ML18081A222

Part B of CSF-1, Application (Selected Parts as Related to the Radiation Safety Program - Part 1)

ML18081A222
Person / Time
Site:	West Valley Demonstration Project
Issue date:	10/12/1962
From:	Nuclear Fuel Services
To:	US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
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ML18081A225	List: ML18081A116 ML18081A222 ML18081A223 ML18081A224
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Download: ML18081A222 (185)

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Befo re The I UNIT ED STAT ES ATOM IC ENER GY COM MISS ION Wash ingto n, D. C.

In the Matt er of the Appl icatio n of NUC LEAR FUEL SERV ICES , INC.

For Cons tructi on Perm it and Licen ses for

. a Spen t Fuel Proc essin g Plant Unde r Secti ons 53, 63, 81, 104 (b), and 185 of the Atom ic Ener gy Act AEC Dock et No. 50-ZO l Part B -- Safet y Analy sis Amen dmen t No. I Octo ber lZ, 1962

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Part B - - Safety Analysis Amendment No, I October 12, 1962

{3n July Z6, 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services filed with the Division of Licensing and Regulation an application to build and operate a fuel reprocessing plant for spent reactor fuel. A two-volume Safety Analysis was submitted as Par_t B of this application. During the past two months there have been several design changes. These will be reflected in a series of amended pages to the Safety Analysis. The amended pages will be submitted as soon as they can be prepared and the required copies printed. These changes are summarized as follows:]

[!_> Elimination of Thorex EquipmenfJ The expected load of ThOz-UOz fuel is less than originally con-templated so that it does not now appear appropriate to include the expensive facilities needed to provide a processing capability for this type of fuel equiv-alent to that of the uo2 fuels. "Therefore, the plant capacity for Th02 - *.uo2 fuels will be 500 kg/day in place of the 1000 kg/day described in the Safety Analysis. Also, the facilities for decontamination of the recovered thorium have been eliminated. Thorium will be permitted to go into the high level waste stream and will be stored in stainless steel tankage along with the fission prod-

• ucts from this particular fuel. Stainless steel tankage will be provided for this purpose as required.

E Reduced Capacitl £or Stainless Steel-Cermet Fueli)

The Safety Analysis* indicates the inclusion of a Darex facility capable of handling 225 kg/day of stainless steel, The capacity of this unit has been reduced to 125 kg/day and the capital aUovtanb~'. tincH\iclEFthc edsl - .. :

of this capabili ty. If development work on electrolytic dissolution at SRP continues to look favorable prior to freezing of design, NFS may change the design to provide for electrolytic dissolution at a processing rate of 125 kg/ day I --- -----

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of s*t ainless steel. Allowance has been made in cost estimates to permit the t

inclusion of either (not both) s eta of equipment.

Waste Storase Facilities)

Facilities for storing neutralized wastes which will be installed at the outset will include two 750, 000-gallon carbon steel and concrete tanks.

One of the tanks to be installed will be used for storage of the neutralized wastes from the entire processing sequence. The second will be held as a spare. Other waste storage shown in the Safety Analysis will not be built at the outset. Stainless steel tankage will be provided by NFS as required, but funds will not be committed until receipt of firm commitments for the pro-cessing of fuels whose wastes require this type of storage (e.g., stainless steel- uo2 cermets, Th0z_ uo2 , depleted uranium-molybdenum, uranium-aluminum, or uranium-zirconium alloys). The depreciation schedules for waste storage are sufficient to provide a revolving fund for new mild steel .

waste storage as required and contractual commitments will permit addi-tional capital as needed.

E Removal of *One Dissolverj As a result of the reduced requirements on the plant for the ThOz-UOz fuels, one of the three dissolvers was removed.

The remaining plant facilities including fuel receiving and storage, mechanical cell, extraction equipment, acid recovery, solvent handling, prod-

uct packa ging and handl ing, utilit ies, main tenan ce, and ana.ly tical facili ties rema in eaeen tially uncha nged as descr ibed ln the Safet y Anal ysis.

Thes e chang es have alrea dy been comm unica ted to the USAE C in a

letter to Mr. R. C. Blair , dated Septe mber Zl, l 96Z.

~ lett~ r dated *Septe mber 5, l 96~, the Divis ion of Licen sing and Regu lation of the USAE C raise d eleve n quest ions form al answ ers to which are hereb y subm itted )

1) Ques tion: The appli catio n does not give the types and maxi

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. quan tities of radio activ e mate rial that will be prese nt in each proce ssing step and in the stora ge areas durin g norm al opera tion of the plant . This infor matio n is nece ssary to determ i11e the proba ble relea ses that could be antic ipate d in the event of an accid ent.

Answ er: In Table A-I-1 there is given a tabul ation of the quan tities of radio activ e mate rials expec ted in each proce ss strea m. Data are given for fissio nable mate rials , fertil e mate rials, total fissio n produ cts and speci fic fissio n produ cts. The data prese nted are repre senta tive o(. th~ most radio -

activ e fuel which we expec t to proce ss in the plant . Thes e data are for a fuel burne d to ZO, 000 mwd /ta*n, Z7. 5 mw/t on, irrad iated two years at *85o/o load facto r and coole d 150 days.

The maxi mum quant ity of fuel which can be store d in the stora ge pool is about 1000 fuel elem ents. It is *expe cted that norm ally no more than ZS% of the pool will be full. The amou nt of activ ity store d there in can only be estim ated since it will depen d upon the past histo ry of the parti cular fuels deliv ered to the plant . An estim ate of the amou nt of fuel norm ally in stora ge is given in Table A-I-2 .

The amou nt and type of activ ity in waste stora ge will chang e with time, incre asing as the tank is filled and at the same time decre asing due 1------ l

to decay. The maximum amount of activity in storage in a given tank will be present just at the completion of the filling period. An estimat,r

• of the total quantity of waste and the major specific fission product contributors at the time the first waste tank is filled is given in Table A-I-3.

2) Question: It does not appear that a "mock-up" shop will be included in the plant. Existing Commission facilities which utilize "remote maintenance" have "mock-up" shops and these shops have reduced exposure considerably during maintenance. How does NFS plan to minimize employee exposure during maintenance operations without such a &hop?

Answer: The NFS plant does not have a full-scale "mock-up" shop complete with crane of the same type as that used at Hanford and Savannah River. However, the plant does have the capability for carrying out the function of the 1 'rr1ock-up" shop, viz, to check out the exact dimensions of a

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piece of equipment to be installed in the chemical processing cell. Jigs are provided in the maintenance shop to set up an equipment piece going into the CPC and to check all of the pertinent dimensions against the known-require-ments.

The need for this type of facility is less in the NFS plant than in the AEC production plants since there are only 15 pieces of equipment in the CPC which are handled in this manner and the proposed procedures will adequately allow the checking of such a small number of equipment pieces.

Further, it is felt that this is not a safety problem at all ~ut rather an economic one. The installation of equipment in the CPC is done remotely and does not involve the exposure of personnel in excess of the normal plant

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background. The penalty for making an error in the measurement of C

dimensions (resulting in failure to be able to install the equipment) is not taken in increased personnel radiation exposure but rather in lost production time. If it were not possib le to install the equipm ent piece, it would be necess ary to move it out into the decont aminat ion area,cl can it up to the point where it could be worked on again, and make the necess ary correc tions *

3) Questi on: The choppi ng techniq ue for the variety of fuels that will be pro-cessed has not been employ ed before in spent fuel proces sing plants and the probab ility of widesp read contam ination in the cell, as anticip ated by NFS,

• does necessi t..\te "remo te mainte nance. 11 How is this remote mainte nance going to be accom plished on large items such as cell window s and the "push-out ram?

Answe r: The choppin g techniq ue has not been in ro1,tine plant operati on, but it has been operat ed on full plant scale at Oak Ridge Nation al Labora tory ..

by the Chemi cal Techno logy Divisio n. The amoun t of "dustin g" is estima ted to be about 1 per cent. To confine this and any fines produc ed, the choppe r C

will be separa tely sealed and washed down at t he end of a cycle. Noneth eless, the cell is expect ed to be highly contam inated and the specifi cations for every equipm ent piece install ed in the cell requir e that it be capabl e of remote mainte nance for most repairs , and that it be remova ble either in pieces or in toto if that is require d. The window s are remova ble from the outside of the cell.

Since the push- out r l'\m was questio ned specifi cally, a step-b y- step method for its remov al is given below:

1) The drive system , contro l, and power connec tions are located outside the cell a!ld are not contam inated. These are first remov ed.

2) All the suppor ting connec tions outside the cell are then remov ed after which the suppor ting connec tions inside the cell are remov ed or loosen ed by use of the ,na.nip ulator.

3) A wall section of the operating aisle opposite to the PMC must be removed to allow complete removal of the unit.

4) Around the ram drive mechanism there is some unit sbielding.

This is removed from outside the cell.

A partial radiation check can then be made of the unit. Decontamination of the unit will undoubtedly be re-quired. This is done using the remote manipulators inside the cell. Addi-tional radiation checks are made during the course of the decontamination.

5) Roller units are set up in the operating aisle to allow the unit to be brought out horizontally. A special dolly is brought up outside the building to support the unit as it is being removed and to carry it to the maintenance shop.

6) A sling is attached to the crane in9ide the cell and the sling is secured to the end of the ram housing. 'l1le housing is raised sufficiently by the crane to take the weight off the supports.

7) The rollers are also raised until the ram housing no longer con-tacts the supports. The ram unit is now free to move.

8) A cable is attached to the ram in the operating aisle, threaded through the opening in the outside wall and attached to a winch located outside so that a straight line pull on the ram unit is possible.

9) The winch is actuated and the ram slowly pulled out of. the cell.

The crane inside the cell must be moved in parallel with the ram movement.

Coni\tant radiation monitoring is carried out during this operation to ascer-tain that the decontamination has been sufficient. It may be n~cessary to stop and do additional decontamination. Additional decontamination may be done either in the operating aisle, with or without the use of portable shielding, or it may be done inside the cell by partially_reversing the removal operation.

10) As the unit emerges it is placed on the dolly and then transported

to the mainte nance shop. The openin g in the PMC wall is tempo rarily shielde d, Q 4) Questi on: In paragr aph 4. 11 the return of the fuel transfe r basket from the Proces s Mecha nical Cell (PMC) to the Fuel Stor:\g e Pool Compl ex is describ ed, The transfe r of contam ination to the fuel pool is not discus sed during this step. What evalua tion has been made to determ ine the quantit y of contam ination that will be transfe rred to the pool? How well will the ion exchan ge equipm ent (see paragr apl =.. 4) remov e the contam ination ? Since only a single circuit of cooler , filter and ion exchan ge equip:a.nent (see Figure 5, 4) is going to be used, how will cooling be accom plished throuS( h-out the pool while decont aminat ion of only one compa rtment of the pool (see paragr aph 5. 5) is in progre ss?

Answe r: Revalu ation of the contam ination proble m has led NFS to decide G on a slightl y differe nt approa ch to the proble m of transfe rring the fuel ele-ments into the PMC from the FRS. The fuel storag~ basket s will be sized so that the elemen ts will protru de a short distanc e above the top of the basket .

The basket will be affixed to the underw ater transfe r convey or as indicat ed in paragr aph 4. 8 and brough t into positio n below the hatch. The crane will then be used to pick up the fuel elemen t from the basket leaving the basket in place in the underw ater transfe r convey or. The basket is returne d to the fuel storag e pool never having gone into the PMC where it might becom e contam inated. Paragr aphs 4. 8 and 4. 10 are being rewritt en to reflect these change s and new pages will be submit ted.

It would appear that the remain der of the questio ns in this section were promp ted by the contam ination possib ility create d by the return to the L

pool of basket s which had been in the PMC and, therefo re, they may be consid ered to be answer ed by the above change . There is, of course , some t=_* - -----

chance of pool water contamination from other l:3ources such as the storage of the elements. This is not a problem which is unique to this plant, how-ever, and the proposed method for handling the cooling and the decontamina-tion of the pool water has proved effective in many previous installations. There is no justification for duplicating the ion exchange equipment. No contamination problem in a fuel pool is so acute or so sudden that the cleanup facility has to be in constant operation. The same is true of the cooling system. The fuel pool is a tremendous heat sink. At the design rate of heat release, 600, 000 Btu/hl"--*

a number which we believe to be conservative, equivalent to the heat from the ZOO-day-cooled output of 6000 mwt of reactors--the temperature of the fuel pool would increase only O. 1 F per hour. Thus it does not appear to be necessary to provide a spare cooling loop.

5) Question: In reference to the proposed ventilation system what evaluations indicate that (1) a manifolded and butterfly valve controlled system on the exhaust of the blowers (see Figure 6. 3) will prevent blow back in the event of a blower failure and (Z) that a "minimum" 100 £pm face velocity thru openings will prevent backmixing from active to less active areas. (see paragraph 6. 9)

Answer: 1) A deta iled answe r i s being prepared and will be submitted.

Z) The 100 ft/min figure has been generally used throughout AEC installations for design purposes.

6) Question: According to Table z. Ila and z. llc freezing conditions and snowfall can be expected from October to April. Under these conditions, will operational and contamination problems occur in outdoor areas, such as the washdown area (see paragraph 3. 6 and 4. 3 ), the general purpose evaporator (see paragraph 4. 97 and 5. 43 ), the concrete lined burial bins for high level solid waste (see paragraph 4. 98 ), the low level trash burial area (see para-graph 4. 98 ), the water seals on the thorium and depleted uranium storage I

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tank s (see Figu re 4. 96) and the dive rsio n box and outd oor sam plin g poin ts (aee Figu re 6. 23e) ?

Answ er: ( 1) Ope ratio nal prob lems can be expe cted to occu r in an outd oor waahdown area , The refo re, this conc ept has been aban done d. All wash ing and deco ntam inati on will now be done insid e the build ing.

(2) The gene ral purp ose evap orat or has also been mov ed int.o the buil ding .

(3) It is no long er plan ned to use the conc rete -line d buri al vaul ts. The se wer e for the stor age of met al hull s whic h have been leac hed in boil ing nitr ic acid and thor ough ly rins ed with wate

r. Acti vity whic h is not rem oved by this trea tme nt is not like ly to be rem oved by wate r at a pH of near neut ralit y. We prop ose to bury thes e dire ctly in the silty till, a form a-tion whic h is not a aqui fer and in whic h the rate of mov eme nt of any wate r that shou ld get into it is esse ntia lly ze~q .

(4) Low leve l tras h buri al is an oper atio n whic h can be halt ed in extr eme ly incl eme nt wea ther . Buri al ditc hes will be dug som ewh at ahea d of time and slop ed to one end so that rain wate r colle cting in the open tren ch will coll ect awa y from the poin t at whic h buri al is takin g plac e*. If wate r does coll ect in the end of the tren ch, it will eith er be pum ped out prio r to the use of the end of the tren ch or the end will be back

-fill ed with out mak ing use of it for low leve l buri al.

(5) The seal s calle d for are liqu id seal s. Duri ng wint er mon ths, the liqu id will be of a non- free zing type .

(6) The dive rsio n box func tion has also been take n back into the build ing.

(7) The only outd oor sam plin g poin ts are on the was te tank s them selv es and into the annu lar spac e arou nd the tank

s. The se will be a

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simple thief-type sampler which will operate in inclement weather.

Appropriate char.gee have been made in the Safety Analysis to re-fleet the above and the revised pages will be submitted.

l 7} Questlon: Where and in what quantity will cell penetrations be provided for the future anticipated requirements as indicated by Figures 3. l 9(a),

3. l 9(b), 3. 22, 4. 21 (a), 4. 33 (c), and 4. 39(a)?

Answer: There are provided in the contact cells 10% spares for ~.all penetrations and there are 20% spares in the remote cells. These penetra-tions take the form of stainless steel pipe or tubing so arranged that there is no leakage of radiation in excess of the design shielding for the wall in which they are installed. Both ends are sealed by welding. ConsequentJ-y, they represent no safety hazard. Their exact locations will be shown on the final drawings.

8) Question: Clothing, monitoring and change facilities are discussed in paragraphs 8. 14 to 8. 17 but this discussion does not define the boundaries of the controlled zones in the plant, the traffic pattern in the controlled zones or the type and size of facilities provided at each boundary to prevent carry over of contamination from one zone to the next. A discussion of these point& for the proposed plant layout will be necessary.

Answer: Drawings are being prepared, coded to show the five kinds of plant areas from a contamination control standpoint. These are:

a) unrestricted access b) access when wearing plant clothing and shoes I c) access when wearing plant clothing, shoes, and special I II*

shoe covers .1 I

d) r.io access at all except after thorough decontamination, health physics surveys, special clothing, and shoe change e) a few limited areas in which either (a) or (b) is permit ted. Person s will enter the plant only throug h the main entran ce. ,,. ..

They will have free acce11 to the (a) areas withou t changin g clothin g 01~ 1boe1 and may al10 go into (e) areas. In the case of (e) areas visitor s will not be permit ted unle1s accom panied by plant per1on nel. The worke rs will change clothes and shoes in the locker rooms after which they will have acce** to the (b) areas. At the interfa ce betwee n all (b) and (c) areas there will be shoe cover rack* and ~ere will be a change of footge ar at every cros aing of the1e interfa ces. The (d) areas will not be entere d at all except under full health safety covera ge and there will be clothes and shoe change areas set up at the point of entry.

9) Questi on: What are the averag e ar.d maxim um discha rge concen tration s and flow rates of 1129 and 1 131 that will be exhaus ted throug h the stack? What C. total quantit y of these materi als will be release d per year?

Answe r: In v~ew of the implic ations of questio n 11 (see below) the reques ted data are provid ed not only for the iodines but also for krypto n 85.

In Table A-1-4 there are presen ted data represe 11ta.tiv e of the discha rges which are expect ed from averag e fuel during the fi'rst few years of operati on.

The discha rges of these same isotope s from a fuel repl"es entativ e of the highes t burnup s which we contem plate proces sing in the NFS plant were shown as a part of Table* A-1-1 (see answe r to questio n 1) and are repeate d here for conven ience:

Kr 85 8. ZS x 103 curies I 1Z9 O. 017 curies I 131 1. 7 curies C

Xe 131m 1. 1 curies Xe 133 5 x 10-3 curies

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It bad been our intention to die cuss this type of fuel when the time came to develop technical 1pecific;atione. In view of the interest shown by the ACRS at the meeting held on October 5, 1962, we have decided to redo the calculations of Sections VII and vm using the above maximum numbers.

Revised pages for these section* will be submitted as soon a* po11ible.

10) Ques~on: It is c.uggested in paragraph 7. 12 that the 1torage lagoon will be uaed a* an emergency holdup area for the overhead* from the general purpo*e evaporator. What maximum concentration of activity in theae over-heads would be diacharged to the a to rage lagoon? Do any other 1tream1 feed thi1 lagoon? U 10, what type and concentration, of activitiee wilt' be in these stream*? How operable will the lagoon be during winter weather condition* 1*

Answer: There appears to be some mi1under1tanding concerning the function of the storage lagoon. It i* not our intention to operate thi* as a seepage basin. That is, it is not the intention to routinely percolate wastes out into the stream through the ground using the ion exchange capacity there-of for additional decontamination.

All the liquid discharges will pass through the storage lagoon. They will be monitored and a record kept of the volume and activity which has been discarded. We expect to discard liquid at this point sucli that 10 CFR Part 20 will be met in Buttermilk Creek on a gross count basis assuming the absence of radium (1 x 10*7 uc/ cc). The average dilution factor available in Buttermilk Creek has been calculated to be 2. 7 x 103. Using a dilution of 103 would imply that the discharge from the storage lagoon could be as high as 10-4 uc/ cc.

If the storage lagoon discharge were to become higher than that required to meet 10 CFR Part 20 in Buttermilk Creek the overflow would be

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• topped and the di1charg e held up until the conditio n causing the higher activity level had been correcte d or until 1pecific fia 1ion prociuct analy1e1 could *how that the waste could be aatiafac torily di'achare d within the limit*

ol 10 CFR Part 20. It i* then the function of the lagoon to hold up the activity.

In dry warm weather 1ome aeepage into the ground can be expected and for the amount which doe* 10 aeep advantag e would be taken of the ion exchang e capacity <<>f the ground. Thia would be an abnorm al and not a routine opera-tion, however , In cold weather it ia conceiv able that the volume held up would freeze. Since the ice could be expected to ~wa1:.1 in place the atorage lag(),)n could then be 1aid to be carrying out its function very well.

The proce11 streams which go to the storage lagoon and their ex-pected activity levels are a1 follows:

1) Overhea d, from acid fraction ation- - - - 1O- 5 uc/ cc

2) Overhea d* from General Purpose Evap--- 6 uc/cc

3) Floor drain* from non- contami nated area a of the plant--- - - --- ----- - - - -- ------- ---- --- -- ---zero to 10-6 uc/ cc Miscella neous wastes such as laundry waates and laborato ry wastes can go to the storage lagoon but they do so by way of the General Purpose Evap Feed Tank. If they prove to be low enough ao that evapora tion is not necessa ry they can be then routed to the storage lagoon. We expect to set an operatin g limit for any waste discharg ed to the storage lagoon at about 10-2 uc/ cc.

• We expect not to dischat*g e a~ything from the storage lagoon so that Butterm ilk Creek could become in excess of 10 CFR Part 20.

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• This is approxi mately the limit used at Savanna h River also.

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11) Queetlon: Since at1nlftcant quantltlea of Kr 85 and 1131 (aee para1raph 1 . 6 and Table 1. 1) will be diachar1ed to the atmoaphere, with what degree of certainty can we be aaaured that the generalised parameter* uaed are conalatent with the actual alte metereology? .

Anawer: Before operation baa atarte~ we expect to have collected on-alte meteorolopcal data for at leaat a year and to have aome evidential aupport for the meteorological parameter* uaed. In the meantime the data uaed in making all calculation* have been deduced by Dr. Maynard Smith from a atudy *o f the alte. He waa aaked to aupply a "conaervative" aet of data. At a meetln1 of the ACRS aubcommlttee held in Buffalo on September 12, ~962, Dr. Smith defined hia concept of the degree of con-aervativiam aa followa : The parameter* were selected to reflect condi-tion* which are per}lapa aa much aa three timea b~ter than the worst po11ible condition and about 1000 timea worae than the beat conditions .

Reapectfully submitted, Nuclear Fuel Service,, Inc.

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Subacribed.and sworn to before Preaident me thi1 /,,k I

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VII PROTECT!~ CF THE PUBLIC Surrmary 1*.1 The plant and process which have been describ ed in detail in precedi ng section s are designe d to operate so that, under all normal operati ng proced ures, any dischar ge of radioa ctivity to the environment will be well within the limits set forth in 10 CFR Part 20.

7.2 Radioa ctivity can be los~ from the process complex at the followi ng points*

1. Stack

2. Waste storage tanks

3. Storage lagoon

4. Burial ground

5. Egress of personn el and materia l

6. Produc t shipment In subsequent paragra phs, each of the above possib ilities is analyzed to show that the stateme nt of Paragraph 7.1 is valid. Some of the detaile d calcula tions are shown in Appendicies as noted.

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(j 7.3 Furthe r, this plant and its site are shown to be I so designe d and located that, in the unlikel y event of the most -seriou s acciden t which could possibl y be deemed credibl e, there will be no dischar ge to the environment which results I in levels of exposure in excess of those set forth in Section s I 100.ll (a)(l), (2) and (3) of 10 CFR Part 100; anrl further that steps can be taken to assure that, even in the event I of such an acciden t, the dischar ges to surface waterways at the site boundary can be kept within the limits specifi ed in 10 CFR Part 20 through the use of reasona ble correct ion measures after the acciden t or release has occurre d.

7.4 ThP. followi ng abnormal events have been postula ted1

1. The complete rupture of a waste tank releasi ng 600,000 gallons of high-le vel waste.

2. A critica lity inciden t anywhere in the plant involvi ng a total of 1019 fission s in a siugle bu~at or a multip le continu ing event totalli ng 10 fission s.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964 L

3. A cri tic ali ty inc ide nt in the fue l sto rag pool which set s up a 10-nMt boi lin g wat e rea cto r which ope rate d for as long as 3 er hours bef ore it can be shu t down.

4. A chemical exp los ion in the pla nt which assumed to rup tur e a ves sel con tain ing is ful l day 's charge of the maximum fiss iona pro duc t con ten t pos sib le.

5. The r.omplete fai lur e of the iod ine remova equipment so tha t for a per iod of up to l day the complete charge of iod ine is losone to the atmosphere. t The rat ion ale for the sel ect ion of the se sel ect for the pla nt, the sta ck, and the eve nts has been to which rep res ent the upper lim it of cat ast tan k farm eve nts occ ur in each of the se are as, even thoughrop he which could the like liho od of occ urre nce is ver y sm we bel iev e tha t par agr aph s, eac h~= the above pos sib ilitall. In subsequent ies is ana lyz ed.

7.5 Throughout thi s sec tio n, number rec ur. Valu~s for such rec urr ing assaum of assumptions in Table 7.5 . Assumptions spe cif ica lly ptio ns are col lec ted icu lar cal cul atio n are inc lud ed in the rel ate d to a par t-cal cul atio n.

Normal Oper~tions Sta ck 7.6 As exp lain ed in Par the ven t.i lat ion systems are designedagrtoaphs 6.3 through 6.2 1, normal ope rati ng con diti ons , flow of airass ure tha t, under of lea st contami nat ion int o tho se of hig is always from are as There are sep ara te systems for ves sel s, her con tam ina tion .

cel ls 'themselves. These joi n tog eth er dis sol ver s, and the bef ore dis cha rge through a 65-meter sta and are filt ere d of air dis cha rge d is 32,000 cfm. Iod ineck. The tot al volume are dsig ned to col lec t 99.5% of the inc removal fac ilit ies assumed tha t all of the nob le gas es in ide nt iod ine . It is dur ing the cou rse of the day. Under nora dai ly charge escape con diti ons , the amount of sol id fiss ion mal ope rati ng the gas stre am is assumed to be low eno pro duc ts tak en int o of thi s stre am *wi ll red uce them to the ugh tha t the filt eri ng neg lig ibl e in comparison to the gaseous poi nt where the y are are based on an average fue l which we mayact ivi ty. Cal cul atio ns in thi s pla nt rep ~es ent ed by the foll ow exp ect to pro ces s ing par am eter ss Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

C Table 7.5 Assumptions Used in Ca lcu lat ion s Se cti on s VII & VI II

1. The dis per sio n parameters used are Table 2.1 4 and in "Nuclear Sa fet y", tho se given in June 1961 * . Fig ure s V-1 and V-2 Volume 2, No. 4, and ve rti ca l dis per sio n co eff ici en tsprovide ho riz on tal dis tan ces up to 105 meters and for res pec tiv ely for con dit ion s ranging from "extremely me teo rol ogi cal "mccfarately sta ble ". In all cal culun sta ble " to in thi s sec tio n, "sl igh tly un sta ble ati on s performed have been assumed to rep res ent averag " co eff ici en ts "moderately sta ble " co eff ici en ts hav e con dit ion s and rep res ent inv ers ion con dit ion s. e been assumed to Wind ve loc itie s of 1 meter/second for I I l

con dit ion s and 4 meters/second for have been use d.

The following wind dis tri bu tio n dat ave inv ers ion rage con dit ion s a has been useds Il I L Wind Di str ibu tio n (Per Cent Per Octant)

I Ij Wind Di rec tio n Suniner Winter Averag§.

l N ~ 8% 8.5%

Il NE E

4 2 3

\ 5 2 3.5 SE 17 I s 23 21 9 13 I SN 22 13 25 19 w 9 12 10. 5 NW 20 21 20. 5 1I ;2. Fuel is cooled 150 days bef ore pro ces sin g.

3. Hig h-l eve l waste is sto red at 410 gal is equ iva len t tos lon s per ton which 132 c/g al Sr-90 166 c/g al Cs-137 57 c/g al Ru-106 at the time of sto rag e.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964 I

1ll- - - - - - - -..._.,._-_ _ _ _ _ _:. .- - ,_ _........-.

-

• LL, * . * *~t * ~ 1~~ *** -,.,_ .... , .......

• L O ' * *

---

:,:..*--------~---

Table 7.5 (Cont* d) *

4. The rate of travel in the surficial till is 1.0 foot/day. The rate of travel in the silty till is 5 x 10-5 foot/day.

5. 90% of Sr-90 is associated with sludge in ~he tank.

6. 99.~ of Sr-90 is adsorbed on so°il on passage through it.

7. 99.99% of Cs-137 is adsorbed on passage through the 700 feet of soil.

a. No Ru-106 is adsorbed at all.

9. Tritium is assumed to go 25% to stac~, 10% to waste tanks, 65% to steam.

10. For long-lived isotopes the fission products are taken as 7r:JI, from u235 - 3r:JI, from Pu239. For short-lived isotop,s they are taken as 60% from Pu239 -

40% from u235.

• Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revisiun 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Burnup 20,000 mNd/ton Sp eci fic Power 32 mN/ton ~

Irr adi ati on Time 2 yea rs Load Fac tor 85 per cen t Cooling Time 150 days Using the se parametex*s the inp ut act ivi cal cul ate d. The gaseous act ivi ty* inp ty to the pla nt was ut iss Kr-85 6.3 x 103 cur ies I-129 0.022 cur ie I-131 1.8 cur ies Xe-13lm 1.0 cur ie~

Xe-133 3.8 x 10- cur ie Tri tiu m 50 cur ies Under the con dit ion s sta ted above, the from the sta ck usi ng the average act ivi tot al dai ly dis cha rge wi ll bes ty lev el fue l contemplated Kr-85 6.3 x 103 cur ies I-129 1.1 x 10-4 cur ie I-131 9.0 x 10-3 cur ie Xe-13lm 1.0 cur i!

Xe-133 3.8 x .10 3 cur ie Tri tiu m 50 cur ies

(_

7.7 The con cen tra tio ns of var iou s dis tan ces and under var ioueac h of -these iso top es at s me teo rol ogi cal con dit ion s are cal cul ate d from the following form ul ae&

for sho rt-t erm cal cul ati ons s X

• g exp 2o-2 (7.7a) z For Long-period average con cen tra tio ns 2rr , exp h2

__ __1__

(7.7b)

Titer z U X 8 2o- 2 z

• At 150 days coo ling the se are the onl y sig nif ica nt gaseous iso top es.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Where X = conce ntrati on in curies /m3 (,c/cc )

Q = emission rate in curie s/seco nd

°y* <rz = dispe rsion coeff icien ts in meter s h = stack heigh t in meter s u = wind veloc ity in meter s/seco nd x -= distan ce downwind in meter s f = wind frequency in per cent/ octan t The calcu lation has been carri ed out for both inver sion and avera ge condi tions over the range 1500 to 51,000 meter s (see Appendix 7.7). The resul ts of these calcu lation s are prese nted in Table 7.7. The maximum conce ntrati ons are given for both the avera ge and inver sion condi tions . For avera ge condi tions the maximum conce ntrati on occur s at the site boundary; under inver sion condi tions the maximum conce ntrati on occur s over the range of about 4000 to 10,000 meter s downwind from the stack . It can be seen that all of the conce ntrati ons are well withi n the MPC value s with the excep tion of the Kr-85 conce ntrati on under inver sion condi tions . The inver sion conce ntrati ons given are cente rline conce ntrati ons and inclu de no wind diver sity facto r; they are not expected to persi st for more than a few hours at a time. The yearl y avera ge conce ntrati on, which is perm itted under 10 CFR Part 20, will not be signi fican tly incre ased by these occur rance s.

7.8 Although 10 CFR Part 20 conta ins no provi sion for

• limit s on the depos ition of radio iodin e on pastu rage, the plant is designed to relea se iodin e at conce ntrati ons lower than the MPC for conce ntrati on in air in order to prote ct those areas surrounding the plant site which are used for dairy ing. Using the long- perio d avera ge conce ntrati on and a depos ition veloc ity of 0.01 meter per second, the depos ition rate has been calcu lated (Appendix 7.8). Since yearl y avera ge conce ntrati ons are used," it is reaso nable to assume that the equil ibrium condi tions are reach ed; i.e. the rate of depos-ition equal s the rate of decay. The south , south west and north west octan ts have the highe st yearl y avera ge wind frequ encie s, rangi ng from about 19 to 22 per cent. There fore, a wind frequency of 25 per cent per octan t has been used in these calcu lation s. It was found after the Windscale incid ent that a grazin g area contamination level of 1 µc per squar e meter resul ted in about 0.1 µc/li ter of milk*.

Using this relati onshi p the resul tant activ ity level s in milk have been calcu lated . The milk activ ity level s are

~hown in Table 1.g-.

7.9 The Feder al Radia tion Council has estab lishe d a Radio activ ity Intak e Guide for Iodine-131 of 100 µµc per day, based on the uptak e by child ren as the most sensi tvie segment of the popu lation . As can be seen from Table 7.8, the con-sumption of about five liter s of milk per day from dariy cattl e grazi ng inrn~diately adjac ent to the site boundary would be requi red to equal the level of intak e as estab lishe d by

• TID-8206, Page 56 Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Au~. 20, 1964

~~,,_,_______ ---*-----------------=- -------*----*-*--*-..--._,______

Ta ble 7.7 Maximum Co nc en tra tio n of Gaseo us Iso top es Under In ve rsi on and Average Me teo rol og ica l Co nd iti on s Iso top esd x, pc /cc Cu rie s/S ec on d Inv ers ion a AverageE MPCc pc /cc Kr-85 7.3 X l0- 2 ,,.....,.f*\\

7.3 X 10-7 1.6 X 10-8 3 X 10 -7 ::,"

J I-1 29 -9 1.3 X 10 1.3 ~ 10- 14 208 X 10-16 6 X l0- 11 I-1 31 1.0 X l0- 7 1.0 X 10 -12 2.2 X l0- 14 3 X 10-lO Xe-13lm 1.1 5 X 10 -5 1.1 5 X 10 -10 2.5 X 10 -l 2 4 X 10 -7 Xe-133 4.4 X 10 -8 4.4 X 10-13 9.7 X 10 - 15 3 X 10 -7 Tr iti um 5.8 X 10 -4 5.8 X l0- 9 1.3 X 10 -lO 2 X 10 - 7 C

I i

\

a Maximum co nc en tra tio n occu1*s sta ck ; co nc en tra tio n wi thi n abat ab ou t 6000 me ter s from the from ab ou t 4000 to 10,000 me ou t 10% of the maximum oc cu r ter s from the sta ck .

b Maximum co nc en tra tio.ns oc cu r at the sit e boundary (1500 me te:r-s).

c Ta ble II , Appendix B, 10 CFR Pa rt 20 .

d At 150 days co oli ng , the se ar iso top es . e the on ly sig ni fic an t gaseous 1 e Based vn 1 tri to n produced pe l in 1 to 4 x 104) wi~h 25% lo str 104 fis sio ns (re po rte d as 1 liq ui d wa ste ef flu en t, 10% to up the sta ck , 65% lo st in sto rag e tan ks .

Re vis ion 1, Oc t. 29 , 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20 , 1964

. *- . ' . - ~ . -

....,..,._.._..,._--...,..._,....._ .. _~ .

~

-.....--.......---*--~.....,.......... ...__ ................

____ ____ _____..:.__,.....,,,,.,~==m::t=!l===-~?

Table 7.8 Iodine Deposi tion and Milk Concen trationa Ground Concen tration Milk Concen tration Distanc e in Meters uuc/m2 uec/lit er

-l *\' 1500 200 22 2000 150 15 5000 31 3.1 10000 8.9 0.89 20000 2.6 0.26 a See Table 7.5 for assumptions and Appendix 7.8 for detaile d calcula tions.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

-- -----= -=-=-::-

this Guide. Thi s rate of consumption is high I tha t can be exp ecte d, prop ably by a fact or of er than any fou r. In add itio n, no cre dit is taken for diluat lea st

• pro cess ing) by milk con tain ing less er (or no) tion (dur ing radi oiod ine or the fac t tha t cat tle are pas tureamounts of New York Sta te only abo ut hal f the yea r. d in Western Waste Stor age Tanks 7.10 The desi gn of the was te stor age tank s has been disc usse d in det ail in Para grap hs 5.50 and in Submission l date July 1, 1963. Thesethro ugh 5.56 bui lt in a "cup -and -sau cer" desi gn. Ope ratin tank s are cal l for mon itor ing of t~e ann ular space betwg prcc edu res and its sauc er and of the wat er intr odu ced und een the tank If ther e is sign ific ant leak age from the tank er the tank s.

sau cer, the ent ire tank con tent s wil l be tran into the a spa re tank kep t for tha t purp ose. Thus, und sfer red into ope rati ng con diti ons ther e wil l be !lQ loss of er normal thes e tank s. act ivit y from Stor age Lagoon

• 1.1 1 The very low -lev el was tes from this pro ove rhea ds from acid frac tion

'. atio cess --

n, solv ent was tes, and mis cell ane ous was tes- -can be put through the C eva por ator and the overheads from this can begen eral purpose exchange columns if nec essa ry. It is exp ecte dput through ion act ivit y con tent of the overheads from the gen tha t the normal eva por ator wil l con tain abo ut 10-6 µc/c c of acteral purpose be furt her reduced by a fact or of 30 by the use ivit y. Thi s can non -reg ene rate d cati oni c ion exchange resu ltin of sim ple, rati on of 3 x 10~8 µc/c c. The exp ecte d volumeg in a con cen t-waste~ is 40,000 gal/ day . The aver age ava ilab of thes e But term ilk Creek is 41 cf~ which is equ al to le flow in Thus, the ava ilab le on- site dilu tion fact or is2.7 x107 gal/ day .

In Cat tara ugu s Creek an add itio nal dilu tion fac6.8 x 162.

8.5 is ava ilab le. The con cen trat ion in Cat tara tor of abo ut would be exp ecte d to be abo ut 10-lO µc/c c. Furtugu s Creek the resi dua l acti vity in this stre am wil l be herm ore, and I-13 1 with some Zr-Nb-95. The MPC's for larg ely Ru-106 are 1 x 10-5 2 x 10-6 , 6 x 10-5 , and l x 10-4thes e isot ope s than l x 10-~ for unknown act ivit ies when radi µc/c c rath er The refo re, the ava ilab le fact or of safe ty is um is abs ent.

out any ana lyse s of the effl uen t and abo ut 104abo ut 103 with -

to carr y out spe cifi c fiss ion prod uct ana lyse if we choose stre am. Thi s stream wil l also carr y abo ut 130s on this effl uen t day of trit ium sinc e ther e i s no known way to cur ies per remove the triti um . The con cen trat ion of trit proc ess it to But term ilk Creek wil l aver age 1.3 x 10-3 ~c/c ium on- site in MPC is 10- l µc/c c. In Cat tara ugu s Creek the c. The on- site triti um C con cen trat ion is expected to aver age 1.5 x 10-4 MPC here is 3 x 10-3 µc/c ~. µc/c c; the Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

~ . .

• *- * * ..,..'! ) * , * * * .. * .' > ,Rf;. * > ~ * ~ * !.Ji - ~..._ * ~ ' ~.

1Utt ,...,,.._ P J ae

• ---------~-==

7.12 This low-level stream can be discharged directly to Buttermilk Creek and the level of activity at the site boundary will remain well within the MPC levels of 10 CFR Part 20. In addition there will be a series of lagoons available for use as an emergency holdup area. Their use will permit time for the decay of shorter-lived isotopes and will allow the adsorption on the soil of some of the longer-lived isotopes. The low level waste streams from the plant discharge into the interceptor, a concrete pit of 50,000 gallons capacity, which is designed for batching of wastes. A valved interceptor drain line will permit collection of one days output from the plant which will thon be sampled for gross alpha, beta, garruna and tritium. The pH of the sample will be checked and the interceptor contents neutralized if necessary to pH to 6 to 8. A line is available for pumping the interceptor contents back to the plant for further processing. Normally, after sampling, the inter-ceptor drain valve will be opened and the contents allowed to drain by gravity to the first holding pond, a 300,000-gallon settling basin with a high level overflow to the second pond. The second and third ponds each have capacity of about 2.3 million gallons. Between the second and third ponds will be a high level overflow and a valved drain line about 18 inches above the bottom of the pond. A valved drain line from the third pond will discharge to the creek. The capacity of the ponds above the overflows will allow complete holdup of 100 days output from the plant.

7.13 In view of the factors of safety available, no hazard will be presented by the routine handling of this aspect of the operation.

