be part of the facility's contingency plan.


tie individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area after the contents of the individual's pocketis have beet examnined verifying that nto atleruipt has been made to pass explosives or firearms into the proleeted area. If. however, all alarmi continues t) register.
able means of establishing identification and authorization.


tie individual should be physically searched 1w a%,n tiarned security individual, while at least one gCaif or armcd pitrol watchnian observes.
5.7-5 III


to verify that no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the hndividtral.
VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT
    A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared    proposed amendments was made available in the Commis for the revision to this regulatory guide. The changes were sion's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash made to make the guide consistent with the upgrade ington, D.C., at the time the proposed amendments were physical protection amendments to the regulations published published. This analysis is appropriate for the final amend in final form in the FederalRegister of November 28, 1979 ments as well as for the regulatory guide revisions appropri
(44 FR 68184). A value/impact analysis prepared for the ate to those amendments.


I!* tile individual relfuses to comply with the ren.ýuesl tI r furthher searching, or if a weapon or cexpiosives
5.7-6
:tic ftound. tlie individual should be denied h. -Materil Access Area Exit Point If an SNM or metal delector alarii or a door.'ir~i is triggered at a miatcrial access area exit point ated bd hv a guard or watchman or at all unattended A.,lt point, security personnel, at least one of whom is armled (a guard or arnied patrol watchman).
should be dispatched to that exit point. The individual should be scatrhed bw emptying pockets and passing again through!O detection equipment or by a hands-on search 1.xrfortned by an unarmed security individual while at least ote guard or arnied patrol watchman observes.


Th, ca~(, of the alarm should be determined before the individual is ieleased.
APPENDIX
1. BACKGROUND                                                        The performance criterion for firearms detectors is at least an 85% effective detection rate. The performance criterion The purpose of this appendix Is to provide an example            for explosives and nonferrous metal detectors is at least a of a testing method for determining the detection capabil            90% effective detection rate. One example of a method for ity of firearms, explosives, and nonferrous metal detectors.          detection rate testing Is outlined on the following pages.


If the cause of the alarti was an uhiect. metal or SNM, not concealed by the individual.
This example should not be interpreted as a regulatory                The testing methods for showing at least 85% and at least requirement. Other testing -methods for demonstrating                90% effective detection rates are similar, the only difference compliance with the detection rates may be used if fully            being that more successful tests are required to demonstrate documented and approved by the NRC. The purpose                      the higher detection rate. The security personnel should of testing a detector is to ensure that the installed instru          test each detector by having one of the members of the ment is operating according to one of the three performance          security organization walk through the detector carrying criteria stated below.                                               the appropriate test material.


thl. individual should be searched without the object to ensure that the object is not a decoy and that SNM is olt still tk:ing concealed by the individual.
I. Firearms Detectors - Regulatory Position C. L.e of this          2.1.1 Firearm.sDetectors guide' states, in part, that firearms detectors should be capable of detecting firearms with at least an 85%                For firearms detectors, test each detector 30 times.


If the::cur 1ity personnel determine that attempted unauthtorized removal of SNM has been made with tile intent to .;teal SN.M, local police and the Federal Bureau Wf Investigation should be contacted.
effective detection rate.


and tile individual should be field by the security personnel until the local polio: arrive and arrest the individual.
1. If 29 or 30 of the 30 tests result in successful detec
    2. Explosives Detectors - Regulatory Position C. I.e of          tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate this guide states, in part, that explosives detectors        a detection rate of at least 85%, with 95% confidence in should be capable of detecting explosives with at least      this statement.


c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas It1 unautllioried ent ry is made or atlempted into a vital area or material access arca. or if atn intrusiorn alarm protecting all unoccupied vital or material access area is triggered, two drnied xecuirity personnel should he dispatched immediately to the area of al:irn. If.however. the area of the alarm can be obsev.:ed by CCTV. tile guard or valchniman in the alrm :.iation whiere the TV mronitor is located should first verily tile existence of intrusiOn and assess tile extent of a tharc:. if any. before dispatching flie security persottnef.
a 90% effective detection rate.


If ilie ,,i,.cti ce of all intrusion is verified, cither by CCTV or:;CCLMiy personnel in tile area, a law en 'oreeren juimi'ty should be nolified imnmediately.
2. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections
    3. Nonferrous Metal Detect6rs - Regulatory PositionC.2.d        of the test material, the detector should be checked for an of this guide states, in part, that the metal detection      obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi system should be capable of detecting nonferrous              tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in metals with at least a 90% effective detection rate.          successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 38 successful
2. TESTING THE DETECTORS                                            detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion. However, Uf only 9 out of the There are at least two types of testing that should              10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.


