Regulatory Guide 5.31: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13350A241
| number = ML003740081
| issue date = 06/30/1974
| issue date = 04/30/1975
| title = Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
| title = Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
Line 10: Line 10:
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = RG-5.031
| document report number = RG-5.31 Rev 1
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 3
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:Jime 1974 June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC EMERY COMMISSION
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                                                                     Revision 1 April 1975 REGULATORY GUIDE
                                REGULATORY
OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
                                  DIRECTORATE Of REGULATORY STAINDARDS
                                                              REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR
                                                                                                                                GUIDE
                                  ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
                                                                  REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR
                                      ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
ized entry tis provided, in part, by the armed picsonnel within the vehicle who axe in turn protected by the Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physcal                                    inhercnt design of the armored vebIiclc.
entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical                              design of the armored vehicle.


Protection of Plants and Materials." requires that road movements of 5pecial nucleal material (SNM)                                               Acc.eptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel in quantities identified in §73.l(bI(2) be protected by                               used in armored car s;erxe arc provided in this guide.
Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti                                      Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel ties identified in paragraph 73.1(bX2) be protected by                               used in armored car service are provided in this guide.


one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanirng the shipment in a                                       I. ARMOR
one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least                             This revision reflects comments received from the public two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa                                and other factors.
separate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability                                  Armored vehicles ate supplied to the industry by a to diversion by design features that permit irnmtobiiiia-                              very small number of manufactuters. The six-cific design tion of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to                                  of the armor supplied by each comrpany is coiisidered physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed                                proprietary information. The armor can generally he guards are used with the specially designed vehicle,                                    desribed With respect to its fesistance to projectile immobilization is not required. Paragraph 7330(d).                                      penetration. All inanufacturers provide armor which will requires that the qualification of individuals to act as                                resist initial penetration by bullets frum readily available guards used pursuant to §73.3 I(c) be documented. This                                  small urns. The armor is usually altxicd to the vehicle in guide describes features accvptabl to the Regplatory                                    such a "v          as to provide prultection to the occupants staff for a vehicle operated by armed guards to ship                                    agains'r attlac from any external direction.


special nuclear material by road and for the quiific"ation of the armed guards.                                                                   2. CAlB-CARGU INTERFACE
rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di                              1. Armor version by design features that permit immobilization of                                  Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical                              very small number of manufacturers. The specific design penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards                              of the armor supplied by each company is considered are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza                            proprietary information. The armor can generally be de tion is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d) requires that the                          scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur                              tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re suant to paragraph 73.31(c) be documented. This guide                              sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi                          small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear                               such a way as to provide protection to the occupants material by road and for the qualification of the armed                             against attack from any external direction.
                                                                                            The cab-caigo interface can be provided with several


==B. DISCUSSION==
guards.
options. In mrt cases the xparnting wall bttween cab and cargo compz? tment is armored to provide protection There are two approaches that can be taken to satisfy                              in case either conpartment is -compromise


====d. A window====
2. Cab-Cargo Interface
§73.31(c)2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer.                               of bullet-resistzs-t material which allows the crew in one One method would be the use of a specially designed                                    compartment to have . clear view of the access doors of secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist                                the ofther compirtmeni is ao provitied. Some models entry for a substantial period of time by unauthorized                                  have a door tLat allows passage from the cab to the personnel using 3.wide variety of tools and weapons. The                              cargo compartment without leaving the vchicle. Ohiler penetration time would be commensurate with the time                                    models are e4quipped with gunports that permit ftirng needed for law enforcement agencies to respond to the                                  from cab to cargo compartmett.


scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion                                     
==B. DISCUSSION==
The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab There are two approaches that can be taken to satis                        and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection fy paragraph 73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or                          in case either compartment is compromised. A window trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de                              of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to                            compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor                          the other compartment is also provided. Some models ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap                              have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with                                cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re                                  models are equipped with gunports that permit firing spond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would                               from cab to cargo compartment.


===3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS===
be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.                                                                3. Guards and Drivers Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo The other method would be through the use of ar                            or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized                        compartments. For long-distance trips the crew.is often USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES                                        Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commlseeien. U.S. Ntuclaw describe to staff    and make available to the public    Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C.        N00.  Attention: Docketing *nd methods              to issued Guides are Regulatory ccpble        the NC          of implementing specific prtsService              Section.
attempt.                                                                                    Normally vi armored vehicle crew consists of two or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo The othl'r method would be through the use of                                      tompnntrtnts. For long-d"tance trips the ciew is often armored car service. In this case resistance to unauthor-                              increased to xllow nst periods for drivers and guards.


USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES                                      Co~t. of piB*~          od f M"1 60h 0"ofpwd by FOW~Mt0-4icnilq Ow divitirn tiett US. Atmek 10ww c~xn.muio"
Commission's regulations. to delineate techniques used by the      staff in evalu- T    uides are iuued in the flowing ten broad divisions:
                                                                                              "ha                                                            . 206*5.
                                                    to provide guidance to appli.


Mc~a.
ating specific problems or postulated accidents, or cants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, end complilance      1. Power Reactors                      &  Products with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in    2. Research aedrTetReactors            7. Tran**otatlon the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to 3. Fuels and Materiale Facilitle      8. Ocsupat"oe    "eo the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.              4. Environmental and Siting            9. Antitrust Review Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged            5. Materials and Plant Protection    10. General at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate. to accommnodate com ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised asa      Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff        divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion.WasnIngton. D.C.


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                                                                                        2. P..avdt avidTont ftagoe                 


===7. Ttgtvopttofta===
increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards.          munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long              stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain        structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in the full-protective capacity of the armored service during      use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals these trips, it is important that adequate crews for            received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted continuous manning of both compartments during                  antenna that could logically become the first target of normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in       an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre achieving this end would be provided if both guards and          clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either           ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as function (guard or driver).                                     sistance. To provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages,
                                                                                        2. Falls and Mogemif Faciliuties              Onetml       Iafetht P~iai~ld p~dn sill ba irri           psyhatfl~y. so mpprOtwta.     to mtwwnIod        4. fokm w            awd ShiM                S Araftiswht P4#~.
  4. Door Locks                                                    antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment          be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases,          hardening. The actual antenna could be concealed or access to the cargo compartment requires positive action        designed to appear as some other object while con by personnel in both compartments when the cargo                ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be compartment is occupied by a guard.                              conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to
CMftfWfit   MW troofiIt¶9 moigut~ieftio or vivo'                                                    -LMI4ftOdpomP~"              to,.oSI
   5. Alarm System                                                  enable emergency messages to be transmitted. Hardened, Many of the armored cars presently in service are          attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to       provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other those used by police and emergency vehicles. The aware          similar methods could enhance the viability of trans ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub        mission.


SNIA shipments we expected to involve frequent loaq 1-            draw outside air from the fioat (cab area) of the vehicle distance trips of two or mome days. In order to uxintalin          wd expl exhaut &ir tbroqh vests in the upper wa o4          - 0 %.
lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di verted materia
the full protective capacity of the armored service dune Z        the vehicle. A alight postive iinterial pmwao provided then trips, it Is important that adequate crews fcU                by the air system offten some resistance to the intro- continuous manning of both compartments dude 8                    ductlon of gaseous subtaces. The &ssintake it under normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility Ian        occupat control and can be closed. Soew vehic aie achieving this end would be provided if both guards an d          normally equipped with gas masks. The use of ps mas*
driven were qualified and permitted to perform eitht er            filters, and internal afr supplies for carrit of SNi function (guard or driver).                                        would enhance the abibity of vehickle crew members to tesist gas attacks.


===4. DOOR LOCKS===
====l.     ====
    All armored vehicles are supplied with compartmu: it         


===9. ANTENNA PROTECTION===
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cam                    Almost all arnored vehicles am equipped with com- access to the cargo compuntment requires positive actio n          munication systems of same kind Each eicle is by personne, in both compartments when the carg o                  equipped by the purchase of the vehicle althaqb      h the compartment is occupied by a guard.                                manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system comnponmt&. In S. ALARM SYSTEM                                                    some instnces, the parchamer may proviWe the can- Many '4 the armored cars presently in service are               munication equipment to the manufacturer who will equipped ;ith audible alarms and/or flashing tighi ts              install the equipment at the tim the vehicle is con- similar to ti ;so used by police and emergency vehicle!    .        structed. Both radio and radjotelephone systems are in The awarencs of attack that such alarms elicit in the              use. Each tystem is dependent on the use of radio sgnals general public can facilitate response to attack cir                received and transmitted from a vehicle-montied an- recovery of diverted material.                                      tenna which could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pred"e
6. Securing the Cargo                                                The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to Armored cars have no standard provision for tying          the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types         guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain of cargo normally handled by these carriers. For SNM            ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected,        local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be          transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel           and compliance with these requirements is expected.
6. SECURING OF CARGO                                                the vehicle occupants from either notifying extetral Armored cars have no standard provision for tyin g            agents of the attack or firnn secking aid or mistance. To down cargo. This Is understandable In view of the types             provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle of cargo normally handled by these carriers. For SNM4              crew to transmit emergency massages, antenna protec- cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected .          tion is desirable. Such protection could be provided in some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will b e            the form of concealment. multiplicity, ot hardenizg. The required to provide for cargo integrity and personne I           actual antenna could be concealed or designd to appear safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expens e        as some other object while conventionaly appearing would be required to equip existing vehicles wit]h                dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the tie-down fittings.                                                vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a d,.aIy sufficient to enable emergesny resses to
7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS                                          be transmitted. Hardened, attack-resistant antennas Each siipment will be configured at origin to be bi3          could be designed and ueed to provide a delay time.