Burial Ground 7.14 Two types of wastes will be buried in the ground in conjunction with the operation of thi~ plant. One is low-level solid trash of all sorts coming either from the plant operation itself or shipped in for burial from off-site users of radioactivity. The other is high-level solid trash in the form of leached hulls or equipment discarded from the plant. Activity associated with the former type is considered to be "available" in the sense that it could be leached out

. of the waste if it were contacted with water. The radioactivity associated with hulls and discarded equipment, Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

on the oth er hand, is not con sid ere d to the cas e of the hul ls, the rad ioa ctiv itybe "av aila ble ". In hul ls the mse lve s which are eit her sta inl is induced in the zirc oni um . Both of the se me tals are higess ste el or and would not be exp ecte d to cor rod e in hly ref rac tor y and to any sig nif ica nt ext ent . They wil l havthe bur ial environment lea che d in boi lin g nit ric aci d pri or to e been car efu lly and an aliq uot ana lyz ed to ass ure tha t bur ial , ins pec ted ,

of fue l val ues are not bei ng dis car ded sig nif ica nt qua nti ties to be dis car ded w111 have been exh aus tive wit h them. Equipment in pla ce bef ore bri ngi ng it out of the ly decontaminated cel be fur the r decontami~ated in the Equipm ls and it wil l the n Room bef ore it is bur ied . Hence, sig nifent Decontamination "av aila ble " act ivi ty is not exp ecte d to ica nt qua nti ties of thi s typ e of was te eit her . be ass oci ate d wit h 7.1 5 Bu rial of bot h typ es of sol id was in the sil ty til l des crib ed in par agr te wil l be done and 2.4 1. We have now had con sid era ble aph s 2.1 7 thro ugh 2.2 5 wit h thi s ma teri al in var iou s exc ava tionexp erie nce in working con stru ctin g the pla nt and in the ope ratis in the cou rse of waste bur ial ope rati on for was tes of the on of a low -lev el in par agr aph 7.1 4. From thi s exp erie nce fir st typ e des crib ed acc ept the ver y low per me abi lity fig ure it is pos sib le to dur ing the sub sur fac e inv est iga tio ns reps which were obt ain ed The rein a cal cul ate d hor izo nta l flow rat ort ed in Sec tion II.

( was rep ort ed. Sin ce we exp ect to car ry e of 5 x 10-5 ft/d ay ope rati ons wit hin 100 fee t of any rav ineout no bur ial to something ove r 5000 yea rs for any lea , thi s cal cul ate s the rav ine . Fur the r thi s sil ty til l hasche d act ivi ty rea ch have good ion exchange cap aci ty for the been shown to iso top es, Cs-137 and Sr- 90. Thus, we exp lon ger liv ed def ens es of thi s ma teri al to con tain com ect the nat ura l act ivi ty bur ied in it. ple tely the 7.1 6 Sil ty til l does not , how r, act ion exchange ma teri al for ruth eni um .eveThi as a nat ura l sho rt-l ive d iso top e, however. For the s is a rel ati vel y assume tha t a cur ie of ruthenium were to sak e of illu str ati on bur ial sit e and beg in to work its way tow esc ape from the rav ine s. Fur the r assume tha t dis con tin ard on of the rea ctio n of the was te wit h the soi l sho uit ies or che mical vel oci ty by a fac tor of 100. It would uld inc rea se its yea rs for the act ivi ty to rea ch the stre sti ll tak e ove r 50 of tim e the cur ie ruthenium would have am . In thi s ~er iod The yea rly flow in Cat tara ugu s Creek ave dec aye d to 10- 5 cur ie.

Thu s, for each cur ie/y ear which was lea rag es 3.5 x 1013 cc.

gro und , the con cen trat ion in Cat tara uguche d from the bur ial 3 x 10-23 pc/ cc. The MPC is 10-5 ~c/ cc.s Creek would be Revision l, Aug. 20, 1964

7.17 We expect the rele ase of acti vity to the environ~~nt from the oper ation of the. wa1te buri al grou nd--

low- leve l trash cont ainin g "available" acti vity eithe r from or from the high -lev el waste desc ribed abov e--to be completely inco nse-quen tial.

Egress of Personnel or Material 7.18 The cont rol of rele ase of acti vity into the envi ron-ment by carry ing it 9ut on the persons or cloth ing of pers or on mate rial leaving the plan t must be accomplished by onnel adm inist rativ e means. Personnel working with radi oact ivity

• in the plan t will be provided with prot ectiv e cloth ing whic must be changed befo re they .leav e the plan t. They will h be requ ired to take a shower. Hand and foot coun ters will also be provided for monitoring all pers ons- -vis itors inclu ded-who leav e the working area s. -

7.19 Sim ilarl y procedures will be set up whereby nothing may be sent off the plan t with out firs t having been surveyed and smeared by Heal th-S afety pers onne l. Guards will be instr ucte d not to pass out any mate rial which does not have Heal th-S afety cert ifica tion .

7.20 While it is poss ible that occa sion ally bare ly dete ctab le quan titie s of acti vity might slip through proc edur es, it is esse ntia lly impossible for sign ificathes nt e

quan titie s of acti vity to get outs ide the plan t in this manner. No diff icul ty in contamination of the envir onment is expected from this oper ation .

!rod uct Shipme.n t 7.21 Radioactive shipments are covered by AEC in 10 CFR Part 71 and 72 prim arily . All regu latio nsregu in latio ns at the time of the shipment pert ainin g to such shipments effe ct expected* to be complied with by *the ship per and the carr are The only way in which radi oact ivity could ente r the ier.

environment by way of product shipments is for the shipm to become involved in a serio us acci dent . The regu ent on prod uct shipping cont aine rs are designed with latio ns poss ibili ty in mind. The hazard thus involved isthat not one pecu liar to this plan t, its desi gn, or its oper ation . There is a cons idera ble body of experience on this aspe ct of busi ness and we expe ct in no way to incr ease the degree the risk above that which has alrea dy been acce pted . of Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

- *.* Y.-W I

• * * ~ .

Conclusion .

7.22 Qa the basi s of the data and calc in Paragraphs 7.6 through 7.21 , in the normal ulat ions pres ente d oper ation of the chemical proc essin g plan t desc ribed here in, ther e will be no disc harg e of radi oact ivity to the environment in exce of the limi ts set fort h in 10 CFR Part 20. ss Abnormal ~era tion s 7.23 In Paragraph 7.4 five abnormal ev8'lts were hypothe-size d. These even ts range from the unli kely to the incr but they deli neat e, we beli eve, the upper limi edib le t of any cat-astrophe which could occur in this plan t and its rela ted faci litie s. None of thes e acci dent s would resu in leve of exposure to the gene ral publ ic exceeding the ltquid e limi ls for gaseous emission suggested in Sect ion 100.11 of 10 CFR ts Part 1001 and furth er ther e is reas onab le assurance that liqiu d discharges at the site boundary could be kept with the conc entra tions for drin king water purpose spec~.fied in 10 CFR Part 20. in Loss from High-Level Waste Tanks 7.24 Care ful measures have been taken to ensure the reli abil ity of the high -lev el waste tank s, to prov ide mult iple means of dete cting any leakage in the unli kely even t that any defe cts should develop and to minimize the effe cts on the environment of such leak age.

7.25 ' There are seve ral methods of dete cting leakage froni the waste tank s barr iers between the store d wast e and the environment. The tank s have been equipped with liqu leve l measurement systems which are accu rate to 1/4 inch id abou t 700 gall ons. The tanks are loca ted with in sauc ers or and each sauc er is equipped with a liqu id mon

• Each tank and sauc er is contained with in a reinitori ng system.

forc ed concrete vau lt, the vaul t in turn is cons truct ed upon four feet of graded grav el into which water is introduced for the primary purpose of maintaining the moisture cont ent-- and thus the bear ing prop ertie s--o f the underlying silty till There are eigh t well s loca ted with in a foot of the .

which go down into the grav el area and through whichvaul the t

leve l of the wate r ls measured and from which samp be drawn to determine if ther e has been any leakagelesthrou may the firs t thre e barr iers . If ther e should have been any gh larg e pene trati on of the firs t thre e barr iers , it would be poss ible to retri eve the acti vity with rela tive ly dilu tion by pumping out of the grav el area through littl any e

of the eigh t well s. This area thus repr esen ts the forth barr to the escape of acti vity . ier C

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

7.26 Th* local environment provid es two additi onal barrie rs to the escape if radioa ctivity from the site. The tanks are locate d in the approximate center of a penins ula with a thick layer of silty till. It has been shown that the perme ability of this silty till is so low that essen tially complete containment woula be expec~ed of any waste that did escape the first four barrie rs. The till, then, is a fifth and most important barrie r. The peninsula is bounded by Erdman Brook and Quarry Creek. U&;S geolo gists who did the survey work on the site a*s sure us that any radioa ctivit y which escaped either onto or into the ground on this penins ula would eventu ally have to show up in one or the other of these creeks if it were not adsorbed on the soil by ion exchange.

At the confluence of these two creeks there is establ ished a sampling statio n to determine again that activi ty has not escaped from the site. The average yearly flow at this point is about 2 cfs. While it would be expensive, it would not be impossible to collec t the total flow at this point and pump it back up to the. plant site for additi onal proces sing if this should prove to be necess ary. Thi&

repres ents the sixth barrie r. There ls still a final sampling of the discha rge in Cattaraugus Creek at the point where the efflue nt leaves the plant propet'ty. This will provide the legal record of the plant discha rges.

7.27 A spare tank identi cal to the working tank is provided so that in case the working tank begins to leak the conten ts may be transf erred to the spare. Initia lly there will be a 111 sparin g ratio. It is contemplated that during the first 15 y*e ars of operat ion of the plant two oddtti onal working tanks will be built and that the spare will se1"Ve all three. The eventu al sparin g ratio will be dictat ed by plant experi ence.

7.28 We believ e that a waste tank could be ruptur ed only by sabotage or by a major earthq uake. The former is outsid e the scope* of the requirements of this review. The latter has been shown to be highly unlike ly (see Paragraphs 2.46 through 2.48). In the event that a tank should ruptur e, howev~r, the combination of the vault, the gravel area and wells, and the impermeability of the surrounding silty till can be expected to mainta,.I'\ the tank contento within the inmediate area for a long period of time. There would be more than ampie time to arrang e a temporary piping system to permi t pumping the waste soluti on from the tank, the sauce r, or wells into the grave l, into the spare tank.

Revision l, Aug. 20, 1964 C

7.29 The multiplicity of methods for determining any leakage from the tank make it essentially impossible that such leakage could remain undetected. There are so many barriers between the waste and the* environment that sign-ificant escape into the uncontrolled environment is also considered impossible, We even consider it possible to suffer a complete tank rupture--* most serious hypothetical and unlikely accident--and still maintain Cattaraugus Creek below the IIPC levels of 10 CFR Part 20.

Criticality Incident Anywhere in the Plant 7.30 There have been eleven criticality incidents in solution systems.* Eight of these have resulted in a total number of fissions ranging from 4 x 1016 to 1.3 x 1018. Ole, that at Idaho Chemical Processing Plant in October, 1959, resulted in 4 x 1019 fissions * . Except in one case in' which there was some warping of a tank bottom, none of these resulted in any physical da"88ge. Theassumptio~ is made here that a criticality incident producing 1019 fissions in a single burst 9r 1o20 fissions in a repeating incident is experienced anywhere in the plant and that the entire production of noble gaseous fission products plus 1/3 of the iodines (from 1020 fissions) are lost. The value of 1019 fissions is chosen to conform to calculations made at Savannah River suggesting this value as the upper 1~5it of a single .burst. These same calculations suggest 10 fissions as the resultant of a maximum repeated burst. It will be shown that the limit1og problem with this incident is not a public protection problem but rather the exposure of in-plant personnel to penetrating radiation at the time of the burst. For a repeating incident there would be time to evacuate personnel after the first burst and the exposure to penetrating radiation can be considered equivalent to that from a 1019 fission burst.

This is considered in Paragraphs 8.26 and 8.27~ Insofar as

• the general public is concerned there is no hazard from the inrnediate radiation at the time of the burst. It is well established that the limiting condition in an occurrence of this type is the thyroid dose from the iodine is~topes re-1*eased. Therefore, this event is analyzed on the basis of thyroid dose to a person on the periphery of the site, at Springville, and at Buffalo. All three are calculated for the average and inversion conditions specified in Table 7.5.

In the case of Springvill~ and Buffalo the total population dose is calculated and expressed in man-rem.

• Nuclear Safety, Quarterly Literature Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Dec. 1961, Pages 34-37 plus a subsequent Hanford incident and one in Olarlestown, Rholde Island in July, 1964.

G Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

. Table 7.30 uan tltle s and Concentrations of Sr-Various Poin ts In the Event~of !e!c Qua ntiti es, Cur les Con cent ratlo nsd, ec/c c In Mo nlto rln~ Nonltorlng But ter'l lnk Isotope Leakage Cattaraugus Stat Im _ Stat ion Creek Sr-90 . 2 Creek ~

X 106 20 1 X Jo*5 5 X 10*7 5 X 10-8 .J X 10-7 Cs*137 2 X 106 20 1 X 10*5 lI 5 X 10*7 5 X 10-8 2 X 10*5 Ru-106 1 X 106 100 5 X 10*5 1.5x 10*' 2.5x10*7 1 X 10*5 i

• 100 gall ons per day for 100 clay s.

b Tanks loc ate d* shc!NI on Figu re J.2 so tha t* 11ln1 of trav el to n..rest trlb ~tar y Is ava lllb le. ... of 700 f*t c For off* slte , App endi x I, Table II, 10 CFR Part 20.

d App llce le duri ng the elev enth ,aar folla wln g the con cent ratio ns duri ng foll ~ln g year s wl 11 be loweacci den t;

r. Decay has been negl ecte d for ces h* a11d:*strontl1111

• b Oft l 7.31 Table 7.31 ll1t1 the peak activit y of each of the lodlne l1otope1 131 through 135 and the time after the acciden t when the peak. occurs. The1e have been calcula ted using NRDL-456, "Calcu lated Actlvl tlea and Abundance, of U-235 flaaion Produc ts".

11th .one excepti on, the peak activlt lea have been assumed ln calcula ting the population dose. This procedure is conserv ative but by a relativ ely small amount over the time periods involve d. The one exception ls the activit y of iodlne-134*

at the time it reaches Buffalo under inversi on conditi ons.

The transi t time ln this case ls so large in relatio n to the half-li fe of lodlne-134 and lts precurs ors that its activit y level was found to be negligi ble compared to the remaining iodine l1otope s.

7.32 The off-sit e doses have been computed assuming that the iodine ls release d from the stack instant ar.eous ly. The total inhaled activit y has been calcula ted using Equation 7.7a for short-t erm center- line concen tration s. The calcula tions have been performed for average (slight ly unstab le) meteor ologica l conditons and for inversi on (moderately stable) conditi ons. The distanc es involved area Site periphe ry 1,500 meters Spring ville 7,200 meters Buffalo 51,000 meters 0 The use of Equation 7. 7a is valid for the first two disi.nc es*.

Extrap olation to 50,000 meters is questio nable, but gives a fair estima te. The results so obtained are given in Table 7.32a.

Then using the approximations suggested in 10 CFR Part 100 for the thyroid dose from each of these isotope s, the total rem per person and the fractio n of the 300 rem referen ce value are calcula ted for the three locatio ns and for both types of meteorology. Total man-rem values have also been calcula ted.

These date are present ed in Table 7.32b. Calcul ations supporting the numbers shown in these three tables are given in .Appendix 7.32. It can be seen that in no case is the referen ce value used for evaluaton of reactor sites exceeded or even closely approached. The highes t value indicat ed, a 1.95*-rem/person do** in Springv i~le under inversi on conditi ons, is not expected to be encountered since 1t la the opinion of meteor ologist s (aee Paragraph 2.13) .that an inversi on aimed at Spring ville would be caught and held in the Buttermilk-Cattaraugus Valley systems. Even this value is only about 0.7 per cent of an emergency dose of 300 rem.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964 G

...-~

Tabl*e 7.31 Quantitie1 of Iodine I1otope1 formed from 1o20 Fi11ion11 I1otope Tille of Peak Act ivity Peak Act ivit y, Curie*

1-131 ~.2 houri ~

1-132 7.6 hou r, 80 I-13 3 3.~ hou r, 420 1-134 46.0 houri ~770 1-1 ~ 2.2 hou r, 1470 Total 77~

a A11uaing 1/3 of the iodi ne, are lo1t froaa the -..t ack.

n J I SW Table 7.321 ftM/P*r*eo*

Inver1lon Average L2ai120 , 'llod*rtitl! S~bltl ,s11sbil1 uo1tab11l Site Boundary 0.09 0~63

• Springville l.~ 0.06 Buffalo 0.33 2.8 X 10-3 0

a From instantaneous release of 1/3 the iodines from 1o20 fissions.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964 G

f, I

Table 7.32b Individu al and Populati on D01es at Several Points fn Event of a Critical ity Incident Site Periphery . SDrinqv ille Buffalo Inversion* Ayeraq,! Inver11on8 Average* Inversion* Average*

Individu al Dose, RIii/

Personc 0.09 0.63 1.95b 0.06 0.3~ 2.8 x 10-3 Fraction of 300 Rem/

Person Dose 3.1 X 10-4 2.6 X 10*3 6.3 X 10.3b 2.1 X 10*4 1.1 X 10*3b 9.3 X 10-6 Exposed Populati on *.*-.

Dose, Rem Total --- --- 24b 0.8 593b 5 a See Table 7.5 for conditio ns assumed.

b It is not expected that, under inversio n conditio ns, any activity will reach Springv ille or Buffalo1 but rather .will be trapped in Cattaraugus Valley.

c See Table 7.32a.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Criticality Incident in Fuel Pool 7.33 The fuel pool is designed to hold 1000 fuel elements

• in racks of such geometry that the establishment of a critical array is impossible even if the elements were all of the max-imum reactivity of any fuel before it is irradiated. Allowance is made for moving through the storage array an element of the highest reactivity. This is discussed in Section VI and the occurrence of a criticality incident here is shown to be extremely unlikely. Despite the fact that a criticality incident in the fuel pool is extremely unlikely, the following event is hypothesized*

It is assumed that an element i~ janrned into the interstice between four element~ and that the five elements are involved in a crltical event, that a 10-IIINt boiling water reactor will be set up, and that it will operate 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before it is possible to shut it down. It is further assumed that all five elements are defective and, thus, that some gaseous activity can escape from the **

element.

7.34 Calculations supporting thit section are shown i in Appendix 7.34. The heat released would raise the temperature of th~ water in the storage pool only about 16F even if the 0 pool water coolers failed to operate. Therefore, there is no danger that the water level in the pool would drop sign-ificantly and consequently the

• shielding provided by the water would prevent ~ny hazard from increased radiation levels from direct radiation. EBWR defect test studies have

• shown that the fraction of noble gaseous activity lost per second from a defective fuel element is about 4 x 10-B. This same test showed that the iodine loss was at least an order of magnitude less than this. The total inventory of gaseous activity in the five fuel elements assumed to be involved in this incident and the amounts which may reasonably be lost from the fuel pool water are shown in Table 7.34. These quantities of iodine isotopes are much less than the amounts which have already been shown to be readily tolerated by this environment (see ~aragraphs 7.30 to 7.32). Consequently the iodine releases result in less hazard than has already been shown to be acceptable. The releases of kryptons are also much less than those which have already been shown to be within MPC. Similarly, the xenon-133 discharge results in concentrations under the worst condtions of only 0.01 MPC.

The only aspect of this hypothetical incident which has not already been calculated in the section is the xenon-138 release.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962

. Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 7.34 Gaseous Activiti es Lost from Fuel Pool During Assumed Critical ity Incident Inventro y Fraction Lost Total Lost in Isotoee Curies In 3 Hours 3 Hours I Curies Kr85m 6.1 X 104 4 X 10-4 24 Kr85 2.5*,,X 103 4 X 10-4 1 Kr88 4 X 10-4 10 1131 1132 2.7 3.2 X

X 103 105 4

4 X X

10-5 13 0.1 133 1 5.4 X 104 4 X 10-5 2.2 1134 1.6 X 106 4 X 10-5 64 1135 1.6 X 105 4 10-5 X 6.4 x8 133m 5.2 X 102 4 X 10-4 0.21 x8 133 9 X 103 4 X 10-4 3.6 Xel35 1.5 106 10-4 X 4 X 600 Xel38 3.7 X 106 4 X 10-4 1500 Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Using the method employed in Paragraph 7.7 (Equation 7.7a) the concentration of xenon-138 at the site boundary under inversion conditions is 1.4 x 10-6 p.c/cc. No MPC for this isotope is given in either 10 CFR Part 20 or in NBS Hand-book 69 but it would not appear that this would result in any hazard. l his event can, therefore, be tolerated without exceeding published MPC 1 s.

Chemical Explosion 7.35 The assumption is next made that a vessel containing one full day's charge of fuel in solution suffers an explosion which ruptures the vessel distributing the contents through-out a cell and putting some fraction of the contained solution into the ventilating system. The ventilating system will withstand the rupturing of a tank. However, there might be some plugs or windows loosened. So long as ventilation is maintained air fl<A~ should remain into the cell. except for the instant of the explosion. In analyzing ihis event some assumptions contained in "Radiochemical Facility Hazard Evaluation", by i. D. Arnold, A. T. Gresky, and J.P. Nichols,

~L-CF-61-7-39, July 10, 1961 are used. This is a very similar analysis of a completely analogous situation to that considered here. The assumptions are made therein that aerosols ~ene-trating high-efficiency filters will contain 0.14 mg/M of material with the same concentration as the original dispersed solution ijnd that the MPC for mixed fission products is 6.6 x 10- ~c/cc. The ventilating air passing through the filters of this plant amounts to 32,000 cfm or 900 M3/min.

Then 0.14 x 900 or 125 mg/min of the original solution may be ~ssumed to pass through the filter. We further assume that the gaseous activity has already been released and that in twenty minutes the ventilating system will have picked up nearly all of the gross activity that it is going to. Under these conditions about 2.5 grams of solution will be released.

Th~ maximum activity to be expected in the plant is about 700 curies per liter or 0.45 curie per gram for a total discharge -of 1.1 curies. Followi ng the metho~s of Paragraph 7.7 the poorest value of X/Q (at a distance of about 5,000 meters) is 1 x 10-5. Q is equal to 1.1/3600 = 3 x 10-4 curie/sec.

The X = 3 x 10-9 ~c/cc. This is less than the MPC for mixed fission products assumed by ORNL in the above report and it would appear possibl~ to accept this particularly untoward accident. There would b_e , of course, a big cleanup job in the cells. This would be undertaken according to methods outlined in Paragraphs a.a and 6.54 through 6.56.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Failure of Iodine Removal Equipment 7.36 Finally it ls assumed that the silver reactor s and other iodine removal equipment all fail and that this is not discove red for a period of one day. That this could remain undetec ted for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is extremely unlikel y since the stack monitor would *dete~t the iodine increas e at once. If the entire charge of iodlne- 131, 1.7 curies, ' were to be lost during a day the value of Q is 2 x 10-5 curie/s ec. Under worst conditi ons (at a distanc e of about 5,000 meters) the poores t value of X/Q isl x 10-5 and the ccnce~ tration of iodine-131 at this point would then be 2 x 10- 0 pc/cc.

'nlis is less than the MPC for continuous e>eposure off-sit e.

Conclusion 7.37 All of the abn9rmal inciden ts hypothesized in Paragraph 7.4 have been anaAyzed. It has been shown that in all cases except the 1o2 fission critica lity inciden t the limits prescri bed in 10 CFR Part 20 for continuous exposure are met and that in this one case there is no dose at any point which exceeds, or even closely approaches, the guides suggested in 10 CFR. Part 100 for emergency conditi ons.

Since we expect the probab ility of these events to be very low, to the point of incred ibility , and since th~y can be handled by the environment even if they should occur, we submit that the operati on of this plant does not constit ute an undue hazard to the genera l public beyond the site boundary.

Revision 1, 0:t. 29, 1962 Revisi on 2, Aug. 20, 1964 I

rrr - - - - - - - -- -- - - -- * - - - .. _,_

I.

..._____.......- - J

t

' (j Criticality Incident Anywhere In the Plant 7.38 There hive been ten criticality Incidents In solution systems .*

Eight of these have r1sulted *tn: a totar number of fJsslons ranging from 4 x 1016 to *l .3 x 1016. One, that at Idaho Chemical Process ing Plant In October, 19S9,. resulted In 4 x 1019 _flsslons. Except In one case In wh t ch there was some warp Ing of a. tank bottom*, none *of thest! *resu 1ted In any physical damage. The assumption Is made here that a criticality Incident producing 1019 fissions In a single burst or 1020 fissions In a repeating Incident ts experienced anywhere In the plant and that the entire production of gaseous fission products .(from 1020 fissions) 1$

lost. The value of 1019 fissions Is chosen to conform to calculations made at Savannah RI ver suggesting th Is va 1u.e as the upper 1Im It of a single burst. These same calculations suggest 1020 fissions as the resultant of a maximum repeated burst. It will be shown that the limiting pro~lem with this incident Is not a public protection problem but rather the exposure of In-plant personnel to penetrating radiation at the time of the burst. For a repeating Incident there would be time to evacuate personnel af~er the first burst and the exposure to penetrating radiation can be considered equivalent to that from a 1019 fission burst. This ts considered In Paragraphs 8.27 and 8. 28 . Insofar as the general public ts concerned there ts no hazard from the lmm~dlate radiation at the time of the burst. It ts well established that the 1 lmltlng condition In an occurrence of this type ts the thyroid dose from the Iodine Isotopes released. Therefore, this event ts analyzed

(_ on the basis of thyroid dose to a person on the periphery of the site, at Springville, and at Buffalo. All three are calculated for the average and Inversion conditions specified In Table 7. S. In the case of Springville and Buffalo *the total population dose ts calculated and expressed In man-rem.

7.39 Table 7.39 lists the peak activity of each of the Iodine Isotopes 131 through 13S and the time after the accident when the peak* occurs . These have been calculated using NRDL-4S6, "Calculated Act Ivi t Ies and Abundances of U*23S Flss Ion Products*J: WI th one exception, the peak activities have been assumed In calculating the populat ion dose. This procedure Is conserv*tlve but by a relatively smal 1 amount over the time periods Involved. The on'e exception Is the activ i ty of lodlne~134 at the time It reaches Buffalo under Inversion conditions . The transit time In this case ts so large In relation to the half- life of lodlne-134 and Its precursors that Its activity level was found to be negligible compared to the remaining Iodine Isotopes.

-.'t Nuclear Safety, Quarterly Literature Review, Vol . 3, No. 2, Dec. 1961, Pages 34-37 plus a recent Hanford incident not yet

• reported .

J__..__________,_..........._.________. .-. .,.

. '"" .. 7' P Ffl,:,.TM1iW U F L Y &*B ~.... . ..,._...-.....-..

---

It

~"'-"-- ...,_.....__________

Table 7.39 Quantities o(.lodlne Isotopes Formed from 1020 Fissions Isotope Time of Peak Activity Peak Activity,* Ci.fries 1-131 .5 .2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 73 1-132 J.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 24o 1-133 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1,250

• 1-134 46.o minutes 17,300 1-135 2.2 minutes 4,4oo Total 23,300 t

l f

I

7, 40 The off-site doses have been computed .assuming that all the Iodine Is released from the stack Instantaneously. The total Inhaled activity has been calculated using Equation 7.7a for short-term center*

line concentrations. The cilculatlons have been performed for average (sllghtly unstable) meteorologlcal conditions and for Inversion *

(moderately stable) conditions. The distances Involved are:

Site periphery 1,SOO meters Springville 7,200 meters Buffalo Sl,000 meters The use of Equation 7.7a Is valid for the first two distances.

Extrapolation to S0,000 meters Is questionable, but gives a fair estimate. The results so obtained are given In Table 7.40a. Then using the approximations suggested in 10 CFR Part 100 for the thyroid dose from each of these isotopes, the total rem per person and the fraction of the 300 rem reference value are calculated for the three locations and for both types of meteorology. Total man-rem values have also been calculated , These. data are presented In Table 7.40b.

/

Calculations supporting the numbers shown In these three tables are given In Appendix 7.40. 1t can be seen that In no case Is the reference value used for evaluatlo~ of reactor sites exceeded or even closely approached. The highest value Indicated, a S.8S-rem/person dose In Sprlngvl*lle under Inversion conditions, Is not e>tpected to be encountered since It ts the opinion of meteorologists (see Paragraph 2.13) that an C Inversion aimed at Springville would be caught and held In the Buttermilk-Cattaraugus Valley systems. Even this value ts only about 2 per cent of an emergency dose of 300 rem.

• Criticality Incident In Fuel Pool

7. 41 The: fuel pool Is designed to hold 1000 fuel elements In racks of such geometry that the establ tshment of a crl ti cal array ts Impossible even If the elements were all of the maximum reactivity of any fuel before It Is *irradiated. Allowance Is made for moving through the storage array an element- of the highest reactivity . Thls Is discussed In Section JlI and the occurrence of a criticality Incident here Is shown to be extremely unlikely. Despite the fact that a criticality incident In the fuel pool ts extremely unlikely, the following event Is hypothesized :

It Is assumed that an element Is Jammed Into the Interstice between four elements and that the five elements are Involved In a critical event, th~t a 10-mwt bolling water reactor will be set up, and that It will operate 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before It ts possible to shut It down. It Is further assumed that all five elements are defective and, thus, that some gaseous activity can escape from the element.

" *

• f 0

Table 7,4oa Total Dose Due to Radlolodlnes, Rem/Person*

Inversion Aver*ge Location (Moderately Stable) (Sllahtly Unstable)

Site Boundary 0.28 2,5 Sprlngvl I le s.as 0.19 Buffalo I, 0 8.4 X 10*3

• From Instantaneous release of all the Iodines from 1020 fissions.

• { '

Gd

' -~

I j

it*

i Table 7.ltob

~' Indiv idual and Popu lation Doses at Several Poin ts t: In Event of a Cr i tical ity Incid ent l

S.i te Per lphery Sprln9v 11 le luff* lo Inve rsion

• Average* Invers ion* Averap* Invers ion* Average*

lndtv tdual Dose, R8'1Personc 0. 28 2.s s .8sb I

0. 19 1b . 8.4 X 10-3 i Frac tion of 300 Rem/Person Dose '

9.3 X 10-4 8.3 X 10-3 1.9 X 10-2~ 6.3 10-4 X 3. 3 X 10-~ 2.8 X 10-S Exposed Popu l*tlon Dose, Rem Tota l --- --- 73b 2.4 1750b IS l

I

.....i a See Table 7.S for cond it ions assumed.

b It ts not expected that, under inver sion cond ition s, any activ rathe r will be trapp ed in Catta raugu s Valle y. ity will reach Springvi lle or Buff alo; but c See Table 7.4oa .

• l, 1 - .__ t

. '-f

I,

• - ,c*

J 7.42 Calc uletl ons supporting this sect ion are shown In Appe 7.42. The ~eat relea sed would rais e the temperature of ndix the stora ge pool only about *J6F even If the pool water cool the water In to oper ate. Ther efor e, ther e Is no danger that the wate ers -fail ed pool would drop sign ifica ntly and consequently the shie ldin r *level In the by the water would prevent any hazard from Increased radi g provlded from dire ct radi atio n. EBWR defe ct test stud ies have ' showatio n leve ls frac tion of noble gaseous acti vity lost per second from n that the fuel element Is about 4 x 10-8. This same test showed that a defe ctive .

loss was at leas t an orde r of magnitude Jess than thl.s . the lo~lne Inventory of gaseous acti vity In the five fuel elements assum The tota :

Involved In this Incid ent and the amounts ..tllch may reaso ed to be from the fuel pool water are shown In Table 7.42 . The quan y. be Jost nabl Iodine Isotopes are much less than the amounts ..tllch have titie s of shown to be read ily tole rate d by this environment (see *Paraalrea dy been to 7.40) ~ Consequently the Iodine relea ses resu lt In less graphs 7.38 has alrea dy been shown to be acce ptab le. The relea ses of hazard than I

also much Jess than thos e which have alrea dy been shown kryptons are MPC. Sim ilarl y, the xenon-133 disc harg e resu lts In concto be with in from : IO~to 109. :MPC's. The only aspe ct of thls hypo theti cal entra tions :* ..

~lch has not already been calc ulate d In this sect ion Is Incid ent rele ase. Using the method employed In Paragraph 7.7 (Equ the xenon-138 the conc entra tion of xegon-138 at the site boundary unde ation 7.7a ) '

cond ition s Is 1.4 x 10- ~c/c c. No MPC for this Isotope r Inversion eith er 10 CFR Part 20 or In NBS Handbook 69 but It would Is given In that this would resu lt In any hazard. This event can, ther npt *appear tole rate d without exceeding publ ishe d MPC's. efor e, be Chemical Explosion 7.43 The assumption Is next made that a vess el cont ainin day' s charge of fuel In solu tion suff ers an expl osio g one full n ~lch rupt~ r.es i

I the vess el dist ribu ting the cont ents throughout a cell and frac tion of the contained solu tl_on Into the vent ilati ng syste putt ing some

m. The I:

vent llat*lng system wtll with stan d the rupt urin g of a tank ther e might be some plugs or windows loosened. So *long . How ever, Is maintained air* flow should remain Into the cell except as vent ilati on i

Insta nt of the expl osio n. In analyzing this event some assu for the I

contained In "Radiochemical Facl 1lty Hazard .Eval\la:t' mptions A.T. Gresky, and J.P.N lcho ls, ORNL-CF-61-7-39, July 10, )on, 11~

by: E:.. o*. *~rno ld, This Is a very slml lar anal ysis of a completely analogous 19'1 are used.

to that considered here . The assumptions are made ther ein s*ltu atlo n aero sols pene trati ng high -effi cien cy filte rs wlll cont ain .that 3 of mate rial with the same concentratlori as the orig inal 0.14 mg/M solu tion and that the MPC for mixed fissi on products Is disp erse d The vent lJatl ng air past ing through the filte rs of this 6.6 x 10*9 '-'c/c c.

I to 46,000 cfm or 1300 Ml/min. Then 0.14 x 1300 or 180 mg/m plan t amounts i orig inal solu tion may be assumed to pass through the filte in of the furth er assume that the gaseous acti vity has alrea dy been r. We and that In one hour .the vent ilati ng sys t em will have.pick relea sed I

i

all of the gros s acti vity that Is going to. Under thes e ed up near ly about 11 grams of solu tion wlll be relea sed. The maximumcond ition s be expected In the plan t Is about 200 curi es per lite r oracti vity to 0.13 curi e i

__,1...t---------------------------------------r-1:1 i

'°"" --. . . : ---- -*

. . . . . . . . .-.. .-.---.----------*ii;--tt-*_,. __---- *- -- -- ----- _ _.

- J I Il I If -llti;;:Q 8 Table 7.42 G**~* Activities Lost from Fuel Pool During Assumed Criticality Incident Inventory Fr*ctlon Lost Tot*I Lost 1,,

f Isotope Curles In J Hours J Hours 1 Curles Kr8Sm 6.1 X 104 4 X 10*4 24 Kr85 2.5 x 1o3 4 X 10*4 1 Kr88 2.4 X 105 4 X 10*4* 10 1131 2.7 1o3 4 x 1o*S X ~-. 1 1132 3.2 X 105 4X 10*5 13

t133 5.4 X 104 4,: 10*5 2.2 1134 1.6 X 106 4X 10*5 64 7135 1.6 X 105 4 X 10*5 6.4 I

xe133m 5.2 X 102 4 X 10*4 0.21 l* 0 1

xe133 9 X 1o3 4 X 10*4 3.6

'* xe13Sm 1.5 x.:106 4 X 10*4 600 l xe138 3.7 X 106 4 X 10*4 1500 l., I I.

r I

C

' J t*.- --~i---------.. . . . ------------------

- -----.. ____ - -*"'------~--:-----*--------=--,..-*-*"""'Ulft--------~-:--

1

-. * - .. I I C

~ea* gram for a total discharge of 1.4 curies. Fol lowtng :the methods of Paragraph 7.7 the poorest value of X/Q at ihe *slte boundary *I~

1 x 10*5. Q ts equal to 1.4/3600 * *3.9 x :10-~ curie/sec . Then X

• 3.9 x J0*9~c/cc. This 1.s less than the *"PC for mixed fission.products assumed by ORNL In the above report and It would appear possible to accept this particularly untoward accident. Ther~ would be, of course, a big cleanup Job In the cells. This would be undertaken according .to methods outlined In Paragraphs 8.8 and 6.54 through :6.56.

Failure of Iodine Reppval Equipment 7.44 Finally It Is assumed that the silver reactors and other

Iodine removal equipment all falls and that this _Is not discovered for, a period of one day. That .this could remain .un~tect~d for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Is extremely *unlikely since the stack monitor w:,uld detect the Iodine Increase at once. If the entire charge of ... Jodlne-*131.,: J.6.curilei,. ~

were to *be *lost during a *~Y .the value of Q ls :1.9 x :Jo-s curle,'sec.

At the site boundary under worst conditions the value of X/Q Is Ix 10-S. The concentration at the site boundary would then *be *l.9 x .10* 10

)Jc/cc. This Is less than the MPC :for continuous exposure off-site.

[conclusion 7 .45 Al 1 of the abnormal . Incidents hypoteslzed In -P*ragtaph ,7 .4 have been analyzed. It has *been shown that .ln* all cases except the 1020 f.l ss Ion .cri t I ca 11 ty Incl dent the llmlts prescr Ibed In :10 CFR Part 20 for continuous exposure are met and that *tn .~his on'e case *there ls .no dose at any p9lnt which exceeds, or even closely approaches, .the guides suggested In 10 CFR Part 100 for emergency. conditions. Since we except the prr.>babl 1lty of these eve_n ts to be *very _low, .to the point of Incredibility, and since they can .be handled by . the environment even If they should occur, we *submit that the operation .of this plan_t I does not constitute an undue hazard to *the general publl, beyond the s I te boundary  :.J I I

I I

-.&....+---_,._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.....,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-a,..-i.

-. * - .. I I C

~ea* gram for a total discharge of 1.4 curies. Fol lowtng :the methods of Paragraph 7.7 the poorest value of X/Q at ihe *slte boundary *I~

1 x 10*5. Q ts equal to 1.4/3600 * *3.9 x :10-~ curie/sec . Then X

• 3.9 x J0*9~c/cc. This 1.s less than the *"PC for mixed fission.products assumed by ORNL In the above report and It would appear possible to accept this particularly untoward accident. Ther~ would be, of course, a big cleanup Job In the cells. This would be undertaken according .to methods outlined In Paragraphs 8.8 and 6.54 through :6.56.

Failure of Iodine Reppval Equipment 7.44 Finally It Is assumed that the silver reactors and other

Iodine removal equipment all falls and that this _Is not discovered for, a period of one day. That .this could remain .un~tect~d for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Is extremely *unlikely since the stack monitor w:,uld detect the Iodine Increase at once. If the entire charge of ... Jodlne-*131.,: J.6.curilei,. ~

were to *be *lost during a *~Y .the value of Q ls :1.9 x :Jo-s curle,'sec.

At the site boundary under worst conditions the value of X/Q Is Ix 10-S. The concentration at the site boundary would then *be *l.9 x .10* 10

)Jc/cc. This Is less than the MPC :for continuous exposure off-site.

[conclusion 7 .45 Al 1 of the abnormal . Incidents hypoteslzed In -P*ragtaph ,7 .4 have been analyzed. It has *been shown that .ln* all cases except the 1020 f.l ss Ion .cri t I ca 11 ty Incl dent the llmlts prescr Ibed In :10 CFR Part 20 for continuous exposure are met and that *tn .~his on'e case *there ls .no dose at any p9lnt which exceeds, or even closely approaches, .the guides suggested In 10 CFR Part 100 for emergency. conditions. Since we except the prr.>babl 1lty of these eve_n ts to be *very _low, .to the point of Incredibility, and since they can .be handled by . the environment even If they should occur, we *submit that the operation .of this plan_t I does not constitute an undue hazard to *the general publl, beyond the s I te boundary  :.J I I

I I

-.&....+---_,._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.....,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-a,..-i.