It" pos,;ible.
be conducted on the detectors: detection rate testing and            All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to operational testing. Detection rate testing should be con            demonstrate compliance, since. the cumulative number of ducted quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is                successful detections must be at least 47 out of 50 tests designed to determine whether the detector is operating in          in order to demonstrate at least an 85% detection rate, with compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.              95% confidence.


tli ifiatruder(s)
Operational testing should be conducted daily or, preferably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed          3. If 27 of the 30 tests result in successful detections to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detec          of the test material, the detector should be checked for an tion rate has not decreased to below the performance                obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 addi criterion. Additionally, manufacturer's design specifi              tional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all cation testing could be conducted quarterly. If the detector        20 tests result in successful detections, then the detec does not meet the minimum performance levels for the                tion rate testing can be ended for this detector for this detection rate testing and the operational testing given in          quarter.
found by tile security persotnel shothd searched and detadned until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide proteduhres anrd equipmen t to maintain the level of access control and SNM and facility protection during condilions of emergency or equipment failure. E-mergency procedures should be developed and executed in a rimtiner consistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions which require evacuation of part or all of the facility.


lemporafry SNM checking stations should be established at the perinucler of tile protected area or at a personnel collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should he searched for concealed SNM before being released from the protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll of all individuals
the following two sections, then corrective actions should be taken. All tests, test results, and corrective actions                4. If 26 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful should be documented. The documentation will establish              detections of the test material, compliance with the perform the performance history for each detector, and the test              ance criterion is not demonstrated.
%,,ho had entered tile evacutated area should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated .alfely.If an evacuation or other emergency alarm souttids.guards and watchmen should take at prearranged surveillance points to ensure that: (I) Proper evacuation routes :ire being observed, (2) SNM is not being tossed over tile protected area perimeter harrier, and (3) No one atteinpts to gain trnatlhorized access to the protected area during tile emergency.


b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as possible.
results should be available for inspection and analysis.


Ill the interim, alternate access or exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed, Ili no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise tihe protection of the facility or the SNM within the facility.
Table 1, given below, shows in summary form the
2.1 Detection Rate Testing                                          minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and
                                                                    50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on Detection rate testing should be conducted on each              the detection rate is at least 85%. See the appendices to detector quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is              Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys designed to determine whether the detector is operating in          tems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.              these confidence limits.


S ip4sitive assurance that only individuals authorized access to the vital area are permit ted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an Alarm The guard:, and patrol watchnmen should be trained and prepared to protect tlie l'acility firom sahotage and the SNNI within fromi thelt.a. Protected Area Access Point I Ilion1 annunciation of an alarin from explosive or weapon detctiiOn equipment located at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman, a guard should be dispatched inmediately to the access poii't originating tile alarm. If the aczess point is t1tlat tenrdell.
5.7-7
                                                                                                    1_1


two .should be sent to the access point. At the ajces; point the guard or watchman shouldthar dhc itlividual's pockets be emptied and that the individual pas again tlhr'ough Ltie detection equipment.
Table 1                                        2. If 29 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION                          obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi RATE OF 85%                                    tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be Statement:                      ended for this detector for this quarter, since 39 successful The detection rate              detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the Total No.        Minimum No. of        is at least _%, with            performance criterion. However, if only 9 out of the of ,ests    Successful Detections    95% confidence                  10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.


If the individual complies and if tile alarms do not register.
All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since the cumulative number of
    30                29                      85.1                    successful detections must be at least 48 out of 50 tests
    40                38                      85.1                    in order to demonstrate at least a 90%detection rate, with
    50              47                      85.2                    95% confidence.


tile individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area after the contents of the individual's pockets have been examined verifying that no at lempt has been made to pass explosives or firearms init, the protected area. It1. however. an alarm continues fit register.
If the minimum number of successful detections given in                "3.If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of Table I is not met, compliance with the performance                    the test material, the detector should be checked for an criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to            obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20
be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required            additional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10
level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired,                tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, the adjusted, or replaced), the testing procedure should be                detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance                    quarter.


thle individual should be physically searched 1wv all unarmed security individual.
with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests.


while at least one.Ciad or armed patrol watchman observes.
A table similar to Table 2 of this Appendix can be used for                4. If 27 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful recording the test results.                                            detections of the test material, compliance with the per formance criterion is not demonstrated.


to verify that nio firearms or explosives are yet concealed by tie individual.
Table 2 Table 3, given below, shows in summary form the DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS                              minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and
                                                                        50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on Firearms Detector at (location)                                        the detection rate is approximately 90%(at least 88%). See the appendices of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Quarter      198                                                      Intrusion Alarm Systems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits.


If the individual rfiuses to comply with the request for further searching, or if a weapon or expiosives are found, the individual should be denied*kcces:ý.1). Material Access Area Exit Point If an SNM or nietal detector alarm or a door ,arran, is triggered at a material access area exit point t by a guard or watchman or at an unattended exit point. security personnel, at least one of whom is armied (a guard or armed patrol watchman).  
Date:
should be dispatched to that exit point. Tile individual should be searched by emptying pockets and passing again through thi' detection equipment or by a hands-on search performed by an unarmed security individual while at least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes.
"Time:                                                                                              Table 3 No. of Tests        No. of Successful Detections              SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION
                                                                                            RATE OF ABOUT 90%
              30            -  (if 29 or 30, testing complete)
                                                                                                              Statement:
              10                                                                                              The detection rate Total No.       Minimum No. of      is at least J%, with of Tests    Successful Detections 95% confidence Total        40            -  (if 38, testing complete)
              10                                                            30                30                    90.5
                                                                            40                39                    88.7 so                48                    87.9 Total        50              - (if 47, testing complete)
                                                                          If the minimum number of successful detections given in
    2.1.2 Explosives DetectorsandNonferrourMetl Detectors              Table 3 is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to For explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors,          be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required test each detector 30 times.                                          level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), then the testing procedure should be I. If 30 out of the 30 tests result in successful detec            conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a            the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A
detection rate of at least 90%, with 95% confidence in this            table similar to Table 4 can be used for recording the test statement.                                                            results.


