ML18081A224

Part B of CSF-1, Application (Selected Parts as Related to the Radiation Safety Program - Part 3)

ML18081A224
Person / Time
Site:	West Valley Demonstration Project
Issue date:	10/12/1962
From:	Nuclear Fuel Services
To:	US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
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ML18081A225	List: ML18081A116 ML18081A222 ML18081A223 ML18081A224
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Download: ML18081A224 (130)

Text

• AUG g 19~ Before the Washington', o. C.

(@ W::LEAR FUEL SERVICES, IOC.

_For Licens~s for a Spent Fuel Proce ssing Plant

--- ..-- - -- ~

Cnder Sectio ns 53, 63, 81, 104 (b), and 185 of the Atomic Energy Act (

~

\

AEC Docket No. 50-201 . *1

..:.J

-*I

. r..;

@.su ~is~i on ~o__: _~:_:~ _!inal Sa_fety Analysis Rep~~ !

• A2Pfl0 V£D F .., "'"'"'J ,' .... ----,

Revision of Sect VII.- Protec ~oh "'o f-'thJ 1$'uiiif-E

\

0 Revision 2, August 20, 1964

VII PROI'Ecria. CF THE PUBLIC Swmnary 7 .1 . The plant and process which have been described in detail in preceding sections are designed to operate so that, under all normal operating procedures, any discharge of radioactivity to the' environment will be well within the limits set forth in 10 CFR Part 20.

7.2 Radioactivity can be lost from the process complex at the fo!lowing points,

1. Stack

2. Waste storage tanks

3. Storage lagoon *

4. Burial ground

~. Egress of personnel and n,aterial

6. Product shipment In subsequent paragraph~, each ' of the above possibilities as analyzed to show that *the *statement of Paragraph 7.1 is

,,aucr;-.:.--Soaie of the detailed calculations are shown in

.Appendicies as noted *

• 7 .*3 Further, this plant and its site are shown to be so designed and located that, in the unlikely event of the

- moat sarious accident which could possibly be deemed credible, there will be no discharge to the environment which results in levels of exposure in excess of those set forth in Sections 100.ll(a)(l), (2) and (3) of 10 CFR Part 100; and further that steps can be taken to assure. that, even in the event .

of such an accident, the disch3rges to surface waterways at the site boundary canoe kept within the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 th!ough the use of reasonable correction measures after the accident or release has occurred.

7.4 The following abnormal events have been postulateds

1. The complete rupture of a waste tank releasing 600,000 gallons of high-level waste.

2. A criticality incident anywhere in the plant involving a total of 1019 fissions in a single buiat or a multiple continuing event totalling 1~ fissions. .

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

A crit ical ity inci den t in the fuel stor age 3*

pool which sets up a 10-mwt boii ing wat er reac tor which operateJ[Sfor as long as 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> befo re it can be. shut down.

4. A chemical explosion in the plan t which is assumed to rupt ure a vess el con tain ing a full day 's charge of the maximum fiss ion prod uct con tent pos sibl e.

~. The complete fail ure of the iodi n~ removal

.equipment so that for a peri od of up to one day the complete charge of iodi ne is lost to the atmosphere.

The rati ona le for the sele ctio n of thes e even ts has been to sele ct for the pla~ t, the stac k, and the tank farm 1 even ts which represent the upper lim it of cata strowe phe which could occur in each of thes e area s, even though beli eve that subsequent the like liho od of occurrence is very sma s isInanal yzed .

ll.

para grap hs, each of the above pos sibi litie mptions 7.5 Throughout this sect ion, a number of. assu r~ll ecte d recu r. Values for such recu rrin g assu mpt ions are rela ted to a par t-in Table 7.5. Assumptions spe cifi call ycalc ulat ion

• icul ar calc ulat ion are included in the

• Normal Operations*

Stack 7.6 As explained in Paragraphs 6.3 through 6.21 ,

re that , unde r the ven tila tion systems are designed to assualways from area s normal ope ratin g con ditio ns, flow of air is cont ami nati on.

of lea st contamination into thos e of high er olve rs, and the There are sepa rate systems for vess els, and diss are filte red cell s themselves. These join toge ther k. The tota l volume befo re disc harg e through a 65-meter ~tac val fac iliti es of air discharged is 32,000 cfm. Iodine remo ne. It is are d3igned to coll ect 99.5% of the inci den t yiodi charge escape assumed that all of the noble gase s in a dail al ope ratin g duri ng the course of the day. Under norm ucts taken into con diti ons , the amount of soli d fiss ion prod the gas stream is assumed to be low enoupoin gh that the filte ring of this stream will reduce them to the t where they are neg ligi ble in c~mparison to the gaseous expe acti vity . Calc ulat iona ct to proc ess are based on an average fuel which we may parameters&

in this plan t repr esen ted by the following Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

• Table 7.~

Assumptions Used in Cal cula tion s Sec tion s VII & VIII The disp ar,i on para met ers used are thos e give n in .

1.

Table 2.14 and in "Nuclear Safe ty", Volume 2, zon tal June 1961 * . Figu res V-1 and V-2 prov ide hori No. 4, I and ver tica l disp ersi on coe ffic ient s resp ecti vely for cal dist anc es up to 1<>5 meters and for met ablelogi eoro

" to con ditio ns rang ing from "extremely unst performed "moderately stab le. In all calc ulat ions in this sect ion, "sli ght ly unst able " coe ffic ient s have been assumed to repr esen t aver age con diti ons and "moderately stable" coe ffic ient s have been assumed ~o

. ~~

~*,~

represent inve rsio n con diti ons .

Wind velo citi es of 1 meter/second for inve rsio n con ditio ns and 4 meters/second for aver age con diti ons have been used .

used ,

The foll ~in g wind dist ribu tion data has been Wind D.i stri but ion ( t ...<; i'~"'.)

• (Per Cent Per Octant)

Wind Dire ctio n Sumner Winter 8%

Average N

NE '*

4 2 E 5 2 SE 17 9 s 23 21 gf 13 25 w 9 12 NW

• 20 21

2. Fuel is cooled 150 days befo re proc essi ng.

3. Hig h-le vel waste is stor ed at _,_ 410 g~lloras per ton which is equ ival ent to1 - .... - --....

132 c/ga l Sr-90 166 c/ga l Cs-137

~7 c/ga l Ru-106 at the time of stor age .

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Ta~l* 7.~ (Cont'd) *

• 4. . The rate of travel in the surficial till is 1.0

~.

foot/day. The rate of travel in the silty till 1* ~ x 10-~ foot/day.

~ of Sr-90 is associated with sludge in the tank.

6. 99.CJ' of Sr-90 is adsorbed on soil on passage through it.

7. 99.9CJ' of Cs-137 is adsorbed on passage through

~ the 700 feet of soil.

8. No Ru-106 is adsorbed at all.

9. Tritium is assumed to go 25% to stack, 10% to wa&te tanks, 65% to s*am.

10. For long-lived isotop~s the fission products are

• taken as 7'11, from u235 - 30% from Pu239. For short-lived isotop~s they are .taken as 60% from Pu239 -

40% from u235

• Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

• Burnup 20,000_ D!'f_d /ton Specific Power . 32 IJ'llljt:_on ',

Irradiation Time . 2 years .

Load Factor 85 per. cent Cooling Time 150 days Using these parameters the input activity to the plant was /

calculated. The gas1ous activity* input is1 Kr-85 I-129 6.3 x 1o3 curies , ~/~

. 0.022 curie/ . . . - *t°'* ~ ;,- ~

,J, ~)

... 1..131 Xe-13lm

. 1.8 curies 1.0 curie)

_ .,, "" ='* .)

Xe-133 3.8 x 10- curie ,,),* \ . r : .,,.,.

Tritium 50 curies

• Under the conditions stated above, the total daily discharge from the stack using the average activity level fuel contemplated will bes Kr-85 6.3 x-103 curies I-129 1.1 x 10-4 curie I-131 9.0 x 10-3 curie Xe-13lm 1.0 curi!

3.8 x 10 3 curie ,.

Xe-133 *.

-- -~

Tritium 50 curies .,,; t. I * *

.,,*I 7.7 The concentrations of each of these isotopes at various distances and under various meteorological conditions are ~alculated f~om the following formulae1 for short-term calculations1 X* Q exp (7.7a) 2a-2 z

for Long-period average concentrations

// II rt..0-0lf Q 21T exp 8 2o- ~

z (7.7b) a- *z U X

• At 150 days cooling these are the only signiricant gaseous ...,

isotopes. .

'i Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 ..'

• j Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964 '\

~

~

..

• l 1

Where X

• concentration ln curles/m3 (,c/cc}

• Q

• emission rate ln curies/second*

°y* cr'z

• dispersion coefficients. in meters b

• stack height in ~eters u * *wind velocity in meters/second x

• distance downwind in meters f

• wind frequency *in per cent/octant The calculation has been carried out for both inversion and average conditions aver the range 1500 to 51,000 meters (see Appendix 7.7). The results of these calculations are presented in Table 7.7. The maximum concentrations are given for both the average and inversion conditions. For average conditions the maximum concentration occurs at the site boundary; under inversion conditions the maximum concentration ~ccurs over the range of about 4000 to 10,000 mei ers downwind from the stack. It can be seen that all of the concentrations are well within the MPC values with the exception of the Kr-85 concentration under inversion conditions. The inversion concentrations given are centerline concentrations and include no wind diverstty factor; they are not expected to persist for more than a few hours at a time. The yearly average concentration, which is permitted under 10 CFR Part 20, will not be significantly increased by these occurrances *

• • . 7.8 Although 10 CFR Part 20 contains no provision for limits on the . deposition of radioiodine on pasturage, the plant is designed to release iodine at concentrations lower than the MPC for concentration in air in order to protect those areas surrounding the plant site which are used for dairying. Using the long-period average concentration and a deposition velocity of _0.01 meter per second, ~he deposition rate has been calculated (Appendix 7,8). Since yearly average contentrations are used, it is reasonable to assume that the equilibrium. conditions are reac~edJ i.e. the rate of depos-ition equals the rate of decay. The south, southwest and northwest octants have the highest yearly average wind frequencies, ranging from about 19 to 22 per cent. Therefore, a wind frequency of 25 per cent per octant has been used in these calculations. It was found after the Windscale incident that a grazing area contamination level of l µc per square meter resulted in about 0.1 µc/liter of milk*.

Using this relationship the resultant activity levels in milk ha~e been calculated. The milk activity levels are shown in Table 7.8.

7.9 The Federal Radiation Council has established a Radioactivity Intake Guide for Iodine-131 of 100 µµc per day, b~sed on the uptake by children as the most sensitvie segment of the population. As can be seen from Table 7.8, the con-sumption of about five liters of milk per day from dariy cattle grazing inrnediately adjacent to the site boundary would be required to equal the level of intake as established by

• TI0-8206, Page 56 Revision l, Oct, 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 7.7  :.