. , . _ ti r ra 11 Ii

• n1 .... ,

I (l VII I PROTECTIOO OF PLANT PERSOONEL Design Cri teri a 8.1 The des ign cri ter ia and the ope rati ng NFS pla nt have been set up so tha t the pla rule s ~f the the rul es and reg ula tion s spe cifi ed in 10 nt wil l conform to for Pro tec tion Aga inst Rad iati on. CFR Par t 20, Sta nda rds it 8.2 The pla nt wil l have an acr saf ety program (see Sec tion IX) aimedoss -the -bo ard ind ust rial t

at of all typ es. It wil l mai ntai n a con stanred t ucin g acc ide nts to inc rea se the saf ety morale of all of its prog ram designed in the area of normal ind ust rial saf ety and per son nel , bot h rad iati on saf ety . in tha t of 8.3 The rad iati on saf ety program ls designe the pla nt per son nel from* d to pro tec t I

I a.

b.

c.

ext ern al rad iati on, inh ala tion ,

ing esti on.

I All thre e have been take n into con side rati j of the pla nt. They also dic tate the con diti on in the des ign IG the pla nt wil l be ope rate d. In subsequent ons under which of the se areas is disc uss ed in det ail to dem par agr aph s each I the pla nt as designed can be ope rate d in acc onstrate tha t the pro visi ons of 10 CFR Par t 20. In add itioordance wit h which were hyp oth esiz ed in Sec tion VII are n, the acc ide nts th& stan dpo int of per son nel in the plan t1 rean alyz ed from ser iou s but more pro bab le eve nts are disc uss and some les s

. poi nt of per son nel pro tec tion . ed from the view-P~o tect ion from Ext ern al Rad iati on 8.4 The primary pro tec tion for the worker pen etra ting rad iati on is to inte rpo se suf fici from between him and the rad ioac tivi tY. at all tim ent shie ldin g shi eld ing has been des crib ed in som '4J es. The pla nt e det ail in Paragraphs 6.5 9 thro ugh 6.6 5. The shie ldin g has been when the most act ive uni t which could be in designed so tha t, sec tion of the pla nt is pre sen t, the rad iati any par ticu lar out sid e the shie ldin g in a normal acc ess areon lev el on con tact mr/ hr. In many cas es the poi nt of con tact a would be 1 acc ess ible to per son nel and the per cen tage wil l not be rea dily the shi eld ing wal l is sub ject ed to the max of the time tha t is sma ll. The shie ldin g des ign has been bas imum act ivit y lev el ed on a "de sign "

G Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964 r::._:___ .*- --* ---- - ~-::---- -- -*- -- -- ------,----~- -

fuel having the follow ing irrad iation on histo rys Burnup 30,000 MWD/T Speci fic Power 35 MN/T Cooling Time 150 Days 8.5 Fuel is broug ht into the plant in shield ed casks which have had their desig n caref ully checked to ensur e tha t.

adequ ate prote ction is avail able. A shipment will be survey~d befor e it is sent out. It will be surveyed again upon arriv al at the plant . Befor e the carri er is opened, it is place d under suffi cient water (see Paragraph 3 .. 7) so that, as a fuel element is removed, there will be at least 11 feet of water over the top of the longe st type of fuel eleme nt. Movement of the elements in the stora ge pool and their stora ge are also conduct2d under at least this much w~ter . Trans fer to the PMC is done remot ely under water and back of concr ete shiel ding. The ~echa nical opera tions in the PMC and GPC are carri ed out remot ely back of concr ete shiel ding. The trans fer to the CPC is handled remot ely. All opera tions in the CPC are remote. Trans fers to the remaining conta ct-ma intain ed cells are fluid trans fers carrie d out remot ely. All opera tions in entir e proce ss, there fore, are carrie d out behind shield ing the until produ ct is decontaminated to the point where exter nal radia tion is no longe r a problem. Plutonium produ cts conta ining high conce ntrati ons of Pu-240 will be place d semi-remotely into conta iners with suffi cient shield ing so that they may be handl ed safet y.

8.6 Sampling is an opera tion which can contr ibute signi fican tly to exposure of perso nnel. The sampling system s, which were descr ibed in detai l in Paragraphs 6.22 through 6.36, have been designed to perm it most of the sampling to be carrie d out completely behind shield ing and to provi de working back-ground of 1 mr/hr or less. Many dilut ions will be made insid e*

the shield ing and only the dilute d analy tical sample will be broug ht out. This will reduce consi derab ly the poten tial for spilla ge and also the resul tant exposure in the event of spilla ge.

8.7 In order to maint ain the background level s in tho plant at desig n level s, it is neces sary not only to have adequ ate shiel ding but also to maint ain stri ct contr ols to prev~ nt spilla ge. This is done first by kaeping the activ ity back of the shiel ding- -ther e are no planned withd rawal s of activ ity excep t for the samples, many of which, have been alread y dilut ed; second by a caref ul and conti nual radia tion surve y program to detec t areas in which there may have been an inadv erten t introd uctio n of activ ity; and third by a prompt and immediate cleanup of such areas at the same time deter -

mining the cause of the event and corre cting it.

Revision 1, Aug . 20, 1964

8.8 Maintenance work, both routine and major, can be expected to contribute somewhat to the whole body radiation of the plant personnel. It is the intention of NFS to permit maintenance work only under such conditions that no

~orker will be expos~d in excess of the limits defined in 10 CfR Part 20. Tho maintenance procedures, which are described in*'detail in Section IX have been set up to minimize .the exposure of the pe~sonnel. However, it is clear that maintenance work will have to be 'done in high radiation areas (areas in which the background levels

~xceed 100 mr/hr). Such work will be controlled by a work permii' sys.t;em as describe~ in the Health-Safety portion of Section IX and be authorized by the plant manager. In attacking any maintenance job, the area is carefully surveyed and the amount of time ~hat may be permitted a worker in the are is calculated. Work in the radiation field is done under closely supervised conditions. Accurate time is kept from outside the. field. Record~ng meters* as well as film badges are worn during the ope~ation and a log of the e~posure is kept and this is added to each worker's permanent radiation record. The level to which an area** will .be decontaminated before maintenance is attempted will vary with the amount of time needed to carry out the job, but in no case will a wor~er be allowed to enter a radiation field exceeding 2 r/hr without special approval of the plant ,manager. It will be normal plant practice to limit the exposure of any individual for any single maintenanc~ job to 0.2 rem. Subject to the maximum limitation specified above, the balance be~een ti.Me and activity level .will be a decision to be made by plant supervision in each instance.

8.9 In the normal operation of the plant we expect that an operator will spend .no more than two hours per day in the full 1 mr/hr permitted in a normal access area. It is expected that most of the normal access area will have a background much less than thls. for planning purposes we have assumed that the additional six hours per day will be in an average* background of 1/6 rrµ:'/hr. The total background radiation for the quarter .would then amount to 0.2 rem.

This would leave about 1 rem per quarter for maintenance operations without exceeding 1.25 rem/quarter. With exposure limited to 0.2 rem/maintenance jobs, a given individual could perform five such maintenance jobs per quarter. There will be about sixty men in the plant who can be called upon to carry out such jobs s~ that the plant can carry out a maximum of 300 such operations per quarter, about five per day.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

Inhalation 8.10 The primary protection of the workers from inhalation lies in keeping the activity inside the P-ror.ees equipment itself. As a second line of defense, all 'of the equipment ls contained in cells maintained by a separate ventilation system at a pressure negative to the work,.ng areas. As third line of defense, masks ~.nd supply-*a tr equipment are available. These ventilation *systems have been described in detail in Paragraphs 6.3 through 6.21.

Under all normal operating conditions no process activity ls expected to escape past the first *two barriers and into the operating areas.

8.11 There will be a system of fixed air samplers backed up by a program of air monitoring with portabl* air monitors to assure that the air in the working area does, indeed, remain free of a*ctivity. This monitoring program has already been described (see Paragraphs 6.66 through 6.76). The monitors will have audible and *visual alarms set to operate at the lowest. practical level so that remedial action may be taken before any consideration of evacuation ls necessary.

8.12 Consideration has also been given to the I

mechanism whereby activity could be brought into the plant by recycle into the building air intake of air discharged from the plant stack which ls located on top of the building. In Appendix 8.12 there are shown calculations for average and inversion conditons which indicate that the

• amount of recycle to be expected is completely negligible, in either case. There ls, however, an infrequent condition whereby .the discharge fiom a stack may come directly down upon the stack. Under these conditions the amount of dilution could be small. A calculation ls shown in Appendix 8.12 for the normal lodlne-131 discharge. This 1hows the concentration of Iodine-131 at the stack exit with no dilution at all except that afforded by the ventilation air in the stack itself. The concentration of iodine discharged from the stack would be 6.7 x 10-B .,.c/cc which is only a factor of 7.5 hlgher ;than the occupational IFC of 10 CFR Part 20. Thia p~rt.i~ular meteorological condition ls not expected to occur very frequently or to persist for any long perlo,t of time. Even with !!2 dil_u tion, and it would be expected that there would be some--perhaps a factor of ten, the conr.entration is such that under the provisions of Paragraph 20.l03b lthe iodine-131 present in the building air could be tolerated for five hours. Such a condition would be picked up very quickly by one or mor, of the monitors.

This iodine concentration would be attained only during the course of a dissolutlon1 th,re would be ample time to shut down the dissolver or evacuate the building or both.

Revision 11 Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

..... d

• 8.13 There will be an ample aupply of prote ctive equipment auch a, Scott Air Packs avail able for use during emergency cond ition, or durin g maintenance work inaid e cells . The Healt h-Safet y program (see Sectio n IX) will inclu de frequ ent train ing 1e11ion1 and drill

• for all personnel in the use of this equipment 10 that in an emergency the equipment should be used promptly and prope rly.

Inges tion 8.14 The contr ol of the problem of inges tion of radio activ ity 11 large ly one of developing withi n the workers good-safet y morale and habit s of perso nal hygiene and of provi ding thell with adequate prote ctive cloth ing, devic es, and monitors to facil itate the execution of ,the program. It is a problem which has been dealt with routi nely at all of the prese ntly opera ting chemical proce ssing plant s of the AEC witho ut creat ing any serio us hazar ds.

8.15 Prote ctive cloth ing will be issue d to all perso working in the plant areas and aust be worn there in. This nnel cloth ing will not be worn outsi de the plant areas . It will be laundered at the plant and return ed to servi ce or disca rded to solid waste depending on monitoring preceding and following the laund ering proce ss. An ample supply of other speci alize d prote ctive clothing such as SU1"9ical, heavy rubbe r, and cotto n Q glove s, caps, boots , and tape (for tapin g gloves to cover alls, for instan ce} also will be maint ained .

8.16 Eating and smoking will be contr olled throughout the plant . Eating will be done only in the designated lunch room. Prote ctive cloth ing will not be worn into ~he lunch room. There will be hand and foot counte~s at the door. The area will be checked frequ ently by 't he Hea.lth--Safety survey.

Smoking will be done only in desig nated areas .

8.17 At the conclusion of e,ch shift each indiv idual who works in the plant areas will be requi red to change cloth es, and check his hands and shoe*, befor e leavin g the prem ises.

Two hand and foot count ers are provi ded.

kevis ion 1, Aug. 20, 1964 Q

---

~

8.18 The abov* program of hygiene has-proved to be

,atisfactory to maintein the ingestion of activity to neglig-1blt levels at other installations. The common practice to back up this program with a medical .program will be followed at the NFS plant. The medical plans for the plant are as follows*

The medical program wi'll consist of a very thorough .pre-employment medical history and physicai examination tor each prospective employee. The medica*~ ,history will be aimed at not OJllY past illne~.s.~s and injuries but particular attention wilt be paid to history of past radiation exposure, allergies, blood dyscrasias, tumors, and any eviaence of emotional instability. The laboratory studies on all applicants will consist of *a minimum of complete blood count, serology, urinalysis, chest X-ray, and vital capacity determinations.

Each employee will have a complete physical examination yearly. A complete blood count will be done twice yearly1 clinical urinalysis monthly. Bio-assays will be done on an "across-the-plant* statistical survey" plan and follow-up examination, as this survey may indicate. The pre-employment physical . I examination and laboratory .studies will be repeated on each individual leaving the employ of the company.

A dispensary will be maintained for care of ordinary minor on-the-job injuries. There will be far-ilities for intensive first-aid

~*re of severe injuries such as burns, fractures, and gross conura~.nation with radioactive material. IfflJ'ii\lnization against tetanus will be routine for all employee~.

Close liaison with the H~alth and Safety Department will be maintained. The medical director will assist in health and safety training and indoctrination. He will review with the superintendent of health and

~afety all industrial radiation exposure records1 air, water, and plant radiation survey records. He will cooperate with *the superintendent of. health and safety in

-plant inspections.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964 acwaaa.

Deteiled records of all t he above will be maintained by the medical dj,rector .

8.19 Ae explained in the foregoing paragraphs we anticipate no difficulty in conducting the normal operation of this plant withi~ the fr~m.-ork of permissible levels of exposure. It remains in the ~emainder* of this section to analyze the consequence to employees of accidents.

Analysis of Accidents 8.20 In Paragraph 7.4 five highly abnormal hypothetical' incidents were proposed and the effect of these upon the public wa, considered ln Paragraphs 7.24 through 7.37. These same incidents are now considered wl th reference t~ the*. plant personnel.

Tank Rupture 8.21 It has been shown that the soil in which the tanks will be constructed

• in quite *'impervious and that the liquid from a ruptured tank would be held ln the innediate vicinity for some period *of time. It ls proposed that the waste be transferred in~o one ,of the spare tanks* *as quickly as possible. -The type of

• action envisioned Would involve* puq>ing the "&Olut~c;>n into a Q spare tank probably through iemporary* lines which might be la'i.d *overground with only a minimum ~f shie.l ding.

The laying of .t hfs pipe would not require personnel exposure exc.e pt for th~ *connection i~to the ruptured tank. This would be done by lowering a flexible hose into the tank through one of the spare nozzles on the tank. If necessary~ such an operation cauld* be accomplished from* back of a temporary *s~lel~ constructed outside the radiation field and pushed into place with a payloader or crane. If the earth shield remained intact, no additional shielding would be required. If the

• condenser system was inoperative, it might well be necessary to carry out this operation with the protection of supply-air masks. The transfer system would probably be set up with two pumps in the system in an effort to avoid any maintenance on the pumps during the transfer operation.

The pumps would be operable from outside the radiation field.

8.22 Maintenance of the pumps, if required during this operation, would certainly entail operations in a high radiation. In the transfer set-up a tee would be ins~rted upstream from the pumps so that the lines could be flushed and decontaminated somewhat before such C Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

_ ..,. . . . ._ - , - _ _ _ - .. b - ~""""-----

- * - *- - f J a : ' 4 U

1 maintenance would be attempted. It would have to be done from behind a portab le thie!.d . In the ca1e of 10 1eriou1 a problem 11 thi1 there would be no que1tion that operat ions of the plant would be 1hut down and all availa ble expo1ure time would be u_sed in solvin g this problem. Supervi1ory personnel to the highe st levels and indivi duals from other plants operat ed by the company--thoae who receiv e no radiat ion in the course of their work--could be brought in if necessary.

No indivi dual, however, ne*d be exposed beyond permi ssible levels .

8.23 lloat of the exposure a11ociated with this incide nt would be in cleani ng up afteiw ard. Dismantling the highly contaa lnated line,, puaps, and valves and dispos ing of them would certai nly require operat ions in high radiat ion fields . However, the need for speed would no longer be presen t and enough time and people would be used to a11ure that the task was accoapliahed within the permi ssible radiat ion exposures.

Critic ality Incide nt in Plant 8.24 This incide nt, di1cu11ed in Paragraphs 7.30 through 7.32, assumed that the ventil ation syst.lfr remained in working order since that situat ion result s in the moat ianedi ate and complete discha rge of the gaseous isotop es to the environment. In that ev~nt the air inside the plant would be completely safe, as evidenced by the calcul ations shown in Appendix e.12, in all cases except that of the unlike ly recycl e. In Appendix 8.25 it i1 shown that if such a downdraft occurs under averago condit ions the amount of diluti on will amount to a factor of about ~00. If it occurs under invers ion condit ions the diluti on factor will be about

25. For the purpose of this calcul ation the diluti on is taken as 10. It ls furthe r assumed that during the course of the entire diicha rge (asaumed to be 10 minutes) the downdraft will be center ed precis ely on the air intake ten percen t of the time. It is also assumed that some personnel are exposed to the result ing conce ntratio n for the entire ten minutes and that they are 10 preoccupied with rendering assist ance to other personnel or are otheiw ise 10 upset that thoy did not make use of the availa ble supply -air equipment.

Under these circumstances they would be exposed to the conce ntratio ns and receiv e the thyroi d doses shown in Table 8.24. These calcul ations are also shown in Appendix 8. 25.

The total thyroi d dose is less than the dose suggested as an emergency guide in 10 CfR Part 100.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964 I l

I II t

f_

Table 8.24 Thyroid Do1e During Recycle Coincident With a Criticality Incident Cone., -

X Q X Dose Rate, Rem/ Time, Dose, Isotope .,.c/cc Frequen~y ,c/(cc)(sec) Seconds Rem I-131 2.6 X 10-3 ..J.. 110 600 100 1,.132 6.3 X 10-3 ....L 4 600 0.7 100 I-133 0.04 ..J.. 31 600 24 100 I-134 0.6 ..J.. 2 600 22 100 I-~35 0.16 ..J.. 6 600 ~

100 Total 74.7 Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

8.2~ There is no reason to assume that the events which could l*ad to a criticality incident would also lead to shutting down the venti~"tion system. There may be, however, a small probability that the two events might occur simultaneously. The possibility ls a difficult one to analyze since the allh)unt of leakagi of activity from the cell would be .expected to vary considerabl y depending on th~ conditions. If the supply air remains on, the exterior of the cells would remain at a higher pressure than the cells and little, if any, leakage should occur. If both the supply air and the exhaust go out, there may still be a little negative pressure in the cells due to the natural draft of the 65-meter stack. If the static pressure in th&,

cell becomes equal to that outside the cells, some leakage would occur but it should not be large since any leakage path would be tortuous. There would not seem to be a mechanism whereby the cells would reach a higher pressure than the surroundings. Failure of the ventilation system will activate an alarm which will require evacuation of the plant unless countermanded by plant supervision. We conclude, therefore, that if a criticality incident were to occur coincident with a failure of the ventilating system, the plant would be evacuated long before anyone could receive a significant dose from inhalation.

8.26 The mo~t important asper.t of protection of plant personnel in connection with a cri ticali*~y incident is to assure that no one x-eceives a seri'ous dose of penetrating radiation at the time of the incident. The first line of defense is, of course, to prevent the occurrence of the incident. Great care is being exercised in the design of this plant and in the setting up of its operating procedures to ensure that a criticality incident does not take place.

The whole subject of criticality control throughout the plant has been presented in detail in the final paragraphs of Section VI. We believe that we ha~e reduced the probability of such an incident to an absolute minimum. However, there have been eleven such accidents in solution systems. Every major site save one has had one. There have been five incidents in metal-air systems at Los Alamos.

8.27 An Oak Ridge study* has calculated the prompt neutron and gamma dose at the outside of a normal concrete shield from a nuclear reactor of 1018 fissions and these data are shown in Table 8.27. They can be used for a 1019 fission event by direct ratio. The concrete shielding walls

• ORNL-CF-61 ..7-39, "Radiochemical facility Hazard Evaluation",

E. o. Arnold, A. T. Greiky, and .J. P. Nichols, July 10, 1961, Page 6.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

~- ---

Table 8.25 Thyroid Dose Durlna Recycle Coincident With a Crltlc a11ty ln~ldent

!x ~01e Rate, Cone, Q Ra/ Time, Dose, l1oto e, ,vc/cc Fregu en~ ,+1c/(cc).(1ec) Seconds Ran 1-131 5.6 x 10-3 -'

100 330 600 . 11 1-132 1.9 X 10*2 - 1 100 12 600 :1 t...:133 o. 1 '

loo 92 600 55 1-134 1.3 -100' 6 600 47 1-135 0.34 '

100 25 600 51

-165

- Total l

I l

---

* lf *" '

I Table 8.27 The Prompt Neutron and Gamma Dose at the QJtside Of a Normal Concrete Shield From a Nuclear Reaction of 1018 Fis*iionsa, 6

-J:

Ordinaryc Do1e at 0Jt1id1 of Shield 1 rem Concrete Shield Metal Nuclear Nuclear Reaction in Th1ckneas 1 Ft Reaction Aqueous Solution 1 88,000 5,200 3 317 23 4 17.0 1.9 5 0.960 0.14 6 0.059 I* 0.012 C

a The dose rate may be calculated for any other number of fissions through the use of a direct proporation.

b ORNLi CF-61-7-39, "Radiochemical Facility Hazard Evaluation", E.D. Arnold, A.T. Gresky, and J.P. Nichols, July 10, 1961, Page 6.

c For high density concrete the ganaa dose is reduced by a factor of 1.6 for a given concrete thickness.

C

~ -"" '--.. . . . . ---..--*-1"1:l!.ii-~-=-"'

. --*-- L

for the GPC, PMC and CPC have openings for viewing windows which are equivilant in shielding value to the concrete walls for ganma radiation but offer less protection than the concrete for neutron radiation. Table 8.27 does not reflect the increased neutron dcse to an employee who might be ir9 front of one of the viewing windows. In* the case of a 10 burst from a criticality accident in the dissolver, the total prompt neutron plus ganma dose to an employee at the nearest viewing window would be about 300 rem, if the window were completely transparent to neutrons. The only place in the plant where a metal-air incident is at all possible is in the PMC - GPC. There we have four feet of high density concrete shielding and the resulting dose would be negligible. A solution system event could conceivably occur from the dissolver on. In the CPC there are six feet of concrete and the dose would be even less than in the

• PMC. In Cell #1 there are five feet of concrete shielding.

The dose would still be negligible. In the remaining four cells there are three feet. At the lower end of the process there is no .need for this much shielding from the fission product content. The minimum of three feet of concrete shielding has been carried down to the end of the process in order to assure that even if a 1019 fission critical incident should occur, and a worker should be standing right opposite the point in the cell at which the event

• occurred, he would still not receive a MLD of penetrating radiation.

8.28 When the product must be removed from the plant and. put into storage and eventually onto a truck for shipment, contact with the product is required. Therefore, particular care has been exercised with product shipment plans. This is discussed in Paragraph 7 .. 21.

Criticality Incident in the Fuel Pool

• a.29 -The hazard of a criticality incident in .the fuel pool to the general public has been discussed in Paragraphs 7.33 and 7.34. It was shown therein that the amount of heat released is not enough to destroy the integrity of the water

• shielding which is enough to keep such an incident from ir-radiating anyone significantly from the prompt neutrons and garrmas. It is necessary to consider the gaseous activity which is given off, however. The quantities of gaseous isotopes expected to be released during three hours was shown in Table 7.34. In Table 8.29 these quantities are shown as pc/cc and their concentrations in the fuel receiving and storage area air are shown assuming that it is diluted with the 11,000 cfm of ventilating air which is drawn through C Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

l Table 8.28 The Prompt Neutron and Gamma Dose at the Outside Of a .Normal Concrete Shield From a Nuclear Reaction of io*~ Flsslonsa, 6 Dose at Outside of Shield, rem Concrete Shield Metal Nuclear Nuclear Reaction in Thickness, Ft Reaction Aqueous Solution 88,000 5,200 3 317 23 4 17.0 1.9 5 0. 960 0.14 6 0.059 0.012 a

The dose rate may be calculated for any other number of fiss ions through the use of a direct proportion.

b ORNL-CF-61-7-39, "Rad iochem t ca 1 Fae fl i ty *Hazard Eva 1uat i on 11 ,

E.D . Arnold, A.T. Gresky, and J . P. Nichols, July 10, 1961, Page 6.

J!*** .,: _.. ,

T~.ble 8.'29 Gaoeous Aettv 1tl~~- Lo~t into Fuel Receiving and

, (Pie

• _

Storage .Area, 'Durlna,.,Assumed Cr.iti calitr £~c~a-ent A*t,ti'vi "ty Re_le.a sed Cone, Iso;tope . . v.c/sec µc/cc MPC Kr-85m 2300 4.4 X 10-4 6 X 10-6 Kt--85

• 93 1.8 X 10-5 l X 10-5 Kr-88 930 1.8 X 10-4

<I-131 9,.3 1.8 X 10-6 9 X 10-9 I-132 1200 2.3 X 10-4 2 X 10-1 I-l3~ 200 3:,8 X 10-5 3 X 10-S I-134 6000 1.1 X 10-3 5 X 10- 7 I-135 600 1.1 X l0-4 1 10-7

... X Xc-l:33m 20 3.9 X l0-6 Xe.-133 330 6.4 X 10-5 1 X 10-5 Xe-13Sm 5.5 X 104 1 X 10-2 Xe-138 1.5 X 105 2.7 X 10-2

th*t area . These conc entr atio ns r*ng e from hour MPC for Kr-8~ to 2000 time s the IF(: for twic I-13 t the 40-IIPC'a are for cont inuo us brea thin g and. ~*n be scal4. These down with time . Taking the I-13 4 as con trol ling , ed up or would have to be evac uate d with in 1/2000 of 40 hourthe room just under one minute in orde r nQ~ to exceed one wee s or in able inha latio n. It w.i ll cert atnl y be poss ible to k's allo w-this room in leas than a ainu te~and an even t such evac uate would be imn edia tely obv ious \~ anyone in the r~omas this Presumably ther e would be a visi ble fJaah. lbni*t ors ~

trip and alar m, and the f~e r *poo l itse lf would .be would agit ated * .Afte t' evac uati on, pers onn el coul d put on bly visi air equ i~n t in othe r part s of the bull dlng

• befo supply;.

ente rlng .t~ take rem edia l acti on. re re-Chemical_E5>"loslon 8.3~ . In Paragraph ;7.. 35 a ~hemical e~pi osio n* is a~sumed which rupt ure* a *tank . con ~i~i ng an ehtf tr~ day 's tl:\arge of acti v'ity leis. *l ne:.'ga*s,o ~s );~t ivit y*:.(s lnee arde r to h~ve the full day-'*s

• charge .-i fi sotu tion ,* 1. , in have to . hl*ve been thr.ough the:* diss olut ion r step,*dur t wlll

."I *

• , # - ~ ' A * ,* - ,

ttl*e geie ous* .acti vity *11 I'ost*l * .~~The**ce ll* ven tfla tion ing which ha,, '.bti~n desi gned . to ~w.! thG tand :the* Eif~e~ts :of *such system expl os.io p. ~ ;g'.~g ai1 the -Veriti*J;atio*'

• system i& an*

no acti-.:1'.'ty should~ge.:t OU~ of ~th~ cell . in whic h the ntained, mai took plac e_exce pt ! .ome th~t wo_u ld ~* lost duri ng .the explo~Jon of oyer pias ~ur.&*,:f~l l~ln g . :t h.e.:exp,l osio n. Thi , peri per'i od e;tl -.te d to* .bii abou t bne -second. The calc ul atio nsod* -is

• App'i n,4ix *.8.;i ~

• sliow .'.that*-; °f'or *all cond ition s e>,ec of ept a di;e ct*

recy ~le -'o f ~~<:ic'* disc ~.a:r. ~e . into the . air int~ ke,: th,~.* w~*11 be '1it.g llg.l ble ; conce_n t1at ion of acti vl t,y in ~he I~ thf u~~ ikel yt j \'iot : that such a recy cle and an .~ui ldln g .at.r.,

shou ld:* _co.ltip ide *and usin g a . calc ulat ive method anal expl osio n*

to t~.t shown -1'1 App~ndix 8.~5 ,**, the. con*c entr atio n. ogeys

,unf ilttr ed . adlt ~ act1 vl~¥ at thr th~o at,-o f the. .it.cof , .

be* * *-

k would

• Q~! ~ g/min x 0.45 curi e/gr am x 106* 11e/cc

~ *- 32,000 cfm x 28317 ..cc/c f * * * * <'0112 x .l0'.""5 1-c/~c As in Appendfx 8: 25. a dilu tion : fa~to:r of 1/10 from stack to 1ntak6l and a frlfque~cy .Jac tor of: 1/10 were used .

.e4?ne ntra tlon l,n the buil diri_g would be f!~2. x 19":'7 :!'he rt'.sultb1g This is abou t 100 time s *the *MPo asiUSMd by Olk Ridg ,p.;.J ~c.

ml~l_ed fiss ion prod ucts a.s** ~ero (e,ls an'd 1 e,. for t 1mp.~ it% ~hat **abo ut 25 mi~utes would be av<<~ la61 , for evac uati ng the1 is more than ad~quate. ' , ~1n t; Thi&

Revl1lon 1, Oet. 29, 1962 Revision a, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 8.JO Ga1eou1 Activiti es Lost Into F~~I Receiving and e *Storm Aru purl~ Al1*a

• Crtl*cal Ity Inc dent Activity Refused

• Cone, l1pt0N ~c,,ec JJ.Clcc MPC Kr*8Sa Kr*8S ,,.

2300 4.4

.a X

1 x 10*5 Jo*4 Kr*N *930 1-131 ,., I .8 X 10*4 1.8 X 10*6 9 X Jo*9

,~112 1200 200 2.J X 10,*4 J.8x 10*5 2 X 10*7

] X 10*8 1-134 6000 I.IX 10*3 5 X 10*7 1-135 600 I.Ix 10*4 1 X 10~7

• Xe* 133nt 20 ].9 X *~-, -

I ~

Xe-,133 330 6.4 X Jo*S II X**13Sm 5.5 X. 104 1 X 10*2 Xe-138 J.4 X 105 . 2.7 X 10*2 I* '

.I

.t I

f f

e.31 Although we believe that the ventilation ayetem will be maintained 1n opera*tton lf an* event such as this thould oceur the possibility th4t it does not continue to function muet be considered. Aa *ln the dl1cu11lon of

• Paragraph a.~ we find th11 situation .difficult to analyze and for .the same rea1on1.

• In this case it 11 certain that the cell would:be pressurized for a sho~t time, perhaps several seconds, an~ that during this. time &Olbe activity would escape~ If the buildi'ng ventila,tion system were not functioning, the air *in the building wil~ be essentially stagnent. In the ininediate vicinity. of the cell quite hJ1gh conc.ntrations can be hypothesized depending on the assump-tions chosen. Howev*r,

• it seems difficult to hypothesize a mechanilll whereby *t~is actlvity will *spread, very quickly from the iaaedlate area if th'e building air is n&>t moving.

An explosion ~would alert anyone close to it and the lnnediate area. would. be evacuated in a matter -of secondi. Reconnaissance

~nd remedial action would then be carried out with supply-air masks.

Failure of Iodine Ri!llOval Equipment

• 8.32 As in all *of the situations in which activity is p~t *up the stack, here again there ls no hazard, inaide the .plant at all except* in the unlikely case ~i direct recycle the concentration of iodine that might be found in

• the building air wo,...~d *be,

. ' I

• 20 .. Jle/ see x-0.1 _dilu~b}JI factor x 0.1 frequency _ .

-* ,:~ .r.5\ ~.. =10.7"cc/sec 8

= 1.3 x 10 JJ.C/cc

't h& 4!9-houi* Mf?C fGii:-iodine-l~I is 9 X 10-9 ~/cc which is lowe~~:~han the _ab,ove calculated concenttatfon by only about 4

30 percent9 Tn.P._s-.- *thi.~ co*n centration -could. be permitted

~or over two days. It

• is *11nlikely that the recycle would be in just

• the r~ght p9sitlQn for more than an hour during t he day. In *any 'ev~nt .;this *.'e9.ncentration would trip all the building °iiir .;jp}to11is_ani1.'the inci dent would be dis-cove:red tnote, '"readil-y....*and,*.. t tie dissolver

~ '-! .,.

shut down.

Mipor i\ccident*r;,: *

.. ..' .. <-*.t..

.1 . . .,. _. - ~ ' '

8.33- We do n~~~ **belti:&ve. tQat the accidents which have been discussed -i n seeiions VII' am"d VIII will occur. It is a

. 9ood ,deal mo~~ li~e~y~ ~owevtf, ttjat ~~~ing *the c~urse ~f the opt2:a~f"on of.-,-this l;\lant th~re ~111 , ~e. a ~u~er of .much more minor *occurr!nces wJ)l9h*~~!t no hazard .a.~ all .to the general

• r publio but .w~t~~. if Jt.hey lead to addi t~onal exposure~*ef

,er* not handl*d *properly, could th~ pl ant personnel. Such Revi1iqn 1, Oct. 29, 1962 t Revision 2, Aug. 20 1 1964

event, might be illu1tra ted bya

a. Spill ing of activity , particul arly analyti~al saap'te* or special samples such as waste tank 1amp~e.

b. Tracking of 1pllled activity from one place to another_.

c. Pulling activity into _jet ,team lines by improper venting.

d. Leaklng w11te lines in diversio n boxes.

e. Spilling of product solution

• The probl* with all of *t his iype o*f event is the same. In one way or.anoth er they lead to an inc~ease in the background radiatio n wt,.t ch the worker may receive. Thir, is undesira ble since in n~clea;. work one wishes to avoid a~y unnecessary radiatio n. It is also undesira ble 'since it is important to keep1 'the "'?~*rati ng *bac'kgrounu" **~low as possibltt in order to leave a cu~hion with which to carry out *the required maintenance work. Thero are s,veral lines of defense against this sort of probiem and they a1e the same for all of themt

a. First, the plant~has been designed to eliminat e, insofar as possible , the rtecessit y for handling eve~ small amounts of activity .

b. Second, the operatin g rules are designed to eliminat e every possible exposure.

c. Third, the fixed monitoring system (see Paragraphs 6.66 thr.ough .6.76.} is d~signed to det@ct increase s in either. background radiatio n or air concentr ations.

d. Tfie fixea monitoring system is. backed up by a formal mobile monitoring and survey pr.ogram (see Section fx).

e. Each employee ~ill wear ~oth meters and film badges. _ He will be trained to check his own expoiure rate frequent ly and to use portable monitoro himself to that 'he* need not rely completely upon Health-S afety Coverage.

Revi,ion 1, Aug. 20, 1964 J

Thus, th*** minor accide nt, thould not go undetected. None of the1e accide nt, could credibl y re1ult in expoaure to plant personnel in exce11 of the limit* set forth in lv CPR Part 20.

.Suniury 8.34 In .*this section we have shown that we are able to operate the NFS plant under ~11 normal conditi ons withln the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 as they pertain to the protect lon *of the.-pla nt personnel. This includes protect ion from *extern al radiati on, inhalat ion, and ingesti on. Both the operati on of the proceis proper and all the necessary maintenance operati ons are included in this stateme nt.

8~-3~

• T~e same aerie-. of hypothesized major acciden ts that were di1cu11ed in Section VII have been considered from the standpo int of ~he protect ion of the workers in the plant. It is shown that each of th-se unlikel y event, could be sustain ed without undue risk of exposure to plant person nel.

8.36 Final.ly the problem of minor accide nt, that could lead to increas es in the bactground radiati on received by plant personnel is considered and the multip le aeries of defenses agains t these are shown.

8.37 We conclude that the NFS plant can be operated within .the. requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 as they apply to the protect ion of its own personnel.

Revl1lon 1, Aug. 20 1 1964

IX PLANT OPERATION 9.1 Detailed in thia aection are the following itemsa The org,niz ational make up of the Spent Fuel* Reproce11ing Plant1 11pect1 of act.ini atratlv c contro l and procedure* in various operati ons of the plant1 Trainin g Prograa, Health and Safety Prograa1 Fire Safe~y PrograrA and Eatergency Procedure11 the u1e1 of the Ol)9rating Procedures and Lotter& of Authorization1 - discuss ion of Maloperation1 and the use of Maintenance Procedures.

Organization Plant Manager 9.2 The Plant Manager is respon sible for all activit ies at the plant and 11, therefo re, concerned with all aspects of plant operati on.

The more important areas include produc tion, technic al service s, health and safety, and nuclea r safety.

Production Manager The Production Manager is respon sible for carryin g out production in accordance with approved procedures and accepted Health and Safety standar ds.

Health and Safety Directo r The Health and Safety Directo r serves in a police and guidance capacit y to assure conformance to approved Standard Operating Procedures and to advise in plant operati ons from a Health and Safety standp oint.

• Technical Service s Manager The ~echni cal Service s Manager is concerned with the technic al soundness of the operati ons proposed, the surveil lance of materi al, and particu larly, as a member of the critica lity group, the maintenance of a critica lly safe system. He genera tes applica tions for license revisio ns. He reviews proposed SOP's and Letters of Author ization to confirm compliance with the license .

Plant Critica lity Coaaitt ee 9.3 The Plant Critica lity Connit tee consis ts of the Plant Manager, the Technical Service s Manager, the Health and Safety Directo r and the Production Manager. This conaitt ee sits in individ ual judgment on all SOP's and Letters of Author ization . Each member satisfi es himsel f that the proposed procedure is in. compliance with approved Health and

. Safety policie s and that no crit1ca lity problem is involved. Each member give, particu lar attenti on to the functio n that he represe nts. The usual sequence for review 111 1. Production Manager 2. Technical Service s Man*ger 3. Health and Safety Directo r and 4. Plant Manager.

pt st; ....

1

' Admini1tratioo 9.4 The main functio n of man1gement 11 to safely and economically *dadni ater all operati on* relativ e to the plant. The Plant Manager, who h11 overall re1pon 1ibility for Plant Operat ion*, haa delegat ed certain re1pon 1ibiliti e1 a, enumerated in paragraph 9.2. In additio n to the above, other delega tion of respon sibility is a, shown on the Adllini atrative Organi:zation Chart, Figure 9.4.

Operating Procedureb ,nd ~etters of Author ization

• 9.5 Processing of all specia l nuclear materi al handled under the license is done in accordance with the criteri a set forth in J the license . All operati ons in the Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant are done in accordance with approved operati ng procedures which define the I methods to be used and incorpo rate criteri a contained in the license .

9.6 lt will be the respon sibility of each employee to read, understand and follow explic itly the directi ons contained in the Standard Operating Procedures for jobs which he is called upon to do. It is the respon sibility of each superv isor to know the Standard Operating Procedures which apply in his area, to have copies of these SOP's availab le for employee$ to read and to be certain that individ uals under his superv ision read and understand each procedure. It is Management's re&P9n sibility to review and re-issu e SOP's as necessary t9 reflect changes in the process and *to insure that the instruc tions contained in SOP's represe nt a safe and efficie nt method for accomplishing the work.

• 9.7 Specia l nuclear materi al is receive d into the plant and processed by Approved Letters of Author ization which state the operati ng procedure(s) to be used, special handling where require d, the customer for whom the process ing is being done, the contain er(s) in which the materi al will be found and the materia l to be used as to type, enrichment and weight. Before a Letter of Author ization can be used it is independently review&d by each member of the Plant Critica lity Conait tee to assure its conformance with approved license criteri a. It is the respon sibility of each employee to read., understand and follow explic itly the directi ons contain ed in the Letter(& ) of Author ization . It is the respon sibility of each superv isor to have a copy of the Letter( s) of Author ization availab le for individ uals under his superv ision to read and to be certain that they read and understand the instruc tions contain ed in the Letter( s) of Author ization. It is Management's respon sibility to issue Letter( s) of Author ization thereby scheduling work throughout the plant. Normally, process engi neers under the superv ision of the Production Manager or the Technic al Service s Manager -draft the procedures or author ization . These enginee rs serve also in technic al ,liaison and guidance in production and they conduct and superv ise engi neering development.