The caosc of the alarm should be determined before the individual is feleased.
5.7-8


If the cause of the alarm was an object, metal or SNM, riot concealed by the individual, tile individual should be searched without the object to ensure that tile object is not a decoy and that SNM is nrot still b-ing concealed by the individual.
Table 4                                    the detection rate has not decreased to below the perform ance criterion. One example of a method for operational DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS                              testing is outlined on the following pages. The testing meth od for operational testing is the same for firearms detectors, explosives detectors, and nonferrous metal detectors. The Explosives (or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (ocation)
                                                                    security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through Quarter _, 198_
                                                                    the detector carrying the appropriate test material.


If the security personnel determine that attempted unauthorized removal of SNM has been made with the intent to .4tcal SNM, local police and the Federal Bureau of Invesligation should he contacted.
Date:
                                                                        The operational testing on each detector should result in
                                                                      100% detections of the test material. The test results should Time:                                                                be documented on a success/failure basis. If the detector fails No. of Tests        No. of Successful Detections              to detect the test material on an operational test, corrective actions should be taken and documented. For example, if
            30            S(if 30, testing complete)                the test of the detector results in no alarm (no detection),
                                                                    the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting and retested 4 more times during the
            10
                                                                      same shift if possible. If all 4 of these tests result in alarms, the detector should be tested 5 more times during the same
            40            -  (if 39, testing complete)              shift on the next day. If all these 5 tests result in alarms, Total the daily or once-per-shift testing schedule can be resumed,
            10                                                      since the performance criterion (85% detection rate for firearms detectors or 90% detection rate for explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors) has been con (if 48, testing complete)              firmed. If there were any failures to detect among the 9 Total        50            __
                                                                      additional tests, the detector should not be used until after it has been thoroughly checked, repaired If necessary, and retested according to the detection rate testing method to
2.2 Operational Testing demonstrate that it is now detecting the test material at the rate specified by the appropriate performance criterion. A
  Operational testing should be conducted daily or, pref table similar to Table 5 can be used for recording the test erably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is results.


and the individual should be held by the security personnel until the local police arrive and arrest the individual.
designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that
                                                              5.7-9 II


c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas It' unauthoried en ry is made or atternited into a vital area or material access area. or if an intrusion alarm protecting an unoccupied vilal or material access area is triggered.
Table S
                                            OPERATIONAL TESTING RESULTS
                                                (Success -I, Failure = 0)
Firearms (or Explosives or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (location)
Week beginning              , 198, (in Quarter , 198_)
                                    Date              Tune        Result  4 Retests  S Retests Monday      - Shift I                                        I oro    .        .  ,,.,
                  - Shift 2                                                  . . ..   - -    -
                  - Shift 3                                                  '-  '
      Tuesday    - Shift I
                  - Shift 2
                  - Shift 3 Wednesday - Shift I
                  - Shift 2
                - Shift 3 Thursday    - Shift I
                - Shift 2
                - Shift 3 Friday      - Shift I
                - Shift 2
                - Shift 3 Saturday    - Shift I
                - Shift 2
                - Shift 3 Sunday    - Shift I
                - Shift 2
                - Shift 3
                                                      5.7-10


two arrmed security personnel should he dispatched imnediately to tihe area of alarm. It.however. tile area of' the alarmn can be obsc.'ed by CCTV, the guard or vatlchman in the alarm ,,atlihri where the TV monitor is located should first verify the existence of intrusion and assess the extent of 'tihrkal.
UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
it l any. before dispatching thie security personnel.
    WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20555 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
 
      OFFICIAL BUSINESS        U.SL NUCLEAR REGULATORY
i1 the exiStence of anl intrusion is verified, either by CCTV or sccuniny personnel in tlie area, a law enforcement aJltno ily should be nolified immediately.
  PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300        CoMMISSION
 
                                                        K}}
If' pts,.ihle.
 
th,' nitnider(s)
found by the security personnel sh,0tm1d searched and detained until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide procedures
;nd equipment to maintain the level of access conitrol ;anld SNM and facility protection during conditions ot'emergency or equipment failure. Etmergency procedures should be developed and executtcd in a mn:arne consistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions whicil reqinte evacuation of part or all of live facility.
 
lemporary SNM checking stations should be established at the peri neler of thie protected area or at a personnel collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should Le searched for concealed SNM before being released nrono tile protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll of' all individuals who had entered the evacu:ated area should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated .allly.if an evacuation or other emergency alarm souinds.guards and watchmen should take positio- at prearranged surveillance peints to ensure that: (i) Proper evacuation rouics are being observed, (2) SNM is not being tossed over tire protected area perimeter barrier, and (3) No one attempts to gain unarlhtorized access to the protected area during tIre emergency.
 
b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as possible.
 
In the interim, allernlale access or exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed.
 