compliance with Department of Transportation (DOT )               Combinationt of these or other smhiar methods could general packaging and safety requirements (DOT regu I-            enhance the viability of transnission.
safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie            1. Armor down fittings.                                                        The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impac


lation 49 CFR 173.393). Additionally. in order tio monitor total radiation absorbed by personnel, som e                             
====t. The ex====
"17. Gas  Protection                                              ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow              wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of through (front-to-back) air system for heating and cool          materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im ing the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems draw          pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and        be provided with similar protection against projectile im expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the        pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by         type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the the air system offers some resistance to the introduction        insertion of an explosive device into the tank.


==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
of gaseous substances. The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally            2. Cab-Cargo Interface equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters,              The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en          should be armored. Additional features to be considered hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas          in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface attacks.                                                        depend on the method selected for the protection of the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below
type of personnel dosimetry should be considered 1.
  8. Antenna Protection                                            should be used. These methods are similar in that each Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with              provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is              prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the            ing the vehicle.


Types of personnel dosimeters are the filtm badge anwd                  The characteristics listed below are acceptable to the pocket dosimeter for gamma radiation, and the thei r-              Regulatory staff for a road vehicle operated by armed moluminescent neutron dosimeter (TLD) for neutroin                guards in order to comply with AEC regulations pcrttain radiation. The film badge consists of a film packet in a          ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and plastic holder. The film badge or TLD provide a&          n      lcal requirements pertaining to safe interstate sad local accurate Indication of exposure to radiation over a Ion g          transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments period of time. Since the film has to be developed anid            and compliance with these requirements is expected.
manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access              a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed areas for the communication system components. In                in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn              wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be
  *Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.        considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.


read on a densitometer, it may take some time to obtaii 11 a radiation reading. The pocket dosimeter, on the othe r          I. ARMOR
5.31-2
hand provides a quick estimate of radiation received ove r              The vehicle should provide protection for the a short period of time, but is not as accurate as the filt a      driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The badge for gamma radiation.                                        external surface of the vehicle (side panels, floot, top, firewall area, and viewing areas) should be comstructed
& GAS PROTECTION                                                  of materials which are resistant to at least the muzzle Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow *-              impact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. The fuel tank(s)
through (front.to-back) air system for heating aniI                should also be provided with similar protection against cooling the vehicle interior. Typically, these system 3            projectile impact. The fuel tank(s) should be equipped
                                                            5.31-2


with a lock-type cap and a screen in the tank neulc to          compartment door lock should require positive action pl nt the insertion. of an explosive device into the             by personnel at the cargo compartment door and fi the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors also I2.      CAB.CARGO INTERFACE
b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab          6. Securing the Cargo The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the should be available so that a guard can go directly from        cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the           for such securing devices as are required to provide re vehicle.
        The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside, should be armored. Additional features to be considered         


===5. ALARM SYSTEM===
straint against substantial movement of or damage to the c. Gunports should be available which will permit cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops.
    in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface              Tile vehicle should be equipped with an audible depend ats the method sclectcd fot the protection of(the        and/or visual alarm which is activated froni within the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below              vehicle and which has the samte ranW, of detection as should be used. These methods are similar in that each          that normally required by emergency vehicles. Dcac- provides the capability rot the crew to use fireamis to          tivation of the alarn system circuitry should require prevent entry bi!o the cargo compartment without                acccss to the armored comtnparttmentts of the velhicle.


leaving the vehtrde.
firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.. Addi The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap        177.


a. An armed guard should be pentianenty stationed           
on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartment can be prevefited.                            7. Gas Protection The vehicle compartments should be equipped with
3. Guards and Drivers                                          gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali      crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved          ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should be             and, if possible, the arrival of aid.