Maximum Concentration of Gaseous Isotopes Under Inversion and Average Meteorological Conditions x, ~/cc Isotoeesd CUrieslSecond Inversiona Avera2e6 MPCC JICLCC Kr-85 7.3 X 10*2 7.3 X 10*7 1.6 x 10-8 3 X 10*7

-9 1.3 1o*l4 2.8 10*16 6 l0-11 I-129 1.3 X 10 X X X I-131 LO x 10-7 1.0 X 10-12 2.2 X 10-14 3 X lO*lO Xe-13lm 1.15. X 10-5 1.15 X 1o*lO 2.5 X 10*12 4 X 10-7 Xe-133 4.4 X 10-8 4.4 X 10*13 9.7 X 10*l5 3 X 10-7 Tritium 5.8 X 10-4 5 .8 X l0-9 1.3 X lO*lO 2 X 10-7 a Maximum concentration occurs at about 6000 meters from the stack1 concentration within about 10% of the maximum occur from about 4000 to 10,000 meters from the stack.

b Maximum concentrations occur at the site boundary (1500 meters).

c Table II, Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 20.

d At 150 days cooling, these are the only significant gaseous isotopes.

e Based on 1 triton produced per 104 fissions (reported as 1 in 1 to 4 x 104) with 25% lost up the stack, 65% lost in liquid w.-.ste effluent, 10% to storage tanks.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 7.8

• Iodine Deposition and Milk Concen tration8

• Ground Concentration Milk Concen tration Distanc e in Meters euc/m2 we/lit er 1500 200 22

• 2000 , 150 15

,ooo 31 3.1 10000 8.9 0.89 20000 2.6 . 0.26 a See Table 7.5 -f or assumptions and Appendix 7.8 for detaile d calcula tions.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Reyision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

• this Guide. This rate lf consumption is higher than any that can be expected, probably by a factor of at least four. In additio n, no credit is taken for dilutio n (during processing) by milk contain ing lesser (or no) amounts of radioio dine or the fact that cattle are pasture d in Western New York State only about half the year.

Waste Storage Tanks 7.10 The design of ~le waste storage tanks has been discuss ed in detail in Paragraphs 5.50 through 5.56 and in Submission 1 date July 1, 1963. These t~nks are built in a "cup-and-saucer" design. Operating procedu res call for monitoring of the annular space between the tank and its saucer and of the water introdu ced under the tanks.

If there is signific ant leakage from the tank into the saucer, the entire tank content s Nill be transfe rred into a spare tank kept for that purpose . Thus, under normal operati ng conditio ns there will be no loss of activit y from these tanks. c<<~,.- t J.r ..,.\c,.~,lt. o,\;;;-,

1 Storage Lagoon 7.11 The very low-lev el wastes from this process --

overheads from acid fractio nation, solvent wastes, and

• miscella neous wastes- -can be put through the gene.ral purpose evaporator and the overheads from this can be put through ion exchange ~olurnns if necessa ry. It is expected that the normal activit y content of the overheads from the general purpost!

evapora tor -will contain about 10-6 µc/cc . of activit y. This can be further reduced by a factor of 30 by the use of simple, non-reg enerated cationi c ion exchange r~sultin g in a concent-ration of 3 x 10-8 µc/cc. The expected volume of these .

wa*stes is 40,000 gal/day . The average availab le flow in

• Butterm ilk Creek is 41 cfs which is equal to 2. 7 x!_07 ga.1/day.

Thus, the availab le on-site dilutio n factor is 6.8 x 102.

In Cattara ugus Creek an additio nal dilutio n factor of about 8.5 is availab le. The concent ration in Cattara ugus Creek would be expected to be about 10-lO µc/cc. Furthermore, the residua l activit y in this stream will be largely Ru-106 and I-131 with some ~-Nb-9 5. The MPC's for 4these isotope s are 1 x 10*5~ 2 x 10*, 6 x 10-5, and 1 x 10* µc/cc rather than 1 x 10- 1 for unknown activit ies when radium is absent.

Therefo re, the availab le factor of safety is 4about 103 with-out any analyse s of the effluen t and about 10 if we choose to carry out specifi c fission product analyse s on this effluen t stream. This stream will also carry about 130 curies per day of tritium since there is no known way to process it to remove the tritium . The concent ration of tritium on-site in

-Butterm ilk Creek will average 1.3 x 10-3 µc/cc. The on-site MPC is 10-l µc/cc. In Cattara ugus Creek the tritium

• concent ration is expected to average 1.5 x 10-4 µc/ccJ the MPC here is 3 x 10-3 µc/cc.

• Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

7.12 This low.le vel .stream can be discha rged direc tly to Butte rmilk Creek and the level of activ ity at the site boundary will remain well within the MPC level s of 10 CFR Part 20. In additi on there will be a serie s of lagoons availa ble for use as an emergency holdup area. Their use will permit time for the decay of short er-liv ed isotop es and will allow the adsor ption on the soil of some of the I longe ~live d isotop es. The low level waste streams from the plant ~isch arge into the interc eptor , a concr ete pit of 50,000 gallon s capac ity, ..ich is design ed for batch ing of waste s. A valved interc eptor drain lice will permi t collecOion of one days outpu t from the plant which will then be sampled for gross alpha , beta, ganma and tritiu m. The pH of the sample w,ill be checked and the interc eptor conte nts neutr alized if neces sary ~o pH to 6 to a. A line is availa ble for pumping the interc eptor conte nts back to the plant for furthe r proce ssing. Normally, after sampling, the inter -

cepto r drain valve will be opened and the conte nts allowed to drain by gravi ty to the first holdin g pond, a 300,0 00-gallon settli ng basin vlith a hlgh level overflow to the second pond * . The second and third ponds each have capac ity of about 2.3 millio n gallon s. Between the second and third ponds will be a high level overflow and a valved drain line about 18 inche s above the bottom of the pond. A valved drain 0

line from the third pond will discha rge to the creek . The ete capac ity of the ponds above the overflows will allow compl holdup of 100 days outpu t from the plant .

7.13 In view of the facto rs of safety availa ble, no hazard will be prese nted by the routin e handl ing of this aspec t of the opera tion.

Buria l Ground 7.14 Two types of wastes will be buried in the ground in conju nction with the opera tion of this plant . One is low-

• level solid trash of all sorts coming eithe r from the plant opera tion itsel f or shipped in for buria l from off -site users of radio activ ity. The other is high-levP.l solid trash in the form of leache d hulls or equipment discar ded from the ered plant . Activ ity assoc iated with the former type is consid to be "avai lable" in the sP.nse that it could be leached out of the waste if it were conta cted with water . The radio activ ity assoc iated with hulls and discar ded ~quipment, Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

on the r,ther hand, is not considered to be "available". In the case of the hulls, the radioactivity is induced in the hulls themselves which are either $tainless steel or zirconium. Both of these metals are highly refractory and and would not be expected to corrode in the burial environment to any significant extent. They will have been carefully l leached in bolling nitric acid prior to burial, inspected, and an aliquot analyzed to assure that significant quantities of fuel values ar~ not being discarded with them. Equipment to be discarded will have been exhaustively decontaminated in place before bringing it out of the cells and it will then be further decontaminated in the Equipment Decontamination Room before it is buried. Hence, significant quantities of "available" activity is not expected to be associated with this type of waste either.

7.1~ Burial .of both types of solid waste will be done in the silty till described in paragraphs 2.17 through 2.25 and 2.41. We h~ve now had considerable experience in working with this material in various excavations in the course of constructing the plant and in the operation of a low-level waste burial *operation for wastes of the first type described in paragraph 7.14. From this experience it is possible to accept the very low permeabil*i ty figures which were obtained during the subsurface investigations reported in Section II.

Therein a calculated *horizontal flow rate of 5 x 10-5 ft/day was reported.. Since we expect to carry out no burial operations within...100-.feet of any ravine, -this calculates to something over 5000 years for any leached activity reach the ravine. Further this silty till has been shown to have good ion exchange capacity for the longer lived isotopes, Cs-137 and Sr-90. Thus, we expect the natural defenses~-* this material to cont~in completely the activity buried in it.

7.16 Silty till does not, however, act as a natural ion exchange material for ruthenium. This is a relatively short-lived isotope, however. For the sake of illustration assume that a curie of ruthenium were to escape from the burial site and begin to work its way toward on of the ravines. Further .assume that discontinuities or chemical reaction of the waste with the soil should increase its velocity by a factor of 100. It would still take over 50

. years for the activity to reach the stream. In this period of time the curie ruthenium would have decayed to 10-l5 curie.

• The yearly flow in Cattarau~us Creek averages 3.5 x 1013 cc.

Thus, for each curie/year which was leached from the burial ground, the concentration in Cattaraugus Creek would be 3 x 10-23 ~c/cc. The MPC is 10-5 pc/cc. .

Revision l, Aug. 20, 1964

@4Clittl :J

ronment 7.17 We expe ct the rele ase of acti vity to the envi from nd-- eith er from the operation of the waste buri al grouvity or from the low- leve l trash cont ainin g "ava ilab le" acti inconse-high -lev el waste desc ribe d above- -to b_e completely que ntia l.

Egress of Personnel or Material 7.18 The cont rol of rele ase of acti vity into the envi ron-ment by carrying it out on th~ pers ons or clotmpli hing of personnel shad .by or on mat eria l leav ing the plan t must be acco radi oact ivity adm inis trati ve means. Personnel working with in the plan t will be provided with prot ectit.ve They cloth ing which will also must be changed befo re they leav e the plan counters will be requ ired to take a 1hower. Hand and foot ded- -

be prov ided for monitoring all pers ons- -vis itors inclu who leav e the working area s.

7.19 Sim ilarl y procedures will be set up whereby nothing surveyed rnay be sent off the plan t with out firs t havingdsbeen will be and smeared by Hea lth-S afety pers onne l. Guar not have inst ruct ed not to pass out any mate rial which does Hea lt~-S afet y cert ific atio n.

7.20 While it is poss ible that occa sion ally barethes e ly thro~

dete ctab le quan titie s of acti vity might slip sign ifica ntgh proc edur e~, it is esse ntia lly impossible for t in this qua ntiti es of acti vity to get outs ide the plan ronment manner. No diff icul ty in contamination of the envi is expected from this oper atio n.

Prod uct Shipment latio ns 7.21 Radioactive shipments are covered by AEC r~gu in 10 CFR Part 71 and 72 prim arily . All regu latio n! in effe ct at !h9 time of the shipment pert aini ng to such shi pments are and the carr ier.

expe cted to be complied with by the ship perente r the The only way in which radi oact ivity could the shipment environment by way of product shipm ents is fo~

dent . The regu latio ns to become involved in a serio us acci that on prod uct shipping cont aine rs are designed with pos sibi lity in mind. The hazard thus involved is not one pecu liar to this plan t, its desi gn, or its oper ation . There is a cons ider able body of experience on ease this aspe ct of the busi ness and we expe ct in no way to incr the degree of risk above that which has alrea dy been acce pted .