9.8 The general admini strative philosophy will be to establi sh standar d procedures for as ns..,ny situati ons as possibl e and to contro l the effecti veness of these protedu res by means of regular ly maintained logs and check- off lists. These proced ures,to gether with their

r-,

,.~:

\;

Figure 9.4 Plant Organ izatio n Chart I

Plant Manag I

er AssisI tant Plant Manager Assis tant to the Plant Manager

. Secu rity Offic er Direc tor

......-t 'Indu stria l Relat ions Manager Offic e llanaaer lledic ar D1nc tor ProduI ction Manager Technical Direc tor Assis tant Production Man*ger Technical Servi ces llanaaer ineer Acco untab ility Offic er Mechanical Enaineer Analy tical Servi ces Manager Shift Super visor s Healt h and Safet y Direc tor

supporting 1091 and check-off liat\w ill be 1ubjec t to regula r, but random, inspect ion by higher levels of autho~ ity. For instanc e, certain routine exaaina tlona and mea1ur...nt1 will be carried out dally according to approved check-off ll1t1 and duly logged. In th*** ca*** the next higher level of aupervialon wtll, once a week at a random tille, follow through the apecifi c procedure and deterai ne that it 11 being properl y carried out *. Once every two months the next higher level of 1upervi1ion will do likewis e. Once a year these .saae procedures will be observed by the highes t level of author ity. Personal respon sibility will be empha1lzed by having each one of these inspect ion* recorded by signatu re and date1 the 1091 will be kept as a permanent record. In additio n, duty lists, addresses and telepho ne nuabers will be maintained, and selecte d group, of off-drjty per,onn el, at all levels of author ity and skill, will be .

require dl to keep the plant infol'll8d on their whereabouts at all times for i emergency call.

f Training of Plant Personnel i I

9.9 The initial staff cadre will be largely aade up of people with extensi ve experience in the handling, processing and 110nitoring of radioac tive materi als. This. group, under the Trainin g Directo r, will conduct the itrainin g courses for all additio nal employees. The curriculum (see Appendix 9.9) will be directe d toward the education of certain plant personnel in the processes and related operati ons in such detail as to

• ensure complete familia rity with the equipment, its functio n and competence in its operati on.

9.10 It is the intent of the trainin g program to enable process operato rs to succes sfully satisfy AEC requirements for operato rs' license s by test and examination. Approximately 75 operato rs will be so trained by permanent or temporary staff membe~s. Initial ly, three types of operato rs will be trained for work in three differe nt types of areasa

1. Manipulative Processing Operations

2. Chemical Processing Operatio~s

3. Control Operations The cadre, in additio n to serving as the faculty , will take these and additio nal cou~~e* designed to satisfy AEC requirements for Senior Operat ors' Licenses. Certain employees such as watchmen, secreta ries, etc.

will be exempted from most of the more technic al aspects of the curriculum but all employees wiil be exposed to *a radiolo gical familia rizatio n curriculum. Written examinations, graded according to level of respon sibility and work exposu re.will be conducted.

. 9.11 The curriculum will include an introdu ction (c011pri1ing details of the background and descrip tive material of the plant) details of the process es, health and safety, instrum entatio n, equipment descrip tion and usage, ..chanic al manipulation, process contro l, process maloperation, decontamination procedures, waste treatme nt, emergency measures, accounta-bility, economic and critica lity conaid eration s and lay chemistry and Jt

physic* 111ocl1ted with reactor operati ons and chemical reproce ssing.

In additio n, the curricu lua for the cadre and others prepari ng for Senior Operat or,* lice~**

• will include the conditi ons and liaitat ions in the facilit y license , the de1ign and operati ng 11.IDitations in technic al 1peolfi c1tion1 , the *chani111 for any change, in the llaitat ions in the llc*n** or specifi cations and more advanced 1tudy of chemistry and radioa ctivity . The trainin g prograa for plant personnel will be a continu ing one. Regular process operato rs will be given, period ically, a reorien tation exposure to radiati on safety and to processes and equiplftnt involved in their particu lar plant specia lty. New eaployees will be indoctr inated by trainin g as are the initial employees and will be require d to pass the saae NFS exaaina tions in additio n to AEC license examinations.

I Trainin g of Outside Organizations 9el2 Partly as a aatter of public relatio ns but primar ily to obtain effecti ve and non-panicky assista nce if an ell8rgency requiri ng their cooper ation should develop, local town, county, state police officer s, fire departa ents of the area, civil defense organiz ations and elected officia ls will be invited to lecture s at the plant. The subjec ts covered will be mainly those connected with protect ion of the public and will be designed to establi sh methods of liaison and cooperation if desirab le and necessary under hypoth etical ell8rgency conditi ons so that assista nce la most effecti ve and radiolo gical hazards to outside rs are miniadzed.

Health and .Safety Program O*

9.13 The Health & Safety Department ls charged with the respon sibility for protect ing plant personnel from all job hazards and the public from hazardous quQnti tles of radiati on and radioac tive materi als. '

. Within the scope of this respon sibility the Health & Safety Department I wills l

1. Monitor for radiati on and contamination all plant areas and operati ons, (see Appendix 9.13 for equiP_Mnt)

2. Monitor for radiati on and contamination, areas externa l to the plant1

3. Approve procedures, for work with radioac tive materials1

4. Establi sh emergency procedures,

5. Establi sh liaison with all other departments and advise them in matters pertain ing to health and safety1

6. Supervise the receip t and shipment of all hazardous materia ls1

7. Provide curric ulum and teach aspect s of the health and safety program,

a. Estab lish and mainta in plant fire brigad es traine d to cope with radiat ion area fires,

9. Conduct a contin uing safety traini ng program for all employees,

10. Conduct inspec tions of all areas for fire and safety hazards and instit ute correc tive action when necess ary,

11. Maintain complete, accura te record s of person nel exposure, radiat ion-co ntami nation condit ions in and around the plant, and perform radiat ion instrum ent calibr ation.

Health and Safety Organ ization 9.14 Speci fic respo nsibil ities for members of the Health and Safety group are as follows1 Health and Safety Direc tor Plan, organi ze and superv ise the work of the department.

Maintain close liaiso n with the Medical Direct or advisi ng and seekin g advice concerning the employ9es' health and welfar e. Maintain close liaiso n with other departments and advise them in matter s pertai ning to health and safety .

Maint ain complete, accura te record s of plant, person nel and environment radiat ion-co ntami nation condit ions. Administer health and safety aspectals of traini ng programs. Organize and train plant fire brigad es. Inspec t and mainta in fire fighti ng and emergency equipment. Prepare mater ial for use in safety meetin gs. Conduct fire and safety inspec tions.

Lead Techn iciaq Perform routin e and non routin e monitoring tasks as direct Write complete, accura te report s of condit ions observed. Calibr ate anded.

check monitoring instru ments . Obtain and count air samples. Perform safety inspec tions. Partic ipate in shift safety traini ng programs and safety metttings. Maint ain exposure and survey record files.. Check gamma dosim eters and record result s. Prepar e film badges for distri bution and proces sing and record result s.

Technician - Medical Perform routin e and non routin e m&dical tests on employees includ ing proces sing bio-as say specimens. Receive environmental and moni"toring samples and prepar e them for counti ng.

1 Techn ician - Shift Perform routi ne and non routi ne monit oring and inspe ction tasks as direc ted. Parti cipat e in shift safet y traini ng progra ms and safet y meeti ngs. Write complete, accur ate repor ts of activ ities .

Radia tion Area Work Procedures 9.15 All radia tion area work is governed by proce by respo nsibl e perso ns in Produ ctio~ Plant Engineering and Healtdures approved h and Safet y.

It is the inten t of these proce dures , in accordance with NFS polic incor porat e sound indus trial safet y pract ice and to maint ain exposy, to employees to ioniz ing radia tion and radio activ e conta minat ion at a ure of

• level below the limit s state d in 10 CFR 20.101 and appendix B, through the of monit oring ,deco ntami nation and shield ing techn iques and throug use h the of prote ctive cloth ing, respi rator y prote ctive devic es and other safet use equipment as requi red. y 9.16 For the purpose of defin ing radia tion areas , the follow i~g zones are estab lished s t

Zone I I All areas beyond the site perim eter boundary; Zon~ II All areas withi n the site perim eter boundary I C which are normally free of radia tion-- conta mina -

tion in exces s of 500 d/m alpha and 0.05 i.

I mrad/hr beta-gamma; Zone 1II All areas withi n the site perim eter boundary I

l which may have detec ta9le radia tion-c ontam ina-tion but in which the radia tion level is normally less than 100 mrem/hr and the contam-inatio n level is not signi fican t; Zone IV All areas withi n the site in which the radia tion level exceeds 100 mrem/hr or in which signi fi-cant conta minat ion exist s.

Zoning of the plant and site will be the respo nsibi lity of Healt h and Safet y.

9.17 The General Regu lation s for Radia tion Area to all work proce dures . See Appendix 9.17 for listin g of equipWork will apply ment.

General Regu lation s The minimum requi remen ts for prote ctive cloth ing ares

a. For entry to Zones I and II, no prote ctive cloth ing is requi red J C

j

• I Ji@W

b. For entry to Zone III areas, for inspection only, the minimum protective clothing required shall bea Laboratory coat, shoe covers and glovesJ

c. For entry to Zone III areas to perform *work, the minimum protective ~lothing required shall bea Coveralls, shoe covers, gloves and cloth hatJ

d. Protective clothing required for entry to Zone IV will be specified on a Special Work Procedure, No one will be permitted to enter a Zone IV area until a Special Work Procedure has been. completed and signed and all provisions of that procedure have been implementedJ

e. Respiratory protection requirements will .be posted in t~e "hot" lobby.

The minimum requirements for personnel monit~ring area

a. ~or entry to the plant, the minimum requirement fo~

personnel monitoring shall bel --Badge

b. For entry to Zone IiI areas, the minimum requirement fo~

personnel monitoring shall be1--Badge, dosimeters and dose rate type radiation survey meter.

c. For entry to Zone IV areas, the personnel monitoring requirements will be specified on the Spe~ial Work Procedure.

The exlting proce~ure isa

a. When leaving Zone -IV areas the minimum requirement for personnel survey shall be A complete clothing and body surv~y by Health and Safety PersonnelJ

b. When leaving Zone Ill areas the minimum requirement for personnel survey shall be

• A ~omplete self survey at the station monitors located at the Zone III - Zone II boundary,

c. When leaving Plant Zone II the minimum requirement for ..

personnel survey shall be A hand and shoe check using the hand and shoe counters and station mor, : tors in the building lobby. This survey shall also be made before I

entering the building lunch *room.

The rules for radiation area conduct area

a. No smoking, eating, drinking, or chewing shall be permitted in Zones III and IV. Zone II Plant areas in which smoking is not permitted will be so designatedf

b. Every sur fac e and every pie ce and IV and every too l or art iclof *Jquipment in Zones III e taken int o the se Zones sha ll be regarded as being contam inated un til surveyed and rel eas ed by a rep res ent ati ve of Health and Saf ety f

c. All the pro vis ion s of app lic abl e wo rea d, understood and followed ex rk procedures sha ll be performing the workJ pli cit ly by the personnel

d. Each employee is respons.w~e f or the of equipment iss ued to him and for .hiscar e and tre atm ent performance of assigned work. Ca rel conduct in the handling of equipnent or misconduct ess or wi llf ul mis-be tol era ted and wi ll co nst itu te gro on the job wi ll no t unds for dif mi ssa l.

9.1 8 For work of a rou tin e nat ure sig nif ica nt rad iat ion and /or con in are as normally fre e of the work to be performed wi ll not cau tam ina tio n and where con dit ion s are known and con dit ion s, work is governed by Exten se any sig nif ica nt change in the se or ter mi nat ed at any time by Health ded Wo rk Procedures which may be modified Procedures are given a dat e of ter mi and Saf ety per son nel . Such Extended Wo the dat e of iss ue.

• On, or in advanc nat ion no t exceeding tweive months from rk is revJewed by res po nsi ble persons e of, the dat e of ter mi nat ion , the procedure He alt h and Sa fet y, changed as necessin Pla nt Engineering, Production, and afid re- iss ued wit h a new ter mi nat ion ary to ref lec t cur ren t working con dit ion s, dat e.

9.1 9 For work of a spe cia l or unusua 0 or on equipnent which does involv Sp eci al Work Procedure is iss ued . e sig nif ica nt rad l nat ure or work in are as iat ion -co nta mi nat ion , a one sh ift onl y. Approval of res po nsi Eac h Sp eci al Work Procedure is va lid for Production and He alt h and Saf ety is ble per son s in Pla nt Engineering, and bef ore work can continue on suc req uir ed pri or to the sta rt of any work ceeding sh ift s.

• Job Planning arid Scheduling 9.2 0 Each day res po nsi ble rep res ent Produc tio n and He alt h and Saf ety ati ves of Pla nt Engineering, following day. A Work Schedule is me et to pla n and schedule work for the Work Procedures are prepared and app pre par ed and . dis tri bu ted and Sp eci al Work Schedule lis ts the personnel ass rov ed in adv anc e ~f the work. The to meet for each job , the est im ate d ign ed to eac h tas k, the time and* pla ce procedures govern i ng the work and oth du rat ion of eac h job , the app lic abl e er information of gen era l int ere st.

9.21 The Pla nt Engineer is res po nsi ble fors

a. Estimating the time and manpower req each maintenance Jobi uir ed to accomplish

b. Assigning maintenance personnel to tenance jobl,. each scheduled main-

c. Assuring tha t all maintenance person G sta nd app lic abl e work procedures and nel rea d and und er-tra ine d in rad iat ion -co ntamination worare thoroughly ks

d. Assuring that schedulad maintenance perso nnel unde r-stand what work is to be accomplished and that the prop er tools and equipment, in good cond ition , are avail able in advance of the jobf

e. Assuring that assig ned maintenance perso nnel are avail able at th~ place and time indic ated on the sched ule.

9.22 The Prod uctio n. Manager is respo nsibl e fors

a. Estab lishi ng prio rity of m~inten 9nce in the pl~nt 1

b. Determining what the effec t will be ot scheduled maintenance work on 'pl&nt oper ation s1

c. Arranging for equipment or area shutdown as necessa~y to accomplish the scheduled work1

d. Arranging for pre-maintenance deco ntam inatio n and/or shiel ding as requ ireds

e. Assigning oper ating perso nnel to scheduled jobs as required,;*.

f. Assuring that all oper ating perso nnel read and unde r-stand appli cable work procedures and are thoro ughly train ed in radia tion- conta mina tion work1

g. Assuring that oper ating perso nnel unde rstan d what their dutie s will be for each scheduled job and that the nece ssary equipment, in good cond ition , is avail able in advance of the job1

h. Assuring that assig ned oper ating perso nnel are avail able at the place and time indic ated on the

-schedule1

i. Issui ng the work schedule follo wing each plann ing and sched uling meeting.

9.23 The Heal th and Safe ty Dire ctor is respo nsibl e fora

a. Determining what radia tion- conta mina tion cond ition s and/o r othe r spac ial haza rds will be encountered in performing the scheduled work1

b. Determining whether or not a Spec ial Work Procedure will be requ ired for each scheduled job and if not, which Extended Work Procedure will apply1

c. Determining requir ement s for protec tive clothi ng and/or other safety equipment for scheduled work and assuri ng that such equipment, in. good condit ion, is availa ble in advance of the work*~

d. Scheduling and leadin g a pre-jo b confer ence if requir ed*

e. A- i . *ning Heal th Physics personne 1 to scheduled jobs as l.dquired1

f. Assuring that all Health Physics person nel read and understand ~pplic able work proced ures, are thorou ghly traine d in all pha,se~ of radiat ion-co ntami nation work and ~re traine d and equipped to respond to unusual or emergency condit ions,

g. Assuring that assign ed Health Physic s person nel are availa ble at the place and time indica ted on the schedu le,

h. Initia ting Specia l Work Procedures following each planning and schedu ling meeting.

Unconditional Release 9.24 Release surveys of equipment are the respo nsibil ity of G Health and Safety . Any item leavin g Zone IV or Zone III to go to Zone II or Zone I or any item leavin g the plant site from any Zone, must be accompanied by a completed Uncon ditiona l Releas e. The origin al of the releas e accompanies the equipment, ~nd one copy (in the case of an item leavin g the plant site) is presen ted to the Plant Secur ity Guard who is respon sible for enforc ing this proced ure. This procedure also applie s to commercial vehicl es and railwa y cars. The Unconditional Re~ease states the radiat ion-co ntami nation levels on the items descri bed, and releas es them with no condit ions or restri ctions as to their use.

Condi tional Release 9.25 The use of a Condi tional Release is normally restri cted to equipment which is not to leave ~one III. For example, a proces s pump which is to be taken to the Equipment Decontamination Room or the Main-tenanc e Shop for repair will requir e a Condi tional Releas e. The Condi tional Release descri bes the item releas ed, lists the radiat ion-co ntami nation status of the item and lists any specia l precau tions which must be taken

• for handli ng, disma ntling , and repair ing the item.

Lock and Tag Procedure I

9.26 The Lock and Tag Procedure is used to lock out valves ,

contro ls, and switch es, the unauth orized or inadve rtent use of which could cause proces s upset, damage to facili ties and equipment or person al injury .

Each department will have its own locks and will be respon sible for applyi ng

~

........ ~-*w,,.*"""""~"""............... ,....... ~.....................~.~ ...............__~ ..,....-.........,.,_,,_,

/ __

-* - l lock s to equipment ~s requ ired for employee prot ectio n rasu l t§ ln seve ral lock s* on the same swit ch. The resp even if this prac tice rocks will rest with the department head (or his dele gate d bilit y for removing onsi department resp onsi ble for applying the lock . Non :omp assi stan t) of the prov ision will not be tole ;ate d. Maintenance lock s are lianc e with this duri ng maintenance ~ork on equipment and are removed when norm ally appl ied only The tags are used to indi cate the reaso n for the lock and the work is completed.

personnel of the poss ible cons~qUences of viol atin g this to warn all proc edur e.

Safe ty Hazard Tag Procedure

.' 9.27 Any NFS employee is resp onsi ble for tagg ing or post any equipment or con~ ition which repr esen ts a safe ty haza ing wo~kifig cond ition . Afte r takin g such actio n he should rd and/ or unsa fe or supe rviso r so that the cond ition may be corr ecte d prom noti fy his foreman

. Supe rviso r or Foreman shal l noti fy the Dire ctor of Heal ptly. The th and Safe ty.

Radi ation and Contamination Prot ectio n 9.28 In this paragraph ther e are disc adm inist rativ e limi ts of radi atio n exposure for theusse d a number of NFS Blan t. It is expected that thes e limi ts may be modified as plan NFS employees may be exposed to radi atio n up to thet expe limi rienc e dict ates .

follo wing tabl e with the approval of the employee's inun ts state d in the ediate supe rviso r, Table 9.28 Rems Per Calendar Qua rter

a. Whole body; head and trun k; activ e blooc forming orga ns; lens of eyes ; or gon ads ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----

---

---- --- 1-1/ 4

b. Hands and forearm; feet and ank les- ----- ----- -----

---

----- ----- 18-3 /4

c. Skin of whole bod y--- ~--- ----- ~-~ ----- ----- ----- ----- -----

---

--- 7-1/ 2 Whole body exposure to pene trati ng radi atio n in any 24 be limi ted to 0.1 rem or, if approved in advance by the hours perio d .sha ll Dire ctor , 0.2 rem. Planned sing le e~posures in exce ss Heal th and Safe ty approved in advance by the Plan t Manager. of 0.2 rem mµst be In emergencies invo lving the life of pers onne l, it shal bili ty of the NFS S~nior repr esen tativ e pres ent to l be the resp onsi -

if such be his deci si on, entr y into high er field s of radi e and auth oriz e, dete rmin atio n.

9.29 The whole body dose and skin dose badge read ings . The dose to extr emit ies is cont rolle dis evai labl e from the dose rate to the hands and forearms or feet and anklin the field . If 15 time s the dose rate to the whole body, the time limi es is more than based on the dose rate to the extr emit ies. Vlith prio r t for the work is Plan t Manager and the indi vidu al concerned, an employee approval *of the of NFS may be

permi tted to receiv e a dose to the whole body greate r than that permi tted under paragraph 9.28 provided that.

a. During any calenda~ quarte r the total whole body dose shall not exceed 3 rems, and

b. The dose to the whole body, when added to the accumuleted occup ati_o nal dose to the whole body, shall not exceed 5 (N-18) rems where "N" equals the employee's age in years at his last birthd ay, and *

c. The employees accumulated occup ationa l dose to the whole body has been determined using Form AEC-4, in accordance with the instru ctions in paragraph 20.102 of 10 CFR-20.

9.30 The consequence ior intent ionall y causin g erroneous film badge or dosim eter rea~in gs is dismi ssal.

• 9.31 NFS e~ployees, who have been certif ied in the use of radiat ion monitoring instrum ents by the Health and Safety Direc tor, may in the

• course of their normal duties , self mbnitor in areas where the dose rate does not exceed 100 mr/hr, excep t Zone IV areas~ In areas in which the dose rate exceeds 100 mr/hr or in all Zone IV areas monitoring for any entry shall be by Health and Safety Techn icians . In no case shall employees enter an area in which the dose rate exceeds 2 r/hr unless prior approval of the Plant Manager has been obtain ed. (See 9.28)

Maximum Permi ssible Levels of Radio activi ty 0 9.32 The .maximum allowa ble surfac e contam ination s for the West Valley Plant are shown in Table 9.32a. The Maximum Permi ssible Conce ntratio ns in air of some radion uclide s expected to be encountered in the West Valley Plaot are shown in Table 9.32b. The Maximum Permi ssible Conce ntratio n in on-sit e, nonpotable wate1 in Butter milk Creek of some radion uclide s exp~cted to be encountered at the West Valley Plant are shown in Table 9.32c.

Air Sampling

. 9.33 The air sampling program provides for the evalua tion of alpha and beta-gamm*a air contamination. in all buildi ng areas, the plant site and the site perim eter. Included in the program are 54 in-plant area partic ulate sampl ers, 19 remote in-cel l partic ulate sampl ers, 7 in-pla nt continuous air monito rs, 1 plant site sampler and 3 site perim eter air monit ors. This equipment is descri bed in Appendix 9.33, l s locate d as per Figure 6.67, and discus sed in Faragraphs 6.66 to 6.67.

9.34 The filter paper u~ed for partic ulate sampling is

• Whatman #41 or equal, two i.nches in diamC!ter. Whatman #41 filter paper has a collec tion effici ency of 98 per cent for 0.18 micron partic ulate or larger at a flow veloc ity of 50 centim eters per second. To obtain this flow v~loc ity a minimum flow rate of 60 liters per minute is used for in-pla nt air sampl ers. Self absorp tion in Whatman #41 paper is zero for beta and about 0.3 for alpha.

G

Table 9. 32&

• Maximum Allowable Surface Contamination for"West Valley Plant Smea'r able Non-Smearable Alfha Beta-Gamma Alfha Beta-Ganma Surface d/(m)r100 cm2} As Shown/100 cm2 d/(m)r100 cm2 ) As Shown/100 cm2 Skin No Detectable 500 100 c/m Personal Clothing No Detectable 500 100 c/m Plant Clothing 500 100 c/m 1,000 2,000 c/m Plant Vehicles 500 100 c/m 1,000 5,000 c/m Commercial Vehicles 500 100 c/m 500 0.4 mrad/hr Zone I Zone I limits are per 10 CFR - *20, Appendix B, Table II Zone II' 500 100 c/m 500 100 c/m Zone III 5,000 10 mrad/hr 5,000 100 mraci/hr Zone IV* 50,000 2 r/hr 50,000 2 r/hr

• For personnel entry Conditional Release 1,000 5,000 c/m 5,000 10 mrad/hr Unconditional Release 500 100 c/m 500 100 c/m

1

.,.._.,..NI;.

~ ......... ----***------- -- - *----.,._...

Table 9.32b G Maximum Permis sible Concen tration Cuc/ml)

Mixed Fission Produc ts No respira tory protect ion l X 10-9 Full face filter mask 2 X 10*8 Supplie d air mask Above 2 x 10*8 Strontiu m-90 No respira tory protect ion 3 X 10*10 Full face filter mask 6 X 10-9 Supplie d air mask Above 6 x 10-9 Cesium-137 No respira tory protect ion l X 10-8 Full face filter mask 2 X 10*7 Supplie d air mask Above 2 x 10-1 Plutonium 239 No respira tory protect ion 2 X 10-12 Full face filter mask 4 X 10-ll Supplie d air mask Above 4 x 10-11 Natura l Uranium No respira tory protect ion 6 X 10*11 C Full face filter mask Supplie d air mask 1 X 10-9 Above 1 x 10-9 High Enriched Uranium No respira tory protect ion l X 10-10 Full face filter mask 2 X 10-9 Supplie d air mask Above 2 x 10-9 Iodine-131 No respira tory protect ion 9 X 10-9 Supplie d air mask . Above 9 x 10-9 Krypton-85 No respira tory protect ion 1 X l0-5 Supplie d air masi Above 1 x 10-5 ootnote s to Table 9.32b Maximum Permis sible Concen trations for other radio-n uclides is as indicat ed i~ 10 CFR-20, Appendix B, Table I. When a mixture of radionu clide$ is encountered and the identit y and concen tration of each radionu clide in the mixture are known, the Maximum Concen tration is derived as followsz If radionu clides A, B, V, are presen t in concen tration s ca, Cb, Cc and the applica ble MPC's are MPCa, MPCb, and MPCc respec tively, than the concen tration s shall be limited so that the followi ng relatio nship existsz

~+_9 L-t... f£_ ~l .

MPCa MPCb MPCc

.,._ ............ _......................~.-.,._._. ____ .

.___......... ----*~-*-*--- - * -... .

~

Tab le 9.3 2c Maximum Per mis sib le Co~ cen trat ion (ric/ml

)

On -Si te-B utte rmi lk Creek Off -Si te Cesium-137 4 X 10- 4 2 X 10- 5 Cob alt- 60 1 X 1o-3 3 X 10- 5 Tri tium 1 X 10- 1 3 X 10-3 Iodine-131 6 10- 5 X 2 X 10-6 Plutonium..239 10- 4 1 X 5 X 10-6 Ruthenium-103 2 10-3 X 8 X 10- 5 Ruthenium-106 10- 4 3 X 1 X 10- ~

Str ont ium -90 4 X 10-6 1 X 10- 1 Nat ura l Uranium 5 X 10- 4 2 X l0- 5 High Enriched Uranium 8 10- 4 X 3 X 10- 5 Foo tno tes to Table 9.3 2c Maximum Per mis sib le Con cen trat ion s for in 10 CFR-20, Appendix B. When mix tureoth er rad ion ucl ide s are as sta ted and the ide nti ty and con cen trat ion s of s of rad ion ucl ide s are enc oun tere d sta ted in the foo tno te to Table 9.3 2b iseach is known, the procedure used to determine the MPC.

I ms I

Lp

9.35 Air *samples are coll ecte d and analyzed for mat eria l acco rdin g to the schedule shown in rad ioac tive is sub ject to rev isio n as exp erie nce is gain ed Tab le 9.35 . Thi s sche dule Continuous air mon itor s are used in some occu in ope rati ng the pla nt.

invnediate alarm should high ai~ con tam inat ion pied area s to prov ide an samplers wil l be used occ asio nall y to obta in very exi st. The othe r remote air con tam inat ion con diti ons in the cel ls. The sho rt, spo t samp le& of se remote samplers ares Min iatu re Cel l General Purpose Cel l Chemical Pro cess Cel l Mechanical Cel l X-Cell l X-Cell 2 X-Coll J Product Pur ific atio n and Con cen trat ion Chemical Process Cel l Crane Decontamination Area Process Mechanical Cel l Crane Decontamination Area C 9.36 As each sa1'Dple is removed from the sample plac ed in an envelope which is marked with the head it. is star ted , date -tim e changed and the flow rate . sam pler loca tion , date -tim e changed, acco rdin g to the sche dule , they are brou When all samples have been Lab, removed from the env elop es, plac ed in plan ght into the Hea lth Phy sics por tabl e beta-gamma a~d alph a dete ctio n inst rum che ts and surveyed with samples which show unu sual ly high act ivit y are ents (Appendix 9.36 ). Any han dlin g and prompt atte ntio n in the cou ntin g segr ega ted for spe cial room.

9.37 Alpha, Bet a pro por tion al cou nter s (Append used to ana lyze in-p lan t air samples. All sam ix 9.37 ) are alph a, beta

• count as soon as pos sibl e afte r bein ples rece ive a one minute room. The beta /alp ha rati o is determined base g deli vere d to the cou ntin g d

beta /alp ha rati o is con stan t for *. 1atu ral acti vity on this cou nt. Sinc e the this time to make a prel imi nary ~sti mat e of the , it may be pos sibl e at on the sample. The concentrat~~n of beta emi amount of long -liv ed emi tter s determined basecl on the init ial cou nt. Thi s tter s on the sample wil l be Appendix 9.37 a. All samples rece ive a five min is accomplished as shown in seven hou rs afte r sampling and a second five minute alph a count five to to 25 hou rs afte r sampling. These cou nts are ute alph a-be ta count 23 cou nts due to long -liv ed alph a acti vity (pro duc used to calc ulat e the alph a accomplished as shown i1n Appendix 9.37 b. Any t) on the sample. Thi s is hour cou nt, show less than 1 c/m alph a and less samples which, on the 24 than 1800 c/m beta are

- Jr * *. _ . . _ _ _ _

Table 9.35 Start Up Schedule for Air Sampling*

Shiftwise Daily Weekly Hot Lobby GPC Operating Aisle-west Third Floor Office Mechanical Operating. Aisle-west GPC Operating Aisle-east Second Floor Office Ram Equipment Room Lower Warm Aisle-west Main Lobby

-Chemical Viewing Aisle-north Lower Warm Aisle-east -Maintenance Shop Ventilation Wash Room Acid Recovery Pump Aisle Utility Room Process Sample Enclosu..re-1 Scrap Removal Manipulator Repair Area Process Sample Enclosure-2 Mechanical Operating Aisle-east Product ~ackaging CAM Analytical Aisle

• X-Cell entrance air lock Fuel Storage CAM Extraction Sample Aisle-west U-Product cell EDR Viewing Station Extraction Sample Aisle-east Produc~ purification cell ICR Air Lock Ventilation Exhaust Cell Product Packaging 1, 2 and 3 Ventilation Supply Room Pulser Aisle Fuei *storage 1 and 2 Hot Lobby CAM .

Chemical Viewing Aisle-south Mechanical Operating Aisle CAM Equipment Decontamination Room VSR Access Aisle Chemical Operating Aisle-north Off Gas Cell-3 Chemical Operating Aisle-south Analytical Cell Decon. Area Lower Ex~raction Aisle-ea~t Alpha Lab CAM Upper Warm Aisl~-west

• Lab ~ccess l i sle Upper Warm Aisle~east *control Room Off Gas Cell-2 Extraction Chemical Room CAM OOC-NC Aisle Plant Area Chem Lab*east and west Perimeter-1 Product Lab Perimeter-2 Emission Spec. Lab Perimeter-3 Mass Spec. Lab _ GPC Crane Room

~lpha Lab Mechanical Crane Room Stack Sampler Chemical Crane Room Upper Extraction Aisle.,.st Upper Extraction Aisle-east Extraction CheMical Room-east Laundry ~

_,_ e:n.  ::- - -= - : -~:eL.._!~ .., .:-,- I + 71 I I

• I I ..-,:*!.D,> f':,:c'[.;~. -~..:~~::,"':~-'!!.- :..

~

~

- .. it(£$ .. . - II.) - .. - ' ~~~--*

dis car ded . These counts at maximum of MAC for plutonium-239 and ,tro nti um counting err or, rep res ent about 1%

exceed eit he r or both of the counting -90 res pec tiv ely . Samples which count. The fin al 30-minute count on l\m its wi ll be held for a fin al minimum of fou r days aft er saq:,ling in- pla nt air samples is taken a decay ess en tia lly to zer o. All of to allow the nat ura l act ivi ty to

.co unt s due to product and the con cen the alpha counts are a~sumed to be tra tio*ns are cal cul ate d as followsa Alpha

~c/ml = c/m (l~ ~l x 10 *12)

Since the counting err or for a 30-mi lev el is i 10% at 10 c/m, the minimu nut, count at 95 per cen t confidence a 24-hour ~ample is1 m det ect abl e alpha con cen tra tio n on 10 (1. 31 x 10

• 12> 3 1.5 x 10*13 wi th! 10% acc~racy 86 .4 Beta-G,.ama

~~/ ml = c/m (9. 19 x 10*13}

M3 9.38 Some in- pla air monitors are the fil t~ r tap e is no t normally ntana mo vin g-f ilte r type and of the tap e may be counted and /or g8J lyz ed in the cou nting room. Po rtio ns needed. lllla sca nne d if thi s information is G

9.3 9 The per im ete r samples are change analyzed once as soon as pra cti d weekly and are aft er sampling. The samples are ana cal aft er sam plin g and again four days low background alp hat bet a pro po rtio lyz ed by cou nti ng for one hou; ! n ~

geometry of thi s system is 50%* for nal sys tem (se e Appendix 9.39:a ). The is about 1 c/m. The con cen tra tio n of bet a and 35% for alp ha. The tiackground in Appendix 9.39b and the con cen tra bet a em itte rs is determinft~ as shown shown in Appendix 9.3 9c. A log is kep tio n of alp ha em itte rs* is det termined as res ult s become .pa rt of the permanen t of air sam ple res ult s. These con dit ion s in and around the pla nt. t rec ord of rad iat ion -co nta m~.na tio n 9.4 0 Radioiodine act iva ted charcoal and per im ete r sta tio ns are ana fil ter s from the sta ck scanned to determine if the re are othlyz ed* as fol low s* The fil ter s are gamn1 and in what pro po rtio n. Since the er 91111111 em itti ng iso top es pre pa rti cu lat e fil ter , the re wi ll normarad ioi od ine fil ter is preceded bysen a t

iso top es. The rad ioi od ine fil ter is lly be no int erf ere nce from oth er tio na l counting systems and the con tt_len counted in one of the propor-Appendix 9.4 0. cen tra tio n is cal cul ate d as shown "in I

I Q

9.41 The numbers used and effi cie ncy of and sel f abs orp tionininthifilt s sec tion for geometry of cou nte rs by the manufacturers. The method used to deteer paper are numbers furn ishe d is des crib ed in the cal ibra tion sec tion (Ap rmine act ual cou nte r geometry effi cie ncy of Whatman #41 filt er paper can be pendix 9.3 ~. The col lec tion typ e filt er behind the Whatman #41 filt er to checked by usin g a membrane var iou s con diti ons of ~se in the plant . The tes t the pen etra tion under w;aatman #41 can be determined by co~nting a sel f abs orp tion of alpha in eva por atin g the sol utio n on a plan che t and cou filt er, diss olv ing the filt er, abs orp tion cor rec tion then becomes, filt er counting the pla nch et. The tes ts wil l be run on each batc h of filt er pap nt/p lan che t count. These er rec eiv ed.

Radiation - Contamination Survey Program 9.4 2 Beta-gaama film badges are sup plie d all vis ito rs to the pla nt through an arra to .each employee and nge badge pro ces sor . Badges are exchanged and read men t wit h a conmercial film monthly for adm inis trat ive per son nel. This wee kly for ~os t personnelJ as ope rati ng experience is gained. Immedia sch edu le is sub jec t to change wir e is given for badges which show a dose te not ific atio n by phone or monitoring is accomplished on an area bas is. in exc ess of 100 mrem. Neutron in the product stor age and product packaging N& utro n bad ges are placed and check the neutron dose. rate in the se are and han dlin g are as to esta blis li changed monthly during star tup but thi s may as. The n,u tron bad ges are lat er dat e. be chan ged to qua rter ly at a 9.4 3 Each productio.1 employee and each vis 0-2 00 mr ga11111a dos ime ter which is reaij ito r is issu ed a shi ft following the shi ft on which it is useand the dos e recorded dur ing the the "Dosimeter Readings" form, and 1:s tran sfe a. !he dos e is recorded on Record" card which is *als o used to rec ord bad rred late r to the "Exposure , .

ge car d, designed to be used in a "Vi cto r Vis ible rea din gs. The 5. *x .a*.i nch of the information req uire d by AEC Form 5. " type file , con tain s ali weeks exposure dat a. See Appendix 9.4 3 for '

E ach card r,pr ese nts

• 13 refe rred to above. the "Ex posure ijecord" card 9.4 4 A lim ited number of sel f read ing dosime ava ilab le for use dur ing *"ho t" area deconta ters are These dosimeters wil l be used as the second min atio n and mai ntenance work.

overexposure. The primary con trol wil l be mon line of def ens e aga ins t Saf ety or by the ind ivid ual performing the .wo itor ing , by Hea lth and ind ivid ual or by a timekeeper assigned to the rk, and tim ekeeping, by the job .

9.45 Hea lth and Saf~ty ent ails checking the shipping papers res for pon sib il,it y for product ship aen ts for product spe cifi cat ion s, acc oun tab ilityPro duction dig nat ure app rov al, cer tifi cat ion and surveying the shipping con tain ers to insu re conformanc sta te, and loc al reg ula tion s. The *sig nat ure e wit h all app lica ble fed era l, Saf ety rep res ent ativ e on the shipping papers of an aut hor ized Hea lth and shi p. wil l con stit ute approval to

-.,-r------*--* **-~--*-______, __,. .,. . . -~ --,.... __ ......... --~

9.46 With* the exception of Zone IV egres s, personnel survey* are the reapc ;naib ility of each employee. Health and Safety will audit the frequency and adequacy of such aurveya. Peraonnel fou~d in a Z9ne II or Zone I area with contaminated cloth ing may be aubject to di1mi11a1.

9.47 A regul ar schedule of routin e aurveya will be performed by Health and Safety * . The routin e survey program ia designed to the repor ts of radia tion contamination conditions which are encouauppl ntered ement during maintenance and ot11er work, and to insur e that all plant areaa are surveyed on a regul ar basis . Each routin e survey 18 described in consi der-able detai l on the "r.o utine survey" form (Sc* Appendix 9.47) which will serve as a guide for the Heal th and Safet y peraon,,el performing the survey.

A list Qf routin e surveys 11 a~own in. Table 9.47~ A writt en recor d is .

made 9f every survey performed by Health and Safet y peraonnel. This record which 11 executed on pre-numbered aurvey log 1heet1 become* part of the permanent record of radiation-contamination cond ition, in and around the plant .

Environmental Survey P~ogram 9.48 The environmental survey program, pre-o perat ional and post- opera tiona l is divided into three ~ategoriesa

1. Atmospheric monitoring including air parti culat e monitoring,

• o 2. Water monitoring including surfa ce and ground water samplings

• 3 * . Earth and biota monitoring including samples of silt, mud, plankton* fish and shell fiah from Buttermilk Creek and Cattaraugua Creeks soil, veget ation and milk sample* from the site and surrounding area and small game from the site.

9~49 The pre-o perat ional

• program is divided into the first phase, starte d in the sprin g of 1963, to estab lish ontwo phaaes1 activ ity background wi th a few analyses for speci fic isoto pes andaite the gt~**

second phase, start ing in the fall of 1964, to include more analyses for speci fic isoto pes. Phase II ~ill continue into the poet- opera tiona l perio d. Both Phases aro detai led in Appendix 9.49. A Environmental Monitoring Program is *presented in Tables sunaa ry of the 9.49a and 9.49b.

Waste Disposal Control Program--Gaseous Waste 9.50 Gaseous waste contr ol 11 accomplished by treatment of was.t a gases before relea se, continuous monitoring at the point and environmental monitoring to determine th~ effec t, if any, ofofrelea relea ae activ ity in the environment. Waste gas treatment is discussed in somesed detai l in Section VI, Paragraphs 6.66 to 6.70. Prefi lters , air scrubbers, silve r react ors -and high effici ency filte re are used to minimize the amount of radio activ e ga1e1 and. parti culat es relea 0 routi nely from the plant . It is antic ipate d that the routi ne relea sed ses will be well below the maximum allowable under appli cable

---

--~----~-----

Table 9.47 Routine Survey*

Survey No. Shift Titlf A11lgned s-1 Check Dosimeters and Record Re1ult1 1,2,3 S-2 Pick up Air Samples 1,2,3 S-3 Check Chart* on Gaaa Alan , S111ple System and Weather Monitoring System. 1,2,3 S-4 Count ~le a 1,2,3 D-1 Check Statio n Monitors and Hand Counters 3*

D-2 Ca~ibrate Instruments 3 D-3 Spot Check Laboratories 2 D-4 Survey Hot Lobby 3 D-5 Trans fer Dosimeter Read1ngi* to Exposure Record cards 1 0-6 Spot Check Sample Aisle , Pulse r Aisle

• and Warm Equipaent Aisle 3 Q D-7 Survey Lunch Room 2 0-8 Survey Step- off Pads 3 D-9 .