In no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise the protection of tlie facility or tire SNM within the facility.0 5.7-5 PROTECTED
AREA-J'CCTV CAMERA-N PERIMETER
FENCE-x_ X-xx-X-x--
EXPLOSIVES
DETECTOR-/
1 KEY-CARD READER---'
INNER DOOR-WEAPON (METAL) DETECTOR KEY-CARD READER (FOR EXIT),-PERIMETER
FENCE a ----ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
OUTER DOOR Figure 1 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
INTO PROTECTED
AREA (UNATTENDED)
0.
 
t" PROTECTED
AREA INNER DOOR WEAPON DETECTOR PERIMETER
FENCE co cn>0 0 m mCA I/GUARD STATION I PERIMETER f FENCE_kz __ lz %y _%Z-J OFFICES--- ~ I OUTEF DOOR RECEPTION AREA-I.Figure 2 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
AT ENTRANCE TO PROTECTED
AREA (ATTENDED)
PROTECTED
AREA ENTRANCE Figure 3 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
BETWEEN CHANGE ROOMS
I PROTECTED
AREA--MATERIAL ACCESS AREA KEY-CARD Figure 4 READER~SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
AT EXIT FROM MATERIAL ACCESS AREA}}


{{RG-Nav}}
{{RG-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 10:26, 28 March 2020

(Task SG 909-4), Revision 1, Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Access Areas
ML003739976
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/30/1980
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
RG-5.007, Rev 1
Download: ML003739976 (11)
v • d • e


Revision 1"

May 1980

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY GUIDE 57 (Task SG 909-4)

ENTRY/EXIT CONTROL FOR PROTECTED AREAS,

VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS

A. INTRODUCTION

and entry/exit control systems and procedures for searching individuals, vehicles, and materials. Entry and exit control Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," of procedures are used to provide assurance that only authorized Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, specifies perform individuals are allowed access to protected areas (PAs), vital ance requirements for the physical protection of special areas (VAs), and material access areas (MAAs). Entry search nuclear materials and associated facilities. Section 73.20, procedures, in conjunction with other protection elements,

"General Performance Requirements," describes the general are used to provide assurance that firearms, explosives, and performance objective and requirements that must be met incendiary devices are not introduced into the subject areas.

through the establishment of a physical protection system. Exit search procedures from material access areas are used Performance capabilities necessary to meet the requirements to provide assurance that strategic special nuclear material of § 73.20 are described in § 73.45,"Performance Capabilities (SSNM) is not being covertly removed.

for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems." While detec tion and control requirements are specified throughout the This guide describes measures the NRC staff considers capability statements, specific entry/exit control techniques acceptable for implementing entry/exit control requirements are required under three capabilities. Paragraph 73.45(b) at facilities subject to the above regulatory requirements.

specifies preventing "unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital

B. DISCUSSION

areas." A physical protection system must achieve this by using entry controls, among other things. Paragraph 73.45(e) The objective of controlling access to protected areas,

  • Ipermits "removal of only authorized and confirmed forms vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that only and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from mate authorized persons with legitimate need be allowed access rial access areas." The system must achieve this capability to such areas. The objective of searching vehicles, personnel, by providing detection subsystems and procedures to detect, or packages prior to entry into protected or material access assess, and communicate attempts at unauthorized removal. areas is to prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, Paragraph 73.45(f) provides for ensuring only authorized or incendiary devices that could be used to commit radio access to the protected area and requires, in part, the use of logical sabotage or aid in the theft of SSNM. The objective entry controls to meet the capability. Finally, § 73.46,"Fixed of searching all personnel and material exiting material Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, access areas is to provide a means of detecting attempted Components, and Procedures," outlines typical specific safe theft or diversion of concealed SSNM.

guards measures that will often be included in an overall system that meets the requirements of Sections 73.20 and Entry control involves the following functions:

73.45.

I. Identification and authorization check, A significant element of the physical protection system 2. Entry to control point, is the control of the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, 3. Weapons search, and material. This control includes personnel identification 4. Explosive/incendiary device search,

5. Badge exchange, if used, and The substantial number of changes In this revision has made It 6. Admittance to area or denial and notification to Impractical to Indicate the changes with lines In the margin. security force of a problem.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Regulatory Guide s are Issued to describe and make available to the Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.

public methods acceptable to* the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions:

niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu

'led accidents or to provide guidance to applicants. Regulator 1. Power Reactors uldes, are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliance wIth 6. Products Am Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set 2. Research and Test Reactors

7. Transportation

__,Jut in the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities a. Occupational Health findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review

5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General license by the Commission.

Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, CHfIc divisions is available through the Government Printing Office.

to accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may experience. This guide was revised as a result of substantive com be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ments received from the public and additional staff review. Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.

I I[

The identity of an individual can be verified by determin 3. Escort means a member of the security organization ing something about an individual, such as facial features; or other designated individual responsible for accompanying by determining something possessed by an individual, such those personnel not allowed unescorted access within a as a coded badge; or by determining something known to protected area. An escort is not required to possess technica;

an individual, such as a numerical code. By using combina knowledge of processes or equipment as is required by the".

tions of the above three identity verification processes, two-man concept.

more reliable identity verification can be obtained. Such identification procedures can be accomplished by attendant

C. REGULATORY POSITION

security personnel or by the use of identification equipment such as video comparator system

s.