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

ronment 7.17 We expe ct the rele ase of acti vity to the envi from nd-- eith er from the operation of the waste buri al grouvity or from the low- leve l trash cont ainin g "ava ilab le" acti inconse-high -lev el waste desc ribe d above- -to b_e completely que ntia l.

Egress of Personnel or Material 7.18 The cont rol of rele ase of acti vity into the envi ron-ment by carrying it out on th~ pers ons or clotmpli hing of personnel shad .by or on mat eria l leav ing the plan t must be acco radi oact ivity adm inis trati ve means. Personnel working with in the plan t will be provided with prot ectit.ve They cloth ing which will also must be changed befo re they leav e the plan counters will be requ ired to take a 1hower. Hand and foot ded- -

be prov ided for monitoring all pers ons- -vis itors inclu who leav e the working area s.

7.19 Sim ilarl y procedures will be set up whereby nothing surveyed rnay be sent off the plan t with out firs t havingdsbeen will be and smeared by Hea lth-S afety pers onne l. Guar not have inst ruct ed not to pass out any mate rial which does Hea lt~-S afet y cert ific atio n.

7.20 While it is poss ible that occa sion ally barethes e ly thro~

dete ctab le quan titie s of acti vity might slip sign ifica ntgh proc edur e~, it is esse ntia lly impossible for t in this qua ntiti es of acti vity to get outs ide the plan ronment manner. No diff icul ty in contamination of the envi is expected from this oper atio n.

Prod uct Shipment latio ns 7.21 Radioactive shipments are covered by AEC r~gu in 10 CFR Part 71 and 72 prim arily . All regu latio n! in effe ct at !h9 time of the shipment pert aini ng to such shi pments are and the carr ier.

expe cted to be complied with by the ship perente r the The only way in which radi oact ivity could the shipment environment by way of product shipm ents is fo~

dent . The regu latio ns to become involved in a serio us acci that on prod uct shipping cont aine rs are designed with pos sibi lity in mind. The hazard thus involved is not one pecu liar to this plan t, its desi gn, or its oper ation . There is a cons ider able body of experience on ease this aspe ct of the busi ness and we expe ct in no way to incr the degree of risk above that which has alrea dy been acce pted .

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

• Conclu,12n, .

7.22 a, the ba1i1 of the data and cafcula tions present ed in Paragraph, 7.6 through 7.21, i'n the normal operati on of the ch1111ical process ing plant describ ed herein, there will

• be no dischar ge of radioac tivity to the environment in excess of the l imits set forth in 10 CFR Part 20.

Abnormal ~eratio ns 7.23 In Paragraph 7.4 five abnormal events were hypothe-sized. These *events range from the unlikel y to the incredi ble but they delinea te, we believe , the upper limit of any cat-astrophe which could occur in this plant and its related facilit ies. None of these acciden ts would result in levels of exposure to the general public exceeding the quide limits for gaseous emission suggested in Section 100.11 of 10 CFR Part 100, and further there is reasonable assurance that liqiud dischar ges at the site bounda11 could be kept within the concen trations for drinkin g water purpose specifie d in 10 CFR Part 20.

Loss from High-Level Waste Tanks 7.24 Careful measures have been taken to ensure the reliabi lity of the high-le vel waste tanks, to provide multipl e means of detectin g any leakage in the unlikel y event that any defects should develop and to minimize the effects on the environment of such leakage . ...'

7.25 There are several methods of detectin g leakage from the waste* tanks barrier s between the stored waste and the environment. The tanks have been e.quipped with liquid level measurement systems which are accurat e to 1/4 inch or about 700 gallons .

• The tanks are located within saucers and each saucer is equipped with a liquid monitoring system.

Each tank and saucer is contained within a reinforc ed concret e vault; the vault in turn is constru cted upon four feet of graded gravel into which water is introduced for the primary purpose of maintaining the moisture content --and thus the bea~ing propert ies--of the underlying silty till.

There are eight wells located within a foot of the vault which go down into the gravel area and through which the level of the water is measured and from which samples may be drawn to determine if there has been any leakag*e through the first three barrier s. If there sho~ld have been any large penetra tion of the first thr~e barrier s, it would be possibl e to retriev e the activit y with relativ ely little dilutio n by pumping out of the gravel area thro,*;!l any of

• the eight wells. This 3rea thus represe nts the forth barrier to the escape of activit y.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

• tanks 7.26 Th* local environment provides two additional

~nlen to the **cape 6f r1dioactivi ty from the al te. The

• r* located in the approximate center of a peninsula with a thick layer of aUty till. rt has been shown ~at

~h* perm..blllty of this silty till la so low that essentially complete containment would be expected of any waste that did

.-.cape the first four barriers. The till, then, is a fifth and most important barrier. The aeninsula is bounded by Erdman Brook and Quarry Creek. U&iS geologists who did the survey work on the site assure us that any radioactivity which escaped either onto or into the ground on this peninsula would eventually have to show up in one or the other of these creeks lf lt were not adsorbed on the soil by ion exchange.

At the confluence of these two creeks there is established a sampling *st&tlon to detannine again that activity has not escaped from the site. The average yearly flow at this point is about 2 cfs. While it would be expensive, it

~ould not be impossible to collect the total flow at this point and pump it bac~ up to the plant site for additional processing if this should prove to be necessary. This represents the sixth barrier. There is still a final sampling of th~ ditcharge in Cattaraugus Creek at the point where the effluent leaves the plant property. This will provide the legal record of the plant discharges.

7.27 A spare tank identical. to the working tank is provided so that in case the working tank begins to leak the contents may be transferred to the spare. Initially there will be a lal sparing ratio. It is .contemplated that during the first 1~ years of .operation of the plant two additional working tanks will be built and that the spare will serve all .three. Th~ eveotual sparing ratio will be dictated by plant experience.

• 7.28 c;;,~~that a waste tank could be ruptured only by sabotage or*by a major earthquake. The former is outs!de the scope of the requi rements of this review. The latter has been shown to be highly unlikely (see Paragraphs 2.46 through 2.48). In the event that a tank shbuld rupture, however, the combination of the vault, the gravel area and wells, and the impermeability of the surrounding silty till can be expected to maintain the tank contents within the iamedlate area for a long period of time. There would be more than ample time to arrange a temporary piping system to permit pu:nping the waste solution from the tank, the saucer, or wells into the gravel, into the spare tank.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

7.29 The aultl pllcl ty of method* for determining. any leakage fl"OIII th* tanlrmake lt e11e ntlal ly impo ssible that .

auch leakage could remain unde tecte d. There are so many sign-

. batti "lrl between the waste and the environment that ifica nt escape into the unco ntrol led enviro nmen t ls also conaidered impossible. We even consi der it possi ble to suffe r a complete tank %Upture--a most serio us hypo thetic al and unlik ely accid ent-- and still maintain Catta raugu s Creek below the IIPC level s of 10 CFR Part 20*

Criti c~llt y Incid ent Anywhere in the Plant 7.30 7here have been eleven criti calit y incid ents in solut ion systems.* Eight of these have resul ted in a total number of fissio ns ranging from 4 x 1016 to 1.3 x 1018. Oie, that at Idaho Chemical Processing Plant in October, 1~9, resul ted in 4 x 1019 fissio ns. Except in one case in which there wa, some warping of a tank bottom, none of these resul ted in any physi cal damaga. The assumption is made her~ that a criti calit y incid ent producing 1019 fissio ns in a singl e burst or 1()20 fissio ns in a repea ting incid ent is experienced anywhere in the plant and that the entir e produ ction of noble 9aseous fissio n produ cts plus 1/3 of tht iodin es (from 1020 fissio ns) are lost. The value ofat 1019 fissio ns is chosen to conform to calcu latio ns made Savannah River suggesting this value as the upper l~~itfissio of a singl e burst . These same calcu latio ns suggest 10 ns as the resul tant of a maximum repea ted burst . It*w ill be ohown that the limit ing problem with this incid ent is not a publi c nnel prote ction problem but rathe r the exposure of in-pl ant perso to pene tratin g radia t-ion at the time of the burst . For annel repeating incid ent there would be time to evacuate perso ion after the first burst and the exposure to penP.trating r adiat burs t.

can be considered equiv alent to that from a 1019 fissio n This is considered in Paragraphs 8.26 and 8.27. Insof ar as the general publi c is concerned there is no ~azard from the iaaad iate radia ti.on at the time of the burs t. It ,.s well of

• ~tab lishe d that the limit ing cond ition in an occurrence this type is the thyro id dose from the iodin e isoto pes re-l eased. There fore, this event is analyzed on the basis of thyro id dose to a person on the perip hery of the site, at Sprin gvill e, and at Buffa lo. All three are calcu lated for the average and inver sion cond itions speci fied in Table 7.5.

In the case of Sprin gvill e and Buffalo the total popu lation dose ls calcu lated and expressed in man-rem.

• Nuclear Safet y, Quarte~ly Liter ature Review, V~l. 3, No. ent 2,

Dec. 1961, Pages 34-37 plus a subsequent Hanford incid and one in Olarlestown, Rholde Islan d in July, 1964*

• Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

• 7.31 Table 7.31 lists the peak activit y of each of the iodine laotopea 131 through 1~ and the time after the acciden t when the peak o~~~*! __These have been calcula ted uiing NRDL-456,

• c.1cul ated Actlvlt lis- and Abundances of U-235 Fission Product s".

Wlth one excepti on, the p~ak activit ies have been assumed in calcula ting the popunticm- dose. This procedure ls conserv ative but by a relativ ely small amount over the time periods involve d. The one exception is the activit y of iodine-134 at the time it reaches Buffalo under inversio n conditi ons.

The tranait time in this case ls so large in relatio n to the half-li fe of iodine-134 and its precurs ors that its activit y level was found to b~ ner*igi ble compared to the remaining iodine isotope s.

7.32 Th* off-sit e doses have been computed assuming that the iodine 11 release d from the stack instanta neously . The to~l inhaled activit y has been calcula ted using Equation 7.7a for short-te rm center- line concen trations . The talcula tions have been performed for average (slight ly unstabl e) meteoro logical conditons and for inversio n (moderately stable) conditi ons. The distanc es involved area 51te periphe ry* 1,500 meters Springv ille 7,200 meters Buffalo 51,000 meters

• The use of Equation 7.7a J valid for the first two distanc es.

Extrapo lation to 50,000 meters is questio nable, but gives a fair estimat e. The results so obtained are given in Table 7.32a.

Then using the approximations suggested in 10 CFR Part 100 for the thyroid dose from each of these isotope s, the total rem p,r person and the fraction of the 300 rem referen ce value are calcula ted 'for the three locatio ns and for .both typee of meteorology. Total man-rem values have also been calcula ted.