Prepare Control Samples for Coun~lng l D-10 Prepare Environmental Samples for Counting *l 0-11 Spot Check Product, Packaging and Handling 2 W-1 Survey Alpha Lab 1 W-2 Survey Chem Laba 1 W-3 Survey Spec Laba 1 W-4 Survey Product Lab l W-5 Survey Zone III offic es 3 W-6 S*urvey Mena Locker Room 2

. . ,. . . . . . . . . --.-......**-- . ,. . . . . _. __.. . . . _. _. . . . . . .------*---***., . '11 . . .

~ l

,'"'-**r---.....-- *--~...-- ... - -......

Table 9.47 con* t Survey No. Shif t Titl e A11iqned W-7 Survey five Personnel 1,2, 3 W-8 Survey Ven tilat ion Penthouse 3 W-9 Survey Upper Warm Equipment Aisle *3 W-10 Survey Acce1~ Aisl e 2 w-11 Survey Operating Aisl es 2 w-12 Survey Sample Aisl e 3 W-13 Survey fuel Receiving & Storage 3 W-14 Survey Product Packaging & Handling 2 W-15 Survey Decontaadnatlon Area 3 W-16 Survey Scrap Tran sfer Area 3 0 W-17 Survey Health Phy1ic1 Lab 1 W-18 Survey Mechanical Cell Viewing Area 2 W-19 Survey Laundry 3 w-20 Obtain Environmental Sample* 1 W-21. Sul'Vey Womens Locker Room 1 W-22 Surv~y Warm Equipment Aisl e 3 W-23 Survey Mobile Equipment 1 W-24 Survey Ven tilat ion Equipment Rooa1 2 M-1 Survey Analytical Viewing Area 2 M-2 Survey Instrument Shop 2 M-3 . Survey Main Lobby 1 M-4 Survey Cold Chemical Penthouse 2 M-5 Survey Che11ical Proce11 Cell .Viewing Area D 2

Shi ft Survey No. Tit le Assigned M-6* Survey Maintenance Shop 2 M-7 Survey Guard Houae 1 M-8 Survey Tank Far a l M-9 Survey Bur ial Ground 1 M-10 Survey Rellote Operating Sta tion 2 M-11 Survey Fir st Aid

-1 .

M-12 Obtain Environaental SaJ1Pl** .1 M-13 Aut orad iogr a~ En"ironaental Air.

Saaplea l Q-1 Survey Uti lity Bui ldin g Q-2 Survey Roads, Walka, Parking lot and R. R. Spur * ... . >>

• Q-3 Survey Storage Lagoon and Hardstand Areas Q-4 Survey Dry Wells 1 Q-5 Survey*.zone II offi ces (

3 Q-6 Ob~ain Environmental Samples .

S

• Shi ftw ise

.D*** Daily W* Weekly M

• Monthly Q

• Qua rter ly

Table 9.49a Environmental Monitoring Phase I - Type of Analysis Weekly Monthly Semi-Annually Air Sampling Gross Alpha 3 Perim eter Gross Beta-l Plant Site Gaaa l!!_in & Snow Gross Alpha l Plant Site Gross Beta-Gaaa, Tritiu m Surfac e Water Gross Alpha 1 Erdman Brook Gross Beta-1 Butter milk Creek Gaana, Tritiu m l Cattar augus Creek

~an d Silt ~oss Alpha l Erdman Brook Gross Beta-1 Butter milk Creek Gama 1 Cattaraugus Creek Well Water Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Gama, Tritiu m

---

~------------------------------------------------------------------~.i _;-------

Vegetation Gross Alph:l 3 Perim eter Gross Beta-Gama I-131 Sr-90

~ Gross Beta Neighboring Farm Gamma I-131 Sr-90 Small Game Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Gama I-131 Sr-90 re :

Table 9.49b Environmental Monitoring Phase II - Type of Analys is Weekly Monthly Semi-Annually Air Sampling Gross Alpha 3 Perime ter Gross Beta- Gama Scan l Plant Site Gama Ra\n and Snow Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta- Sr-90 Ga'l'lla Tritium Surface Water

• Gross Alpha l Erdman Brook {",ross Beta-1 Butterm ilk Creek Gama, Tritium 1 Cattara ugus Creek Mud and Silt Gross Alpha l Erdman Brook Gross Beta- Sr-90 1 Butterm ilk Creek Gama 1 Cattara ugus Creek Well Water Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Gama, Tritium Vegeta tion Gross Alpha 3 Perime ter Gross Beta- Sr-90 Gamna I-131 Milk Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta- Sr-90 Gamma I-131 Fish and Shellfi sh 1 Cattara ugus Creek Gross Alpha .

Gross Beta-Gaama I-131 Small Game Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Ganma I-131 Sr-90

feder al and state regul ation s. Spare units and automatic contr

~s neces sary to preve nt the escape of high level burst s of activols ity are used caused by major equipment failu re.

9.~l A continuous stack gas mo~~tor, descr ibed in Appendix 9.51, is used to detec t conce ntrati ons of 3 x 10- ~c/ml or less of gross beta-gamma parti culat e activ ity and about the same conce ntrati on of 1-131.

A signi fican t incre ase in conce ntrati on of eithe r parti culat es or radio iodin will cause an alarm in the plant contr ol room. The exact alarm posit e will be field selec ted based on *oper ating exper ience ; they will be kept ions the lowes t pract ical level to provide the earli est possi ble warning of at stand ard condi tions . off~

9.52 Environmental monitoring to determine the effec ts on the environment of waste gas dispo sal is conce ntrate d in air sampl ing and sampling of soil, veget ation , milk and raino ut. Three site perim eter contin uous air monitoring statio ns are estab lishe d to determine conce of radio activ e parti culat es and r!dio iodin e at these statio ns. One statio ntrati ons is locat ed 3,100 meters south -east of the. plant , the second statio n is n locat ed 2,100 meters north -east of the plant and the third statio n is 4,000 meters north -north -west of the plant . This place s a monitoring locat ed statio n at eithe r end of and adjac ent to Butte rmilk Valley and, according to preva iling wind patte rns, will place one of the three monit ors down wind of the stack nearl y 60 per cent of the time.

9.53 The routi ne soil, veget ation , milk and raino sampling program is defin ed in Table 9.49. b. The entir e sampling prograut 0 to change as opera ting experience is gained but it is expected m is subje ct that any changes will be minor in natur e. Speci al samples wilJ be analyzed lf.

-sta*ck monlto*t indic ates an* alarm cond~.tion.

• The weath er monttoring *statithe (see ippendi,c': 9'."53) will supply data which may be used to determine the ons, direc tion of trave l . of stack fumes and the distan ce at which the maxim ground level conce ntrati on occur s. A mobile motor -gene rator sampler set um will allow sampling down wind of the stack regar dless of wind condi~ions Waste Disposal Contr ol Program -- Liquid Waste 9~54 The primary contr o.i' of high level liqui d waste is in the facil ities provided. *the waste tank itsel f, the concr ete sauce secondary containment, . the impervious "silty till" formation and *ther .for tank all contr ibute to a high degree of confidence in the system. Seespare Paragraphs 5.50 - 5.56, 7.10, 7.14 ~7.18, 7.25 - 7.37. Facil ities are provided for monitoring or sampling in the annul ar space betwe the tank and the vault . Routine surveys will be performed in the wells enlocat ed adjac ent to the waste tanks . A continuous water sampler locate d near confluence or Erdman Brook and ~uarr y* Creek will serve as a third monit the point of contr ol of liqui d waste . orirt9

. 9.55 Low level liquid waste will be disch arged to cattar augus Creek via Erdman Brook and Butte rmilk Creek. Waste water at a volum about 40,000 gallo ns per opera ting day is receiv ed in the inter ceptoer, of batch neutr alized if necessa~y, and disch arged to a serie s of holding

~ oonds. The inter cepto r volume is about 50,000 gallo ns and the ponds

I . _ ... ~ * - - * - - * - - _ _ ........_.......... ....,.,,,.ltr.rlol.. ""..................... 9'fl ..... * - - - , . . ................ ~ - - * -........- , _ _ _ _ _ _ ol,.,.,._..__......_,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ....,,. ......,,. -~---------

-v-----. ** ** - -

provide holdup for 4,000,000 gallons or 100 operating days above the minimum overflow points. Overflow points between ponds are a valved line at two feet above the bottom to provide for solids collection, and an open overflow at one foot from the top. The discharge line to the creek is valved so the amount of waste discharged may be regulated.

9.56 St~eam gauging and sampling stations are provided near the confluence of Quarry Creek and Erdman Brook and on Cattaraugus Creek. Gauging is performed in order to determine the rate at which waste solutions may be metered into Erdman Brook. Samples from these stations will be collected

• and analyzed weekly. Analyses will include gross alpha, beta and gamma, tritium and specific isotope analyses as required for control. (Appendix 9.56)

Waste Disposal Control Pro9ram--Hi9h Level Solid Waste 9.57 A burial area for waste generated in the plant will be mai~tained in an area north of the plant between the waste tank farm and the confluence of ~uarry Creek and Erdman Brook. This area will be reserved for process scrap and discarded process equipment. Process scrap, fuel element end pieces and leached hulls, will be packaged in 30 gallon drums, loaded into a shielding cask on a carry-all type trailer and transported to the burial area. (See Paragraph 7.14.) At the burial area a truck mounted crane with remote controls, 100 feet away, will be used to lift the lid of the cask, remove the scrap drum and place it in the trench. At the end of each burial operatiop, which may require several trips, the crane clam attachment or front end loader, will be used to backfill where necessary to maintain an exposure rate at the security fence of 2 mrem/hr. The drums will be covered with sufficient dirt to reduce the exposure rate at the edge of the trench to 200 mr/hr. -Final backfilling when the trench, or a portion of the trench~ is full will be to a radiation level of l mr/hr or less. The minimum dirt covering will be four feet thick.

9.58 A similar procedure will be followed for burial of process equipment. The equipment, after decontamination, will be suitably packaged and loaded on the truck in the Equipment Decontamination Room, transported to the burial area, loaded into the trench with the crane and backfilled.

Packaging techniques will vary depending on the equipment itself and* the radiation-contamination conditions. Generally a sprayed-on coating or a covering of plastic film will be used.

Medical Program 9.59 The medical program, under the direction of the Medical Director, will consist of a very thorough pre-employment medical history and physical examination for each prospective employee. The* medical history will be aimed at not only past illnesses and injuries but particular attention will be paid to history of past radiation exposure, allergies, blood dyscrasias, tumors and any evidence of emJtional instability. The laboratory studies on all applicants will consist of a minimum of complete blood count, serology, urinalysis, chest x-ray and vital capacity deter-minations. Each employee will have a complete physical examination yearly.

A co~ plet e blood coun t will be done twic e year ly; The pre-empl,oyment phys ical examination and labo ~lin ical urin alys is monthly.

rato on each indi vidu al leav ing the employ of the comp ry stud ies will be repe ated any.

9.60 Bio- assa ys will be scheduled for employees usin "acr oss- the- plan t stat isti cal survey" plan . The num g an is sampled each year and the type anal yses performed ber of time s each employee loca tion . Offi ce employees annu ally , for tota l alph .wil l depe nd on his work prod ucts ; mechanical head end, extr acti on ope rato a and gros s fiss ion cian s, maintenance and util ity ope rato rs sem i-an nualrs, Hea lth & Safe ty tech ni-gros s fiss ion prod ucts ; prod uct puri fica tion and pack ly for tota l alph a and .

for plutonium and tota l uranium. Add ition al samples agin g ope rato rs qua rter ly conf irm any pos itiv e resu lt and spec ial samples will will be obta ined to tion or inge stio n is susp ecte d for any employee. be obta ined when inha la-9.61 Thyroid mon itori ng _o f employees will be perf once each year in conj ucti on with the annual phy ormed at leas t sica l mon itori ng will be performed as indi cate d by air samp examination. Spe cial le coun ting resu lts.

9.62 A disp ensa ry will be maintained minor on-t he-j ob inju ries . There will be fac iliti for care of ordi nary care of seve re inju ries such as burn s, frac ture s and es for inte nsiv e firs t-ai d with radi oact ive mat eria ls. I111nunization agai nst gros s cont amin atio n for all employees. teta nus will be rout ine 9.63 Close liai son with the Hea lth be mai ntai ned. The Medical Dire ctor will assi st and Safe ty Department will trai ning and indo ctri nati on. He will review with in hea lth and safe ty Dire ctor , all indu stri al radi atio n exposure reco rds;the Hea lth and Safe ty radi atio n surv ey reco rds. He will coop erat e with air, wate r and plan t Dire ctor in plan t insp ecti ons. the Hea lth and Safe ty Rad iatio n exposure data for each employee sha

~rt of the permanent reco rd of each employee.ll be kept on form AEC-5 as A permanent checlt-off list sha ll be atta ched to each reco rd cove ring all of the plan ts' requ irem ents rega employee's permanent exam inat ions and pers onal radi atio n exposure reco rdinrdin g phy sica l as all requ irem ents of 10CFR-20. g and con trol as wel l Emergency Procedure Fire Prot ecti on Org aniz atio n 9.64 The Ht!aH ,h and Safe ty department has the prim resp ons ibil ity for trai ning pers onne l and aud ary for fire prev enti on as well as for fire figh ting . iting proc edur es and acti viti es wil l be carr ied out through shif t fire brig ades orga The fire figh ting func tion Appendix 9.64 . nize d as indi cate d in Org aniz atio n fer Rad iatio n Emergencies 9.65 There are a very larg e number which might con stitu te or cause an emergency. Itof combinations of con ditio ns is, ther efor e, not poss ible t_ to pres crib e infl exib le proc edur es for emergency acti on. However, ther e are

... t .

broad categ ories of emergencies for which gener al procedureb and certa in gener al rule& which apply in nearl y all cases . Inmayanyberadia state d emergency, the Healt h and Safet y Department ha& the primary respo nsibi tion to defin e the magnitude and exten t of the problem and to recommen~ a cours lity

. of actio n which will resto re the affec ted areas promptly and safel y. e 9.66 In any radia tion emergency the respo nsibl e group (Prod uctio n or Analy tical} in the area in which the emergency condi tion exist s must take inmediate steps to accomplish the followings

a. Prote ct plant personnel by evacuating affec ted areas and take actio n to confi ne the condi tion and elimi nate or moderate the cause .

b. Notif y the Healt h and Safet y Direc tor (or Technician on off shift )

givin g all possi ble detai ls about the natur e and locat ion of the emergency.

c. If the emergency involves prope rty damage, perso nal injur y, signi fican t radia tion level s, production inter rupti on, or possi ble off-s ite contamination, the following must be notif ieda Health and Safet y Direc tor Medical Direc tor Laboratory or Production Manager Plant Manager &Assis tant Plant Manager Assis tant to the Plant Manager Secur ity Offic er Plant Engineer

d. following the survey by Healt h and Safet y, barric ade and post the affec ted area to preve nt inadv erten t entry .

e. Devise a plan for resto ring the area and assemble the requi red men and mate rials.

9.67 Gene rally, the following rules apply in handling an emergency condi tions *

a. If incid ent invol ves wreckage and a person is believ ed to be alive and trapp ed, make every possi ble effor t to rescu e him. The usual rad~a tion rules may be abrogated upon the autho rity of the senio r person prese nt.

b. Segregate and detai n for furth er examination those persons who have had possi ble conta ct with the radio activ e mate rial. Perform complete contamination surveys of such personnel and insti tute decontamination at once if signi fican t exposure could resul t from a delay . Normally, it is best to leave skin decontamination to those persons with speci fic train ing in this funct ion.

c. Remove injur ed persons from the scene with as little direc t perso nal conta ct as possi ble. Limit first aid and medical procedures to

........ A tho se tha t must be done promptly unt il the doc tor is pre sen t.

d. Do only what 11 necessary to pre serv e life arr iva l of Hea lth and Saf ety spe cia list s. and pro per ty prio r to the

e. Work* wit hin the framework of any app lica spe cifi c typ e of emergency. ble SOP'& covering a Pla nt Maintenance P.rogram 9~~a The Nuclear Fuel Ser vic es mainten planned to insu re continued* saf e ope rati ance program has been Paragraphs 9.1 3 to 9.41, wit h a minimum of dowon of the pla n\ conaensurate wit h con side rati ons . ntim e con sist ent with economic 9.6 9 The rou tine insp ecti on and maintenanc to tha t for a normal chemical pla nt, exc e program is sim ilar ept stri nge nt requirements for the nuc lear asp ects whe re modified to ref lec t more program is based upon uti lizi ng conventional of the pla nt. The maintenance performing con tac t maintenance work. -Sp ecia met hod s and procedures for cov er work wit hin contamination and rad iati onl control& are inco rpo rate d to equipment or systems is done under the sur vei zones. Work on contaminated Department which recoaaends req uire d con trol ll~n ce of the H.e al th & Saf ety pre wri tten job procedures, and clo se coo ~in measures. Car efu l planning, Techni cal Ser vic es Departments ass ure saf e atio n wit h Production and Normal insp ecti on contemplates per iod ic shutand eff icie nt pla nt ope rati on.

and maintenance of tho se por tion s of the pladowns to permit insp ecti on dur ing *rou tine ope rati on. nt not rea dily acc ess ible C

9.7 0 Cer tain equipment is continuous ope rati on of the pla nt. Thideem s equ ed vit al to the saf e and ment tha t could become cri tica lly uns afe fromipment is def ine d as 1. equ ip-

2. any ma*l fun ctio nin g piec e of equipment whi a nuc lear stan dpo int, and the shutdown of the pla nt. ch could reasonably req uire A lis t, refe rred to as the Vit al Equipment '

and Technical Ser vic es Departments and approve Lis t ini tiat ed by the Production compiled and issu ed to the Production Departm d by the Pla nt Manager, is sta tes the requirements to be met bef ore the ent. (See 9.8 2) The lis t ser vic e, and what tes ts and requirements are equ ipm ent is taken out of ment is retu rne d to ser vfce . All equipment to be met bef ore the equip-the Vi tal Equipment Lis t is considered as nonnot spe cifi cal ly des ign ated on of service , rep aire d, and retu rne d to ser vic cri tic al and may be taken out maintenanc e pra ctic e. e according to normal stan dar d Organization 9.71 Maintenance work on Nuclear Fue l Ser vic systems is performed by Pla nt Engineering es equipment and for all mechanical, inst rum ent and ele ctr ica . Pla nt Eng ineering is resp ons ible the se cate gor ies is under the dire ctio n of l mai nten anc e work. Each of between the se groups is maintained to fac ilit a grou p lea der . Close coo per atio n power, and minimize downtime. ate sch edu ling , conserve man-

Under normal con dit ion s, mechanical and on a day sch edu le, fiv e days per week. ele ctr ica l maintenance is accomplished tenance is car rie d out on a sim ila r sch Much of the rou tin e instrument main-are normally on shi ft wit h ope rat ion s edule,

• however, instrument tec hni cia ns per son nel .

Pla nt Engineering Sec tio n Personnel 9.7 2 Pla ~t Engineering eng ine ers , mainttnance mechanics,isins composed of a pla nt eng ine er, mechanic al The Pla nt Engineer is res pon sib le foratru me nt tec hni cia ns, and ste nog rap her .

1. Planning, sch edu ling , and con tro llin g and too ls. per son nel , ma ter ial s, equipment

2. Ini tia tin g tra ini ng and edu ~at ion al p1*o per son nel . grams for maintenance

3. Est abl ish ing and sup erv isin g the ma fil e of des ign and vendor inf orm atioint~ nance of a rea dil y acc ess ibl e n, par ts dat a, pre ven tiv e main-tenance rec ord s, and his tor ica l rec ord s.

4. Supervision of all maintenance ass to cover *sa fe working pra cti ces , rad ignments, inc lud ing ins tru cti ons 'l approved maintenance rep air procedureiat s.

ion pro tec tio n measures and

5. Making tec hni cal stu die s on mainte and ele ctr ica l equipnent, and making nance of mechanical, ins tru me nt changes. recomnendations on des ign

6. Prepdring lab or and ma ter ial cos ts est ima tes for non rou tin e work.

The Pla nt Engineer is pri ma rily ass iste to whom any of the above res po nsi bil itied by two mechanical eng ine ers support is ava ila ble from the Technical s may be del e~a ted . Technical Saf ety Departments which wi ll provide Ser vic es and th~ Health and spe cia lis ts as r.equired.

Fa cil itie s 9.73 The Pla nt Engineering Sec tio n and pri ma rily to perform fie ld mainte shop fac ilit ies are organized nan bas ica lly of minor rep air s, replacement ce wo rk. On sit e shop work con sis ts of equipment. The bulk of the work is of def ect ive components and checkout and the shops are equipped acc ord ing ly. of sho rt dur atio n and minor complexity, car pen try and welding shops are provid Ma chine, ele ctr ic, ins tru me nt, pip e, fun ctio ns req uir e fac ilit ies not provid ed. In cas es where maintenance shops 1~ _nearby Bu ffa lo, New York wi ll ed at the sit e, pri vat ely operated be uti liz ed where pos sib le.

Instrument Maintenance Peraonnel 9.74 The maintenance of instrume ntation and control systems ia the respons ibility of the Plant Engineer assisted by the Instrument Engineer.

Theae respons ibilities are as followaa

1. Adequacy of the maintenance faciliti es and the training of personnel to meet all requirements, both roijtine and emergency,

2. Planning and scheduling of all instrument maintenance in cooperat ion with mechanical maintenance personnelf

3. Establishment of a preventi ve maintenance progrQD for all control systems and components, with particul ar emphasis on those involvin g the safety of the plant,

4. Planning and maintenance of a file system that contairaa 'the infor-mation necessary to analyze, design, order spare parts and components, apply preventi ve maintenance procedures and provide history of repairs on all equipnent. This will be done in conjunction with mechanical maintenance.

Instrument Shop Faciliti es 9.75 The instrument shop is equipped with services , (water, air, 0 electric ity, tools and test equipnent) necessary for the calibrat ion and maintenance of either pneumati~ or electron ic instrume nts.

Maintenance Categori es 9.76 Plant Engineering performs three categori es of work1 preventi ve maintenance and inspecti on, routine maintenance and non routine maintenance~ Any of these categori es of work may involve hazardous conditio ns due to radiatio n or contamination. The procedures used in performing this work depend on .both the category of work and the degree of hazard involved due to direct radiatio n or contamination. These procedures will be subject to approval by the Health and Safety Director in those ,c ases involving*

radiatio n hazards.

Preventive Maintenance and Inspecti on 9.77 The preventi ve maintenance program minimizes shutdowns and breakdowns by systema tically inspecti ng equipment, making calibrat ions or adjustme nt, and scheduling repairs and overhauls before failure occurs.

Each piece of equipment is studied thoroughly, and a schedule of routine inspecti ons is determined and establish ed under the following classific ationsa

a. A-Classa Major inspecti on (complete check of equipment,)

b. B-Classa A "middle- of-the-ro ad" inspecti on. Usually made quarterl y to semi-annually and, on occasion s, monthlYJ, C c. C-Class I A minor inspecti on ( ordinari ly visual and .f requent. ) Usually made monthly to quarterl y and, on occasion s, weekly.

As each piece of equipment le studied, a complete list of items to be checked on each inspection is made. A central control system indicates when inepec~

tiona aro due. If inspection, do not interfere with normal plant operation, the 1nepect 1ons are scheduled and carried out in accordance with work loads in the section. Inspections that require shutdown of equipment or interfere with normal plant operations are coordinated with the Production Department.

• After an. inspection la completed, information is transferred from the inspection sheet to a card as a continuing record. If any repair& are necessary, such repairs fall into the category of routine maintenance and are scheduled according to the urgency required.

Routine Maintenance 9.78 Routine maintenance includes all maintenance work on equipment or systems which is directed toward restoring the equipment or system to its normal functioning capability, without altering its basic design function. Routine maintenance is conducted during normal plant operation, as well as during scheduled shutdowns.

Normal routine maintenance work is either requested by the Production Depart-ment or results from the preventive maintenance program. Because there is

• generally a backlog of work, all work is given a level of priority to facilitate effective scheduling. Priority is based on safeguards _considerations, production loss resulting from the equipment being shut down, or the probability of a breakdown if a repair is not made, with consequent damage to equipment.

!fon Routine Maintenance 9.79 Non routine maintenance includes modificati~ns or additions to systems or processes as differentiated from repair or replacement of faulty equipment. Depending upon the nature and extent of tne work, main-tenance or construction forces are used. In the latter case, Plant Engineering is responsible for maintaining close contact with the work to see that it is performed in accordance with specifications, within the cost estimate, and reporting on the progress of the job during the construction per~od.

Administrative Procedures for Carrying Out Program 9.80 All work performed in the various categories of the main-tenance program, including those of the Plant Engineering Section both during normal plant operation and during plant shutdown, are in accordance with established administrative procedures described below. These administrative procedures deal with the conditions or requirements that must be satisfied to initiate and complete a maintenance operation rather than to exercise control over the actual repa~r work.

Non Vital Components 9.81 Administratively controlled maintenance procedures are not required on non vital components for safe operation of the facility.

Therefore, preventive maintenance or routine maintenance operations on non vital components is carried out by the maintenance sections in accordance I

with normal 1tandard maintenance prac tice , except as The maintenance work on non vita l components is coor noted in Sect ion 9.83 .

Department to minimize downtime. Det aile d maintenance dinated with the Production pl*c ** of equipment are provided by the vendor or are procedures for most per1onnel1 for hazardou1 con ditio ns the oper atio n may writ ten by maintenance adm inis trati vely con trol led as desc ribe d in Sect ion be alte red and 11 maintenance of a non vita l component is disc usse d in9.83 . Non rout ine Sect ion 9.84 .

Vita l Components 9.82 Adm inis trati vely con trol led maintenance proc requ ired on vita l components for safe ope ratio edures are n

prio r to performing prev enti ve maintenance or rout ineof the faci lity . The refo re, necessary to eval uate the effe ct of performing the main tena nce, it is an eval uati on is made on all it,m s list ed as vita l equi main tena nce work. Such Equipment List 11 prepared by the Production Departm pme nt. The Vita l Serv ices Department and approved by the Plan t ,Manager ent and the Technical work does not involve a radi atio n or contamination haza If the maintenance init iate d afte r approval by the Production Manager. rd, the work is contamination hazard is asso ciat ed with the maintena If a radi atio n or to alte r the ope ratio n as desc ribe d in Sect ion 9.83 nce job, it is necessary of vita l components is disc usse d in Sect ion 9.84 . . Non rout ine maintenance Hazardous Maintenance normal maintenanc* procedures befo re mainns 9.83 When hazardous con ditio exis t, it is nece ssary to alte r tenance is init iate d. In all case s, a Spe cial Work Procedure is required. This work proc is administered as desc ribe d in Paragraph 9.17 . The edure is obtained and provides maximum assurance that both the worker and use of this permit step s to minimize the consequences of radi atio n or cont ma~agement take adequate with the job. amination asso ciat ed In all case s involving hazardous maintenance, requirements set fort h in the Spe cial Work Procitedur is necessary to fulf ill the the maintenance ope ratio n is performed in acccrdancee. Afte r this is done, and 9.82 . with Sect ions 9.81 Non rout ine Maintenance 9.84 Non rout ine maintenance invo or add ition s to equipment. When it is necessarlves y to changes in basi c desi gn maintanance, on eith er vita l or non vita l components,perform this type of not carr ied out unt il a complete eval uati on of such such maintenance is and approved by the Cri tica lity Con nitte e. Afte r thea change is conducted the maintenance ope ratio ns are performed in accordan procedure is approved, 9.82 or 9.83

• ce with Sect ions 9.81

. Work Completion 9.85 Rep rese ntat ives of Plan Serv ices (if involved) and Health and Safet tyEng ineering, Production and Technical Dep artments (if involved) observe the test ing and retu rn to ope ratio n of the compone C maintenance. nts or system involved in

Production Department 9.86 The Production Department is responsi ble for the operatio n.

and maintenance of the proce11ing plant and its related process services .

The organiza tion and adminis tration of the department has been planned to provide safety to the public and plant personnel and to effect operatio n and maintenance of the facility within the operatin g license limitatio ns.

In order to effectiv ely operate the plant within the prescrib ed limitati ons, the Production Department has been broken down into groups to achieve effectiv e control of the necessary operatio ns. The group breakdowns are as follows*

a. Fuel and Mechanical Handling1

b. Chemical Processingl

c. Plant Engineering1

d. Utilitie s and Process Services .

9.87 The Fuel and Mechanical Handling group is responsi blb for the Fuel Receiving and Storage area includin g cask transpo rt, handling fuel assemblies, transfer and storage1 operatio n of the FRS water treatmen t facilitie s1 Process Mechanical Cell operatio n includin g fuel assembly transfer ,

handling , disassembly by saw or mechanical means, fuel shearing , handling of scrap, utility services to the area and hot equipment repair or replace-ment1 General Purpose Cell includin g the loading, handling , storage and transfer operatio ns of fuel baskets, scrap material and equipment utility services1 Chemical Process Cell-Equipment Decontamination Room includin g the charge of fuel into and discharg e of leached hulls out of the dissolve rs, replacement of equipment; and remote handling operatio ns within the CPC and the EDR* Scrap removal includin g the handling and transfer operatio ns of waste and material s into and out of the mechanical head end faciliti es.

Account ability and material control coordina tion consiste nt with Production Department requirem ents.

9.88 Chemical Processing group respons ibilities include feed dissolut ion, solvent extracti on, solvent recovery systems, product purifi-cation and concentr ation, acid recovery , *sampling, cold chemical make up, waste concentr ation and rework operatio ns, process off gas systems, building ventilat ion and account ability in these areas consiste nt with Production

• Department requirem ents.

• 9.89 The Plant Engineering group is responsi ble for the main-tenance of the facility as necessary to maintain continui ty of operatio n as describe d in detail in Paragraphs 9.68 through 9.85.

9.90 The Utilitie s and Process Services group includes the

• operatio ns ofa all utility systems within the utility room, plant area and off-plan t faciliti es, non radioact ive systems for both solids and liquids1 operatio n of the conventional low level burial and scrap removal from the plant1 material handling includin g the transpo rt, handling , warehouse and distribu tion of equipment and supplies as required for plant operations1 decontamination of ~reas and facilitie s not included under other groups1 material control includin g records of input, output and inproces s material necessary to effect control, and account ability of source material and

..,. M I ..... .__ __ _,:_..,,*......,._ _

_. . _ . . . . . . _ ~...,.._ ,

--: ---:~

spe cia l nuc lear ma teri at as necessary for Pro duction Department req uire men ts.

(j 9.9 1 r.le bas ic pla nt ope rati on and con trol is car ried out phy sica lly by the pro ces s ope rato rs and shi lar9 e pro ces sing c~p lex such aa the NFS pla ft iup erv isor s1 however, in a tec hni cal and ana lyti cal ser vic es, monitoring nt, add itio nal sup por t inc lu~ ing and c~n trol is nec essa ry to ass ure pro per ope , acc oun tab ilit y, maintenance in Paragraph 9.8 6 and staf fed by pro duc tion rati ons . The groups, list ed wit hin the Production Department to provide sup erv isor s, have been esta blis hed suppo~t. The ir primary fun ctio n is to maintai the def ined por tion s of thi s knowledge of the ir resp ecti ve are as of resp n an up- to-d ate inti mat e have fun ctio nal res pon sib ilit y for the ir areons ibil ity~ These sta ff fun ctio ns is maintained by the Production Manager or as, however, aam inis trat ive con trol This typ e of org ani zati on provides a dec entan Ass ista nt Production Manager.

res pon sib ilit y, yet mai nta ins cen tral ize d con rali zed type of fun ctio nal trol ove r ope rati ons .

9.9 2 To the maximum pra ctic al ext ent all det ope rati on are con trol led by wri tten pro ced ails of pla nt Operating Procedures, Run She ets (inc lud ing ure s. The se incl ude Standard Let ters of Aut hor izat ion . These procedures adm inis trat ive con trol s) and sta tus as des crib ed in Paragraphs 9.5 through are mai ntai ned in a cur ren t 9.7 and 9.9 4.

9.93 The Standard Operati step -by -ste p procedure for fun ctio nal ng ope Procedures incl ude a det aile d and /or process fun ctio n in the pla nt. Therati on of each pie ce of equipment gen era l list ing of the major systems coveredformat for SOP tog eth er wit h a 9.9 3. Included in each SOP is the scope enc by SOP are shown in Appendix ompassed, a gen era l des crip tion C of the ope rati on inv olv ed, cau tion s to be obs tra tiv e con trol s req uire d dur ing the ope rati erved in ope rati ons , adminis-or oth er pro ced ure s, det aile d ins truc tion s on, refe ren ces to rela ted SOP equipment and ,ins ofa r as pos sib le, the mechan for fun ctio nal ope rati on of the ment. This las t item may, in some ins tan ces ical lim itat ion s of the equ ip-in Run She ets. , more app rop riat ely be incl ude d 9.9 4 Run Sheets are ano r set of pr~cad con trol of the pla nt ope rati on. Theythe lis t ures used to mai ntai n campaign of a par ticu lar fue l beginning wit the ope rati ng con diti ons for the con tinu ing through the pro ces s to product stor h mec han ical pro ces sing and and lower lim its for each flow of pla nt pro age . The y incl ude the upp er and minimum flow rate s are list ~d for each ces sing . For exa mpl e, maximum ext rac tion col ullll1 as wel l as a des ired ope rati infl uen t stre am to eac h solv ent are used for each flowsheet auth oriz ed under ng flow . Sep arat e Run She ets pub l'ish ed Run She ets ava ilab le to the shi ft the ope rati ng lice nse . The are gen era lly more res tric tiv e than tho se per sup erv isor and his ope rato rs lice nse . Thi s pra ctic e allows more str ict mis sibl e und er the ope rati ng pla nt ope rati on. The shi ft sup erv isor cannot enfo rcem ent and con trol of the lim its of the Run She et. However, ext ion ope rate out side the spe cifi ed wit hin the lim its of the ope rati ng liceens of the se lim its may be made, ..

nse , by an approved Let ter of Aut hor izat ion . If the sup erv isor cannot maintain the ope rati on wit hin the lim i t spe cif ied by the Run She ft the affe cte be shu t down unt il the con diti on is cor rec tedd por tion of the ope rati on must she et is rec eiv ed. Run Sheets lare reviewed or approval to modify the run deemed nec essa ry. Under no con diti ons is theper iod ica lly and amended ~s Q techni cal spe cifi cat ion s included in the ope , pla nt ope rate d out side the rati ng lice nse .

9.95 Let ter s of Au tho dir ect ing act ual plr nt ope rati on asriza des tion are an ijdm inis trat ive procedure crib ed !n Paragraph 9.7 . They are used to aut hor ize a spe cif ic Run She et and par ticu lar processing campaign and in add /or &uxiliary procedures for a the res tric tiv e procedures est abl ish ed foritio n, are used to modify any of Au tho riza tion are approved as dis cus sed pla nt con tro l. All Let ter s of in Paragraph 9.7 .

9.96 The act ual ope rati on of the complet is performed by personnel lice nse d as e pro ces sin g pla nt 9.1 1. The bas ic areas of ope rato r res pondes crib ed in Par agraph 9.9 through

• spe cif ic cat ago ries or are as of the pla sib flit y are broken down int o l ope rati ng tec hni que s. The spe cif ic are~snt con sis ten t wit h production pla nt wit h the ir group lice nse . The spe cif ica lly are man ned by ope rato rs con sis ten t are as followsa -as sig ned areas for each shi ft

1. Cen tral Control Room1

2. Process Mechanical Ce lli

3. General Purpose Cel li

4. Fuel Receiving and Storage-Chemical

5. Sampling1 Processing Ce lli

6. Chemical Makeup1

7. Product Packaging

a. Waste Handling. and Handling1 In ad~ itio n, non lice nse d personnel are

1. Uti lity Room1 assigned to the following areasa

2. Yards and ground, etc

• A bri ef des crip tion of each of the se are res pon sib ilit ies for the res pec tive areasas out lini ng the bas ic ope rato r is as follows*z

l. Cen tral Control Room The Chemical processing por tion of the pla Control Room loc ate d on the fou rth flo nt is con tro lled from a Cen tral beginning wit h dis sol ver ope rati ons and or of the process bui ldin g. Pro ces sin g sol yen t ext rac tio n, product pur i(ic atio n,continuing through feed adjustment, operated from thi s loc atio n. Complet~ ~oncon cen trat ion and sto rag e are from the con tro l room wit h the exception trol of the process is exe rci sed manual block val ves for the process ser of non rou tine ope rati ons such as in the Upper and Lower Ext rac tion Ais lesvic e requirements which are loc ate d Lower Ext rac tion Ais les is performed by . Manual val vin g in the Upper and of the con tro l room ope rato rs or shi ft sup oth er ind ivid ual s at the req ues t is a semi-graphic typ e for- ease of ide nti erv iso rs. The con tro l room paoel In add itio n to pos ting the Run She ets in fic atio n* and eff ici ent ope rati on.

ins trum ent s are ind ivid ual ly posted showinthe con tro l room, many of the g the lim its of ope rati on.

2. Process Mechanical Cel l

a. Fuel assembly tra nsf er and han

b. Fuel assembly disassembly usi ngdlin g* .

c. Removal of extraneous hardware. saw or mechanical means.

d. Make up of fue l modules and she ng.

e. Handling ind ivid ual fue l elementari

f. Scrap han dlin g, cel l dec~ntaminas. tion and in- cel l remote maintenance.

1

- -- -- -- --* I

The run shee ts for the PMC are somewhat diffe rent than those .

of *the proce ssing complex. They are made up of deta iled fuel hand for the rest procedures which, in effe ct, are simi lar to an.SOP. Each diffe ling of fuel requ ires spec ific instr uctio ns for handling throughou rent categ ory fuel handling procedures indic ate the adapter& and fixtu res requ t the PMC. The

• handling diffe rent fuels with in the cell, deta iled instr uctio ired for the fuel on the saw table , the disassembly, inspe ction and push ns for handling shea r feed magazine, sequence of shea ring and spec ial preca ution out table ,

taken . Included also are throughput quan tities so that they can s to be be coord inate d

• • 1th chemical proce~sing.

3. General Purpose Cell

a. Chopped fuel loadi ng, hand ling, stora ge and trans fer oper ation

b. "Leached hull sampling, handling and trans fer oper ation s. s.

c. Receiving and trans ferri ng scrap and othe r ~zter ials to the 11\C.

d. Fuel basket hand ling inclu ding liner s, capping and mate rial cont

e. In-c ell remote maintenance rol.

4. Fuel Receiving and Storage

a. Acco untab ility as appli cable to Production Department resp onsi Cask recei ving , unloading and. trans port. bilit ies.

b.

c. Fuel assembly hand ling, trans fer and stora ge.

d. Coordination with mechanical head end oper ation .

e. Operation of pool water treat ment systems.

0 5. Chemical Process Cell--Mechanical Handling a

• Charging disso lver with fuel.

• b. Diss olver disch arge of leached hulls .

c. Equipment replacement by remote* mechanical means.

d. othe r remote oper ation s with in the CPC requ iring use of mechanical handling faci litie s. the remote

6. Process Sampling Sampling of the vario us proce ss streams and vess els is conducted abil ity, proca ss cont rol, and waste loss deter mina tion throughou for acco unt-proc essin g porti on of the plan t. The samples are taken at times t the chemical the Run SheetJ auxi liary samples may be taken as determined by presc ribed by supe rviso r. Laboratory anal ytica l data from the samples are trans the shif t acco unta bility offic er and also to the cont rol room where the mitte d to the resu The shif t supe rviso r then makes proce ss adjustments or trans fers lts are logged.

limi ts presc ribed by the Run Shee ts. with in the

7. Chemical Makeup Areas The chemical makeup area inclu des proce ss solu tion makeup for the cessi ng porti on of the plan t. These inclu de all cold chemical chemical pro-for the solve nt extra ction columns and othe r cold proce ss solut influ ent streams disso lutio n and regen erati on solu tions . Each proce ss solut ion ions such as C* is made up from

_.._ ___ .. .. -~

a prescr ibed detail ed form listin g the consti tuent conce ntratio ns and total amounts of each soluti on. The soluti on is then sampled and held for certi-ficati on. Following certif icatio n, and upon proces s demand, the soluti on is then transf erred to a run tank for subsequent introd u:~ion to the proces s or, in some cases, direct ly into the proces s vesse ls.

8. Produ ct Packaging and Handling

a. Load out of plutonium produc t into bird cages and interim storag e in the proces s buildi ng.

b. Load out of high enrich ed uranium into bird cages and interim storag e.

c. Load out of lo~ enrich ed uranium produr.t to transp ort vesse l.