1. PROTECTED AREAS

Searching of incoming personnel or material can be a. Entry.Identificationand Authorization accomplished by a hands-on "pat-down" search, by-the use of devices that detect unauthorized materials, by the use of At each entry/exit control point (EECP) into a protected a "strip" search, or by a combination of all three. Entry area, a means of establishing the identity and access autho searches that use equipment to perform the search function, rization of incoming individuals should be provided. Accept such as metal or explosives detectors, are preferred as they able means of identity verification are facial recognition minimize the imposition of a hands-on or strip search. and positive comparison to an authorized picture badge.

Such identity verification can be performed by attendant Exit searches, which are conducted to ensure that security personnel or by the use of remotely viewed closed concealed SSNM is not removed from material access areas, circuit television (CCTV) systems that display an acceptable should use both special nuclear material (SNM) detection image of the individual's face and compare it to an image of equipment and metal detection equipment to provide a picture badge or a stored image of that individual's face.

greater confidence that either shielded or unshielded The identification/verification procedure and confirmation material could be detected. All materials leaving the material of entry authorization should be performed prior to any access area should undergo such a search. search function. To facilitate both identification and search functions, entry and exit traffic should be separated by Direct responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of physical barriers, and employee and visitor traffic should be personnel, vehicles, and materials normally resides with processed separately.

members of the security organization. They should be adequately trained in operation of entry/exit control and b. PersonnelSearch search equipment and procedures in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to A search of entering personnel for firearms, exploK..

10 CFR Part 73. sives, or incendiary devices should be conducted by use of both a firearms detector and an explosives detector. All Extensive discussions and descriptions of various alterna incoming individuals not possessing a Department of tive equipment and procedures for use in controlling entry Energy (DOE) material access authorization should undergo and exit and for conducting searches of personnel, vehicles, such a search. DOE couriers engaged in the transport of and materials can be found in NUREG-0509, "Bibliography SSNM are exempt from such searches.

of Technical Guidance for the Physical 1 Protection Upgrade Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites."' A sample of all individuals possessing DOE material access authorizations should be searched. The sample rate For the purpose of this guide the following definitions should be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected are provided: randomly from all entering personnel who possess the necessary authorizations.

i. Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special In the event that search equipment indicates the presence nuclear material against theft and the protection of a plant of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the following against radiological sabotage. actions should be taken:

2. Watchman means an individual, not necessarily 1. The security personnel should request that the uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection individual empty his or her pockets and again be tested by for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the the search equipment. If the individual complies and after course of performing other duties. the equipment no longer indicates the presence of firearms or explosives and the contents of the pockets have been verified as not including firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the individual may be allowed to pass into the

1 NUREG-0509 is available for public inspection or copying for a protected area.

fee at the NRC's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW

Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased directly from the NRe by writing to the Publications Sales Manager, Distribution Services 2. If, however, the equipment continues to indica!

Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. the presence of firearms or explosives, a physical searck..,

20555 or the National Technical Information Service, Springfield.

Virginia 22161. should be made by one unarmed security person, while at

5.7-2

least one guard observes the search. An acceptable alterna personnel, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior tive to a hands-on search is a "'strip search," which could be to entry into the protected area. The search should include completed in the privacy of a separate searchroom and the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo which should include the individual disrobing (except for area. (Refer to NUREG/CR-0485, "Vehicle Access and underclothing) and submitting his or her clothing for Search Training Manual," 2 for details. A level I search inspection. should be conducted as a minimum.) The use of vehicle sally ports (secure access passageways) is an acceptable way

3. If an individual refuses to comply with either a to facilitate identification, control, and search functions.

hands-on or strip search or if a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device is found, entry should be denied. All material or packages to be delivered into the PA

are required to be identified and verified as an authorized

4. If material of a suspicious and unknown nature is found, delivery prior to entry. A sample of all such delivered entry should be delayed until responsible security personnel packages or materials should be searched for firearms, are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. explosives, or incendiary devices, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with samples selected randomly from all When the initial search uses hand-held detectors or is a such deliveries. Where size, weight, packaging, or other hands-on search, firearms should be searched for first, as it characteristics prohibit an effective search by direct observa is presumed that a concealed firearm is a more immediate tion, detection equipment, or X-ray, entry may be granted danger to the searcher than concealed explosives or incen so long as:

diary devices.

1. The material is escorted to its destination by a Entry into the protected area should be granted to member of the security organization, individuals only after they have satisfactorily met the identification, authorization, and search requirements of 10 2. The material is not initially offloaded or unpack CFR Part 73. The opening to the last barrier to the PA aged adjacent to a vital or material access area, and should be controlled by an individual isolated within a bullet-resisting structure. Acceptable means to accomplish 3. Offloading and unpackaging is observed by at least this are to provide a builet-resisting booth meeting UL two authorized individuals, one of whom is a member Level IV standards at the last barrier of the EECP for the of the security organization, for the purpose of ensuring individual who controls the opening to the PA or to have that only authorized material has been delivered and that this opening controlled by the central alarm station (CAS) there are no concealed firearms, explosives, or incendiary or secondary alarm station (SAS) operator or both. devices.