These date are presented in Table 7.32b. Calcula tions supporting the numbers shown in these three tables are given in -Appendix 7.32. It can be seen that in no case is the referen ce value used for evaluaton of reactor sites exceeded or even closely approached. The highest value indicat ed, a 1.95-rem/person dose in Springv ille under i nversio n conditi ons, is not expected to be encountered since it is the opinion of meteoro logists (see Paragraph 2.13) that an inversio n aimed at Springv ille would be caught and held in the Buttermilk-Cattaraugus Valley systems. Even t ~is value is only about 0.7 per cent of an emergency dose of 300 rem.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

• \i_...

Table 7.31 Quantlti** of Iodine Iiotopes Formed from 1o20 fissions*

p,..-. :..

U~ Nr>tL* IS' Isotope Time of Peak Activity Peak Activity, Curies ___

.. :.. . .f~

!tz

>>:!'?'E .

f""" 1)

S,II, 7,"

"',..*.,,," I-131 I-132 5.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 7.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

, ' .,. '/7, <<:

-i+t- ,YJ 25 80 ~. '? N

) ... " ho.,,. I-133 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> I Z. So ~ '11 -: 420 .:z, ~

I-134 ~ 46.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. ' ~770 -" 3 M 1\-11" 1

l. ~ ;"' I-13' I

/~r ; ,+ 3 '2.o:,, 1470 <,7 H

/

Total 7765

""" ,,,... \ C.f '

.... , + L....u,i 0

a Assuming 1/3 of the iodines are lost from the stack

• Table 7.32a ToS,1 po,, PY* to Radloiodlnes, Rem!Person*

Inver sion Average Location (llod erate lv Stabl e) (Slig htly Unstable)

Site Boundary 0.09 0.63 Sprin gvill e 1.95 0.06

• Buffa lo 0.33 2.8 X 10*3 a From insta ntane ous relea se of 1/3 the iodin es from io20 fissi ons.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

• Criti cality Incid ent in Fuel Pool 7.33 The fuel pool is designed to hold 1000 fuel elements 1~ racks of such_ geometry that the establ ishme nt of a critic al array is impos sible even if the elements were all of tha max-lllum react ivity of any fuel befor e it is irradi ated. Allowance is made for ~vlng through the storag e array an element of the highe st react ivity. This is discu ssed in Sectio n VI and ttie

• occur rence of a critic ality incid ent here is shown to be extramely_un likely . Despi te the fact that a critic ality incide nt 0

in the fuel pool is extremely unlik ely, the following event ls hypothesized*

It ls assumed that an element is janrned into the inter stice between four elements and that the

• five elements are involved in a critic al event .

that a 10-nwt boilin g water reacto r will be set.

up, and that it will opera te 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before it is possi ble to shut it down. It is furthe r assumed that all five elements are defec tive and, thus, that some gaseous activ ity can escape from the element.

7.34 Calcu lation s suppo rting this sect ion are shown ~in

• • Appendix 7.34. The beet releas ed would raise the temperature of the water in the storag e pool only about 16F even if the pool water coole rs failed to opera te. There fore, there is no danger that the water level in the pool would drop sign-ifican tly and consequen~ly the shield ing provided Ly the water would preve nt any hazar~ from increa sed radia~ion levels from direc t radia tion.

• EBWR defec t test studie s have shown that the fracti on of noble gaGaous activ ity lost per second from a defec tive fuel element is about 4 x 10-s. This same test showed that the iodine loss was at least an .order of magnitude less than this. The total inven tory of gaseous activ ity ir, the five fuel elements assumed to be i nvolved in this incide nt and the amounts which may reasonably be lost from the fuel pool water are shown in Table 7.34. These ts quan titi,s of iodine isotop es are much less than the amoun which ~ave alread y been *shown to be readi ly tolera ted by this environment (see Paragraphs 7.30 to 7.32) . Consequently the iodine releas es resul t in less hazard than has alread y been shown to be accep table. The releas es of kryptons are also much less than those which have. alread y been shown to be withi n MPC. Simil arly, the xenon-133 discha rge resul ts in conce ntrati ons under the worst *condt ions of only 0.01 MPC.

The only aspec t of this hypot hetica l incide nt which has not se.

already been calcu lated in the sectio n is the xenon-138 relea ReviQi~n 1, Oct. 29, 1962

• Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 7.3 4 el Pool Gaseous Ac tiv iti es Lo st from Fu ide nt Durin9 Assumed Cr iti ca lit y Inc fra cti on Lo st To tal Lo st in

• Inv en tro y 3 Hours 1 Cu rie s Cu rie s In 3 Hours I1o toe e 4 4 X 10 -4 24 K r~ 6.1 X 10 4 X 10 -4 l Kr85 2.5 X 103

.4 X 10 -4 10

.Ki-88 2.4 X l@

1131 2.7 X 103 4 X 10 -5 0.1 4 X 10-S 13 1132 3.2 X l@

10-5 2.2 1

133 5.4 X 104 4 X 1134 1.6 X 106 4 X 10 -5 64 4 X 10-5 6.4 1135 1.6 X lo5 4 X 10-4 0.2 1 xel33m 5.2 X lo2 9 lo3 4 X 10 -4 3.6 xe l33 X 4 X 10-4 600 Xel35 1.5 X 106 1500 Xel38 3.7 X 106 .4 X l0- 4 Re vis ion 1, Oct. 29 , 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20 , 1964

• Using the method employed in Paragraph 7.7 (Equation 7.7a)

~h* concentration of xenon-138 at the site boundary under inversion con~itions is f.4 x 10-6 p.c/cc. No MPC for this isotope is given in either 10 CFR Part 20 or in NBS Hand-book 69 but it would not appear that this would result in any hazard. This event can, therefore, be tolerated without exceeding published feiPC' s_.

Chemical Explosion 7.35 The a*ssumption is next made that a vessel containing one full day's charge of fuel in solution suffers an explosion which ruptures the vessel distributing the contents through-out a cell and putting some fraction of the contained solution into the ventilating system. The ventilating system will 8ithstand the rupturing of a tank. However, there might be some plugs or windows loosened. So long as ventilation is maintained air flow should remain into the cell except for the instant of the explosion. In analyzing this event some assumptions contained in "Radiochemical Facility Hazard Evaluation", by E. o. Arnold, A. r. Gresky, and J.P. Nichols,

~L-CF-61-7-39, July 10, 1961 are used. This is a very similar analysis of a completely analogous situation to that considered here. The assumptions are made therein that aerosols pene-trating high-efficiency filters will contain 0.14 mg/M3 of material with the same concentration as the original dispersed solution and that the MPC for mixed fission products is 6.6 x 10*9 a,.c/cc. The ventilating air passing through the fllt.e rs of this plant amounts to 32,000 cfm or 900 M3/min.

Then 0.14 x 900 or 12~ mg/min of the original solution may be assumed to pass through the filter. w~ further assume that the gaseous activity has already been released and that in twenty .minutes the ventilating system will have picked up nearly all of the gross activity that it is going to; Under these conditions about 2.5 grams of solution will be released.

The maximum activity to be expected in the plant is about 700 curies per liter or 0.45 curie per gram for a total discharge of 1.1 curies. Following the methods of Paragraph 7.7 the poorest value of X/Q (at a distance ~f abou~ 5,000 meters) ls 1 x 10-5. Q is equal to 1.1 3600

• 3 x 10-4 curie/sec.

The X

• 3 x 10-9 p.c/cc. This is le s than t e MPC for mixed - :; ..

fission products assumed by ORNL in the above report and it would appear possible to accept this particularly untoward accident.

• There would be, of course, a big cleanup job in the cells. This would be undertaken according to methods outlined in Paragraphs 8.8 and 6.54 through 6.56.

Revision 1, Oct. *29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

failure of Iodine Removal Equipment

. 7.36 Finally it is assumed that the silver reactors and other iodine removal equipment all fail and that this ls not discovered for a period of one day. That this could remain undetect ed for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is extremely unlikely since the stack monitor would detect the iodine increase at once. If the entire charge of iodine-13 1, 1.7 curies, were to be lost during a day the value of Q is 2 x 10-5 curie/sec . Under worst conditio ns (at a distance5of about 5,000 meters) the poorest value of X/Q is 1 x 10- and the concentr ation of iodine-13 1 at this point would then be 2 x 10-10 p,t;/cc.

lhis ls less than the MPC for continuous exposure off-site .

Conclusion I I. ,o

• "' /

I u,, , **

)

7.~7 All of the abnormal incidents hypothesized in Paragraph 7.4 have been ana yzed. It has been shown . that 0

_in all cases except the 1o2 fission criticali ty incident

• the limits prescribe d in 10 CFR Part 20 for continuous exposur~ are met and that in this one case there is no dose at any point which exceeds, or even closely approaches, the guides suggested in 10 CFR Part 100 for emergency condition s.

~ince we expec~ the probabil ity of these events to ba very low, . to the point of incredib il~ty, and since they can be handled by the environment even if they should occur, we submit that the operation of this plant does not constitut e an undue hazard to the general public beyond the site boundary.

Revision 1, OCt. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Before the UNITED STATES ATCIIIC* ENERGY Ca.lMISSION Washington, D. c*

0 In the Matter of the Application of Ntl:LEAR FUEL SERVICES, Itl:.

for Licenses for a Spent fuel Processing Plant

' Under Sections 53, 63, 81, 104 (b), and 185 of the .

Atomic Energy Act "AEC Doc:ket No. ~-201 ..,'

0 Submission No. 16 - final Safety Analysis Report Revision of Section VIII - Protectio n of Plant Personnel 1

Revision 2, August 20, 1964 I SJ)U44 =* 7 &A JS **** ;ca C~""~

J U ¥ £ It

VIII PR0rEC1'I0i Of PUNT PERsmHEL l>e*lf! Criteria 8.1 The design criteria and the operating rules of the N1S plant have been set up so that the plant .will conform to th* rules and regulations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against *Radiation.

8.2 The plant will have an across-the-board industrial safety program (see Section IX) aimed at reducing accidents of all types. It will maintain a con~tant program designed to increase .tM s,afety morale of all of its personnel, both ln the area ~f normal industrial safety and in that of radistion safety.

8.3 The radiation safety program is designed to protect the plant personnel froms

a. external radiation,

b. inhalation, *

c. ingestion.

All three have been taken into consideration in the design of the plant. They also dictate the conditions under which the plant will be operated. In subsequent paragraphs each of these areas is discussed in detail to demonstrate that the plant as designed can be operated in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 20. In addition, the accidents which were hypothesized in Section VII are reanalyzed from the standpoint of personnel in the plants and some less serious but more probable events are discussed from the view-point of pers*onnel protection.