All operat ions are conducted on a batch basis following specif ic instru ctions by the shift superv isor.

9. Suppo rting Areas

a. Scrap Removal Areas , includ ing the receiv ing and transf er to the burial area of *leach eo hulls ana other *head-end scrap genera ted .durin g proces sing, and transf er of new mater ials to the General Purpose Cell for head-end proces sing.

b. Equipment Decontamination Room, includ ing the mechanical handli ng to and from the chemical proces s cell.

c. Proces s Laundry for decontamination of the anti-c ontam inatio n clothi ng used in the facili ty.

10. Utilit y Room Opera tion--A ll Plant Servic es Contained Within the Utilit y Room Complex

a. Water--raw, filter ed, proces s, demin eralize d, and potab le.

b. Air--p rocess , instru menta tion.

c. Steam--equipment, proces s .and heatin g.

d. Electr ical--n ormal and emergency.

vrs:r - ..

Process Maloperation 9.97 M.Jch desi gn, ope ratin g info rma on the chemical proc essi ng of spen t reac tor fuel ,tion , and expe rien ce exis ts by solv ent extr acti on. The Pure x-ty pe of extr acti part icul arly on proc essi ng used in the NFS plan t, is a thor ough ly test ed procon proc ess, which will be pect ed to oper ate with out unusual diff icul ty. Plan ess and one which is ex-upon the "norm" or. usua l cond ition where the equipmet oper atio n is pred icat ed and no human mist akes are made. Obviously, such nt oper ates as desi gned idea always exis t. This sect ion disc usse s poss ible malo l cond ition s wil l not of the plan t, the resu lts of such mal oper atio n, the pera tion in vari ous area s mal oper atio n, and the corr ecti ve acti on to be take method of dete rmin ing a part icul ar mal oper atio n. This info rma tion is larg n in the case of the form for ease in review and assi mila tion . A list ely pres ente d in tabu lar the disc ussi on is found in Table 9.97 . of abbr evia tion s used in Mechanical (Head End) Proc~ssing 9.98 Mal oper ation s that may occu r in the head-end are mechanical in natu re. M:>st of the malo pera proc essi ng tion fail ure of a man ipul ator grap ple duri ng the tran sfer s envi sion ed invo lve a bask ets and con stitu te litt le or no haza rd, as such of fuel elem ents or veni ence and time loss duri ng proc essi ng. Maloper , but rath er an inco n-GPC, and CPC are item ized ln tabl e 9.98 a, b, c, ation s in the FRS, P~C, and d.

Dissolution - Feed Adjustment

(

9.99 Diss olut ion- Feed Adjustment step s under norm tion s are disc usse d in Sect ions 4.21 thro ugh 4.34 al cond i-ope ratio n can vary with the fuel being proc esse d. . The natu re of a mal-the fuel s will be divi ded into (1) ceramic U0:2 or For disc ussi on purp oses ,

in form, clad in *stai nles s stee l 1Jr Zirc aloy tubi ng Th9'2 fuel s, cyli ndri cal Con solid ated -Edi son, Yankee, Commonwealth-Edison, (as repr esen ted by Power Fue ls), (2) uranium-aluminum allo y fuel s (MI'R and Nort hern Stat es allo y fuel s (STR type ). Mal oper ation s in diss olvi type ), and (3) Zr-U will be fair ly repr esen tativ e of diff icul ties thatng thes e type s of fuel s all type s of fuel s proc esse d by NFS. can be enco unte red i~

A ~ummary of diss olut ion malo pera tion for thes e thre in tabl e 9.99 . Con tent s of this tabl e are disc usse e fuel type s, is give n para grap hss d in the follo wing Ceramic Fuels, Stainless- or Zircaloy-Clad Yankee, Commonwealth-Edison, and Northern Stat es prac tica lly iden tica l in proc essi ng. These fuel s Power fuel s are into bask ets, and the bask ets plac ed in the diss olve are chopped, loaded in Sect ion IV. Diss olve nt acid of the app ropr iate rs, as desc ribe d to the diss olve rs, the solu tion heat ed, and the dissstre ngth is added proc eeds . Too low or too high a diss olve nt conc entrolut ion of the fuel or too much diss olve nt added to the diss olve r are atio n or too litt le most like ly to occu r. The resu lts of, and corr ecti the malo pera tion s such a malo pera tion are give n in tabl e 9.99 . ve acti ons

• requ ired by,

'J Table 9.97 INSTRt.lENT FUNCTIONS (Nomenclature used in Maloperation Discussion)

. ~

.::.* 1

~ Disp lay Devices 7 Con trol ling Devices ~, /

,-.ob If 1/:

l# ~

9~

c1 §

~

~

c1

~

~

~

~

f l9! .. ~.;

. l'\~

<t""*' glf-

..~

.~<t

,4 I i

,;

(ij~ ~ . j ~ j i:,; .,., (J,,, ~

Measured Variable ~ cl (j

~

'b (j cl

~ (ij ' I t.,

0~

'I 1* T_tw JH nloi Column Pulse (Frequency-Pressure) C CIC CAL CAH Density D DI DR DIC DAL DAH 1 Flow F FI FR FIC FG FAL Inte rfac e Pos ition IRC IAH/L

_,{Column) I IAH/L

~,.

(LIC- (hi ah-low)

~J~ id Level L LI LR LIC LIC LAL LAH Pres sure p '

Pr PR

- PIC PG PAH Pressure Diff eren tial Pd PdR ..

PcCL PdAL PdAH I Temperature T* TI TR TIC TR:: TG TAL TAH I f --,:* .~.- ... U * . . --..;; .. a...,,,-. ' '. .. ------*------ __________ ___ .;_

(' (-..

Table 9.98 a MALOPERAnON IN FtEL RECEIVIt<<; AND ~G E AREA (FRS

)

. - Maloperation Resu lt Indi catio n Corr ectiv e Action

1. Grapple failu re duri ng Fuel element drops to floo r Visu al.

fuel tran sfer . of cask unloading pool . Spec ial underwate1* ex-i

• tens ion wrenches and tong s used to retri eve

fuel .

' 2. Fuel element cannot be re- Inconvenience and time loss , Poor triav ed from floo r of cask. visi bili ty or bind ing Cask cove r repl aced and r unloading pool . between cask and pool wall cask removed to decon-or cani ster s. tami natio n area to pro-I t '

vide working spac e.

I 3. Fuel element stuc k in in- Inconvenience and time loss , Visu al.

divi dual shipping slot . Use underwater working II tool s or fabr icate equipment for removal.

I i

I I

I I

l .

II

- -- ._... - ~

I ____ _ __ .

I Table 9~98b IIALOPERATION IN PROCE!!S IIEC~mCAL CELL AREA (PIC)

---:- 't'.. - - - - - * * ............ . . . . . . . .A. ... - .......... .

~n~ ct~ ....w:::- ~~-- * - * *

1. Major breakdown of shea r Inop erat ive shea r duri ng ope ratio n. Visu al. Hold fuel element or mechanism.

segment in PIC as long as nece ssar y, mon itor-ing temperature oc-casi ona lly. If temper-atur e is too high , wat er cool with spra y nozz les in shear magatine.

Repair shea r

• I

2. Saw cut through fuel Saw cutt ings cont aini ng

~

element (wet cutt in~) . Visu al. Coolant will be proc es-fuel .par ticl es drawn into saw coo lant . sed if desi rabl e.

3. Saw cut through fuel element (dry cutt ing} .

Visu al. Remove filt er to fuel bask et for subsequent proce~sing ira diss olve rs if ecoi'581Dics dict ates I

recovery of fuel

• i1

( '1

(

• 0 Table 9.98 c MAI.OPERATION IN GEtl:RAL PURPOSE CELL AREA (GPC)

Mal oper ation Resu lt Indi catio n Corr ectiv e Action .

1. Grapple failu re during Part of fuel may be spil led Visu al.

tran sfer of loaded fuel onto floo r of GPC. *Power Manipulator bask et. (2V- 73) brought in and pi~c es retr ieve d one at a time to fuel bask et.

• Notes Same procedure is ,sed to retri eve *spil led leac ~d hull s.

2. fine s dropped on cell Lost fines1 inconvenience floo r from dropped fuel Visu al. Wash down cell floo r to and time loss .

bask et. crlt ical ity safe suap .

Reaove auap pan and plac e fine s in fuel

- bask et.

3. Sheared fuel lodged in Stuck fuel piec e in redu cer

• G-1 -aon itor (2-LAH-l) at redu cer duri ng desc ent. Reaove fuel bask et and 9-Jnch di...ter poin t in fuel chut e tip1 nao w redu cer. fuel piec es with 11H ter slav e *nip ulat ora or power aani pula tor.

i It t i

7---..al.~fei :iiW- *

- - _J_ - - ,u J --

Table 9.98~

• IIALOPERAnON IN THE CtEIIICAL PR<aSS CEU. AREA ( CJlC) llaloi>eration

1. Grapple failUflt during Fuel or leached hulls Viaual.

tranafer of fuel basket Recover pieces Iiith spilled ori floor of cell. poar aanlpul,tor.

or leached hulls to or

• from Dissolvers :1:-1 and

1:-2.

• i

~

I I

t--

.!Ir 11:liiil3l*r~

Cona olidat ed-Ed ison fuel i s the excep tion in this group. This fuel

.) conta ins mixed .thorium-uranium oxide s in the fuel and requi res a much highe r nitri c acid conce ntrati on than other fuels of clad- oxide type, plus .04 .M hydro fluor ic acid in the disso lvent to disso lve-fuel the thorium oxide . Possi ble malop eratio ns in this case includ e all the above cases plus insuf ficie nt, or exces s, or omission of, the hydro -

fluor ic acid.

Boric acid is also added to the disso lvent on the Conso lidate d-Edi son fuels . Omission or change in conce ntrati on of this component is a criti calit y consi derat ion and is discu ssed in Secti on VI.

Aluminwp-Uraniym 411oy Fuels These fuels , prima rily of the MTR type, are charged into the witho ut chopping. They are disso lved in 5.4 .M nli ric acid baske ts in which

.005 .M mercu ric nitra te serve s as a disso lution catal yst. Malop tions would inclu de the use of acid with too low or to~ high a con- era-centr ation , too little or too much acid of the corre ct conce ntrati on, the addit ion of too little , too much, or the omiss ion, of the catal yst.

These malop eratio ns too, are shown in table 9.99.

The addit ion of too much or too little acid to the disso lver is un-likel y since the disso lvent is made up batchwise as requi red and is certi fied prior to trans fer in total to the disso lvers . The remai n-ing malop eratio ns, their consequences and corre ctive actio n requi red

.} are given in table 9.99

• Zircooium-Uranium Alloy Fuels Disso lution of fuels of this type is accomplished by the appro priate addit ion of 1.0 .M nitri c acid to the disso lver with baske ts of chopped fuel in place , and to which is added 27.6 .M hydro fluor icun-acid at a suffi cient ly slow rate that little free fluor ide ion is prese nt (fluo ride is complexed by the disso lving zircon ium). After of the disso lutio n, aluminum nitrat e-chr omic acid solut ion iscoq>l etion added to furth er complex the fluor ide and to oxidi ze tin (from the Zirca loy) and uranium to their hi gher, and more solub le, valen ce state s.

Maloperation can occur from incor rect quan tities and conce ntrati ons of the three solut ions added to the disso lver. Consequences of, and corre ctive measures to be taken after , such rnalo perati ons, are in table 9.99. Stab ility regio ns for the disso lver produ ct-fee dgiven solut ions are given in TID-10089.

Other Fuels The SCRUP fuel is clad in aluminum and this cladd ing is removed with an NaOH-NaN03 solut ion befor e disso lution of the f uel. Excess de-cladd ing solut ion or high component conce ntrati ons i n this solut ion will resul t in highe r-than -norm al waste solut ion volumes but will I have no serio us proce ss consequences. Insuf ficien t decla dding L,

~

Table 9.99 IIALOPERATION AND CORRECTIVE ACnON DlllIM1 DISSOLU TION (3::-1 or 3::-2)

.Fu eLi we llalo nAr atio n

1. JCeramic1 Sta inle ss Stee l1 Zirconium Clad.

Idiss Low acid con cen trat ion in olv ent.

Riru uilt.

Low con cen trat ion of I ic+i va &~+ ton Recharge diss olv er with fer tile mat eria l in dis - add itio nal diss olv ent and solv er pro duc tf all fue l complete diss olu tion .

not dissolved1 low acid . Acid adjustment in 30- 1.

2. Ceramic1 Sta inle ss Stee l1 Too high an acid concentra-1 High acid in extr acti Zirconium Clad. tion in diss olv ent. on Dilu te high acid in 30-11 feed1 low decontamination run w1th low con cen tra-fact ors if run . tion s of uranium, thorium, end plutonium through the par titi on *c ycle .

3. ICeramic1 Sta inle ss Stee l1 I Ins uffi cien t diss olv ent.

Zirconium Cla d. LAL-21 LCL-21 high concen- Adj ust con cen trat ions in trat ion of fer tile and 30-1 into HAF spe cifi ca-fiss ile mat eria ls in dis - tion sf add add itio nal solv er pro duc t. Low acid solv ent to diss olv er.

con cen trat ion.

4. ICeramic1 Sta inle ss Ste elJ *Excess solv ent.

Zirconium Cla d. High acid and low *ta ls Dil ute to pro per acid con tent of diss olve r con cen trat ion *in .3D-11

- pro duc t. zun *to extr acti en sya tea with low *ta l... con tent .

• If .fil led too high , could lov erfl orto the oth er of tha solu tion of all thilN ves Hla ' con tent s diss ol\l er or tCJ 30- 1. In this event~ a batchwiM adju stae nt in 30-1 laould be neceasary-.

5. Uranium-aluminum allo y. Low acid con cen trat ion in disa olv ent .

I Low* alUllin\llll con cen trat ion Add add in dlss ol"9 nt pro duc t. itio nal diss ol"9 nt

• Acid def icie nt pro duc t. t.r 3C- l and 3:-2 tf

• Saa fue l aay be und is-nec essa ry to complete solv ed. diss olu tion . If nec es- J sary , add acid to 30-1*. '

Boi l down *to cor rec t tl>TEa The ind icat ion

• in alll of the *above mal aluminum con cen trat ion.

operationlf is by sample ana lysi s.

I. - *--- --- ---."'**-

'4_

...,_w;

• ilii1a1.. ~

• r.*---*.:..;-.

..... ..........1! --~ - - -**--*

lilaiiia

-_ _ -* 'J

i?I F II r

Ii Table 9.9 9 Con MALOPERAnON AND CCMECTIVE ACTION DtR tinued ING DISSOLUTION {3C -l or 3C-2)

I I .EueLTwe Malooeration Rea ult r.n rre ctiv e Act ion

6. Uranium- aluminum allo y. High aci d con cen trat ion in di.s sol ven t.

I High aci d in dis sol ven t product1 low sal ti~

Add Al (~ ) to 30-1 and 3

adj ust to ext rac tio n fee d stre ngt h for ext rac tio n. spe cif ica tio ns.

7. IUranium-aluminum allo y Low Hg{N03)2** Dis sol utio n incomplete; Retain sol uti on in dis -

dis sol ver sol utio n low in solver1 add Hg{NO.:a) and aluminum, high in JR>

• con tinu e dis sol utr on.2

a. 3 Uranium-aluminum allo y. High Hg{N03)2* No pro ces s consequences1 Ad jus t waste1 boi l off however, may lim it concen- if nec ess ary .

tra tio n of wa ste .

9. Zirconium-uranium allo y.* Hi gh ~ con cen trat ion . Pos sib le pre cip itat ion from Dil ute sol fee d upon long sta ndi ng. uti on in dis -

sol ver or in feed adj ust -

ment tank if dis sol uti on has alr ead y occ urr ed.

• N itri c aci d is added to dils sol ver s batchw Sta bil ity ranges a~ giv eqi n 1I1RI& for ise. Hydrofld:>ric aci d is metered s~p ara t~ly int o the nit ric aci d.

zirconium-uradium dis sol uti on.

---***-------------------..----------------------+------

10. Zirconium-uranium allo y. Lo w~ con cen trat ion . ---------------...~-------------------

Lowered sol ubi lity of Add con cen trat ed HN ~ to zirconium in dis sol ver solu

• dis sol ver or tio n. to fee d adjustment tank -if dis -

sol uti on has already taken pla ce.

11. Zirconium-uranium allo y. Excess HF. Aluminum pre cip atio n in Dil ute dis sol ver pro duc t fee d adj ust me nt. High wit h water or add itio nal

- equipment cor ros ion . HN0 as sta bil ity reg ion per3iiit s.

OOTEa The ind ica tio n in alll of the above malop erationsl is by sample ana lys is.

., \

I I Table 9.99 .Continued MALOPERAnON AND CCJUlECTIVE ACTION IXJRING DISSOLUTION (X- 1 or X:-2 )

Fuel T llal ope rati on

12. IZirconium-uranium allo y. Res ult Co ~ct ive Action Ins uffi cien t HF. Zirconium pre cip itat ion in If solu tion is sti ll in diss olv er or feed adju st~ diss olv er, add add itio nal ment. All allo y may *not HF, hea t, and sparge.

diss olv e. Add HF at con trol led rat e, usin g dilu tion air .

13. IZirconium-uranium allo y. Excess Al(N0 )

• 3 3 Aluminum pre cipa tes. Add add itio nal HF to brin g composition into stab le rang e.

14. IZirconium-uranium allo y. Ins uffi cien t Al(N0 )

• 3 3 Zirconium pre cipi tate s1 Add add itio nal Al (~)

high corr osiv e rate s on to diss olv er or feed 3 stai nle ss stee l equipment. adjustment acc oun tabi lity tank as required

• NOTE1 1

The ind icat ion in ail .o f the above maloperations fs by sample ana lysi s.

~

solu tion or low component conc entra tions in this solu tion 0 in only part ial jack et removal. As a resu lt, diss olut ion will resu lt complete or perh aps may not even star t. A repe at of the may be in-step will be nece ssary in this case . Decladding shou ld decl addi ng attem pted unti l all prev ious diss olve r solu tion is remo not be diss olve r so that prec ipita tes of sodium diur anat e cannved from the Malo pera tion durin g the actu al fuel diss olut ion will be ot be formed.

to that for the oxid e fuel s and tabl e 9.99 shou ld be refevery simi lar poss ible consequences and corr ectiv e step s. Malo pera rred to for adju stme nt and acco unta bilit y tank s are concerned prim tions in the fe~d human erro r. The most impo rtant of thes e erro rs invo lve arily with to add the prop er cold chem icals or to thoro ughl y mix the failu re prio r to samp ling. These and othe r malo pera tions are the solu tion tabl e 9.99 for tank s 30-1 and 40-1 . These malo pera tions deta iled in appl y to othe r feed adju stme nt and acco unta bilit y tank will also downstream feed adju stme nt and neut raliz er *tank s. * . s and to othe r Solvent Extraction - Partition Cycle; Extraction Column (4C-1};

Feed PYmp Pots (4C-13a and 13h}; and Meter Head Pot l4Y-14}

9.10 0 The most like ly malo pera tions that can occu r on column, the feed pump pots , and the meter head pot, the this sect ion. will be disc usse d in

~ ' Many of thes e malo pera tions will be conrnon to .all and tabu latio ns made for this column will be appl icab le puls e columns flow shee t columns as well . Furt her, it is reco gniz ed to downstream that of this column, in a casc ade system such as is used here malo pera tion some of the downstream columns. A disc ussio n of sequ , will affe ct will not be made here ; . this disc ussio n will be used asentia l diff icul ties downstream columns. The plan t oper ating and surv eilla bein g typi cal of desig ned to dete ct malo pera tions befo re consequences can nce proc edur es are upse t any column. sign ifica ntly The malo pera tions that will be tabu lated and which are othe r columns follows appl icab le to

1. Inco rrec t puls e amp litud e-fre quen cy setti ngs;

2. Inco rrec t flow ratio s between the vario us strea ms;

3. Inco rrec t strea m com posi tions ;

4. Inte rfac e crud and orga nic qual ity;

5. Column floo ding ;

6. Loss of column jack et cool ing wate r;

7. Nozzle plat e foul ing.

Puls e amp litud e-fre quen cy setti ngs, if inco rrec t, column waste loss es, or column inst abil ity and floocan ding resu lt in high high wast e loss es. Figu re 9.10 0 illus trate s the vari atiocombined with Equi vale nt to a Theo retic al Stag e) with vary ing puls e n of HETS (Hei ght If the combination of the column desi gn and flow shee t ampl itude setti ngs.

met by cond ition s at poin t A (which repr esents minimum requ irem ents are amp litud e requ irem ents for the Yankee fuel flow shee t), HA colum n puls e then oper ation to

Tabl e 9.99 Continued MALOPERATION OF FEED ADJUSTMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY TANK (30- 1)

Mal oper ation J?p~11 1+ Indi catio n

1. Low steam in coil s.

Corr ~c ~ive Action Poor temp eratu re cont rol. TI-2 -5; LR-6; DR-4; Sample Hold solu tion in tank Cannot evap orate solu tion 3C.

for conc entr ation corr &ct- unti l sample shows it ion. is of corr ect concen-trati on; add cold chem icals to prop er conc entr ation .

2. I Low cool ing wate r in coils ~ Poor temp eratu re cont rol TI-2 5; DR-4. Check cool ing wate r for jetti ng.

valv e; hold sol utio n in tank unti l prop er cond i-tion s are achi eved .

3. I Condenser wate r not on. Loss of solu tion (vap ors) TI-2 -4 in cond ensa te; LR-5 I Check cool ing wate r valv e.

to vent system. in 3D-2.

4. I Inco rrec t cold chemical Inco rrec t conc entra tion of addi tion . I Sample 3C; LR-6; DR-4. Hold solu tion in tank ;

solu tion .

add prop er conc entra tion of cold chemicals to brin g the solu tion to prop er conc entr ation .

I

5. I Air spar ger off. Poor mixing; inco rrec t I Sample 3C; l-[;-24. Turn on air; hold solu -

sample. ,, tion in Tank H:-24 unti l conc entra tion is corr ect.

Table 9.99 Continued MALOPERATION OF FEED TANK 10 PARnTION CYCLE (40-1 )

Maloperation Resu lt Indic ation Corr ectiv e Actio n

1. Low cooli ng wate r. Poor temp eratu re contr ols I Tl 14.

high feed temp eratu re, re- Incre ase cooli ng water flow.

l sulti ng in poor column effic ienc y if HAF is too hot.

2. No air sparg ing. Poor mixing, which resu lts IC-29 off; manual check of

. in a bad sample. Tum on Hand Cont rol hand contr ol valv e. vaive from air supply line (1-C-29) 1/2 hour prio r to takin g sample.

3. Inco rrect cold chemical Wrong solut ion comp ositio n, Sample 4C.

addi tion. which can cause a loss to Cert ifica tion and admin-prod uct to the HAW strea m istra tive check of prop er or poor df. amounts of cold chem icals to bring the solut ion to the prop er conc entra tion.

i r:

I l;,

the left of this point would resul t in poor conta cting , highe r HETS value s, fewer stage s, and consequently high fissi le mater ial losse s to the waste stream and poor decontamination of produ ct. Point in figur 9.100 repre sents minimum pulse amplitude-frequency condi tionsA e maxilll.lm amplitude-frequency situa tion would be repre sente d by . point The Amplitudes above B would resul t in incre ased stage heigh ts due to in-B.

adequate phase disengagement or other effec ts. Hence, for a given pulse frequency, the amplitude opera ting range would fall between point s A and B. Operating outsi de these raQges would be consi dered malop eratio

• f

n. I I

I Figur e 9.100 II.

HEYS VARIATION WITH PULSE AIFLITlllE - HA OOLUIN At a parti cular frequency (cycl es per minu te).(S ee note)

I i

• I Maximum accep table HEYS

,.,--- -~-O pera ting Rang e~~~ ~~__ ,;;:*

Pulse Aq,li tude NOTEs Diffe rent frequ encie s would gener ate a family of curves with simil ar chara cteri stics .

For satisf actor y opera ting condi tions , low frequ encie s are neces sarily bined ~1th high amplitudes and high frequ encie s with low ampli tudes . com-Workable opera ting combinations will be estab lishe d for each column and flows heet. Mllop eratio n would be due to hwun error or equipment failu and the corre ction needed would be obvious in each case. re

flow rat ios of the org ani c-a que ous stream on waste los ses and dec ont ,mi nat ion fac s (0/A rat io) have dir ect bea ring we ll as the lA, IO, and !IA columns, wiltor s. Losses from the HA column, as rat ios . The magnit~de of 0/A inc rea se l dec rea se wit h inc rea sin g 0/A flow or rat io change*. pos sib le in the dow is lim ited , however, by the inc rvased column in que stio n. For example, the 0/Anstream column, or by floo din g the Yankee flow she et is normally about 1.7 . rat io in the HA column for the inc rea sin g A.( or the feed rat e), to app If thi s rat io is dec rea sed by in the ~HAW stre am wil l sta rt exceeding .theroximately 0.8 0, the waste los ses of Q.1% of the uranium in the fue l. Lik economically per mis sib le val ue *

(by inc rea sin g org ani c - the HAX stream ewise, inc rea sin g the 0/A rat io in a floo din g con diti on in the column and ) by a fac tor of 2.0 would res ult and , add itio nal ly, org ani c phase in thi aga in high uranium in the HAW s stre am .

Op era ting lim it$ on the

• O/A rat ios wil l be set on eac h of the columns in the sys te~ *as dis cus sed for the HA colu the se lim its would be con sid ere d ma lop eramn above. Op era tion out sid e human err or, fai led or err ati c flowmeters tion and would be the res ult of

, or metering puq:,.

In eac h of the above, pul se or flo w-r pro bab le res ult is hig h fis sil e los sesatio ma lop era tion , the most in the raf fin ate stre am . Recovery of fis sil e ma teri al wil l be dis cus sed und sys tem . Column ma lop era tion s are tab ula er the ope rati on of the rework ted in tab le 9.1 00 *

._! ope rati ons in the Par titi on Cycle Fee are mainly concerned wit h flow rat es to d Puq> Pot s and Meter Head Pot s als o dis cus sed in tab le 9.1 00. and from the column. These are Plutgnit.p cycle feed Conditioott Jank C4Q-6) 9.1 01 Maloperations of Tank (4D-6) *are shown i~ tab le 9.1 01.the Plutonium Cycle Feed Con diti one r The ma lop era tion s are as des crib ed in paragraph 9.9 9.

feed Cgnditioner to fir st Uranium Cycle C4P:9) 9.1 02 Maloperations of

~ir st Uranium Cycle (4D-9) are shownthe Feed Con diti one r Tank for the in tab le 9.1 02. The ma lop era tion s are as des crib ed in paragraph 9.9 9.

Second Uranium cycle feed Cgnditioott (40-12) 9.1 03 Maloperations of Con diti one r Tank (~0-12) are shown inthetabSecond Uranium Cycle Feed as des crib ed in* paragraph 9.9 9. le 9.1 03. The ma lop era tion s are Plutgnit.p Purification c,11 9.1 04 The ope rati on of the Plutonium Pur dis cus sed in paragraphu 4.7 3 to 4.7 5. ific atio n Ce li is sid ere d con sis t in gen era l of human err Ma lo~ rati ons thi t have been con*

ors . The se inc lud e the ove r-

.' (_

• flowing of tan ks, improper s~l utio n adj ust me nt, imp ro~ ~ v~l vin g, and fai lur e to ope rate Plutonium Ion Exchan j

i pro per ly. These ma lop era tlon s are tab ulager s 5C- 1A, 5C- 1B, and 5C-1C ted in tab le 9.1 04.

IV Q.

Table 9.100 Continued MALOPERAnON OF HA COLtllN ( C- 1)

Malo rat ion Re sul t la. Flooding cau sed by high Ind ica tio n o Same as item 1. Same as item 1.

flow rat es. I Reduce flow rat es.

lb. Flooding cau- sed by poor Same as item l.

disengaging time of Ind ica tio n wi ll be same as Stop .flo odi ng as in org ani c. item 1 in column. If item l. Co rre ct 1 , org ani c disengaging time is the cau se, ana lyt ica l &891p-l8s wi ll ind ica te poor dis -

org ani c problem by sol ven t wasting or rep lac e sol ven t.

engaging time or org ani c

. deg rad atio n.

le. Flooding .caused by- pul ser l Same as. item amplitude-frequency. 1. Same es item l for column Ad jus t RPII of pul ser ins tru me nta tio n. Pu lse r motor or adj ust pul ser frequency can be counted surge tan k pre ssu re.

on osc illa tio ns of PR-8 or by counting RPM of pul ser f poppet cam sha ft. Pu lse r amplitude determined by maximum pre ssu re on pul ser surge tan k (pu lse str ok e).

2. Cy clic flo odi ng. Probable lar ger amounts of Int erf ace con tro lle r LR:-29 Reduce flow rat es or re ent rai ned org ani c in HAW wi ll be err ati c, caused by str ee . Excessive pro duc t C:,Uce pul ser fre que ncy -

a repeated bui ld- up and amplitude. Check ana ly los s to HAW and poor de- breaking of an aqueous contamination in column. tic al dat a for org ani c lay er in the ext rac tio n sec* disengaging tim e.

tio n of the colUllll. This wi ll ref lec t an err ati c be-hav ior of DR-23 als o. PR-8 wi ll inc rea se slowly as the aqueous lay er bui lds. up, the n drops sha rpl y to norma:

as it bre aks .

l  !*

C * ,**,,_,

-- ( i

("

a Table ~.lex> Continuftd MAI.OPERATION OF HA COLlllN (C- 1)

1. Flooding. Organic leav es the column Inte rfac e con trol ler LIC-29 Reduce colm n thro ugh -

through the normal aqueous will fi1a t become erra tic effl uen t line and aqueous put rate s and /or pul ser then will decrease loadi'1g l thr~ugh the normal orga nic effl uen t line if allowed .to cont inue . This allows prod uct to the waste stream pres sure to pot 4Y-15 sig-nifi can tly allowing orga nic to flow out HAW line .

DR-23 (~xt ract ion sect ion frequency and upli tude .

Rework mat eria l as nece s-sary . Organic which left through the HAif line will be separated and fiss ion pr9d uct to the den sity ) will incr ease in-prod uct stl'.9am. Both will in the deca nter 4Y-l dica ting laye r buil d-up of and retu rned to the requ ire rework of mat eria l. aqueous in the column. The No. 1 solv ent system.

laye r of aqueous may break occa sion ally showing a shar p retu m ,to near normal of DR-23 read ing with a following grad ual buil d-up .

PR-8 (column stat ic pres su will be erra tic brat wil l show a sub stan tiall y high er reading, indi cati ng incr ea-sed aqueous in ttie colUlll.

lll-2 2 (~n sity in top dis-engaging head) will in-crea.. sign ific antl y when aqueous repl aces the orga nic in this sect ion.

When aqueous flows to surge pot 4Y-5 and thence to HBX*

colUllln C-2 , the inte rfac e con trol ler, LIC-33 will be unst able due to incr ease in f aqueous flow to that column I

I

I Table 9.1 00 Continued MALOPERAnON OF HA COL\IM (C- 1)

Malooeration Res ult

3. Pul ser sto ps. I Column wil l iaa edi ate ly go XA-19 pul ser into a tot al flooded con di- sound. Osc illa alarm wil l . Shut down par titi on tion as in item 1. tion eff ect cyc le columns immediately.

of pul ser on iris tr\l Nn ts Restart aft er pul ser PR-8, UC-29 wil l sto p. trou ble j.s cor rec ted .

Err atic beh avio r of ins tru - Rework ma teri al as

• n ts des crib ed in item 1 *nec essa ry.

wil l not occ ~r. PR-8 wil l show inc rea se as aqueous bui lds up in column dis pla c ing org ani c. DR-23 wil l in cre ase , fin ally showing tot al aqueous. Organic flow to SUrge Pot 4Y-5 wil l decrease to approximately 1/2 sinc e flow wil l be equal to aqueous inf lue nt onl y. LR:-29 loading pressure wil l decrease sig -

nif ica ntly to allow org anic to flow out HAW line .

4. Loss of HAF. Loss of pro duc t in nol'llal Zero read ing on LR-281 In- If not res tore d

, stream. Pos sib le car ry- terf ace Con trol ler LIC-29 wit hin ove r of exc ess fiss ion five min utes , shu t down wil l decrease sha rply unt il par titi on cyc le.

pro duc t to subsequent con tro ller adj ust s to brin g cyc les. lev el back to des ired poi nt DR-23 wil l decrease1 DR-22 wil l decrease1 PR:.a wil l dec rea se.

5. Loss of HAX. Loss of pro duc t to waste system.

FAL-9, FR:-22 on HAX1 flow Shut down par titi on to Surge Pot 4Y-5 stops1 cyc le inn ate ly.

LIC-301 DR-23 and PR-8 wil l RellOrk as edi nec ess ary .

1 inc rea se.

I I

I l

f

c, r Table 9.100 Continued MALOPE8AnON OF HA COLlllN ( C-1 )

llalos:,e_ration Rewlt_ Ind icat ion ~"'T"Ntctive Aci lon

6. Loss of HAS. Decontamination wil l reduce FAL-7, FIC-1 on HAS1 LRC-29 If not rest ore wit hin by a fac tor of 10 to 100. wil l decrease sha rply unt il 5 min utes , shudt down Fiss ion products wil l be con trol ler adju ats for re- par titio n cyc le.

car ried to downstream duced aqueous flow. DR-23 cyc les. and PR-8 wil l dec reas e.

7. High HAF flow rate . L~ss of prod uct to HAW. LR-28 incr ease (HAF *as ur- Lower HAF feed rate ing pot J . PR-8, DR-23, and (FRC-16). Rework DR-22 ir.cr ease I I.R:-29 mat eria l as nec essa ry.

low er load ing pres sure .

a. Low HAF feed rate . Pos sibl e stri ppi ng of exc es,L R-2 8 dec reas e (HAF fiss ion product and carr y- ing pot ). PR-8, DR- measur- Incr ease HAF feed rate ove r to subsequent cyc les. DR-22 decrease1 LJC23, and (FRC-16).

-29 hi~ r load ing pre ssu re.

9. I High HAX feed rate . Same as ltem 8 FRC-22 (HAX) incr ease 1 Decrease HAX rate with PR-8, DR-23, DR-22 wil l FIC-22.

dec reas e.

10. I Low HAX flow rate . Same as item 7. FIC-22 (HAX) decrease1 Incr ease HAX rate with PR-8, DR-23, DR-22 wil l FIC-22.

incr eas e.

11. I Higl HAS flow rate . Incr ease waste volume of HAlftFIC on HAS1 PR-8, Pos sibl e loss of product to wil l-1 incr DR-23 *1Reduce HAS flow with FIC-1.

lwaste. ease 1 LRC -29 load - Rework mat eria l as nec es-ing pres sure wil l dec reas e. sary .

12. I Low HAS flow rate .

scrubbed from orga nic in scru b sec tion of column.

I Fiss ion products wil l not be FIC-1 on HAS1 PR-8, DR-23 I Incr ease wil l decrease1 LIC -29 load - FIC-1. HAS flow with ing pres sure wil l incr eas e.

Table 9.100 Continued IW.OPERAnON OF HA COLl.111 (C-1)

HAS.

llaloo eratio n I

Resul t cause reflux ing in column I

13. ILoss of saltin g agent from Same as item 12. Will also DI-1 and lab Indica tion analys is on 140-171 PR-8, al-23, and and loss of product to waste DR-22 will decrea se.

Corre ctive Action Certif icatio n of HAS make-up soluti on before use.

stream .

14. INo coolin g water on HA Depending on teq:,e rature of !Cooling water valves close4,. Open coolin g water colUJlll c-1 jacke t.

• influe nt. stream s, may cause Sample analy sis of efflue ntlval ves.

less effici ent decontamina- streams.

tion factor and waste loss.

15. IExcess interf ace crud. Increa se disengaging time. Sample analy sis of efflue n If severe enough to Possib le poor decontaminat stream s. HAW and uranium affect product specif ica-of Zr and Nb. and plutonium. streams from tions, increa se solven t subsequent columns. clean- up to improve dis-engaging time. If troubl e still preva ils, displa ce interf ace to HAif syst* by Standard Operat ing Pl'ocat,re.

16. IFouling of column nozzle Reduce contac t of organi c Can only be determined by

!plate s. Clean out system and try aqueous and n\Dber of colUJlll critic al analy sis of all to remove foulin g mater-stages with result ing los~ factor s affect ing colUllll ial by chemical flushe s.

of column effici ency. opera tion. If unsuc cessfu l, replac e column.

I f

I

Ci 0 Q-*-""'

Table 9.100 MALOPERATI~ OF PARnTION CYCLE FEED PlJIP POTS (<<:-1 3A -

138) llalo a:-~t inn

1. I Air supply is high . I Cause high flow of HAF LR-28 on *ter Head Pot Corr ect setti ngs on stream. 4Y*l4 and FR::-16 on air LR-28 and FJC-16 supply. instr wnen ts.

2. I Low air supply. Cause low flow of HAF 1trea1 LR-28 on Meter Head Pot Co~ ct setti ng on 4Y-14 and FR::-16 on air LR-28 and FR::-16 supply. instl'Ullants.

3. I Loss of pot due to crud in check valv es.

I Low or loss of HAF stream. I LR-281 FR::-16. .. Switch to air lifts for HAF feed.

l

I

I Table 9, 100

• IMLOPERAn~ OF METER JEAD POT (4Y-14) 1.

-*-... -.-.-L......

High leve l in pot.

-~----- -

The ~olu tion will go thro uj, I.1C-2S1F1C-l6.

-**--..... *--** ~---.......-................-..

the overflow line to Tanlc LIC-28 will adju st air 41).l unti l maloperation is flow to PUii> pots C-13A corr ecte d. and 1381 rese t inst nJ-ments if nece ssary .

2. Low leve l in pot. Low flow to HA col\1111\. LJC-281 FIC-16. LIC-28 will adju st air flow to Pllllp Pots lC-13A I' and 1381 rese t instrum 'f if nece ssary*

. . \ .

. l .. "

~*

~

.. I

- ,. - J 1

~

- ~ ;

,l '

0 n - )

Table 9.101 MAI.OPERATION OF PLUTCJUlll-cYCLE FEED C~DinON ER TANK (40-6)

1. High level in tank.

Cause overflow to 60-3.

- * * - - -. . . ..&.v1.

La=-11 sample in Vent Correct flows in and System Catch Tank 60-3. out of tank and recycl e

. product from vent *system to rework.

2. Low oxident concent~ation Results in insuffic ient FR1 FAL on 'cold chemical Add oxident to correct of cold chemicals. oxidatio n of plutonium, feed tank1 sample 9C1 DR-1. concentr ation and recycle which causes the plutonium IIAW from 40-8 to rework.

• product to go with the IIAW stream.

3. No air 1parging1 poor Poor tank mixing1 poor Air Supply Valve 11:-11 thin Open. Jl:-11/2 hour pri or mixing. sample. line on UC-1. to sampling; check and l og opening of spare valve

• Table 9.1 02 MALOPERATION OF FEED COODITIONER TO FIRST URA NIUM CYCLE (40-9)

Maloperation Res ult Ind ica tion Cor rec tive Action

1. Wrong cold chemical Cause wrong feed con cen tra- DRC-3; sample add itio n. tion to Uranium Cycle and 22: . Cor rec t con cen trat ion and los s of pro duc t to IAW or rec ycl e IIAW to the rewo rk poor df. system.

2. Low coo ling wat er on coo lel Poor tem per atur 4E- 4.

e con trol ma1 Valves clo sed on coo ler; cause poor column efficicnC)I column eff Open val ves on coo ler.

lue nt samples.

3. Air spa rge r off . Poor mixing, res ulti ng in a OC-4 off ; sam bad sample and poor concen- ple 22: ; DRC-3 Ins ure spa rge r on for 1/2 trat ion con trol on IAF.

• hour pri or to sampling.

Tab le 9.10 3 MALOPERATIOO OF SECCND t.RANIUM CYCLE FEED

~DI TIO NER (40- 12)

Mal o~r ati.o n Res ult lndi cat§ on= r. -":iv ~ A~t inn

1. Inc orre ct cold chem ical Wrong feed con cen t~at ion, FR on Cold Ch~ iesl Feed add itio n to 4P- I2. .Co2>rect concen~

7es ulti ng in poo r extr acti on Tan:tJ sample 2i>B~ DR-7 ~ , 'in tank ":and recyrai;J cfe on and loss of pr:oduct to IIM 40-1 2. IC.

or poor df.