===6. SECURING THE CARGO===
qualified to perform either function, and interchange of function should be allowed if required for the safety and      8. Antenna Protection security of the cargo and crew.                                      Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR                   munication system to transmit an emergency message.
    in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous                The vehicle should be ,supplied with fittings in tlrc wail of armuot with a buflet.resistant window would be          cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.                    for such securing devycos as are required to provide b. Access to the cargo compartnent fr(mn the cab            restraint against substantial movement of or damage to
    %houldbe available wo that a guard can go directli' front        the cargo in normal operation and during emergency die cab to the cargo cornpaftmcnit without leaving the          stops. The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR
    vehicle.                                                        Part 177.


c. Gunports should be availabli which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment,                  7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other        9. Immobilization applicable State and local requirements. All guards and               Although there is no requirement for immobili drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC            zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali        ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro            mobilization upon an authorized command originating gram.
    Additionally. the gunports should permit firing of the               Personnel involved In the handling of radioactive wcapmi at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides        material should be provided with a filmn badge, a pocket of the cargo compartmcnt call be prevented.                      dosimeter and for plutonium shipments, a titer- moluminescent neutron dosimete


====r. These should he====
from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im mobilization system should resist unauthorized de
    3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS                                            monitored after each trip.
  4. Door Locks                                                  activation for -as long as feasible. Caution should be The cargo compartment doors should normally be            taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking            mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in            from being energized from spurious electromagnetic both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if            signals.


All peorsonnel of an armored vehicle should be qualifred to perform all normal operational tasks in-           
the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door                             


===8. GAS PROTECTION===
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
    volved with a shipment.        guards and drivers should th1b                                    The vehicle cornpartlnents should be equipped witli be qualified to perform either function., and interchange        gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the of functiom should be allowed if required for the safety          crew to resist art attack by incapacitating gas for a and security of the cargo and crew,                              sufficient time to allow transmittal of a distrems message and, if possible, the arrival of aid.
lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be               The purpose of this section is to provide informa further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com        tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's partment door lock should require positive action by          plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.


Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR
personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors should                        This guide reflects current regulatory practice.
    173.3936X4) which deals with radiation levels in oc-           


===9. ANTENNA PROTECTION===
normally be locked and should require key insertion for        Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant operation from the outside.
    cspied vehicle, should be mfaintdined in addition to                  Either a concealed or a hardened anterina should lie other applicable State and local requirements. All guards        provided in order it) afford sufficient timte I"r the and drivers should be qualified ini accordance with A[iC          comnmunication systeln to1transmit an cmncgeuncy nies- Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training. Equipping. and                  sage.


Qualifying of Guards and Witchmarn," tir an equivalent program.                                                         1
or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Com S. Alarm System mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff The vehicle should be equipped with an audible            in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the          of license applications, licensee security plans, or other vehicle and which has the same range of detection as documents pertaining to materials and plant protection that normally required by emergency vehicles. De submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of activation of the alarm system circuitry should require        this guide.


===0. IMMOiJIZATION===
access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.
                                                                          Although there Is no requirement for imnojbilization
    4. DOOR LOCKS                                                    of vehicles which use armed guards, this is a desirable, The cargo compartment doors should normally be in            feature. The vehicle could have a provision for immobi- a locked mode and should he secured by n locking                  lization upon art authorized command originating from mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in              within the vehicle. Once commanded, the immobi- both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if              liiation system should resist unauthorized deactivation the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo corn-            Ibr as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to assure parttrnm is not occupied, the cargo compartment door              that activation devices which cause imnmobiliiation are lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be            adequately shielded to prevent them from being erier.


further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo                gw.ed from spurious clectromagnetic signals.
5.31-3


5-31.3}}
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
        OFFICIAL BUSINESS          UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
  PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300    REGULATORY COMMISSION}}


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Latest revision as of 11:20, 28 March 2020

Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
ML003740081
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/30/1975
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
RG-5.31 Rev 1
Download: ML003740081 (4)


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revision 1 April 1975 REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR

ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A. INTRODUCTION

entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical design of the armored vehicle.

Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel ties identified in paragraph 73.1(bX2) be protected by used in armored car service are provided in this guide.

one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least This revision reflects comments received from the public two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa and other factors.

rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di 1. Armor version by design features that permit immobilization of Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical very small number of manufacturers. The specific design penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards of the armor supplied by each company is considered are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza proprietary information. The armor can generally be de tion is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d) requires that the scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re suant to paragraph 73.31(c) be documented. This guide sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear such a way as to provide protection to the occupants material by road and for the qualification of the armed against attack from any external direction.

guards.