c. Package or MaterialIdentificationand Search e. Entry and Search Aids At PA EECPs, all hand-carried packages should be searched The use of pedestrian and vehicle sally ports can provide by direct observation, by the use of firearms detectors or an effective means of isolating, identifying, and searching explosives detectors, or by the use of X-ray equipment for individuals in a controlled area prior to allowing entry into concealed firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other the PA. By interlocking the first and second openings in the items that could be used for theft or sabotage purposes. sally port so they cannot be opened simultaneously and by Packages carried by individuals who possess a DOE material providing observation of entry, a positive means of prevent access authorization may be excepted unless that person is ing "piggybacking" is available.

one of the sample selected randomly to'undergo an entry search, in which case any hand-carried packages should also Firearms detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal be searched. variety, should be capable of detecting with at least an 85%

effective detection rate one of the following located any Hand-carried packages or materials that cannot be readily where on an individual: (1) Colt .25 automatic, (2) Titan opened or otherwise cannot be effectively searched by .25 automatic, (3) General Precision Model 20-.22 caliber, direct observation should be submitted to suitable detec (4) CDM .22 short, or (5) the calibration source specified in tion equipment, which may include X-ray devices. If the NILECJ-STD-0601.00, "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for nature of the packaging interferes with effective operation Use in Weapons Detection." 3 The false alarm rate should of firearm or explosives detection equipment, X-ray should 2 NUREGXCR-0495 is available for public inspection or copying be used. Any item or material determined to be of a ques for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW.,

tionable nature by search personnel should not be allowed Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased for $4.75 directly from NRC by sending check or money order, payable to Superintendent into the protected area until responsible security personnel of Documents, to the Director, Division of Technical Information are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 205SS. GPO Deposit Account holders may charge their order by calling (301) 492-9530. Copies are also available for d. Vehicle and Cargo Entry and Search purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

3 All vehicles except DOE vehicles engaged in the transport National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Standard 0601.00, Stock Number GPO-2700-002S6,Is for sale for of SNM and emergency vehicles responding to emergency 65 cents per copy by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.

conditions are required to be searched for unauthorized Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

5.7-3 II{

not exceed 10% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to verifying authorization is the use of a code intrinsic to the this detection level. The devices should be adjusted to picture badge indicating that entry to MAAs is authorized.

discriminate between typical firearm and non-firearm masses of metal. One example of a testing method for At no time should a lone individual be allowed entry to demonstrating compliance with the detection rate is given an MAA or a vault. As a minimum, entry to an unoccupied in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods MAA requires at least two individuals to meet the intent of may be used if the methods are fully documented and the two-man concept.

approved by the NRC.

b. Packageor MaterialIdentification and Search Explosives detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least a All packages and materials entering a material access

90% effective detection rate dynamite, TNT, and similar area should be searched for firearms, explosives, and nitrogen-containing compounds in a minimum amount of incendiary devices. Search procedures and equipment, as

200 grams. One example of a testing method for demon discussed previously, for use at protected area EECPs should strating compliance with the detection rate is given in the be used. In the event that security search personnel are Appendix. Other testing methods may be used if the suspicious of the nature of any searched packages or methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. material, entry should be delayed until the nature or The false alarm rate should not exceed 1%when the detector identity of the package or material can be determined.

sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. If the search for explosives is to be performed directly by security c. Entry and Search Aids personnel, it should be performed only after a search for firearms has been made. Entry and search aids discussed in the section on pro tected areas are also applicable to EECPs at MAA boundaries.

A search dog may be capable of providing a satisfac In addition, unmanned EECP doors should be alarmed and tory detection capability for firearms and explosives. If annunciate in both the CAS and SAS.

dogs are used, they should be individually tested to ensure their continued capability and reliability. As an animal may

d. Exit Search for SSNM

present unpredictable problems and weaknesses, a set of trained and tested backup individuals or other detection Prior to exit from an MAA, all individuals, vehicles, devices or equipment should be immediately available to packages, and other materials are required to be searched serve as a substitute in the event of a dog's illness or other for concealed SSNM. This search should be conducted using sign of abnormal behavior. A dog should be used only if it both metal detection and SNM detection equipment. The can be shown to detect firearms or explosives with equal or metal detection system used to search for concealed shielded greater confidence than existing alternatives. A dog may be SSNM should be capable of detecting with at least a 90%

particularly useful in the search of vehicles or oversize effective detection rate a minimum of 100 grams of nonfer packages. As the duration of a dog's effectiveness for rous metal (shielding) concealed anywhere on an individual.

performing search functions may be limited, it should be One example of a testing method for demonstratinig com used only as a secondary aid. pliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the Annunciation of metal and explosives detection equip methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC.

ment should be both aural and visual. The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% for that level of detection. SNM detection equipment should be capable of The EECP should be provided with one or more duress detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched to alarms that annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. Such 90% in the uranium-235 isotope in accordance with the alarms should be placed in a concealed location that can testing and operational requirements of Regulatory Guide generally be reached by attendant security personnel and 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitor."

activated in an unobtrusive manner. An acceptable alterna tive to duress alarms that annunciate in the alarm stations is Individuals should undergo two separate searches prior the use of duress alarms that are ,Worn or carried by atten to exiting an MAA. An acceptable method of conduc dant security personnel and that can be activated unobtru ting these searches is to require individuals to pass through sively. Such duress alarms should be worn or carried at all two separate sets of metal and SNM detection equipment, times when security personnel attend an EECP. each set monitored by a different member of the security organization. For individuals exiting an area that contains

2. MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS only encapsulated or alloyed SSNM, the second search may be made of a sampling of all individuals exiting the area, the a. Entry Identificationand Authorization sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly to undergo the search.