• fl"OtD .~1 3 to re~ rk;

2. High leve l in tank 40-12&, ,*Overflow of t~nk1 " '~

loss of !Ji-2.?1> i.AH-6 ii) :n~nk

. prod uct to 60- 3. 40-1 2. .

~* ~di~!~ ~5!9W~ "into ~nd out

,.?} ** of ,tan k afld recy cie fros off-gas system to nl-"°rlc*

3. Lo* leve l in Tank 40-1 2. Los s of IDF flmc . "I. * ¥ * *.,:, ~:;:.

LR~'i.2 in 'i'~~' *.i!U)-12.. *

, . -* Adj~st flo~ into ~Rd out of Taruc 40..:12..

~ .....,. ......

4. JL~w coo ling water to Poo r IDF te~*ratu::-e con tl'ol Coo ler 4E-5~ Va!v_es*. cloi e~~i' ,~r( coc lerJ  ; Open VJ}V eS on Col}Oitt-.

~oiurfil effl uen t $aD!ple~-

5. INo air spa rgin g.

Poo r mixi.ny of lOF. R:-8 offj saq> le 26B. Tum on .c-a.

J

~

I

table 9.104 MALOPERAnON IN PLUTCIUlll PlRIFICATI<* CELL (PFC) llalol> eratio n . Rnul t *

• Indic ation

1. orrec t1ve A~tion Plu~onf\lin Ion .E~a nge Overflow goes to Ion E.'IC- LAH*l2 and LR-14 on 50-lt Feea Cond itione r 5>-1 has change Recy~l-. Wilste Tank Start fl°" thx'outh one LR-1 on 5>-2. of the Plutonium Ion been allow ed to overf l~~ ~2 and then to the Plutonium Feed Cond itione r E::~hanger1 ~-lA , S:*lB ,

Ol' ~-lC .

't~

.- &>-6 for rework

• 2~ Improper Plutonium Ion ' 11ax 1~ pluton ium absor ption lTIC- 3 on 5>-11 TR:-4 on Exchange Feed. Condi ti~ne r by ~ !ni.on resin will not 5)-20 Readju1t temperature and

. refer to Standard 50-1 tempe rature and/o r ..~ accom pli~c :l if1'~he 60 Ct tempe rature at Pluto~ium 10 ,C plut~ niuat" Ion E~changer Operating Procedur*s lf l!)n Exchangers *--~ *lA,~. . . , ~mpe ratun *i's not. mtlnt&rl nect11ary1 check ~20

~-).B , and ~-lC>:'dUe ' to At ~l~e r and tower tempera-. for nece11ary watex- J*vel t pump ~7 not *oper it1~ ~~. tures , resin

• e):Cchange improP,er he~~i~g cS tioi *

• fieoien_c y is ~'i~ii. : *

• f- adjust proper teaperatur.

with TIC-4 .

water tpt 51)-20~

I 3 * . I Improper Pluto niua**Ion . ith~u t p~~ \JP.9rglng, 138~ ~148; - l~*~ and 168 Exchange . feecf conc*:a~ra:. .. . prqpe r: -~just men~ of feed ln tiil)ie r, gi Adjus t N~ and HNO tlon ( 5>-1) .due to~paoi t. * ~ l canri~t,**,be* obta,inect. If c,ntra tion1 Ye JJf flu,en t con-1parg ing lndl-addlt lon to tank 50-f produ ct does not . .t if sparg ing or 'improper f,ee~.,\ ~ 3 iff .not; ;_~_ ciiu~~.a*. .

• • adjus taent of ~ and .,, ~ -r7.*2*! ~,-/ U,le..,plut on~

NlfDi.

• 0ot .ojd:dizec! i,*.~ \~

1, . ~ted .by varla tiori' in, level co~ 1 fa\lu n to t~

'indl~ ate~ by* FR*91 1pecl flcatl on1.

l

.ni~l,~ .1 ~ -'p).~ont...; wll}:*

• by LR-14.

• * ... Ix- ,*

..~:~....:.~th8

• *pa11 .,war,:-' *~1~~ \ *Ion. ~

changers (s;.:u , 5:-18*, or.

S:,-lC ) dur.ing:'i he -.l<*Ji'ng1 cycle , t9,

• ~ ****"'*

tbe .{qn *- "~c!Mffige..  ;

iate *Tanlc. S>-2 ..end "111 .

• t ' .. "')

1W .to be return ed .,to *tha

• 1Plut oni\ll Feed Condlt'io;..:r

'ank ( c-6) for nwo~~c.'

~

....... -\

. Tabl* 9.lO\ Contf.1aued . ,.

IW.OJIERAnON ~N PLtJTOfilll PlllIFICAtIClf QLL (PPG

)

lla,lopera~1on Result* ~. - _Imil.catton;

• 4 . Improper; valve .open.durlng Ex~e~s p~utoniu

• elu tr1a t1on -~ycle of Ion . carr ii,d to the *Rec Exchanges ~~lA , !C-l B, m will ycle be*

J* .

$pp le ~-1 4t~*-.SV-16, or 5Y*l 8.

r.. .... t ua, &...+t ftft Double check .cor net val "' upon start of Tan i 50-2.

and ~-l e. * * '

1 cyc le.

'~-- I ~ r valv.e. open ~in g loading or wash cycle of

• ~~ ritl es an~ fiss ion pro- LAH-13, duc ti will_~ carr ied t~

~ .....

LAH-14, LAH-15 on Ion Exchange Col\lll\S11:R~l9 Cor rect valve po1 ltlon 1.

Ion Exchanger (~-l A, .the PbJ tonh a Product Feed on 9>-4*

~-1 B, ~-lC ). . Eva ~r.l tot 1:ank ' 5)-4 .. . Thi~

• • ..ter ial

. ~n be sent baru i t tc 1

~ the PluiOS)ium Ion Exch~nge

• F e~*Conditiol)er .Tank '( 50-l )

for'* rework 0

\

6. Ollit wash cycle o.f O(f product spec ific atio n.

Plutonium Ion Exchangers Sample 148, 151, or 168 on Rework product to tanl

~-.lA, ~-:1 B, or !C-lC and 51)-1 .

t

~-lA , ~-1 B, ~~1 c. . .

-. . Sampl~r l'1B 'on tank 50-4.

"1. No- ~ or' l~ss than 0~2 ~ Fo~ tion of pluioniunl' "J Tank 140-46 analy1e11 no ~

~ elut rian t used in'* . -:- polymets which inlgh Cer tlfic 1tio n of acld elut riat ion cycle Plutoni1.m resi n bed. t plug flow by LI-27 and LR-28. concentration before Ion Exchange Recycle Waste UM.

Tank.

a. Overflow of Plutonium Ion Overflow will be carr ied **i' LAH-1 or LR-1 ori Ttnk Exchange ....9ecycle Waste * . ~hro~gh .ven t *line to the 50-2. Steari Jet 51-32 to the TanJc (5>-2). Vessel -Off-Ga~C~tch Tank Plutonl\11 Waste Catch

( 6D-3 ) 'where 1 t .. can be re- Tank

• 4D-8 or by grav ity or wo~~-d. sent to waste. flow to C>-6.

9. Improper use of Steam Jet May resu lt in tran sfer rl~g 511:.32 (Pump-Out Eductor on *plutonium prod\,Jct: into LR~22 on Plutonium Wa*te Shut off 91-32 and re-Catch Tank -8) and sam-5D-2 ). Plutonium Waste.Catch Tank ple ana lysi s(41> of .40-8.

work <<>-81 send .to tank 40-8 . ~

7D-8 .

I I

",i#* -.....--,-----------:-----....-----.......- .... ~ - _ .... ~--------.............-.....---.-~

Tahle9.104 Con tinu ed IW.OPEJ,ATION IN PLtJrOUtll PlRIFICATION C'EU. (PPC

-~ .. . ~ .* ... '

)

MalooeEation Res ult -.

10. luto nium Prod uct

• Indi cati on.

Plut *onium*.'c an:i ed to PFC LR-19 on 5D-4J LAH-16 on vapo rat~ r Feed Tank 50-4 S\DJ> and *to Solv ent Waste

,/.! Sta rt Pullp Si-1 0 to .

1verflow. iump e evaporator or stop flow Tanlt ( 130=-8) .. by i51- 8 Steam Edµ~ r. *. SUlllp and floo r are into S>-4.

size d to. be ,safe for la~ st vess el ! n *PPC * . Tanlt 130-8 .

has boron Raschig ring s and is' crit ical ly safe *

.ft. iiiut oni un Prod \lct :Liquid. is retu rned to Tanlc

~po rato r ~-2 is allow ed l&>-41 some l iqui d may carr DR-17 and LJC-20 on S:::-2 Stop pump Si-lO J retu rn o *QwnlQW. y and 53-10 resp ecti vely . 5>-6 solu tion to 9)-4

!over thro ugh cond ense r to 15)-6. with IC-41.

1ao lProduct boil -dow n to a IPlutonium conc entr atio n is

_high _COIJCentration in .JC-20, *n 3 1, and DR-17 ;Watch DR-17 cloM lYJ 00 high~ on ~-2 .

• ,Eva pora tor ~-~

• dilu te with dilu te acid *

• in !C-2~

13. I Plu ton i~ Evaporatoi;.Con- * ~on dens ate is c~l ed I 32, LAH-16, and LR-21 Route to rework 7D-8 or dens ate *ranlt 5>-6 overf1ow~through ove rf l"ow ven t

' . *ess el Off-Gas' Ga~ch' Tanlc t o n S>-61 LR-2 on 6~3 . ste 70-2 .

. --,D-3. It can be. hand l*d at

• - ~ -

l'4: :I Insu ffic ient HN03 *in ~1' -**Y form pJ,~ ton, ia pol t poin

,; . t as re<l '}.ih dlol

~

~r i5>-4 sup le ana lysi s.

• iAdd HfO:a if polymer has

. '* -~ 5:-i . '

formed In !C-2 and dige st ntil *in solu tion .

Excess fiss ion product~

5>-4 .

in'\19~: \--~t product 4 sample. Retu rn to 5>-1 with pump

~*pe~ iiica ~ion s.

!IG-10 for reworke r- ...

l,.. ' ** ~ ~* . *:..,,,--.:Jo;

-~ ~ ~ I.. ~ .:!,.  :~ ~

r _~ . =- Iii' .- s>ta:-arn

• fti

. -* . - . P* ~' i rt *sr*rs;

. iJ * ~ '""

CJ

~-...

/?':\

v' Ta~l* 9.1>4 Cont inued IW.OPERAnON iN.* PLUTtliilll PlllIFICATION CEU. (PPC) ratio n

16. I Resi n degfa datio n ~-n , Exce~sive prod uct in ~ ..2. I ~2 SUl) le.

5:-lB , ~-1c . . Replace naln **

1pec iflec f*ln standard Opentlng ~

covering lon **change colulin open tlon .

1-7*; I lllpro per disch arge of

• cont ents of Plutonium I

. Sot>J.t,t!_f~n ~rec ted* to. ~ ~

• tank , J

• I !-.AH-16 on Tank S>-6. Enauze that t.- contents Evaporator Condensate Tanlc an known prio r to (5>-6 ). disch arge.

,)

Uranium Produ,t Pyrification 9.1~ Uranium Product Purifi cation is discus sed in paragr 4.67 to 4.72. This discus sion includ es the operat ion of the Uranium aphs Product Evaporatori the .Silica -Gel Beds, and the storag e of uranium produ ct. Again, the maloperations *discu ssed concern prima rily those associ ated with human errors . These includ e high and low levels of soluti ons in tanks, improper valvin g, improper evapo ratpr operat'ion, and improper sampling. These maloperations are listed in table 9.105.

frUduc t Pi~kaging and Shipping. Area 9.106 In the Product Packaging and Shipping Area, produc plutonium...solut-ion is placed in smal._l bottle s for shipment. High-en- t riched urinium product is also packaged in this area_.and low-enriched uranium is transf erred to tank traile rs from this

• area. Due to the possi bility of hazard from alpha contamination in the *Product Packaging and *Shfpping area, much of the equipment is enclosed in glove !?oxes and electr ical interlo ck contro ls are instal led to insure proper opera procedure and ventil ation contro l. Maloperations in the Product tor Packaging *and Shipping Area includ e any spilla ge of mo~e than a minute quant ity of plut~nium so~io n, cross contamination of the products with any foreiijn mater ial, an

• any act that could cause a crttJc al array. All equipment ~sed for hi~h-enriched uranium and plutonium is geome tricall y safe, includ ing the sumps in the handling area. Here again~ malopera-tions involve human errors and are ~iscus sed in table 9.106.

• Bewotk Evaporator System 9.107 The rework system consis ts of a~ evapo rator, conden-

$er, feed tank, and associ ated piping . The rework system is used to boil down and adjust any one of *the *aqueous waste **streams that are sampled and found to be too htgh in product to dis.card *before rerunn ing through the solven t extrac tion system. Organic streams are not run through the rework system.

The streams reaching the rework system will vary from very dilute

- . soluti gns approaching water, to strong er soluti ons contai ning up to 6.014 HN03. S~me streams will have only a few grams per liter uranium in themi others will be of much higher conce ntratio n, and plutonium may also be presen t. When high-e nriche d fuel is processed, these streams may contai n some of the struct ural alloys *of the fuels, such as aluminum and zirconium. Thorium may also be presen t during thorium fuel proces sing.

Since the feed mater ial ~nteri ng the rework system will vary widely in composition, each batch will requir e specia l consid eratio n and operat ing inttru ctions . Any seriou s deviat ion from these instru ctions would con-stitut e a maloperation and. would result in a product stream u~suit able or less than loptil'lllm in composition for return to the extr~c tion syst~m.

Off-sp ecific ation feed to the extrac tion system will result in l~~* of product and/or furthe r rework opera tions. If .solutU,n~ should t,e:r.,ver-conctn trated in the rewor~ system, a nuclea r critic ality incide nt could result . Prtven tion of such incide nts, however, 1, assured by certai ~

Table 9.105

.IW.OPERAnON OF \MNIUM PRODlCT PlRIFICATIClf llalope ration Result Indicat ion Co~ct ive Action

-1. High level in Uranium Tanlc overflows to 6D-31 I LAH-191 LJC-26.

Product Evaporator Feed Shut down extract ion tank may boil1 no adverse until *xcess solutio n Tarilc 50-7. effect unless ignored for in 5>-7 can be processed.

long period . This tank is

' not normally heated .

2. , Low enriche d uranium Possib le degradation of Tanlc inventory1 LAH-24 in Lock out high enriched transfe rred from 50-7 to high enriche d uranium. 51>-9. uranium transfe r airli~ s 50-9 by ...istak e. produc~ solutio n. when processing low enriche d uranium.

3. +High . enriche d uranium Possib le to approach criti-' LJC-27 on ~-4.

. product misdire cted to Lo. cal concen tration (See When processing high en~

Enriched Ur-nium Product rlched uranium in ~-4, section on Nuclear Safety ). steam will be locked out

~vapo rator !ll'.:-4. of servlce 1 air lift sup-ply will be blanked.

4 gh level in product Poor operati ng behavior of High reading s on LJC-27 Reset contro l point to evapor ators. evapor ators. (low enriche d uranium) and lower value on UC.

-~- .tI High density in product LJC-28 (high enriche d uranium).

Possib le freeze- up of High DIC-20 reading1 high Reset DIC to lower contro l I

evapor ator. evapor ator. TR-1-3 reading (low. enrichlct point. DIC automa tically DR::-21 and TR-1-1 (high dilutes high density enriche d). produc t in evapor ator.

6. Low density produc t in Low product concen tration . Low DIC-Z> reading1 low evapor ator. Reset DIC to higher TR-1-3 reading (low enrichtd contro l point.

high produc t volume1 DR::-21 and TR-1-4 (high enriche d).

J,

Table Cll05 Continued .

IIALOPERAnON OF URANIUM PRODtCT PUR IFICAnON

- llal ope rati on Res ult

7. Too 1111ch coo ling wat er to Plugging of eva Ind ica tion Corrective Action eva por ato r dis cha rge lin e pro duc t dis cha por ato r High eva por ato r lev el1 Warm pro duc t lin e wit h 1 jac ket . rge lin e if pro duc t volume1 LJC-27 (low ove r con cen trat ion of steam or hot wa ter via enriched)1 LJC-28 (hig h temporary con nec tion .

uranium. enr ich ed) . Operate eva por ato r at lower con cen trat ion .

e. Too lit tle cooling wa ter Vapor to ven t system; to product eva por ato r High water temperature on Reset TIC to lower pos sib le uranium los s to Condenser TRC-5 ( low condensers , ven t system. tempe,r atu re.

enr ich ed) and TIC-9 (hig h enr ich ed) ; high temperature

- in 50-8 ( TI-2-36 ~.

9.

• I High lev el in Uranium Overflow to ven t system; Product Evaporator Con- los s of uranium. LAH-20 on 50-81 LJC-29. Stop evaporator1 sample den sate Taruc 50-8. ana lys is wil l determine

10. I Low lev el in &>-8.

dis pos itio n.

Lack of str ip feed for firstlLAL-211 FAL uranium cyc le. -28 on ICX fee d. Supply sol utio n from col d

~-

--- make-up are a.

I High lev el in Uranium

,1;1..

PrQduct Surge Tanlc 50-9. 6D-3.

I Overflow to ven t system to LAH-24 in 50-9 1 LR-2 on 6D-~.Increase rat e set tin g of I pumps ~-2 and ~-2 A ard/

or sto p inf lue nt flows *

12. 1 Low lev el in ~9 .

I 1

I Taru c run res ult s.

s dry  ; no adv erse LAL-25 in 50- 9. I Ad jus t pump *nt e on ~2 or 5r2 A at lower set tin g or sto p pump.

13. High teq :,er atu re in 50-9. I Improp er feed temperature tofTRC-11 hig h on 50-

.i sil ica gel uni ts. 9. Reset nc- 111 use coo ling wa ter if necessary1 check

14. :'l""High fee d rat e to e"' li~ a IExcess sol coo ling wa ter to 5E-10.

gel beds ~-6 A and ~-6 B. *. to 50-9; noutiadv on flows back IHigh_~ad ing on PR-9 or erse eff ect . PR-10 on Head Pot s 5Y-29 or 1Decrease Feed Pump 5;- 2, s;-2A rat e set tin g.

5Y-30.

i I

i I"

J lliL:: . * -~_!*.' ~-~ -- - ,, _-z* .,* 7 C::* ...-.-~ * **  !" P Fl ORGI. F pp * , ..,~__.,..............._

~ ~ ~ ' '_. __~ ~ ~ ~

A V

0 .

Table 9.105 Continued MALOPl:RAnc. OF tRANilll PROWCT PURIFICAnc.

llalf unct io<< Result Indi catio n Corr ectiv e Action

15. I Line blin ds and valv es se Poss ible dive rsion of -tJ4' ..-,._

wrong on silic a gel unit . product to rework. Valves are inter lock ed to' Adlllinistrative procedure insu re prop er setti ng11 will insu re corr ect

,I' visu al obse rvati on of blin d posi tion ing of blin ds

,I I

before eith er load ing or I

• regenerating silic a gel

~~.,-

beds.

• 16' High leve l in High En- Overflow to Tank ~-13 8 or

' rich ed Evaporator Product LAH-4 on 5D-13A. Tran sfer solu tion to

~-13 :1 poss ible rework of 50-1381 shut down Product SUrge Tanlc 5D-13A. prod uct.

I Evaporator ~-5 .

17., I Off- Spec ifica tion product Product must be reworked. Saq, le anal ysis .

in 5D-13A. Tran sfer to ~-1 3:.

18. I Tra~ sfer of 5D-13A to Poss ible rework of prod uct. I Level inve ntor y on tanks1 50-1:11 or 50-13: by erro r Resu ple and rework if befo re sampling. LAH-5 or 5D*l38 or LA-6 or requ ired .

• I 5>-1 ~.

19. l High leve l in High En- ** 1Qverflow to 5D-13A and 1'iched Uranium Tank 50-138.

Storage 50-1 ~1 poss ible rework.

LAH-4 in 5D-13A1 LAH-5 on

&>-138 or LAH-6 on 50-1 3:.

Inecessary.

Resample1 rework if

20. -I High leve l in &>-13:. Overflow to &>-13A or 1381 I LAH-6.

poss ible rework. Resu ple all thre e tank s (5>-13A, 8, and C) and rework if required.

21. High te~ ratu re in 5>-13A or 138.

No adverse effe ct1 educ tor tran sfer may be diff icul t.

High(TI-2-22 on 5D-13A or I Check cooling wate r to TI-2-23 on 5D-13B)reading11 5E-111 allow tank inop erab le educ tors or ):ADIi)*

• cool by air spar ging s to

22. I High leve ls in Low En- Overflow to 60-3 V9ssel Off-I LAH-7 on &>-l2A1 LAH-8 on rich ed Uranium Product Gas Condensate Catch Tank1 I 50-128. Tran sfer flow to empty Sample Tanks 5>-12A or

• tank1 tran sfer full tank poss ible rework of s*o lutio n.

I 128. to 50-158 afte r sampling1 resample tank s involved in overflow1 rework if nece ssary . 1 l

I

I

~**

,* Tabl e 9 .105 Continued IIAi.OPERAna. OF mAN itll PR<DJCT PlllI FICA na.

23.

• High temp eratu res . in No adve rse resu lts1 poss ible High read ing on TI-2 -25 on

--- -- ----- -- --- **-t1 -**

5D-12 A or. 128. boil ing in tank . Turn on cool ing water.

i 5D-12A1 TI-2 -26 on 50-128.

24. Fail ure to spar ge tank s Poor sample1 inco rrec t 5D-12A or 128 befo re LR-6 on Tank 5D-12A shows Ope rator must follo w pro-anal ysis . tank was or was not spaiged sampling (See note ). per sampling procedure1

'"}

by linet race 1 LR-7 on Tank resample tank1 turn on

' 50-128. sparge air 1/2 hour prio r Note1This malo para tion pl'CI cedure appl ies to all prod uct

~- Solu tion put into w£ong tank (e.g .50-12A inste ad and resam pling .

tank s requ iring sa8') ling.

Poss ible rework of prod uct Level inve ntor y on tank LR-6 on S0-l2 A1 LR-7 on s1 to sa.., ling .

Resample tank s as required *

' of 5>-128.

S0-1 2B;i f too full , LAH-7 or

' 5D-12A or LAH-8 on 50-128.

26. High leve l in Low-Enrichec Overflow to off-s Uranium Stor age Tank .

compartment in 50-1 5".

peci ficat ior. LAH-9

• Resample and tran sfer 5>-15A. solu tion s as required.

'ZT. High temperature in No adve rse resu lts1 poss ible High TI-2 -27 read ing.

Turn on cool ing wate r to 50-l M. boil ing of solu tion .

coil s.

28. High leve l in Low-Enrichec Overflow to 5D-15A off-Uranium Stor age Tank LAH-11. Resa8')le and take inve nto ry1

.' spec ifica tion compartment1 5>-1 ~. resam pling requ ired1 possil>b: rework as required *

. ~r1 " ".l

" rework *

29. Low leve l in 50-1 53. No adve rse resu lts1 auto - When Pump ~-6 stop s, low Wait for more solu tion to mati c shutdown of prod uct leve l is reco rded .

' *~ - . -

J?UDlp ~-6 . accumulate or tran sfer moire

, solu tion from

50-12A or B

30. H\gh leve l in Low-Enriched More solu tion than requ ired uranium Prod uct Weight LI-141 scal e weig ht. Tran sfer to next tank tru ck.

to fill tank trai ler.

Tank 5V-l.

"1c

~. a u -1 Degradation of silic a gel. Fail ure to remove zirconium

, and niobium

• from uranium Sample anal ysis of S0-12A and 50-128.

Rework if necessary1 re-

'l

.' ~

.. 1, *,,

I

. ' prod uct. gene rate or repl ace silica l '"': [\

~

. I 1* *

• r**1,

r gel beds .

I * ),

- ,I

.. ,I j I..'*

~

1'\ -

b d ~i:'!r..~

I

,. . ~* ., ,,;!)' Cl 'lH ,: ".J

• 1}

-s"'.I

,..,.......R ,~; ...

~

...i* QfCl i.iit 1

~

~,,

Table9.106 MAI.OPERATION OF THE PR<>IXCT PACKAGit<<; AND SHIPPIt<<; AREA (PPS) .

.......Vti""'if' ... 8 .....Vla . &lilliJVV... 111fiii'

• • • v*v* 1i1*v1 1 ~ ....... vw**- -~ - * .,...

1. Plutonium prod uct bottl e Plutonium solut ion will

• Visual observation of spil- Close valve s on filli ng r*

over fille d or filr line spil l in bottl e filli ng lage and/o r measuring pot mlsconnected. heads move to drip con-

. stati on sump. to a volume > 10 liter s.

~ 3 . taine ra trans fer spil l to*W-4 with eductors clean . up area with de-u

~

. contamination washes.

2. Enriched uranium product Spill age of enric hed uranium Visual obse rvati on of bott le over fille d or im- in fill area . Close fill valve s and prop er connection of fill spill age. trans .fer spill to En-

- riche d UraniU ID Product head.

Stora ge Tank S>-138.

3. Ll Two fille d prod uct bottl es May approach a criti cal (plut Radi ation alarm. All equipment and opex onium or enric hed array (See secti on on

.,(1 uranium) brought toge ther. Nuclear Safe ty.) ating procedures have been designed to preve ,t.

• "' 1*.

more than one uncaged

~ *t.

I '

prod uct bott le from be ing in the area at one tia *

i~

' If the radia tion alarl!

• ' sounds, area will be

' evacuated at once. *

4. 'c ross- over valve s opened Cross contamination of between plutonium and Radi ation alarms prod uct These valve s will be prod ucts. Pluto nium alpha anal ysis. locked at all times un*

. ' .line uranium spill trans fer contamination of uranium

~ s. product fill area

• le11 a spec ial situa tic,n

- requires thei r use_s

' material retum ed to re*work.

5. Glove ruptu re. -* Personnel hand contaminatial Visu al.

' Negative pressure on g .ove

' box .will preve nt leaka J*

' of contamination from box.

J Hand decontamination a presc ribed by Health a d Safe ty. Replace glove

~-l r

j

Table 9.10 6 Continued MALOPERATION OF THE PROOU::T PACKAGIOO AND SHIPPING AREA (PPS

)

6. Improperly stop pere d Gross co1'ltamination of the product bott le.

• Monitoring prio r to Inmediate evac uatio n of bird cage . shipment. area1 decontamination of bird cage under Heal th and Safe ty supervision1 de-contamination procedures as pres crib ed by Heal th and Safe ty.

1 I

, *1

procedures and administrative controls, which are discussed in the chapter

) on Nuclear S~fety. The rework system receives solutions into the Rework Evaporation Feed Tank (7D-8) from seven other collection tanks (40-2, 40-8, 40-10, 40-13, 60-3, 70-10., and 130-8). The solutions in these seven tanks have been sampled; hence, they are of known composition. These analyses determine which solutions shall be routed to Tank 70-8. On the basis of these known compositions and extraction feed requirements, a procedure is followed for reworking each batch. If soluble neutron poison is required, as determined by ana*lysis, it is added from Tank 14D-32 in the cold solu-tion area. Acid, or other reagents, could be added from the same tank, if required. Solution in Tank 7D-8 is air-sparged and transferred by

-steam-jet eductors to the R~work Evaporator 7D-4. Becaus~ of criticality considerations, Evaporator 70-4 is operated on a batch basis only. A low-level alarm and control prevent overconcentration in the evaporator.

Condensate from the rework evaporator flows to the Low-Level Waste Evaporator Feed T3nk. This material will be very dilute acid with some activity in it. The bottoms from the rework evaporator are transferred by steam transfer eductor to the Partition Cycle Feed Tank (30-1).

Solutions may also be transferred to the Low-Level Waste Accountability and Neutralizer Tank. Various possible maloperations of the Rework Evaporator System, together with possible consequences, alarms, indica-tions, and corrective measures,are listed in table 9.107.

High-Level Waste Evaporator System 9.108 A schematic representation of the High-Level Waste Evaporator System is shown in figure 4.81. The system consists of Tank 70-1 (the High-Level Waste Evaporator Feed Tanij, 7C-l (the Low-Level Waste Evaporate~, 7E-5 (the High-Level Waste Evaporator Con-dense~, and 7D-4 (the High-Level Waste Accountability and Neutralizer Tank). The system is fabricated of stainless steel except for the heat transfer tube bundle, which is made of titanium. Waste from the parti-tion cycl e or from the rework evaporator can be transferred to the High-Level Waste Evaporator Feed Tank. Solution may be transferred to the evaporator by air lift or by jet. It is intended that the evaporator bottoms be operated at an acid concentration no greater than BM HN03

• M~loperations in this system are detailed in table 9.108. The evaporator bottoms, after analysis, are either neutralized with caustic and pumped to the tank farm for storage or are recycled, if l 1*

necessary.

Low-Level Waste Evaporator System 9.!09 A schematic representation of the Low-Level Waste Evaporat or System is shown in figure 4.83. The system consists of Tank 70-2 (th~ Low-Level Waste Evaporator Feed Tanij, 1:-2 (the Low-Level Waste Evaporate~, ,~-7 (the Low-Level Waste Evaporator Condense~, and 7D-10 (the Low-Level Waste* Accountability and Neutralizer Tank. The system is fabricated of stainless steel except for the heat transfer tube bundle which is made of titanium. The Low-Level Evaporator System evaporates the overheads fr.am the High-Level. Evaporator System, the aqueous waste streams from all of the solvent extraction steps except

v>

Table 9.107 MALOPERATION

SUMMARY

OF REWCRK EVAPORATOR SYSTB~

Maloperation Result Indication Corrective Action 1.1 Transfer of too much Overflow of 70-8 to Tank I LAH-7 on 70-8; PAH-3. Turn off steam to trans-solution from any one of 40-10 and 40-13, one of the fer eductor, causing excess seven feeds to 70-8. seven feeds to 70-8. transfer.

2. Transfer of insufficient 70-8 will run dry when LAL-8 on 70-8. Shut down* of Evaporator solution to 70-8. evaporator is running. 7C-4 is automatic; supply more solution to 70-8 if available.

3.1 Transfer of organic to Organic will flow to 7C-4; . I DI; low densities in seven Jet out organic to waste 70-8 (see note). some solvent degradation ma~ feeds (70-8 and 7C-4). tank after using special occur. wash solution to strip out any product from the organic.

Hydraulics of equipJnent and piping is designed tp prevent organic reaching anv one of the seven feed to

-7Note:

0-8. Concentration of aclid used in 7C-4 will not ~ausb serious solvent nitration.

4.

70-8.

I Transfer of wrong tank to Boil down of wrong solution; Sample analysis; tank level Revise boil-down and rework incorrect rework product inventory will show wrong procedure to compensate 5.

composition. tank has been transferred.

Insufficient air sparge tc Poor mixing in 70-8; this isl HC-5 off; LR on 70-8 will 70-8. only s3rious when widely djf.f draw thin, even line.

fering compositions from two for different solution.

Turn on HC-5. I or more tanks are mixed or neutron poison is required.

6. Failure to add neutron LRC-4 and LAL-9 on 7C-4 will Level inventory on 70-8 and Administrative procedure poison to 70-8 when provide control and alarm tQ 140-32; also administrative designed to provide two required. prevent possible critical check and data sheet. or more independent checks condition. in such cases to insure poison has been added. See 1section on Nuclear Safety.

( ) ( ~

( '

Table 9.107 Continued MALOPERATION

SUMMARY

OF REWORK EVAPORATOR SYSTEM' Maloperation Result Indication Corrective Action

7. I High level in 7C-4. Solution overflows to 30-1 LAH in 30-1. Level control in 7C-4 before it is properly set too high or steam adjusted. supply too low -- reset.

8. I Level too low in 7C-4. Concentration too high or LAL-9. Dilute as necessary.

steam coil not covered, resulting in low capacity.

9.

off.

I Air sparger on 7C-4 turned No adverse results; bo1ling None other than position ofl None necessary.

will supply ample mixing. air valve.

I

10. Cooling water to Condenser Water and nitric acid vapor High temperature on 7E-8 too low or turned off in Vessel Vent System. high temperature in TR-1-8; Increase water flow to Vessel 7E-8.

entirely. Vent System; excess conden-sate in Vessel Vent System.

Table 9.108 MALOPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED TANK (7D-l)

Malooeration RP~tJli: Tndi t'!;::ii:inn r.n~~ot'!tiuP -A_ction

1. Feed lift to 7C-l working 7C-l level rises due to in- I LRC-6 in 7C-l. Automatic cutback of too fast. creased flow. air flow.

2. Feed lift to 7C-l working 7C-l level drops due to I LRC-6 in 7C-l. Automatic increase of too slowly. decreased flow. air flow.

3. Liquid level too low in Liquid level will drop in LAL-5. Shut off air lift. Shut 7D-l. evaporator 7C-l. down steam to evaporator 7C-l to avoid overconcen tration.

4. Liquid level too high in If alarm is lgnoTed and no I LAH-4. *Shut off steam jet from 70-1. action taken, will overflow 4D-2; increase steam and back to 40-2, the Partition air jets in 7D-l, re-Cycle Waste Hold Tank. moving liquid as much as necessary (both eventu-ally feed 7C-l).

5. Rate jet fails or is 7C-l level drops. I LRC-6. Use air lift as alter-plugged. na*te transfer mechanism.

6. Transfer of organic when Organic will decompose in I Sample of tank 7D-4. No explosion will occur using rate jet 7H-4. 7C-l with subsequent trans- because steam is limited fer to underground tank. to 25 psig; the temper-ature is then below fl*ash point organic; when using 7H-~tank 7D-l will not be complet-J ely emptied.

I I *

• J t

.* I

' f t j

J I

~ ~~~~.......-c.;..-~--

l --  ! I

c, (', 0 J

f Table 9.108 Continued MALOPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE EVAPORATOR (7C-1}

Malooeration Result Indication Corrective Action

1. Not enough st ~am in heat- Insufficient amount of TR,;,1-6 in 7C-1; LRC-6 in 7D-) Increase steam flow ing coils. liquid boiled off; liquid LR-9 in 70-4; OR-5 decrease. through coils with level rises, which auto- FIC-3. Stop steam jet matically shuts off air lift from 70-1.

from high-level waste evap-orator feed tank (70-1};

level in high-level waste accountability and neutral-izer tank (70-4} rises by solution traveling through overflow pipeline from 7C-1 to 70-4 if on continuous processing.

2. Too much steam in heating Too much liquid boiled off; LRC..6, ~1-6 in 7C-l; DR-5. .Turn down steam to coils coils. liquid level drops; liquid

• with FIC-3; use batch temperature *rises; density transfer jet 7H-4 if rises; level recorder con- necessary.

trol will automatically draw more feed from ttigh-Level

, Waste Evaporator Feed Tank (7D-1}.

3. Liquid level too high in Level recorder control will LRC-6; check flow from 70-6. If automatic control not 7C-l. automatically reduce flow enough, shut off steam from High-Level Waste Evap- jet from high-lev~l waste orator Feed Tank (70-1}. evaporator feed tank (70-6}; increase heating steam flow to 7C-l with FIC-3.

I f

r

....! I I I I

I I

.,...,. *~

Table 9.108 Continued MALOPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE EVAPORATOR (7C- l)

---,~----M_a_l_o.,_e_r_a_t_i_o_n___ ___,___ __.~R.e-s-u_l;.;;t;.....__

__ __ __. . .;;I;;.;.;n;.;d.i.;.c,;;,at_1;;;.;o;.;n..,..

• __ __ _...;:;C;.;o.;;.r,;;.r.;.e.;.ct~i;;;.;v;.;;e;,,..,;.;A;.;c;.;t_i_o;.;;.n_..r

4. Liqu id leve l too low in Level reco rder cont rol wil LRC-6.

7C-l . auto mati cally incr ease flo If auto mati c cont rol from High-Level W*aste not enough, use batc h Evap orato r Feed Tank (7D- l) jet 7H-4 i ncre ase flow 1

from 7D-6; redu ce heat ing steam flow to 7C-l with FIC-3.

1

~s:

e::rn---

w  : ,. x7i "' IF

-- u . ao - <<CA";w:" .......

,*, <<* s:41=4tt::;r,z~a ...~i-~ !3:Q1 Y:wzt ;r- zem=:

~-.u-..  ; to .......!=

0 ( , 0 Table 9.108 Continued MALOPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE EVAPOOATOR CONDENSER (7E-5)

1. Not enough cooling water Insufficient condensation; TR-1-9 on bottoms stream. Increase water

. flow.

to 7E-5. will send additional vapor to low-level waste feed tan (7D-2) and then to vent header in liquid waste cell increase in temperature of condensate stream; outlet water temperature will rise abnormally.

2. Condenser fouled. Insufficient cooling ondensate temperature Reverse flush with dilute capacity. (TR-1-9) high. HN03

• J I

I______ I I Ii.--. .-.,,...

f.

Table 9.102 Continued .

MALOPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE ACCOUNTABILI1Y AND NEtITRALIZER °TANK (70-4)

Malooeration R~~ult. Tndication Corrective Action

1. Too much water in cooling Solution too cold; may caust TIC-8. Autom~tic temperature coils of 70-4. settling of particles to control of water; bottom of tank; will give administrative check prier inaccurate sample. to sampling; TIC-8 set too low - reset.

2. Too little water in cool- Solution too hot if adding TIC-8. Automatic temperature ing coils of 70-4. caustic; may cause some control of water; TIC-8 vapor to enter off-gas and set too high - reset.

vent system (see off-gas and vent *system).

3. IAir sparger not on 70-4. Will not provide adequate IC-15 in off position; LR-91Turn on air sparger with cooling while adding will draw a thinner line IC-15.

caustic. than if sparger were on.

4. Liquid level too high in If high-level alarm ignoredJ LAH-14 on 70-4. Turn off steam jet from 70-4. will overflow into Low- high-level waste evapo-Level Waste Accountability rator 7C-1; jet* solution and Neutraliz~r Tank (70-10~ into Low-Level Waste not enough room to complete Accountabili~y Neutralizer neutralization if unneutra- Tank (70-10) and complete lized. neutralization in 70-10.

5. Not enough caustic added to 70-4.

Solution sent to 70-10; more acidic than desired.

ISample 70-10.

taken in 70-4 and Add more caustic in 70-4 or 70-10.

6. Teo much caustic added to Increase waste volume. I Samples taken in 70-4 and Add additional acidic 70-4. 70-10. !waste.

~  ::tc :MT* Na ~

j n 0 0 i.

• I I

Table 9.109 MALOPERATION OF LOR-LEVEL WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED TANK (7D-2)

,_. ~ ~11u.1,.l"".:..IT...1,.Ufl Corr~ .. *~ .. , *,11

1. Organic solution in 70-2. Organic fed into Low-Level DAL-3 on 70-2. Shut off steam jets to Waste Evaporator if not 7H-l and 7H-2 to Low-detected by operator. Level Waste Evaporator 7C-2; open steam jet to Solvent Waste Hold Taruc 130-8. ..

2. Liquid level too high in If LAH *ignoreds will over- LAH-2 on 70-2. Pump as much as possible 70-2. flow into 40-10 or 40-13. to Low-Level Waste Evaporator 7C-2; stop influent flows.

3. Liquid level too. low in Low-Level Waste Evaporator DAL-2; LR-1. Increase feed to tank 70-2. 7C-2 will drop in level. where possible; shut doiwn steam in Evaporator 7C-to avoid damage there.

4. Steam jets not on. Evaporator 7C-2 liquid LRC-7 in 7C-2. Start steam jets.

level will fall due to decreased flow.

Table 9.109 Continued MALOPERATION OF LON-LEVEL WASTE EVAPORATOR (7C-2)

MalopeTation Result Indica tion Corre ctive Action

1. Not enough steam in heatin ~ Liquid level will rise; LRC-7 in 7C-2; TR-1-7 in coils. Increa se steam flow to level record er contro l will 7C-2; DR-6. coils with FIC-4.

autom aticall y reduce flow from Low-Level Waste Evapor-ator Feed Tank (70-2) ;

temperat ure will drop; den-sity will drop.