2. Cab-Cargo Interface

B. DISCUSSION

The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab There are two approaches that can be taken to satis and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection fy paragraph 73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or in case either compartment is compromised. A window trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor the other compartment is also provided. Some models ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re models are equipped with gunports that permit firing spond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would from cab to cargo compartment.

be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt. 3. Guards and Drivers Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo The other method would be through the use of ar or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized compartments. For long-distance trips the crew.is often USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commlseeien. U.S. Ntuclaw describe to staff and make available to the public Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. N00. Attention: Docketing *nd methods to issued Guides are Regulatory ccpble the NC of implementing specific prtsService Section.

Commission's regulations. to delineate techniques used by the staff in evalu- T uides are iuued in the flowing ten broad divisions:

to provide guidance to appli.

ating specific problems or postulated accidents, or cants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, end complilance 1. Power Reactors & Products with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in 2. Research aedrTetReactors 7. Tran**otatlon the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to 3. Fuels and Materiale Facilitle 8. Ocsupat"oe "eo the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Review Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate. to accommnodate com ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised asa Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion.WasnIngton. D.C.

review. 2f6. Attention: Director. Office of Sandaerds Developement.

increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards. munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in the full-protective capacity of the armored service during use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals these trips, it is important that adequate crews for received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted continuous manning of both compartments during antenna that could logically become the first target of normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre achieving this end would be provided if both guards and clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as function (guard or driver). sistance. To provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages,

4. Door Locks antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases, hardening. The actual antenna could be concealed or access to the cargo compartment requires positive action designed to appear as some other object while con by personnel in both compartments when the cargo ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be compartment is occupied by a guard. conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to

5. Alarm System enable emergency messages to be transmitted. Hardened, Many of the armored cars presently in service are attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other those used by police and emergency vehicles. The aware similar methods could enhance the viability of trans ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub mission.

lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di verted materia

l.

C. REGULATORY POSITION

6. Securing the Cargo The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to Armored cars have no standard provision for tying the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain of cargo normally handled by these carriers. For SNM ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected, local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel and compliance with these requirements is expected.

safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie 1. Armor down fittings. The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impac

t. The ex

"17. Gas Protection ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of through (front-to-back) air system for heating and cool materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im ing the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems draw pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and be provided with similar protection against projectile im expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the the air system offers some resistance to the introduction insertion of an explosive device into the tank.

of gaseous substances. The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally 2. Cab-Cargo Interface equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters, The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en should be armored. Additional features to be considered hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface attacks. depend on the method selected for the protection of the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below

8. Antenna Protection should be used. These methods are similar in that each Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the ing the vehicle.

manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed areas for the communication system components. In in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be

  • Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue. considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.

5.31-2

b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab 6. Securing the Cargo The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the should be available so that a guard can go directly from cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the for such securing devices as are required to provide re vehicle.

straint against substantial movement of or damage to the c. Gunports should be available which will permit cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops.

firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.. Addi The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap 177.

on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartment can be prevefited. 7. Gas Protection The vehicle compartments should be equipped with

3. Guards and Drivers gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should be and, if possible, the arrival of aid.

qualified to perform either function, and interchange of function should be allowed if required for the safety and 8. Antenna Protection security of the cargo and crew. Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR munication system to transmit an emergency message.

173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other 9. Immobilization applicable State and local requirements. All guards and Although there is no requirement for immobili drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro mobilization upon an authorized command originating gram.

from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im mobilization system should resist unauthorized de

4. Door Locks activation for -as long as feasible. Caution should be The cargo compartment doors should normally be taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in from being energized from spurious electromagnetic both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if signals.

the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door

D. IMPLEMENTATION

lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be The purpose of this section is to provide informa further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's partment door lock should require positive action by plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.

personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors should This guide reflects current regulatory practice.

normally be locked and should require key insertion for Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant operation from the outside.

or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Com S. Alarm System mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff The vehicle should be equipped with an audible in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the of license applications, licensee security plans, or other vehicle and which has the same range of detection as documents pertaining to materials and plant protection that normally required by emergency vehicles. De submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of activation of the alarm system circuitry should require this guide.

access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.

5.31-3

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

OFFICIAL BUSINESS UNITED STATES NUCLEAR

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 REGULATORY COMMISSION