• Protection from External Radiation 8.4 The primary protection for t he worker from penetrati ng radiation is to interpo1e sufficient shielding between him and the radioactivity at all times. The plant shielding has been described in some detail in Paragraphs

• 6.~9 through 6.65. The shielding has been designed so that, when the most active unit which ~ould be in any particular section of the plant is present, . the radiation level on contact outside the shielding in a normal access area would be 1 mr/hr. In many cases the point *of contact will not be readily accessible. to personnel and the percentage of the time that the shielding wall is subjected to the maximum activity level 11 small. The shielding design has been based on a "design"

• Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

fu*l !Mving the following lrradlatlon on history*

Burnup 30,000 llfD/r Speclflc Power ~ */r Cooling Time ~o Daya a., Fuel la brought into the plant in shielded casks which have had their design carefully checked to en~ure that adequate protection ls available. A shipment will be surveyed befo:re it is sent out.. It will be survey_ed again upon arrival at the plant. Before the carrier is opened, lt is placed under sufficient water (see Paragraph 3.7) so that, as a fuel element la removed. there will be at least 11 feet of water over the to~ of the longest type of fuel element. Movement of the elements ln the storage pool ,and their storage are also conducted under at least this much water. Transfer to the PII: ls done remotely under water and back of concrete ahleldlng. The mechanic1l operations in the PMC and GPC are carried out remotely back of. concrete shielding. The transfer to the CPC ls handled remot4!ly. All operations ln tho CPC are remote. Transfers to the remaining contact-maintained cells

• are fluid transfers carried out remotely. All operations in the enti:re process, therefore, are carried out behind shielding until product ls decontaminated to the point where external radiation ls no longer a problem. Plutonium products containing high concentrations* of Pu-240 will be placed semi-remotely into con'tainers with suffic.i ent shielding so that they may be handled safety.

J 8.6 Sampling ls an operation which can contribute significantly to exposure of personnel. The sampling systems, which were described in detail in Paragraphs 6.22 through 6.36, have been designed to permit most of the sampling to be carried out compl~tely behind shielding and to provide working back-ground of l mr/hr or less. Many dilutions will be made inside the shielding and only the diluted analytical sample will be

• brought out. This will reduce considerably the potential for spillage and also the resultant exposure in the event of spillage.

8.7 In order to maintain the background levels in the plant at design levels, it is necessary not only to have adequate shielding but also to maintain strict controls to prev~nt spillage. -This is done fir.st by keeping the activity back of the shiolding--there are no planned withdrawals of activity except for the samples, many of which, have been already dlluted1 second by a careful and continual radiation survey program to detect areas in which there may have been an inadvertent introduction of activity1 and third by a prompt and imnedlate cleanup of such areas at the same time deter-mining the cause of the event and corr*cting it.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

• *tnt ena nce work, both rou tine and maj or, can be a.a le body rad iati on expected to con trib ute aoaawhat to the who n of NFS to of the pla nt ptrt oM tl. It l* the inte ntio con diti ons tha t no

. l'lli t ..1ntenance work only und er such the lim its defi ned in worker wli l be expo,ed ln exc ess of res, which are 10 CPR Par t 20. The maintenance proc edu set up to dea crlb ed 1n det ail ln Sec tion IX have been ever, it ls ain laiz e the exposure of the per soM el. How be done in high clea r tha t maintenance work wil l have to grou nd lev els rad iati on are a, (are as in which the back trol led by a work exc Hd 100 ar/h r). Such work wil l be lth- con per ait aya t.. as desc ribe d in the Hea Saf ety por tion of ager. In Sec tion IX and be a~thorlzed by the pla ntlsman car efu lly surveyed atta ckin g any maintenance job , the area itte d a worker in the and the amount of time tha t may be permon fiel d is done under are ls calc ulat ed. Work in the* rad iatl e time is kep t from clos ely 1upervi1ed con diti ons . Accurat l as film badges outs ide the fiel d. Recording meters as wel the exposure ls are worn during the ope rati on and a logs of anent rad iati on kept and this ls added to .each wor ker' lperm be decontaminated reco rd. The leve l to which an area wil wit h the amount befo re maintenance is attempted -wi ll vary in no case wil l a of .time needed to carr y out the job , butfiel d exceeding 2 r/h r worker be all"'.'fed to ente r a rad iati onmanager.. It wil l be rdth out spe cial approval of the pla nt osure of any indi vidu al normal pla nt pra ctic e to lim it the exprem. Sub ject to the

• for any sing le maintenance job to 0.2 bala nce between time maximum lim itat ion spe cifi ed above, the be made by pla nt and act ivit y leve l wil l be a dec isio n to susfervlslon in each instance.

nt we exp ect 8.9 . In the. normal operation of the pla hou rs per day two tha t an operator wil l spend no more thanal acc ess area . It ln the full 1 mr/hr permitted ln a normess area wil l have a la expected tha t most of the normal acc ning purposes we background much less than this . For plan per day wil l be have assum*d tha t the add itio nal six hours tota l background ln an average backgrcund of 1/6 mr/~r. The to 0.2 rem.

radiation for the qua rter would then amount maintenance This would leav e about l rem per qua rter for rter . With ope rati ons with out exceeding 1.25 rem /qua job s, a given exposcre lim ited to 0.2 rem/maintenance ance jobs per indi vidu al could perform five such mainten pla nt who qua rter . There wil l be 3bout. sixt y men in sothetha t the pla nt can be call ed upon to carr y out such jobs per qua rter ,

can carr y ou~ a maximum of 300 such ope rati ons about five per day.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, ,

1964

• Inhfl*tton 8.10 The prlaa ry prote ction of the workers from .

lnhal atlon it... in keeping the activ ity insid e the proce ss

• er tpaent ltael f. As a second line of defenbyse,a all

• "'11pment ls contained in cells maintained separ of the ate venti latio n system at a press ure negat ive to the working areas . As third line *of defen se, masks and supp ly-ai r equipment are avail able. These venti latio n systems have be6n descr ibed in detai l in Paragraphs 6.3 through 6.21.

Under all normal opera ting cond itions no proce ss activ ity is expected to escape past the first two barri ers and into the opera ting areas .

8.11 There will be a system of fixed air samplers backed up by a program of air monitoring with porta ble air monitors to assure that the air in the working area does, indeed, remain free of activ ity. This monitoring program has already been descr ibed (see Paragraphs 6.66 through 6.76) . The monitors will have audib le and visua l alarm s set to opera te at the lowest pract ical level so that reme dial actio n may be taken befor e any consi derat ion of evacuation is nece ssa_ry.

8.12 Consideration has also been given to the mechanism whereby activ ity could be brought into the plant by recyc le into the build ing air intak e of. air disch arged 0

• from the plant stack which ls locat ed on top of the

• build ing. In Appendix 8.12 there are shown calcu latio nsthe for average and inver sion conditons which indic ate that amount of recyc le t~ be expected ls completely negli gible ition in eithe r case. There is, however, an infre quen t cond down whereby the disch arge from a stack may come direc tly upon the stack . Under these cond itions the amQunt of .

dilut ion could be small. A calcu latio n is shown in Appendix 8.12 for the normal iodine-131 disch arge. This shows the conce ntrati on of Iodine-131 at the stack exit latio with no dilut ion at all except that affor ded by the venti n air in the stack itsel f. The conce ntrati on of iodin e disch arged from the stack would be 6.7 x 10-8 ~c/cc which ls onlyCFR a facto r of 7.~ highe r than the. occup ation al MPC of 10 Part 20. This parti cular mete orolo gical cond ition is not expected to occur very frequ ently or to pers ist for any long perio d of time. Even with .Q2. dilut ion, and it would be expected that there wculd be som~~perhaps a facto r of ten, the conce ntrati on is such that under the provi sions of air Paragraph 20.103b the iodine-131 prese nt in the buildwould ing could be toler ated for five hours . Such a cond ition be picked up very quickly by one or more of the monitors.the This iodin e conce ntrati on would be attai ned only durin g course of. a disso lution 1* there would be ample time to shut

• down the disso lver or evacuate the build ing or both

• Revision 1, Oct * . 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

8.13 There will be an ample supply of protect ive equlpne nt such aa Scott Alr Packs availab le for use during emergency conditi ons or during maintenance work inside cells. The Health-

• Safety program (see Section* IX) will in~lude frequen t trainin g aeasiona and drills for all personn el in the use of this equipment so that ln an emergency the equipment should be used promptly and properly.

I Ingestion

• 8.14 The control of the problem of ingestio n of radio-activit y ls largely one of developing <<ithin the workers good safety morale and habits of persona l hygiene and of providi ng them .with adequate protect ive clothin g, devices , and monitors to facilita te the execution of the program. It ls a problem which has ~~en dealt with routine ly at all of the present ly operating chemical process ing plants of the AF.C without creatin g any serious hazards .

a.1~ Protect ive clothin g will be issued to all personnel working in the plant areas and must be worn therein . This clothin g will not be worn outside the plant areas. It will be laundered at the plant and returne d to service or discard ed to solid waste depending on monitoring preceding and following the launder ing process . An ample supply of other special ized

~rotect lve clothing such as sur9ica l, heavy rubber, and *cotton gloves, caps, boots, and tape (for taping gloves to covera lls, for instan, e) also will be maintained.

8.16 Eating and smoking will be control led throughout the plant. Eating will be done only in the designated lunch room. Protect ive clothing will not be worn into the lunch room. There will b~ hanci and foot counter s at the door * .The area will be checked frequen tly by the Health- Safety survey.

Smoking will be done only in designa ted areas.

8.17 At the conclusion of each shift each individ ual who works in the plant areas will be require d to change clothes ,

and check his hands and shoes before leaving the premise s.

Two hand and foot counters are provide d.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

II 8.18 The above program of hy,1iene has proved to be aatlsfactory to malntaln the ingestion of activity to neglig-ible levels at other installations. ~ The' coamon practice to back up Jils program with a medical program will be followed at the NfS plant. _The medical plans for the plant are as j followsa The medical program will consist of a very thorough pre-employment medical history and physical examination for each prospective employee. The medical history will be aimed at not only past illnesses and injuries but particular attention wlll be pald to history of past radiation exposure, al~ergies, blood dyscrasias, tumors, and any evidence of emotional instability. The laboratory studies*

• .on all applicants will consist of a minimum of complete blood count, serology, urinalysis, chest X-ray, and vital capacity determinations.

~.ach employee will h~ve a complete physical examination yearly. A complete blood count will be done twice yearlyJ clinical urinalysis monthly. Bio-assays will be done on an

• across-the-plant sta~lstical survey" plan and follow-up examination, as this survey may indicate. The pre-employment physical examination and laboratory studies will be repeated on each individual leavirag the employ of the company.

A dispensary will be maintainP.d for care of ordinary minor on-the-job injuries. There will be facilities for intensive first-aid care of severe* injuries such as burns, fractures, and gross contamination with radioactive material. Inrnunization against tetanus will be routine for all employees.

Close liaison with the Health and Safety Department will be maintained . The medical director will assist in health and gafety training and indoctrination o He will review with the superintendent of health and safety all industrial radiation exposure recordsJ air, water, and plant radiation survey records. He will cooperate with the superintendent of health and safety in plant inspections.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

Deta iled recor ds df all the above will be

• ..inta ined by the medical direc tor.