2. Too much steam in heatin g Liquid level will drop; TR-1-7; LRC-7; DR-6 in 7C-2.

coils. Decrease steam flow to level record er contro l will coils with FIC-4.

autom aticall y increa se .flow from Low-Level Waste Evap-orator Feed Tank (70-2) to limit of jet in operat ion; tempe rature will rise; den-sity will rise.

---+Liquid

---

----- --= ----- ----+ ----- ----- ----- ----- +--- ----- ----- ----- ---., ----- ----- -----

3. level too high in Level record er contro l will LRC-7 in 7C-2; check flow --

Increa se heatin g steam 7C-2. autom aticall y reduce flow from 70-3. flow with FIC-4 until from Low-Level Waste Evap- desire d height obtain ed; orator Feed Tank (70-2) . stop 70-3 flow if necess ary.

4. IOverc oncen tration . Densi ty will rise; liquid DR-6; LRC-7. LRC-7 will autom aticall y level will drop. increa se flow from 70-2; if no soluti on availa ble, 7C-2 conten ts must be dilute d.

(- ( ~

Table 9.1or Continued MALOPERATION OF LCNI-LEVEL WASTE EVAPORATOR CONDENSER (7E-7)

... _,.. ___ ---** n.c.:,u.i. t.. i.na1.cai:;1.on corrPr.tivP Ar.t,nn

1. Not enough cooling water Insufficient condensation TR-1-10 on condensate stream Increase water flow.

to 7E-7.

l with excess vapor entering vessel .vent system (see

. vessel vent system); con-densate will have higher I than normal temp~ratur~.

~

2. Condenser fouled. Insufficient cooling Condensate temperature Reverse flush with capacity. (TR-1-10) high. dilute HN03*

I I f

I I I I I

Tab le 9.109 Continue MALOPERATION OF LON-LEVEL WASTE ACCOUNTABILITY dAND NEUTRALIZER TANK (7D-10)

Mal ooer atio n Res ult Tnrli r.::a+i nn r-- --~1 ...... 6-'*1 1--

1. Too much wate r in cool ing Solu tion will be too cold coil s in 70-1 0.  ; U.C-7 Automatic tem pera ture may cause sett ling of par-ticl es out of solu tion and con trol of wate r; poor sample. adju st nc- 7.

2. Too litt le wate r in cool irg Solu tion will get to~

coil s in 70-1 0. hot ii TIC-7. Automatic temp erat ure addi ng cau stic ; may cause some vapo r to ente r ven t con trol of water; adju st system (see off- gas and ven1 TIC-7.

syst em) .

3. Air spar ger not on in 7D-10. Wil l not prov ide adequate HC-12 off; leve l reco rder Turn on air spar ger wit h mixing for cool ing duri ng will draw a thin ner line

• cau stic add ition . HC-12.

than if spar ger were on.

4. Liqu id leve l too high in If alar m is igno red, solu tia LAH-11.

7D-10. will over flow into High-Lerel Inst all temporary jet waste Acc oun tabi lity and (if not neu trali zed) and Neu trali zer tank (70- 4); not tran sfer some of the enough room to neu tral ize. solu tion to 70-4 ; shu t off steam jet from low-

. leve l waste evaporator (7C- 2); shu t off steam jet from Hl.gh-Ievel was te Acc oun tabi lity and N:!u-

.. . tral izer Tclnk (70- 4); 1f read y, send to radi oact v~

waste stor age tank (80- ) .

~,

I .

---

..:.------------------------------~~~--,~ --* - -- -  :..:...~ :....... - ~

J l, Ci 0 0 I.

~

i Table 9.109 Continued MALOPERATION OF LCM-LEVEL WASTE ACX:OUNTABILI1Y AND NEUlRALIZER TANK (70-10)

-- .... _ - -*- ------ - -**--~"Ila..,_....,... ~~rrA~f:1 V~ - * , L_.l._**~I

5. Wrong steam jet turned on If ne**tralized waste storage HC-13 on instead of HC-141 Shut off incorrect. jet to 70-10. solution goes to Rework LR-3 in 7D-81 will increase ~ and turn on correct jet Evaporator Feed Tank (7D-8), on 7D-10J jets are kept it may have to be reworked. locked1 unlocked tr/

Shift Supervisor only.

6. Not enough caustic added Solution going to waste Sample taken from 7D-10. Add more caustic to to 70-10. storage ( SD-1) will be more 7D-10.

acidic than desired.

7. Too much caustic added to Soluti on going to waste Sample taken from 7D-10. Let more acid enter 7D-10. storage (SD-1) will be more 70-10.

basic than desired.

~

I l l

I J

~

I i

the partition cycle, and the aqueous solvent washes. The solution is either jet or air lifted from the feed tank to the evaporator~. It is intended that the evaporator bottoms operate at an acid concentration no greater than 8 ~ HN03

• The ~ottoms from the evaporator are collected in the Low-Level Waste Accountability and Neutralizer Tank (70-10) and are sampled.

After sampling, the waste is either n~utralized with caustic and pumped to the tank farm or is recycled for further processing. Various possible maloperations of the Rework Evaporator System are found in table 9.109~

General Purpose Evaporator System 9.110 The General Purpose Evaporator System concentrates wastes from a number of sources, as shown in figure 4.89. The condensable overhead is directed to the interceptor and the evaporator bottoms, after neutralization, to the Waste Storage Tank. Maloperations include incorrect steam. loading, undesirable iiquid levels, incorrect caustic addition, failure to air sparge and improper use of transfer jets. Tabulation of maloperations may be found in table 9.110.

Acid Re~overv System 9.111 The Acid Recovery System is described in par~graph 4.85 and is shown schematically in figure 4.85. It consists of an Acid Fractionator Feecl Tank (70-3), a Feed Vaporizer (7E-1), a Hot Acid Storag~ Tank (70-11),, a Hot Acid Batch Tank (70-12), the Acid Fractiona-tor (,'C-3), the Weak Acid Catch Tank (70-6), the Recovered Acid* Storage (

Tank (70-5), and appurtanant equipment. The tabulation of maloperations that may be encountered in the operation of this system may be found in table 9.111.

Dissolver Off-Gas System 9.112 The Dissolver Off-Gas System is shown in figure 4.26 and is discussed in paragraph 4.26. It consists of a Scrubber (6C-6),

Silver Reactors (6C-l ' and 6C-la), a Heater (6E-1), a Rocirculation Pump (6G-3), a Cooler (6E-2), Filters (6T-l or 6T-1A), Blowers (6K-l or 6K-1A),

and appurtanant equipment. The Dissolver Off-Gas System has been in-stalled in order to insure against the release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. A listing of ma~operations may be found in table 9.112.

Vessel Off-Gas System 9.113 A number of process vessels are vented through the

• Vessel Off-Gas System. The Vessel Off-Gas System serves also, in the case of some tanks, as the solution overflow line. The system is shown schematica!lly in figure 6.3c. In general, the maloperations considered in the discussion of the Vessel Off-Gas System concern the overflow of process vessels to Catch Tank 60-3 and the treatment of the nonconden-sables leaving Tank 60-3. A discussion of maloperations in the Vessel Off-Gas System may be found in table 9.113.

( } C) *o Table 9.110 MALOPERATION OF GENERAL PURPOSE EVAPORATCR (7C-5)

Maloperation Result Tndir.ation r.n~r.+ivo &r.+ion

1. INot enough steam in heating Low evaporation rate or LAH-19 if solution is being,Correct setting on coils. l rate will stop. added; possibly TR~l ~ll. automatic Pie of steam flow.

l I

2. I Too much steam in heating coils.

I Liquid level will drop; temperature may rise if overconcentration occurs.

LR-13; TR~l-11.

..~ '

Correct setting on automatic PIC of steam flow or shut-off evaporator

• i

3. Liquid level too high. If alarm ignored, will over~ LAH-19. Increase steam heating flow into laundry and or shut off inputs.

analytical drain catch tank1

{70-13) or interceptor.

4. ILiquid level too low. Possible exposure of heatirgl LR-13; TR~l-11. Shut down steam in coils; temperature will heating coils.

rise. *

5. Air sparger not on. While tank is cold, contents LR-13 will draw thinner Tum on sparger for set may tend to form non- line than if sparge~ were ti* (1/2 hour) before homogeneous solution and on. ta~ing sample.

give inaccurate sample.

s. Too much caustic added * . Solution more basic than S,.mple of tank contents. !Pennit addition of more desired. acid.

---,t------------t-------------.....;*-------------1-----------

7. INot enough caustic added. I Solution more acidic than Sample of tank ccntents. ~dd more caustic.

desired'.

l

I i

I Table 9.110 Continued I

i MALOPERATION OF THE GENERAL PlJRI><& EVAP<RATOR CCIIDENSER (7E-13) i t

f

1. Too little water in Temperature of condensate ITR-1-12. I Increase water flow.

t f

cooling coils. will be higher than desired1 l additional steam may enter vessel off-gas header.

1 i

l

n 0 ~

\-~I Table 9.111 MALOPERATION OF ACID FRACTIONATal FEED TAtlC (70-3)

Malor:,eration Result Indication Corrective Action *

1. Air sparger not on i n Tank contents may layer and IC-27 off1 LR-15 will draw Turn on Air Sparger 70-3. give inaccurate sample. a thinner line than if IC-27 and leave on 1/2 sparger were on1 operator hour before taking l will initial LR-15 chart each time sample is taken to insure thick line has appeared for prior 1/2 hour.

sample to permit solution to mix.

2. Hot vapor entering inste1 Level will not increase LR-151 TR-1-10 on 7E-7. Increase cooling water of liquid.

• properly in 70-3. flow to condenser 7E-7 (Low-Level Waste Evapo-rator Condenser).

3. Liquid level too high infI If high-level alarm ignored~ LAH-221 LR-15. Pump as much as possible 70-3. will back up to 7E-7. into 7E-11 if necessary, stop the Low-Level Waste Evaporator (7C-2).

4. Liquid l evel too low in 70-3.

Feed to acid fractionator i FAL-24; FR::-51 LAL-23. Decrease flow to 7E-l if l will be reduced. possibleJ increase flow from 7C-2 if possible.

• l I

i

~

Table 9.111 Continued MALOPERAnON OF ACID FRACTIONATIJl FEED VAPORIZER (7E-l)

• -----~l~e!r~tion Result Indication Corrective Action

1. I Too much steam in heating Liquid level in fractionato1 LIC-18; TR-1-13. Automa~ic control of coils in 7E-l. will rise. ' steam by LIC-18.

2. I Too little steam in Liquid level in fractionatoJ LIC-18; TR-1-13. Automatic control of heating coils in 7E-l. will drop. steam by ur::-1a

3. I Liquid level too high in Possible flooding of Acid ur::-1s ur::-1a will increase 7E-l. Fractionator ~1th liquid. steam flow to vaporize exces*s liquid.

4. I Liquid level too low in Possibility of vapor enter- I.R;-18. L1C-1a :will *decrease 7E-l. ing Vaporizer Bottoms steam flow to enable Cooler *(7E-11). liquid to build up.

-~ ff * .,.. .*..,,. "-' .* ,~.,* . ~ P I I~ JIA~i'll'Q9:laSla

'DD-..-.**--- - -- - -

0 0 Table 9.~111 Continued MAI.OPERATION OF VAP<RIZER BOn<<.S COOLER (7E-11)

Maloperation Result Indication Corrective Action

1. Too much cooling water No adverse effect. TG-2 will *show below-normal I Decrease water flow rate.

to 7E-ll.

• rise in temperature . of cooling _water.

2. Too 11ttle cooling* water I Output too hot. Temperature gauge will showl I~crease water flow rate.

to 7E-ll. above-normal rise in tempe ature of cooling water; TI-2-48 in 70-11

• I

,I

Table 9~111 Continued MALOPERATION OF Har ACID ST~AGE TANK (70-11)

-1. --- - Maloperation Air sparge r not on 70-11.f Result Indicat ion Solutio n may layer and givel IC-28 off1 LR-16 will draw Correc tive Action Turn on Air Sparge r IC-28 inaccu~ ate sample. . a thinne r line than if and leave on 1/2 hour be-sparge r were on. fore taking sample to per-mix solutio n to mix. It is best to have sparge r on at all times.

2. Liquid level too high in 70-11.

I If alarm is ignored , solu~: LAH-251 LR-16.

tion *will overflow to R6~

Pump as much as possibl e into Hot Acid Batch Tanlc covered Acid Storage Tank 70-121 shut off valve from 70-5. . 70-5.

3. Liquid level too low in I Possibl e shortag e of acid I LR-16. Switch acid source to 70-11. -t to dissolv ers. Concen trated ffN0:3 Day Tanlc 140-3, having. acid enter through 1:40-22.

0 n..._,.. ~ *

~ J I

i Table 9~111 Continued .

MALOPERATION OF HOT ACID B~TCH TANK (7D-12)*

Malooeration Result

1. Air sparger not. on .10~12. Tank contents may layer }l;-29 off; LR-17 will draw Turn on Air Sparger .

and give inaccurate sample a thinner line than if . lC-29* and leave on 1/2 sparger were on. hour before taki ng sample to permit solu-

• tion to mix.

2. Liquid level too high in Wi ll overflow into Recover LR-17. I If Dissolvers (3C-l, 10-12. . ed Acid Storage *Tank 70-5. 3C-2) cannot accept a flow, send excess t o Low-Level Waste Tank (7D-2).

3. Liquid level too low in Shortage of acid for LR-17. I Use solution from iie-70-12. Dissolvers 3C-l and 3C-2. cover&d Acid Storage Tank 70-5, Hot Acid Storage Tank 70-11, and/

or Dissolver Solids Mix Tank 140-22*

Table 9.111 Continued MALOPERATION OF ACID FRACTIONATCR (7C-3)

Malope ration Result Indicat ion Correc tive Actio.lL.__

- ~no ugh

i:m in hea;-1 Tempe:.alu:r,: will drop in TRC-13; TR-1-14. Automatic temper ature

.I ing tubes. Fractio nator Reboile r contro l of steam input (7E-2). to reboile r. (THC-13)

2. Too much steam in heating Temperature will increas e THC-13; TR-1-14. Automatic temperAture tubes. in Fractio nator Reboile r *contro l of steam input (7E-2). to reboile r TRC-i3.

3. Liquid enterin g fractio n- Temperature will drop in TRC-13; TR-1-14. -Automatic temper ature con ator instead of vapor. Fractio nator. trol of steam input THC-13; Correc t flow or steam to 7E-l.

4. Liquid level too high in Level recorde r control will LRC-19. Check flow rate control 7C-3. start pump to evacua te from Acid Fractio nator bottoms to Recovered Acid Fee1 Tank 70-3; check

~torage Tank 10-5. temper ature and level recorde r contro ls on 7C-3 to make sure all three are set correc tly.

5. Liquid level too low in Temperature will rise in I TRC-13;LRC-19. Check flow rate contro l 7C-3. Fractio nator; temper ature irom Acid Fractio nator recorde r control will Feed Tank 70-3; check decreas e steam flow to temper ature and level heating coils; output pump will be automa tically closed 6y level recorde r recorde r contr~ ls on 7C-3" to make sure all three .I are set co~rec tly. f contro l.

6. Too much weak acid Increas ed h~~t require ment! TRC-13; DR-15.

enterfn g. Automatic tempera ture on Fractio nator (7E-1) . control of steam input will lower temper ature and with TRC-13.

density .

7. Too little weak acid Decreased heat require ment I TRC-13; DR-15. Automatic temper ature con enterin g. on fractio nator will raise trol of steam input with temper ature. TRC-13.

' 1 Table 9.111 Continued MALOPERATION OF ACID FRACTIONATOR CONDENSER (7E-3)

Maloperation Result Ind

1. Too little cooling water Output stream will have TRC-14 on cooling water TRC-14 on water flow.

in 7E-3. higher than normal temper- output.

ature; insufficient con-densation, which will over load 7E-9 an~ 7E-10.

I f

Table 9.111 Continued MALOPERATION OF WEAK ACID CATCH TANK (70-6)

Maloi:>eration Result Indication Corrective Action

1. Liquid level too high in If LAH ignored, will over- LAH-26; LR::-20. Increase flow with 7D-6 *. flow into Vessel. Off-Gas LR::-20.

Header.

2. Vapor,instead of liquid, Vapor may enter. Vessel Off-I TI-2-22. Increase cooling water entering tank 70-6. Gas Header ( see Vent Sys1Eoi to 7E-3 (overhead con-denser for acid fraction- .f ator). I

3. Too much caustic added tof Solution going to intercepti Sample taken. Permit more acid to enter 70-6. or more basic than desired. 70-6.

4. Not enough caustic ad~ed Solution going to intercept-I Sample taken. Add more caustic to 70-6 io 70-6. or more acidic than desired. or to interceptor.

5. Air sparger not on 70-6. I Tank contents may layer and IC-35 off; LR-20 will draw Turn on Air Sparger IC-35 give inaccurate sample. a thinner line than if and leave on 1/2 hour sparger were on. before- taking sample to

• permit solution to mix.

6. Liquid sent to wrong area If interceptor flow is sent. j LI in tanks; RAH-28. Shut off open valve and from* 7D-6. ta any of the other tanks, open the correct one.

it will increase heat dutiet

• due to nonproductive fluid being present. If flow for another tank is sent to the interceptor and radioactiv-i~y is in solution, RAH in interceptor flow ,will sound.

- ** * ,,...,--~-:: ..._...auCif_

'f~swn 1 1 ttz,IJJ; .-..,~"

.r, r,

Table 9:111 Continued MAI.OPERATION OF RECOVERED ACID STORAGE TAtlC (7D-5)

Maloar1 t1on

1. I Liquid level too high in If alarm is ignored, it LAH-201 LR-14. Pump as auch as possible 7D-5. *w111 overflow into Hot Acid into Hot Acid Storage Storage Tanlc. Tanlc 70-11.

2. I Liquid level too low in 7D-5.

I Not enough to supply tanks that draw on it (Dissolv er LAL-211 LR-14. Shut off Removal Pump 7G-2 to penlit backup of acidJ Solids Mix Tanlc 140-221

• use alternat e supply from 140-3 Concen trated~ Day :t Partitio n *Cycle Feed Add Tanlc 140-20; Partitio n Tanlc. i Scrub Mix Tanlc 140-161 Hot Acid Storage Tank 7D-111 Hot Acid Batch Tanlc 7D-12). I

3. I Liquid sent to wrong tank May overflow 140-16, l J LAH-25 70-11. Level indi- Shut off\val ve to incorrect from 7D-S. 14D-22, 7D-12. or 7D-3 will cators or recorder s on all tank and open correct valve1 all overflow back into 7D- tanks should be watched Solution that went into while tank is filling to wrong tank should not harm make sure correct tank is tank.

being fed.

i*

Table 9.112 MALOPERATION OF DISSOLVER OFF-GAS SYSTEM Maloperation Result Indication Corrective Action

1. Recirculation Pump 6G-3 Loss of scrubbing action FAL-7; FI-1; PdAL-6; Restart motor 6G-3 or not operating or no will increase the carryover increased radioactivity in put in caustic.

caustic in scrubber 6C-6. of fission products to the stack monitors.

Silver Reactor (6C-l or 6C-la) and possibly out of the stack. The Silver Reactor will normally still remove 99.5% .of the iodine.

There would be less 12 than a complete off-gas system failure postulated in 7~44 j and 8.32.-

2. High liquid level in Liquid carries over to PdAH-5; PdR-3; increased Reduce liquid level by scrubber 6C-6. heater (6E-1) and possibly radioactivity in stack using pump 6G-3 and some moisture to Silver monitors. pumping to Low-Level Reactor ~6C-l or 6C-la). Feed Evaporator 70-2.

• 1

3. No water spray in Possibly plugged scrubber PdAH-5; PdR-3; TI-2-39 low; Increase scrubber scrubber 6C-6. off-gas flow or loss of

• increased radioactivity in temperature; add caustic; pump;' increased scrubber stack monitors. flush out scrubber 6C-6; pressure1 condenser presS\119 increase water spray.

may damage equipment and cause leaks.

4. Low heater 6E-l tempera- Below 11cc no 12 is n-2-40 lows TAL-9 on 6C-l Increase superheater ture. removed in Silver Reactor and TAL-12 on 6C-la (Silver 6E-6 steam temperature (6C-l or 6C-la)1 release of Reactor); increased radio- and/or flow, using 111:-1 12 would bt less *than in activity in stack monitors. or TIE-2.

7.44 and 8.32.

Table9.112 Continued MALOPERATIOO OF DISSOLVER OFF-GAS SYSTEM Malooeration Result Tndir.saHnn r. - - +iv* &~inn

5. High heater temperature Above 212: AgN03 will_melt, TI-2-40 high and/or high Reduce flow and/or 6E-l. allowing I 2 to pass through FR:-21 TAH-8 on Silver superheater 6E-6 top-

• Silver Reactor (6C-l or Rea~tor 6C-l or TAH-ll on erat~ before reaching 6C-la) This case would be 6C-1a; increased radio- 212 C if possible& if less than in paragraphs activ*tty in stack monitors. AgN03 has melted switch 7.44 and 8.32. to aitemate Silver Reactor (6C-l or 6C-la)J regenerate initial Silver Reactor.

6. Silver Reactor (6C-l or f I 2 released to atmosphere Radioactivity gradually . Switch to alternate 6C-la) becomes saturated. but would be less than that increasing in stack reactor (6C-l or 6C-la) postulated in 7.44 and 8.32, monitors over a period of and recharge initial I 1. No cooling flow through I Reactor 400 F gas from Silver time.

TR:-3-will indicate high reactor.

Open coolant valves.

cooler 6E-2. (6C-l or 6C-la) wilJ gas outlet temperature damage glass filters. from cooler. PR-6 will indicate no coolant flow.

i a. Low cooling flow (6E-2). I Operating at a temperature TJr;-3 and PR-6. Incr~ase cooling flow to higher than 150 F will cooler 6E-2.

damage filters over an ex-tended period of time.

\

9. Fouled cooler; valves closed (6E-2).

Increased cooler, Sil~.c Reactor (6C-l or 6C-la) and I PdAH-10 cooler.

at outlet of Clean cooler or open proper valves.

I scrubber fc-d pressures causing *p ossible damage as discussed in the previous malfunction discussion,

, number 3.

f

I Table 9.112 Continued IIALOPERATION OF DISSOLVER OFF-GAS SYSTEM Malfunction Result Indication Corrective Action

10. Plugged filter or the Decrease flow through PR-6 and PAH-14 at the Switch to alternate fi valves are closed (6T-l system. inlet to filter1 also shows t :..' r or open proper val.ves1 or 6T-1A). on differential pressure valves are locked open (FdR-7 on 6T-l and PdR-9 at all timesJ as dif-l on 6T-1A) and on dissolver pressure.

ferential pressure in-creases, filters will no1'111ally be switched and changed~

11. Blower not operating Altemate system blower will PdR-9, Pc:EL-10, PdAL-16 on Start blower 6K-l or (6K-l or 6K-1A). automatically switch on. I 6K-l; PdR~7, Pcl:L-8, 6K-1A.

If it does not, then, if PdAL-15 on 6K-lA1 increase the stack system pressure in radioactivity shown by is greater than the dis- stack gas monitors.

solver off-gas system pnssure, the dissolver check valve .will close until dissolver system pressure builds up and then

. the check valve would open

• Not having a* negative pressure in system would allow soae off-gas leakage into theprocass cells.

This gas would I>> carried out the stack through

- vessel off-gas system.

.I

12. Filter fails .(blown). Activity to stack. \ PdAL-1~1 PdAL-161 atack Filters will switch monitors will show in- automatically through

' creased radioactivity. Pcl::L-8 and Pcl::L-10.

,; ?

.. t-*, '

Tabl~ 9.113 IIALOPERAnON OF VESSEL OFF-GAS SYSTEM I 1.

Malooeration Overflow of process vessels to 6D-3.

Result This tank is protected by boron-glass Raschig rings1 Indication OAL-221 DR-31 saq,le analysis1 LR-2 increase.

r*-. ~ - :.iv. *~+*""

Send to Rework Evapora-tor Feed Tanlc 7D-8 or t

• ~ a determination must be Low-Level Evaporator Fe,ed Tanlc 7D-2 as necessary.

made as to when the catch-tank material must be reworked.

2. Liquid overflow of catch Overflow to 7D-8. LAH-171 LR-2 in catch tank1 Process from Rework Eva:po-tank 6D-3. increase in LR-3 in 7D-8. rator Feed .Tank 7D-8 as re-

. quired1 also process Ta 1k 6D-3 contents as requi:r d.

3. Discharge of Catch Tanlc If product if found in Sample analysis of solutiail If product is put into 6D-3 fluid into wrong Catch TanJc 6D-3 and dis- DAL-221 DR-3 on 6D-31 jets Low-Level Feed Evapora-system. charged into Low-Level Feed are kept locked and trans- tor 7D-2, transfer it to TanJc 7D-2, expensive produc1 fer approved only by Shift *the Rework Evaporator is lost. On the other hand, Supervisor. Feed Tanlt 70-81 if con-if discharge is made into densate with no product Rework Evaporator Feed Tank is transferred to 7D-4, expensive plant pro- Rework Evaporator 70-8, cessing time may be lost. it can be boiled down and transferred to Low-I . Level Waste Neutralizer Tanlt 7D-10.

I 4. No cooling water or low When exit water temperature TIC-41 TI-2-42 in Scrubber Start cool~ng water or

\ flow in the Condenser is greater *than lOOoF, the 6C-3. increase water flow

-6E-3. gas teq,erature in the (6E-3).

Scrubber 6C-3 will be high, reducing scrubber efficiency.

I t

• I ,

Table 9.113 Continued IIALOPERATION OF VESSEL <FF-GAS SYSTEM 1

Malo ration Result . In i +. D 6,tion

5. I Incorrect pressure differ- Indicates fouling1 this PdAH-18 or PdAL-191 PdR-11 Adjust TIC-4 for maxialml ential across the will cause trouble in

• on 6E-3. cooling water (6C-3.

Condenser 6E-3. columns ~t the gas-liquid

. . interface.

6. I No caustic and/or deminer-1 Small quantities of radio- LI-3 low1 TI-2-42 (6C-3)and Fill Scrubber TanJc 6C-3

' alized water spray in Scrubber 6C-3.

active material will be pasF.ed through system.

However, this will be a PI-2 readings will be in-correct. The PdR and PdAL should give further indi-with caustic and/or start. water flow on Scrubber 6C-3.

lllllC'.h smalle~ amount than in cations of a maloperation.

I tha dissolver off-gas sys Increased-radioactivity in stack monitors.

7. I The Scrubber Recirculating! Same as 6 above.

Pump 6G-2 is not operating I FI-3 low1 FAL-20 would be activated in addition to I Start Pump 6G-2.

the indication& listed in 6 above.

a. The Scrubber Tank 6C-3* is If tank is allowed to fill ~1-a, PI-2, and ~FI~3 would Drain scrubber oy Pump allowed to overflow. up to the Heater 66-4(a head indicate tiigh 'level on 6G-2*to Low-level Evapo of 17 feet) the heater woulc Scrubber 6C-3. The alarm rator Feed Tank 7D-2 to vaporize this *solution and systems on the Catch Tank proper height1 regulate

. release it to the atmosphe~ 6D-3 would be activated as water and caustic flow.

through tlie stack. Some the overflow from the radioactive material could scrubber tank filled the be released to the atmos- catch tank. Increased phere, but not of a larger radioactivity in stack magnitude than in 6 above. monitors.

However, tank level would remain below this height and feed back to Condenser Catch Tank 6D-3 for a

. period of time. . -

r; 0 "'

\.;!

Table 9.113 Continued MALOPERATION CF VESSEL CFF-GAS SYSTEM Malooeration Resul:t

9. Low flow or no heating in Off-gas will pass through TIC-5 on Heater 6E-41 Increase steam flow or Vessel Off-Gas Heater final filters at a less- PdR-13 and PdR-14 will start steam flow through 6E-4. than-optimum teq:,erature. increase. Heater 6E-~. .

The filters will collect excessi ve moisture and de-teriorate more rapidly.

10. Blower not operating. The whole vessle off-gas PdR-131 PdR-141 electrical Start blower or 'switch

( 6K-2 :r 6K-2A) system -will lose its nega- controller on blowers PIC-1 to alternate systea tive pressure which will and PIC-21 PAH*l and PAH-31 (6K-l or 6K-1A) if cause some off-gas leakage PAH-2 and PAH-4. automatic switch does not into the vessel cells. No work.

gas can c~me back from the stack system because of the off-gas check valve.

Off-Gas High-Leyel Waste Storage System 9.114 Off-gas from the High-Level Waste Off-Gas Storage System is treated prior to its releas~ to the atmosphere. The system is shown in figure 6.3d. Table 9.114 defines maloperations in this system.

Waste Iaok Farm 9.115 Underground tankage is provided for the storage of all process wastes containing nondiscardable quantities of radioactivity.

These will be neutralized wastes largely from the bottoms of the high-and low-level evaporators. The system is described in paragraphs 4.88 and 4.89. A discussion of the possible maloperations that may be in-curred in this system is shown in table 9.114. Also, included in this table is a discussion of the maloperations associated with the storage of Consolidated-Edison liquid wastes.

t I r

r-,

Table 9.114 MALOPERATION OF OFF-GAS' IN HIGH~LEVEL WASTE SfCRAGE SYSTEM

' Malocer ation R~sult Indir.~+i nn Correcti ve ~ction

1. No caustic in Scrubber Acid Waste Tank ac-1.

This allows acidic off-gas t o reach main off-gas waste LI-111 low level in tank ec-11 FAL-18 will be set IFill Scrubber SC-1 with caustic.

tank system. off and LAL-12 and LAL-13

• alarms are set off in control room and at tank farm1 low pH of condensa te.

2. I Recircul ating Pump SG-3 Same as 1 above. FAL-181 PG-71 and as in Start Pump 8G-3.

not operatin g. Notes 1 above. no alternat ive.

3. Scrubber ~-1 is allowed to overflow .

ICaustic will be carried to knock-out drum and to the waste tank~

LI-111 LAH-12 alarm set IReduce scrubber level to off in control room and at norma~ by pumping (SG-3) tank alarm. to Knock-OUt Drum 80-6.

4.

ting on Waste Tank Off-Ga be reduced so that most of Tank 80-i wtll increase .

I Cooling fan is not opera-~ Off-gas temperat ure will not TR-1-1 and TI-3-1 on Waste Start fan. Notes fans are automat ically started.

Condenser (8E-l or 8E-1A}. the waste tank condensate PdAH-4 and PdAH-5.

heat will be -returned to waste tank via knock-out drum.

5. Steam not flowing on Con- During cold we~ther, if No flow out of steam trap. I Open steam valves.

denser (SE-1 or 8E-1A). steam line is not operatin g, coils could freeze and rupture.

6. Condenser inlet or exit Pressure will be relieved by PAH-8 on tank valves closed (SE-1 or waste tank off-gas relief ao-2; PAH-4 Valves are locked open.

8E-1A). knock-out drum through a on tank 80-1; PR-1 on 80-21 7-foot water leg; will blow PR-4 on 80-1.

seal pot only. (See malopera+ *,

tion of Waste Storage Tank.)

~

l-

Table 9.114 Continued MALOPERATION OF OFF-GAS. IN HIGH-LEVEL WASTE STORAGE SYSTEM Mal operation Result Indication Corrective Action Open valves to* proper

7. Knock-Out Drum 8D-6 drain All liquid will flow LI-4; LAH-3 both in valves closed. through overflow to 8D-l. control room and tank farm, tank or turn on conden-sate pump SG-1 to reduc

liquid level; open up or

adjust normal flow valv s.

a. Waste Tank Off-Gas The system's negative PRC-3; PdR-2. Start Blower SK-1 or Blower SK-1 or 8K-1A is pressure would not be main- switch to alternate syst em not running. tained, allowing seal pot (8K-1A).

to blow (see maloperation of Waste Storage Tank).

9. Filter valves are closed Loss of *negative pressure PRC.. 3; PdR-2. Valves are locked open.

or the filter is not in system.

operating. (ST-1 or ST-lA:

I I

I

Table 9.11 5 a MALOPERATION OF WASTE TAN< FARM Malo_p_eration Resu lt Indi catio n Corr ectiv e Action

1. !Sol ution in tank becomes High boil ing temperature in IHigh temp eratu res reco rded over -con cent rated . tank ; solid s prec ipita tion . low leve l; samp  ; Add water to tank if le anal ysis . requ ired .

2. !Waste put into wrong tank !Loss of spar e tank .

via gene ral purpose evap or- Level indi catio n in spar e Lock-out on spar e tank .

ator disc harg e. tank .

3. IToo littl e sparge air. Poor tank agit atio n; loca l Temperature reco rder s show Incr ease air flow.

over heat ing. wide temp eratu re diffe ren-tial s; low air-f low read ings uneven off- gas flow.

4. !Acidic waste sent to stor*

• Poss ible corr osio n rate in- If batc h of acid ic waste is age tank . crea se in condensate system. tran sfer red, will not affe ct Route condensate to GPE; anal yze corr osiv e pH of tank1 indi catio n will effe ct (ext ent) ; veri fy be low p of cond ensa te. prop er amount of free caus tic in Ui tank .

~. !Liquid blown from seal Tank vapors will bypass off-lPAH-2 followed by poss ible loop s. gas cond ense rs; loss of Add water if required acti vity alarm . from plan t water throu gh wate r; poss ible acti vity to atmosphere. knock-out drum 80-6 ;

check valv es to insu re prop er vapor flow through cond ense rs.

Table <l.115 Continued MALOPERATION OF WASTE TANK FARM Maloperation Resu lt Indic ation

6. ILeak in trans fer lines Hot waste will flow into Sample of encasement sump1 f%om plant to waste stor- line jacke t and then into Obtain sample from tank*

age tank. LAH-1 sump and small sump encasement sumpJ high which first catch es volume leak will then over- spilla ge befor e it flows flow to vault sump. into tank sump. If solut ion is radio activ e, pump back into waste tank.

if solut ion is nonradio-activ e, pump to lagoon.

• 1 Insta ll jumper so that alter nate trans fer line

7. IWaste tank develops a leak.lWaste flows to waste tank sump. If pan fills , waste LAH-1 on waste tank sump1 activ ity may be found can be used.

Obtain sample of liqui d in sump. If nonradio-I flows to concr ete vault . coming from sump vent. activ e, trans fer to lagoonJ Some relea se of activ ity if radio activ e, retur n to through vault vent. waste tank. Insta ll port-able waste trans fer pump and line and trans fer entir e conte nts of tank to spare tank.

.......r.*, _, _#..,.._..__.------ --------------* ---- ------

~

f  !

0 Table 9.116 MALOPERATION OF CONSOLil1'TED-EDISON WASTE STORAGE SYSTEM Malo ration Result Indicati on Correcti ve Action .

1. TanJc coil fails. FAH-14 and PCV-9 admits air TAH-15 on tank1 FAH-14. Switch to spare coils.

to coil . High temperature in waste tank and eventual boiling. Acid and *activity to waste tanJc off-gas scrubber .

2. I Tank leak. Tank leaks to tank vault LI-9 and LAH-10. Transfer solution to sump. spare tank, cease further waste transfer and fuel processi ng of this fuel.

3. Incorrec t solution compo- Possible corrosiv e damage tolAnaly sis of waste before Analysis of all waste sition reaching tanks. tank or preci pitate forma- transfer from 70-4 solution before transfer and tion1 storing of unnecessary inventor y. adjustment of off.

solution volume. specific ation material 1 blank influent lines in CPC.

4. I Vent valve closed at out-

• 1Waste tanks will vent into !Higher pressure on tank PR-741 Lock valve open .*

let of scrubber (SC-1). tank vault and eventual ly to possible activity release1 atmosphere. probable pick-up on galllnj monitor in area.

s. High activity in cold Indicate s leak of solution Radiatio n~larm hi gh; RAH-16'Switch to spare coil.

water return. into coils.

6. ILoss of cold water. Tank temperature will TR-2 through 6J TR-2-1 Switch to plant process increase . through 6. water.

MALOPERATION SOLVENT TREATIENT SYSTEI§ 9.117 Solven t treatm ent facili ties in the plant consis t of three 'ident ical treatm ent systems which servic e certai11 sectio ns of the plant. Eac~ system is identi cal in proces s and equipment make up and operat ion. l he three systems are tntend ed to provid e organi c to, and receiv e organi c from, the follow ing areasa No. !-Part ition cycle and altern ate for first cycle plutonium; No. 2-Firs t cycle uranium, first cycle pluton ium; No. 3-Second cycle uranium.

Each solven t system is designed to operat e contin uously in conjun ction with its applic able solven t extrac tion batter y. The proces sing equipm ent consis ts of a packed carbon ate wash column, two-st age solven t washerthe and an acid wash column. The fresh carbonat e soluti on is introd uced to second stage of the carbon ate washer, contin ues to the washer first stage; then to the carbon ate wash column and finall y to aq9eous waste.

The influe nt organi c stream from the solven t extrac tion batter y is first contac ted in the carbon ate wash column, then proceeds to number land mumber 2 stages of the solven t washer. Mixing in the solven t washers is accomplished by combining an aqueous and organi c flow to the suctio n side of the recirc ul&tio n pump thereb y performing pump mixing. The recirc ulatin g pump then discha rgel the mixttJr e back into the solven t washer for phase separa tion and contin ued mixing and re-circul ation.

The aqueous waste soluti on from the carbon ate and acid wash column is collec ted in Catch Tan~ 130-7, then transf erred to Hold Tan~ 130-8, for g sampling and analy sis. These tanks are poisoned with boron glass Raschi rings to preven t a critic ality incide nt. The soluti on will be trans-ferred to the Low Level Waste Evapo rator Feed Tan~ 70-2, for subsequent proces sing in the waste system or to rework *if suffic ient produc t loss has been encou ntered . >

Solven t adjust ments can be made to each system during the proces sing by making up the requir ed TBP and/or diluen t in Tank 14D-48 and trans-ferrin g to Tank 140-18. The solven t is washed in 130-18 and is then transf erred to the appro priate solven t system storag e tank.

Possib le malop eration s and . their result s are indica ted ancl descri bed in Table 9.117. The Table has been prepar ed for one system only but is applic a~le to any of the three; thu~ the. identi fying instrum ent numbers have been omitte d.

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Table 9.117 0

SOLVENT TREATMENT SYSTEMS Mal operation Result Indication Corrective Action I 1. Washer circulation ~s---Colvent and aqueous-:111- - , Fl~-::-orde:-on puaps turned off. . rcontinue to flow through the will show no flow.

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' Turn on puq,s.

I ystem, but contacting will e inadequate.with an effect

~ n the quality of solvents.

2. Valves i~roperly set :Either no solvent flow or Depletion o_f solvent levelsfAdjuit vahes properly.

around circulation pumps. solvent is pumped to other in storage tariks. Increase parts of the system. in 130-18 or storage tanks 130-15; 16 and 17.

3. Air lifts turned off Carbonate solution level wil~LIC's in washers. Turn on air lifts.

around solvent washers. rise in washers until it ihally overflows to acid ash column. No carbonate ill flow to carbonate wash

~ olumn.

4. !~roper steam supply to IToo low a temperature in I TI too low in washers. Reset te8')erature indi-solvent washers. ~olvent washers leading to c&tor controllers to

!Poor washing. proper temperature.

5. Carbonate solution sup- *tq:,roper washing; uranium . FI on carbonate solution Set correct flows on plied in wrong strength or land plutonium carry over inventory, solution anaJ- controller, analyze acid quantity or turned off. pay not be removed. ysis. wash before use.

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Table 9.117 Continued Mal operation Result Indication Corrective Action I 6. Acid solution &UPPlled in t::vent will not be propnlv I FAL on supply llne1 sol.u.;. Set correct f lOIIS on 1

wrong strength or quantity onditioned for reuse. . . tion inventory1 solution ontrollen, analyze or turned off. lsions and product 1011 analysis. acid wash before use.

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7. High uraniua or plutoniua t*ibonate scrub will reaove High uraniua or plutoniua rt high product loss to waste solvent ranium and plutonium ana in 130-8 analysis. 'aste, check extrac-streaas. ollect them in 13>-7 which ion coluan operating ontains fixed neutron onditions.

,oison to prevent critical-ty.

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