Individuals desiring entry to material access areas should be verified as being on appropriate authorization schedules If an SNM or metal detector is triggered by an individual /'

and should be identified by comparison of facial features to attempting to exit an MAA EECP, the individual should be an authorized picture badge. An acceptable method of asked to remove all items from his or her pockets and again

3.74

Entry control should ensure use of the two-man concept pass through the detection equipment. If the detector still during entry and access to vaults and should ensure that the triggers, a hands-on or strip search should be conducted. In vault is monitored by CCTV in both alarm stations and at the event search personnel are unsure of the nature of an least one other continuously manned onsite location.

object or material uncovered during a search, the material or object should be confiscated and the individual's exit

3. VITAL AREAS

delayed until a determination can be made that the object or material is not SSNM or does not contain SSNM. Entry to vital areas should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules Vehicles, materials, or packages, including trash, uncon are accomplished prior to entry into the area. Use of the taminated wastes, tools, and other equipment should two-man concept for entry control is recommended. The be searched with SNM and metal detection equipment where use of attendant security personnel, authorized escorts, or appropriate. This search should be conducted by a team of remotely viewed CCTV systems that compare a facial image at least two authorized and designated individuals who are to an authorized picture badge are all acceptable means of not normally allowed access to the material access area in providing such control.

question. An acceptable means of accomplishing such searches for items too large to be accommodated in pedes

4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

trian EECPs is to provide a holding area within the MAA

that can be isolated from other MAA activities when search Emergency procedures should be developed to deal personnel are conducting authorized searches.

with the possibility of failure of entry/exit detection and assessment equipment or emergency evacuation.

e. Accounting for Individuals In MAAs a. Failureof Detection Equipment Procedures should be employed at MAA EECPs to account for the number and identity of individuals within Provisions should be made to use alternative EECPs the MAA. Manual or automated accounting procedures are or backup detection equipment or security personnel and equally acceptable so long as the procedures can determine provide for rapid repair of malfunctioning detection equip at any given time that no lone individual Is within the ment. Failure of detection equipment should not be allowed MAA. An attempted violation of the two-man concept to compromise the effectiveness of required search proce should be detectable at the EECP, CAS, and SAS (e.g., dures.

if one of two individuals alone within an MAA attempts to exit without the other).

b. Evacuation Procedures I. Vaults To the extent possible, and without compromising safety practices or considerations, procedures should be

.Entry to vaults should be controlled so that individ established to protect against the possibility of an emergency ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules evacuation being used to remove SSNM from the facility or are accomplished prior to opening the vault door. The use to gain unauthorized access to the facility. Such procedures of split-screen CCTV or CCTV and badge reader are accept should be part of the facility's contingency plan.

able means of establishing identification and authorization.

5.7-5 III

VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT

A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared proposed amendments was made available in the Commis for the revision to this regulatory guide. The changes were sion's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash made to make the guide consistent with the upgrade ington, D.C., at the time the proposed amendments were physical protection amendments to the regulations published published. This analysis is appropriate for the final amend in final form in the FederalRegister of November 28, 1979 ments as well as for the regulatory guide revisions appropri

(44 FR 68184). A value/impact analysis prepared for the ate to those amendments.

5.7-6

APPENDIX

1. BACKGROUND The performance criterion for firearms detectors is at least an 85% effective detection rate. The performance criterion The purpose of this appendix Is to provide an example for explosives and nonferrous metal detectors is at least a of a testing method for determining the detection capabil 90% effective detection rate. One example of a method for ity of firearms, explosives, and nonferrous metal detectors. detection rate testing Is outlined on the following pages.

This example should not be interpreted as a regulatory The testing methods for showing at least 85% and at least requirement. Other testing -methods for demonstrating 90% effective detection rates are similar, the only difference compliance with the detection rates may be used if fully being that more successful tests are required to demonstrate documented and approved by the NRC. The purpose the higher detection rate. The security personnel should of testing a detector is to ensure that the installed instru test each detector by having one of the members of the ment is operating according to one of the three performance security organization walk through the detector carrying criteria stated below. the appropriate test material.

I. Firearms Detectors - Regulatory Position C. L.e of this 2.1.1 Firearm.sDetectors guide' states, in part, that firearms detectors should be capable of detecting firearms with at least an 85% For firearms detectors, test each detector 30 times.

effective detection rate.

1. If 29 or 30 of the 30 tests result in successful detec

2. Explosives Detectors - Regulatory Position C. I.e of tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate this guide states, in part, that explosives detectors a detection rate of at least 85%, with 95% confidence in should be capable of detecting explosives with at least this statement.

a 90% effective detection rate.

2. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections

3. Nonferrous Metal Detect6rs - Regulatory PositionC.2.d of the test material, the detector should be checked for an of this guide states, in part, that the metal detection obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi system should be capable of detecting nonferrous tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in metals with at least a 90% effective detection rate. successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 38 successful

2. TESTING THE DETECTORS detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion. However, Uf only 9 out of the There are at least two types of testing that should 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.

be conducted on the detectors: detection rate testing and All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to operational testing. Detection rate testing should be con demonstrate compliance, since. the cumulative number of ducted quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is successful detections must be at least 47 out of 50 tests designed to determine whether the detector is operating in in order to demonstrate at least an 85% detection rate, with compliance with the appropriate performance criterion. 95% confidence.