8.19 As expla ined in the foregoing paragraphs we

~"tic ipate no diffi culty in conducting the normal operastion of this plant withi n the framework of perm issib le levelon of exposure. It remains in the remainder of this secti to analyze the consequence to employees of ac~id ents.

• Analysis of Accidents 8.20 In Paragraph 7.4 five highl y abnormal hypo thetic al incid ents were proposed and the effec t

• of these upon the publi c was considered in Paragraphs 7.24 through 7.37. These same incid ents are now considered with refer ence to the plant perso nnel.

Tank Rupture 8.21 It has been shown that the soil in which the tanks will be const ructe d in quite impervious and that the liqui d from a ruptu red tank would be held in the iaaed iate vicin ity for some perio d of time. It is proposed that the waste be trans ferre d into one of the spare tanks as quick ly as possi ble. The type of actio n envisioned would involve pumping the solut ion into a t spare tank probably through temporary lines which migh be laid overground with only a minimum of shiel ding.

The layin g of this pipe would not requi re personnel exposure except for the connection into the ruptu red tank. This would be done by lowering a flexi ble hose into the tank through one of the spare nozzl es on the tank. If neces sary, such an opera tion could be d accomplished from back of a temporary shiel d const ructe outsi de the radia tion *field and pushed into place wi th a payloader or crane . If the earth shiel d remained intac t, no addit ional shiel ding would be requi red. If the sary condenser system was inope rativ e, it might well be necesy-

. to carry out this opera tion with the prote ction of suppl air masks. The trans fer system would probably be set up with two pumps in the system in an effor t to avoid any maintenance on the pumps durin g the trans fer opera tion.

The pumps would be opera ble from outsi de the radia tion field .

8.22 Maintenance of the pumps, if requi red durin g this opera tion, would certa inly entai l opera tions in a high radia tion. In the trans fer set-u p a tee would be ln1er ted upstream from the pumps so that the lines could be flush ed and decontaminated somewhat befor e such

• Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

• maintenance would be attempt ed. It would have to be done from behind a portabl e shield. In the case of so serious a problem as this there would be no questio n that oper~ti ons of the plant would be shut down and all availab le exposure time would be used in solving this probl*em. Supervi sory personnel to the highest levels and individ uals from other plants operated by the company--those who receive no radiatio n in the course of their work--could be brought in if necessa ryo No individ ual, however, need be exp,>sed beyond permiss ible levels.

8.23 Most of the exposure associa ted with this inciden t would be in cleanin g up afterwa rd. Dismantling the highly contaminated lines, pumps, and valves and disposi ng of them would certain ly require operati ons in high radiatio n fields. However, the need for speed would no longer be present and enough time and people would be used to assure that the task was accomplished within the permiss ible radiatio n exposur es.

Critica lity Inciden t in Plant 8.24 This inciden t, discuss ed in Paragra phs 7.30 through 7032, assumed that the ventila tion system remained in working order since that situatio n results in the most iamediate and complete dischar ge of the 9aseous isotope s to e the environment. In that event the air inside the plant would be completely safe, as evidenced by the calcula tions shown in Appendix 8.12, in all cases except that of the unlikel y recycle . In Appendix 8.25 it is shown that if such a downdraft occurs under average conditio ns the amount of dilutio n will amount to a factor of about 500 0 If it occurs under inversio n conditio ns the dilutio n factor will be about

~. For the purpose of this calcula tion the dilutio n is taken as 10. It is further assumed that during the course of the entire dischar ge (assumed to be 10 minutes) the downdraft will be centere d precise ly on the air intake ten percent of the time. It is also assumed that some personnel are exposed to the resultin g concent ration* for the entire ten minutes and that they are so preoccupied with renderin g assistan ce to other p~rsonnel or are otherwi se so upset that they did not make use of the availab le supply- air equipment.

Under these circumstances they would be exposed to the concen trations and receive the thyroid doses shown in Table 8.24. These calcula tions are also shown in Appendix 8 .,25 0 The total thyroid dose is less than the dose suggested as an emergency guide in 10 CFR Part 100.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 8.24 Thyroid Dose During Recycle Coinc ident With a Crltl callty Incid ent X Dose Rate, Cone., Q X Rem/ Time, Dosef 1,1,c/cc Frequency '1c/(c cHsec ) Seconds Rem Isotos,4t 2.6 10*3 110 600 5 I-131 X ...L 100 I-132 6.3 X 10*3 ...L 4 600 0.7 100 0.04 _L 31 600 24 I-133 100 0.6 _L 2 600 22 1-134 100 I-135 0.16 ..L 6 600 ~

100 Total 74.7 Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

a.~ There la no r1a1on to assume that the events which could lead to a criticality incident would al10 lead

.to ahuttlrig down the ventilation 1ystem. There may be, however, a iaall probability that the two events might occur 1laultaneou1ly. The possibility is a difficult o~e to analyze since the amount of li,akage of activity from the cell would be expected to vary considerably depending on the conditions. If th' supply air remains on, the exterior of *the cells .would remaln ' at a higher pressure tlijln the cells and little, if any, leakage should occur. If both the supply air and the exhaust go out, there may still be a little negative pressure in the cells due *t., the natural draft of. *t he 65-meter stack. If the static pressure in the cell becomto equal to that outside the ce-lls, some leakage wc,uld occur but it should not be large since any leakage path would be tortuo~s. 'There would not seem to be a mechanism whereby th~ cella would reach a higher pressure than the surroundings. Failure of the ventilation system will activate

• an alarm which :will require evacuation of the plant unless counte%111anded by plant supervision. We conclude, therefore, that *tf a *critical.tty incident were to occur coincident with a failure of the ventilating system, the plant would be evac~~ed long before anyone could receive a significant dose from inhalation.

8.26 The most* tmportant aspect of protection of plant

• personnel in connection With a criilcality incident is to assure th~t no one rec~ives a serious dose of penetrating

• radl~tion at the time of the incident. The first line of de{ense -is, ~f course, to prevent the occurrence of the incident. Gre~t care ls being exercised in -the design of this plant and in the setting up of its operating procedures to ensure tha.t

• a

• crl ticall ty incident does not take place.

The whole subject of crlticality control throughout the plant ha* been pr,sented in detail ln the final paragraphs of Section vi; We believe that we have reduced the probability of such*~ incident to an absolute minimum. However, there have been eleven such accidents in solution systems. Every

• mijor site save one has had one. There have been five incidents in metal-air systems at Los Alamos.

8.27 An Olk Ridge study* has calculated the prompt neutron and gamna dose at the outside of a normal concrete shield from a nuclear reactor of 1018 fissions and these data are shown in Table 8.27. They can be used fqr a 1019 fission event by direct ratio. Th9 concrete shielding walls

• ORNL-cF-61-7*39, "Radiochemical facility Hazard Evaluation",

E. D. Arnold, A. T. Gresky, and J.P. Nichols, July 10, 1961, Page 6.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 8.27 Th* Proapt Neu_tron and Gaaaa Dose* at the OJtslde

• Of *t Nort11l *eo,,crttf Shleld From a Nuclear a.actl oh of 1018 Fifsio ns*, 6 QrdlnaryC .Dose at Q.Jtsldt of Shield, rem O

Concnte Shield Metal Nuclear Nuctear- Reactlon in Ib\c1to1**, Ft Rea:ti on 5,200 Aqueous Soluti on 1 88,00 0 3 317 23 17.0 1.9 0.960 0.14 o.~9 0.012 a The dose rate may be calcu lated for any other number of fissio ns through the use of a direc t propo retion .

b ORNL-CF-61-7-39* "Radiochemical Facil ity Hazard Evalu ation" , e.o. Arnold. A.l. Gresky. and J.P. Nicho ls.

July 10, 1961, Page 6.

c F~r high densi ty concr ete the ganwa dose is reduced by a .facto r of 1.6 for a given concr ete thickn ess

• for the GPC, PIC and a>>c have openings for viewing windows which aze 4t1Ulvllant in shield ing valuo to the concrete walls for gaaaa radia tion but offer lea, prote ction than th* concr ete for neutron radla tlon. Table 8.27 does not

~uile ct thelncreaaed neutron do1e to an employee who might be 1(1 front of one of the viewing window,. In the case of a 1o.r.9 burst from a critic ality accident in the disso lver, the total prompt neutron plus 91111111 dose to an employee at the neare st vi1Wing window would be about 300 rem, lf the...,

window were coaipletely transp arent to neutrons. The only place ln the plant where amet al-alr incide nt 11 at all poaai ble 11 in the PIii: - GPC. There we have four feet of hlgh denai ty concrete shield ing and the result ing dose would be negli gible . A soluti on system event could conceivably occur from the di1so lver on. In the CPC there are six feet of concrete and the dose would be even less than in the

~ . In Cell #1 there are flve feet of concrete shield ing.

The dote would still be negllg ible. In the remaining four ss cell* there are three feet. At the lower end of the proce there ls no need for this much shielding from the fissio n product *c~nte nt. The minimum of three feet of concrete ahleld lng has been carried down to the end of the proc*e ss in order to assure that even if a 1019 fissio n critlc 5l incide nt should occur, and a worker should be standing

. right oppos ite the point ln the cell at which the event occur red, he would still not receive a MLD of penet rating

• radia tion.

• 8.28 When the product must be removed from the piant and put into storage a~d eventually onto a truck for shipment, conta ,t with the product ls required. Therefore, partic ular car* .ha* been exercised ~1th product shipment plans . Thi s 11 di1cu111~ .i n Paragraph 7.21.

• Criti cality Incident in the Fuel Poo_!

8.29 The hazard of 3 criticality incide nt ln the fuel pool to t:,e general publlc has been discussed ln Paragraphs 7.33 and 7.34. It was shown therei n that the amount of heat releas ed ls not enough to destroy the integ rity of the water shield ing which ls enough* to ~eep such an incide nt from ir-radia ting anyone signi fican tly from the prompt neutrons and gallDl s. It ls necessary to consider the gaseous activ ity which ls given off, however. The quant ities of gaseous isotop es expected to be releas ed during three hours was 1hown ln T~ble 7.34. In Table 8.29 these quant ities are shown as pe/cc and their ~oncentratlons ln the fuel receiv ing and storag e area air are ~hown assuming that it is dilute d h wlth the 11,000 cfm of venti lating air which ls drawn throug

• Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 at.vision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

Table 8.29 Ga1eou1 Activitie s Loat into Fuel Receiving and Storage Area During Assumed Critical ity Incident -

Activity Released Cone, Isotope ,,,.c/sec ,,,.c/cc .. MPC Kr-85aa 2300 4.4 X 10*4 6 X 10-6 Kr-~ 93 1.8 X 10-5 1 X 10-5 Kr-88 930 1.8 X 10-4 I-131 9.3 1.8 x* 10-6 9 X 10-9 I-132 1200 2.3 X 10*4 2 X 10-7 I-133 200 3.8 X 10-5 3 x 10-8 I-134 6000 1.1 X 10-3 5 X 10-7

• I-1~

Xe-133111 Xe-133 600 20 330 1.1 3.9 6.4 X

X X

l0-4 10*6 10-5 1 x 10-7 1 X 10-5 X~l35m 5.5 X 104 1 x

• 10*2 Xe-138 1.5 X 1<>5 2.7 X 10-2

that area. Th*** concentrations range from twice the 40-hour MFC for Kr-&!\ to 2000 times the MPC for I-134. -These IIPC'* are for continuous breathing and can be scaled up or down ~1th tllle. Taking the I-134 as controlling, the room would have to be evacuated within 1/2000 of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> or in just undtr one minute in order not to exceed one week's allow-able inhalation. It will certainly be possible to evacuate this room ln less than a minute and an event such as this would be iaaediately obvious to anyone in the room.