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, preferably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed 3. If 27 of the 30 tests result in successful detections to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detec of the test material, the detector should be checked for an tion rate has not decreased to below the performance obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 addi criterion. Additionally, manufacturer's design specifi tional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all cation testing could be conducted quarterly. If the detector 20 tests result in successful detections, then the detec does not meet the minimum performance levels for the tion rate testing can be ended for this detector for this detection rate testing and the operational testing given in quarter.

the following two sections, then corrective actions should be taken. All tests, test results, and corrective actions 4. If 26 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful should be documented. The documentation will establish detections of the test material, compliance with the perform the performance history for each detector, and the test ance criterion is not demonstrated.

results should be available for inspection and analysis.

Table 1, given below, shows in summary form the

2.1 Detection Rate Testing minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and

50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on Detection rate testing should be conducted on each the detection rate is at least 85%. See the appendices to detector quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys designed to determine whether the detector is operating in tems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving compliance with the appropriate performance criterion. these confidence limits.

5.7-7

1_1

Table 1 2. If 29 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi RATE OF 85% tional tests should be conducted. If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be Statement: ended for this detector for this quarter, since 39 successful The detection rate detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the Total No. Minimum No. of is at least _%, with performance criterion. However, if only 9 out of the of ,ests Successful Detections 95% confidence 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.

All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since the cumulative number of

30 29 85.1 successful detections must be at least 48 out of 50 tests

40 38 85.1 in order to demonstrate at least a 90%detection rate, with

50 47 85.2 95% confidence.

If the minimum number of successful detections given in "3.If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of Table I is not met, compliance with the performance the test material, the detector should be checked for an criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20

be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required additional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10

level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, the adjusted, or replaced), the testing procedure should be detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance quarter.

with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests.

A table similar to Table 2 of this Appendix can be used for 4. If 27 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful recording the test results. detections of the test material, compliance with the per formance criterion is not demonstrated.

Table 2 Table 3, given below, shows in summary form the DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and

50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on Firearms Detector at (location) the detection rate is approximately 90%(at least 88%). See the appendices of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Quarter 198 Intrusion Alarm Systems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits.

Date:

"Time: Table 3 No. of Tests No. of Successful Detections SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE DETECTION

RATE OF ABOUT 90%

30 - (if 29 or 30, testing complete)

Statement:

10 The detection rate Total No. Minimum No. of is at least J%, with of Tests Successful Detections 95% confidence Total 40 - (if 38, testing complete)

10 30 30 90.5

40 39 88.7 so 48 87.9 Total 50 - (if 47, testing complete)

If the minimum number of successful detections given in

2.1.2 Explosives DetectorsandNonferrourMetl Detectors Table 3 is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated. The detector needs to For explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors, be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required test each detector 30 times. level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), then the testing procedure should be I. If 30 out of the 30 tests result in successful detec conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A

detection rate of at least 90%, with 95% confidence in this table similar to Table 4 can be used for recording the test statement. results.

5.7-8

Table 4 the detection rate has not decreased to below the perform ance criterion. One example of a method for operational DETECTION RATE TESTING RESULTS testing is outlined on the following pages. The testing meth od for operational testing is the same for firearms detectors, explosives detectors, and nonferrous metal detectors. The Explosives (or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (ocation)

security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through Quarter _, 198_

the detector carrying the appropriate test material.

Date:

The operational testing on each detector should result in

100% detections of the test material. The test results should Time: be documented on a success/failure basis. If the detector fails No. of Tests No. of Successful Detections to detect the test material on an operational test, corrective actions should be taken and documented. For example, if

30 S(if 30, testing complete) the test of the detector results in no alarm (no detection),

the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting and retested 4 more times during the

10

same shift if possible. If all 4 of these tests result in alarms, the detector should be tested 5 more times during the same

40 - (if 39, testing complete) shift on the next day. If all these 5 tests result in alarms, Total the daily or once-per-shift testing schedule can be resumed,

10 since the performance criterion (85% detection rate for firearms detectors or 90% detection rate for explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors) has been con (if 48, testing complete) firmed. If there were any failures to detect among the 9 Total 50 __

additional tests, the detector should not be used until after it has been thoroughly checked, repaired If necessary, and retested according to the detection rate testing method to

2.2 Operational Testing demonstrate that it is now detecting the test material at the rate specified by the appropriate performance criterion. A

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, pref table similar to Table 5 can be used for recording the test erably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is results.

designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that

5.7-9 II

Table S

OPERATIONAL TESTING RESULTS

(Success -I, Failure = 0)

Firearms (or Explosives or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (location)

Week beginning , 198, (in Quarter , 198_)

Date Tune Result 4 Retests S Retests Monday - Shift I I oro . . ,,.,

- Shift 2 . . .. - - -

- Shift 3 '- '

Tuesday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Wednesday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Thursday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Friday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Saturday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3 Sunday - Shift I

- Shift 2

- Shift 3

5.7-10

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20555 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

OFFICIAL BUSINESS U.SL NUCLEAR REGULATORY

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 CoMMISSION

K


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