Presumab\y there would b~ a visible flash. Monitors would trip and alarm, and the fuel pool itself .would be visibly agitated. After evacuation, personnel could put pn supply-alr equipment in other parts .of the building before re-entering to take remedial action.

Chemical .Explosion 8.30 In .Paragraph 7.3~ a chemical explosion is assumed which ruptures a tank containing an entire day' s charge .of activity .les~ the gaseous activity (sine~, in orde~ to have the full day's charge in solution, it will have to have been through the dissolution step during which the gaseous ac~ivity ls lost). The cell ventilation system has *been designed to withstand *the effects of sucn an explosion. So long as the ventilation system is maintained, no activity ,hould get out of the cell in which the explosion took place e~cept s~e that would be lost during the period of oyerpressure following the. explosion. This period is estimated to be about one second. The calculations of Appendix 8.12 show that,' for all conditions except a direct recycle of stack discharge into -the air intake, there will be negligible concentration of ~ctivity in the building air.

In the unlikely event that such a recycle and an explosion should coincide and using o calculative method analogous to that shown in Appendix 8.25, the concentration of unfiltered solid* activity at thr tnroat of the stack would bea 0.12~ g/min x 0.45 curie/gram x 106 pc/cc /

• 32,000 cfm x 28317 cc/cf

• 602 x io-5 p.c cc As in Appendix 8.25 a dilution factor of 1/10 from stack to intake and a frequency factor of l/10 were used ~ The resulting concentration in the building would be 6.2 x 10-7 µc/cc.

This is about 100 times the MPC assumed by Oak Ridge for mixed fission products as aerosols and it implies that about 25 minutes would be available for evacuating the plant. This ls more than adequate.

Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962

• Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

8.31 Altho ugh** believ e that the venti lation system

• *111 be .. intain ed in opera tion if an event such as this ahould occur the possi bility that it does not contin ue to functi on 111.11t be consid ered. As in the discu ssion of Paragnph 8.25 we find this si'tua tion diflic ult to analyze and for the same reaso ns. In this case it is certai n that the cell would be pressu rized for a short time, perhaps sever al seconds, and that du1ing this time some activ ity would escap e. If the buildi ng venti lation system were iOt functi oning , the air in the buildi ng will be essen tiallyhigh stagn ant. In the ianed iate vicin ity of the cell quite concentrations can be hypothesized depending on the assump-tioni chosen. However, it seems diffic ult to hypothesize a mechanism whereby this activ ity will spread ver, quick ly from the immediate area if the buildi ng air is not moving ~

An explosion ~uld alert anyone close to it and the inmediate area would be evacuated in a matte r of seconds. Reconnaissance and remedial action would then be carrie d out with supply-air masks.

Failu re* of Iodine RP1Doval Equipment 8.32 As in all of the situat ions in which activ ity is put up the stack , here again there is no hazard inside the plant at all except in the unlik ely case of direc t

• recyc le the conce ntrati on of iodine that might be founc in the build ing air would bes

• 20 ~c/sec x 0.1 diluti on factor x O.l frequency 8 l.~ x 107 cc/se~ = 1.3 x 10- µ:/cc The 40-hour MPC for iodine-131 is 9 x 10*9 p,c/cc which is lower than *the above calcu lated conce ntrati on by only about 30 perce nt. Thus, this conce ntratio n could be permi tted for over two days. It is unlike ly that the recyc le would be in- just the right positi on for more than an hour during the day. In any event this conce ntratio n would trip all the build ing air monitors and the incide nt would be dis-covered more readi ly and the dissol ver shut down. *. .

Minor Accidents 8.33 We do not believ e that the accid ents which have been discu ssed in Sectio ns VII and VIII will occur . It .is a good deal more likely , however, that during the course of the opera tion of this plant there will be a number of much more minor occurrances which pose no hazard 3t all to the gener al publi c but which, if they were not handled prope rly, could lead to additi onal exposure of the plant perso nnel. Such

• Revision 1, Oct. 29, 1962 Revision 2, Aug. 20, 1964

event, alght tp., llluatr1ted bya

a. Spllllng of activity, particularly analytical aamplea or special samples such as waste tank sample.

b. Tracking of spilled activity from on& place to another.

c. Pulling activity into jet steam lines by improper venting.

d. Leaking waste lines in diversion boxes ,

• • Spilling of product solution.

The problem with all of this type of event ls the same. In one way or anothe~ they lead to an increase ln the background radiation which the worker may receive. This is undesirable since in nuclear work one wishes to avoid any unneces.s ary radiation. It is also undesirable since it is important to keep the "operating background" as low as possible in order to leave a cushion with which to carry out the required maintenance work. There are several lines of defense against this sort of problem and they are the same for all of thems

a. First, the plant has been designed to eliminate, insofar. as possible, the necessity for handling even small amounts of activity.

b. Second, the operating rules are designed to eliminate 9very possible exposure.

c.

• Third, the fixed monitoring system (see Paragraphs 6.66 through 6.76) is designed to detect increases in either background radiation or air concentrations.

d.

• The fixed monitoring system is backed up by a formal mobile monitoring and survey program (see Section IX).

e. Each employee will wear both meters and film badges. He will be trained to chec~ his own e:q,osure rate frequently and to use portable monitors himself so that he need not rely completely upon Health-Safety Coverage.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

the** alnor accidencredibl Thu*, ts should not go undetected. tlone of th*** accidents could y result in exposure to plant personnel ln excess of the limits set forth ln 10 CFR Put 20. .

. 8.34 In- this section we have shown that we are able to operate the NFS plant under all normal conditio ns within the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 as they pertain to the protect ion of the plant personnel. This includes protect ion froai external radiatio n, inhalat ion, and ingestio n. Both the operati on of the process proper and all the necessary aalnten ance operatio ns are included in this stat~e nt.

a.~ The same aeries of hypothesized major acciden ts that were discussed in Section VII have been considered from the standpoint of the protect ion of the workers in the plant. It i ~~~~9Wn that each of these unlikel y events could be sustaln td without undue risk of exposure to plant personnel.

8.36 Finally the problem of minor acciden ts that could lead to increas es in the background ~adiation received by plant personnel ls considered and the multipl e series of defenses against these *are shown.

• 8.37 We conclude that the NFS plant can be operated within the requi rements of 10 CFR Part 20 as they apply to the protect ion of its own personnel'.

Revision 1, Aug. 20, 1964

0 I

Before th*

UHITED STATES ATCJlIC ENERGY ca.NISSION Washington, D. c.

• I In the Matter of the Application of

~CLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC.

For Licenses fo~ a Spent Fuel Processing Plant Under Sections ~3, ~3, 81, 104 (b), and 185 of the Atomic Energy Act

.;,;*~- ..

0 /-_* \ ~-**.

AEC Docket No. ~0-201 f- ..

\

I

...

• I I #

I Submission ~o. 18

• Final Safety Analysis Report I

I Paragraphs 9.0 through 9.96 of Section IX of the Safety Analysis

• I u~nn

IX PLANT OPERATION

• 9.1 Detaile d in this section are the following ftems1 The organiz ational make up of the Spent Fuels Reprocessing Plant; aspects of adminis tra ~:ve control and procedures in various operatio ns of the plant; Trainin g Program, Health and Safety Program; Fire Safe~y Program and Emergency Proce~ures; the uses of the Operating .Procedures and Letters of Author ization ;~ discuss ion of Maloperation; and the use of Maintenance Procedures.

Organization Plant Manager 9.2 The Plant Manager is respons ible for all activit ies at the plant and is, therefo re, concerned with all aspects of plant operati on.

The more important areas include product ion, technic al service s, health and safety, and nuclear safety.

Production Manager The Production Manager is respons ible for carryin g out product ion in accordance with approved procedures and accepted Health and Safety standar ds.

Health and Safety ~irecto r 0 The Health and Safety Directo r serves in a police and guidance capacit y to assure conformance to approved Standard Operating Procedures and to advise in plant operati ons from a Health and Safety standpo int.

Technical Service s Manager The Technic al Service s Manager is concerned with the technic al soundness of the operati ons proposed, the surveill ~nce of materia l, and ;particu larly, as a membgr of t~~_cri ticality group, the maintenance of a critica lly safe system. -He generat es**appl lcation s for license revisio ns. He reviews proposed SOP's and Letters of Authori zation to ~onfirm compliance with the license .

Plant Critica lity Committee

• 9.3 The Plant Critica lity Committee consist s of the Plant Manager, the technic al Service s Manager, *the Health and Safety Directo r

• and the Production Manager. This committee sits in individ ual judgment on all SOP's and Letters of Author ization. Each member satisfi es himself that the proposed procedure is in compliance with approved Health and Safety policie s and that no critica lity problem is involve d. Each member gives particu lar attentio n to the functio n that he represe nts. The usual seq Jence for review is1 1. Production M~nager 2. Technical Service s Manager 3. Health and Safety Directo r and 4. Plant Manager.

HI.Jo&*UtSl9o 9 .. 4 The *ln functlon ~*of una,...nt*':t.& t,r:~afa,l y ~

ec~cally ~lnlattr 111 operations r*latt~e t~ ~- ~~t.. .Th~._fl*".'~

llaNSger, -~ Ml overall respon1lbillty f~i> Pl&niJ ~r*f~r.l~

cert~in reaponslbllltles as 3numtrated ln par*gr:tii't"9.Q~ :.:-.I~ :additl,on to

• ~I *rr** *d~l*CJ~ted.,

the &bovt, ~.t her delegation of responslblllty t:S, ij_ , :;~!)owtr ~ _tbe-- A~ttis~~~t!vt

~ganlz~tlori Chart, f lgure 9.4. -,~ -

• Operating Procedures and Letters o*f ~Au$h9~lza~t*on ..

- - . ,* ~

. 9.~ P;roc:e11ln9 of all spe~ial ;,,wel_e ~r aaatiril'l}~~~~~;d/ .

under the

• llcenst ls done in accordanc* wtth* th* crl~eri'ilt set-:f~r:t h'.'1in

~ Uc-tne&. ' AU opera::tlon$ in th* Spent* F~ct.l Repr-C,C*l>SStng PJ:"(fi~*~ afe

~* in accordance wt th*'-appraved operating :pr~ed~~~s .; ,~fch*:,det~n,. th**

Ntf\ods to bo used and incorP.)rate* criteria. contair5,~d :tn tji~ l :l~on"t*e..,

.. . ) . . . .. .. *

' r , ~

9.6 It wll'l be th* responslbUlty o°f. eac.h e~plt>Jtt..to .z:.ad, 1',nder1.tand at'\d foUow expllcltly the dlrt~t1ons -cont*a lned - ln the. Stanaa*rd

• Operating P~ocedures fo~ j~bs which. he \s ~alltd : upon t~~~; it 1~ tht

.r*1ponslb1Uty of . ~etch s~pervi~or to ,know* ~tie. Stanclard. Operat:lng" Proc'e dures whl.ch ipply in* his area,

• tc, .have copies 9f. these .sop**s~.~vat&a~!'a .for .,_~

employeea to read and to-:be certain that l ru:Mviduals und~.r hi~ su~~lsion read anict' und*J'lstand .each procedure. It ls: Manage~nt '-s

• zespon's.lbiltty to r*~lew and re-issu.} SOP':*~ as necessary, to re:ne_e t\ ct>lang_e s*' ,in tp~ procsss and to insure that the inst.ructions contained in SOP' s rep:r,eset"\t* ~ safa*

and efUclent,!19thod, for ?~compllshing tne work .. *.

g..1 SpeclaI nuclear material ls. recQlV~d into the plant*

and

• pr_o ces~ed by Appr:oved Letters of Authorliation whic~ 'state* the ~perat ing proclkt\µ'e(s) to be tisiKI, specl1l handl \ng where, r*e quired, ,* th~ cust9iHr.

• fen wf\Odl tn* -p!'OCi!tslng ls being done, the contaln~r(s). in *which the SJl&terlal will be* found and the material to be .uned . . as to t.ypti; enri(:hment 1nd weight. '81,f~rt a Letter ot . Authorlz~tlo~. cin~be used it ls inaependently

.tOView~ by. tac~ mem..,er ~, th~ Plant Critltality Con11J1lttee t <i:assura its confc,~e, with approved license criteria. It h . the 11Spons1b1Uty of each tm~loy,~ to r,idr under.stand l~nd follow exp~~c~tly th, *dlre~iiono co{'taln~**1n th** Le.tt~r{s) of ~u~horlza_tl~n.. It! ls th~-- r~sJjonsibil~ty of each s~~rvJso~ to have a copy uf t ~e Letter(~) 9f AJtho~lzatiqn av111~~lt for -t~ndl~id~als under his su~~vis~~n to raa~ a~d to be certain that )~h*~ reQd and unders~and the inst~ctlons containe~ ln the Letter(s) of : ~u\~ orb*tlon. It .ls Manage~nt's respons!ibillty* to iss~e Letter(s)

{if.., Authorization t.,ereby scheduling work thrataghout the plant$ Normally, p.ioc*es.s engln'lerS "nd~r the supervision of. th*e Pr~uction Manager or tha fechnic*l S.rvlces Manager draft the procedures or authorization. T_hese

~nglneirs , serve aito t~ tec~lc~l liaison and guida~ce in prQduction and thiy conduct and supei:vlse englneet'ing development.

• 9.8

• the general ad&niftlstrattve philosophy will b, to

~st~bli .h standal'Cl ~proc~dures . for at many situations as* possible and to

~ontrol th* t1fectlvtnes* of the,* -procedures by aneins of regularly ,

.malnt..lned .log* and check-off lists." These procedures,toget~et with th~ir

Fl9un:.9 .4 C. .. t>

plant Ot9anl1atlon *Ctwrt. (

.P lant 1ta~9er I

Aa1l1tan t -to : r~

Se-curl ty Of fleer I Tr,;:! Di~ctor I Industri al Rel*tlon a Office Manager Mecllcal-Dlrecto~

C Pl'OducUon lf.ana9!r Technica l Director I

Assistan t Production ~ r Technlca I

l-Sirvlce s llana9!.:

PlantI Engineer Accountjtil_l}ty Offleer

r Analvtlc al Services Ma r Shlft-S rvlson Dh*-ctor

avpponlng 1091 lf4 chtck-off llatr.wUl be 1ubJ*ct to re~lar, but randoa.

• lns,-ctlon by higher levtll of autho.r ltyr. For in~t*nce, c1~ain routine txuln.tlon* and . . ,,u.r... nt1 wlli bt carrted out dally :*ccordln9* to approved chtck*off li1t1 and duly logged. In th*** ca111 th* next higher level of 111pervt1ion wlll, once a week at a random tJ*, follow through

~ apec,tr tc procedur* and d1tt?!9ln1 that lt 11 being properly ca~rlod out. One* every_ two aontha the *.~ext higher l1v1l of supervision will do llkewi*** On;*..;:* year th11~ suae( pro~edur** will ~ \observed by the h~gbest level :;of authGrlty. ~* Pers~nal 'ltspc}nsibUity wlll be 111phalized by hwlng *~ch one of theie*.'tnspie tlon1 : recorded by . 1 lgnature and date a the log* wlll be kept .11 f~. pe~nent' r1c~rd. In adcUtion;* duty ll1t1, lddrt*~** and telt~cm* "J!~*~*.,-~11~*,ba-:~1,.t1lntd, and 11lect1d gr9ups

~e off*du.t y perso~et, ... ~"' al.1 *1~1~ of authority and skill, will b.e nqulr.t d to keep

• the:pJ~i ;i nfo~ ~rF that ..; wher,about1 at all times for

~r941ncy c'&11. *

• Jrtt~l09 of. Plint Pegso~nel_

_

• 9o9 Th* initial. staff cadre will be largtl¥ IRl<lt *~p of

-~Ople wl~.~xtenslve experltn*~* -in ~- handling, pro~~sslng_and *~ nitering.

af .1'4ioac\ lvo Ntirials. Thh grlNPe. und,r *the Training Director, will

. ~~t ~ - training c°-"i-.tes -f~?> *111

• a~l tlonal. employees. The curriculum

(-- *Appendix 9.J!t.~ wtll ..be* dlr*ct~

• towar~ th~ .~ucation *of ce~tain ph~at P!iti'ioMel ~n the .pr~c*e ,1e1 ;and r*l*~ed o~~*~lons in. such detail air to

. *tn,~. coaplet* famlll*ritj with in. tt, operation. ~

th* equipment, tts function and .~oaipet,nce

• • llcen*** i,y:

9.10 It ls th* ' lntent of the *tral~lng _program to ,nable proc*** (iperat~r* to successful~y s3~isfy -AEC ;requlteoent1 for oper~t9r1' te*t and ..e)(amlnat.l on ... Approxlmattl_y 7~ operators* wlll ~ so train~

• by. ,pemn*ent* or 'tn~rary .staft~*~mt,,rs. .I nitially, three types oJ operator, . wUl- - be ' t g11lried *fo*r trork ,...

ln thl'ee dlff erent types

,. :of are*

. a- ta

1. l:it~~~l1t lv1 Pi oce11lng Oper~tlons

2. Chnlc.al Processing Operations

3. c.on~rol Operitions tu. cadi"e, in ac!iltlo~>to s,rv*l~ 11 the faculty, will .take these and adctttlon~l .. courses ?'e*19ned to satl_sfy AEC requ,l r~nt~ . for ~enlor .

Oper&tors' Llcensgs. C.rt~in ,employees such *~~w1tchmen, secietarlei, etc.

will ~ .txM~~ fl'.~ ~~~ of _-th, more tee_hnicil aspects of the currlculuftl.

but~*ll ~loy~s will ~ ;.expo;ed to, a radlelogl~al famlllarlzatlon cunlcul.._; Wt.l t t!n 'fxtstii*~atlona, g:r;ded according to*.leve l of re1pon1.U,l U ty Ind WOfk exooaul' . .. *.; *w

. ,U l ~be ...

.co~ducted~

• A * *J ._~l th~ c~rl~l~~wlll lnclud1 an. -l!'t::oductlon (comprising detail* ~ .;; th~ .. b~kg~.nd ,nc1 :~eactlptifl' material o()tbe pli~t) detalla of tht proee1101, healih-and *afetv., *1nat~ntat1on, 1qul~nt description and usage; -.aechanlcal:..~nlpu*l &tion, *process control, proee11:.maloperatl'on, d~ .,nt*lnatlon procedures, *waste treatment., ***rgency *1sur11, * ,ccounta-b111tl, **conomlc ~~ ct1t1c~11ty conaldtr~tlon,~,nd lay ch,mlttry and

• pi\y1lc1 ***oclatf!Cl .wt'llt reactor os-r1tion1 and chealcal reproce11in9

• In f!ddltlon, tl\t currlcul~ for th* cadre and others preparing for Senior ~

Ope~*t~* llc*n*** wlll include .th* condition* and limitations in the factllty llcen*** ti\e design and operating limitations in technical speclficatl~~*j ihe aiec~nisa for any changes ln the limitations in the 11*cen~*-oi- lptelflcatlons and more advanced study of che1~istry and

• radioactivity. ' The training program for plant personnel will be a

.contfl'!Ulng one. - Regula~ _process operators will .be given, periodically, a rtorfentatlon exposure to radiation safety ar.d to processes and equipnent lnvqlved ln their particular plant .specialty. New employees will be tndoctrtnated by training as are the *1niti*l employee~ and will be requ~red ;to pass the same, m:s examinations in *ddition to AEC license ex.,.1.nations.

• Training of Outsid~ Or91niz~tion1 9.12 Pa~tly as *a matter *of public relations but primarily to obtain efftctiv* 1nd. non-p1nicky assistance if an emergency requiring t.b*lr coo~~atl~n ihould develop, local town, county, state police officers, fire departmentt .of .the ar,a, . civil defense organizations and. elected off~clala wlU be_ invl ted to lectures at the plant. The subjects covered will be ,Jialnly those connected with protection of the *pu~lic and will be designed to ett1blish *method1 of Ua1son. and .cooperation 1(_dealrabl& and nee***~ und~r hypothetical e~rg,ncy conditio~s so that assist,nce it IIIO&t*effectlvt a~d radlologlcal haza:1(1s to outsiders are mlnimiied.

Health ~net Safety Program

. ~.13 The Health&' Safety i:>e'pa~n~ is charged with the re1P9.naiblllty* fot* protecting .plant per,onne.l from all job hazards and the

-public frQill *haza.rdous quan~ities o( ~a<ilation *and* ridloactlve materials.

lflthln th* scope of thit re~pondblll ty 'the Heal th~& Safety Department wllh .

1. lil~itor for... radlation and contimlnation .au plant

• ~eis and. op.rati(?r\ff (see ~ppendlx 9.13 *f or equlp111nt.)

2. Monitor, for radiation and cont'amination, areas

. .ex\ernal to th* plantp

3. Approve ~oeedt;Jrts for work wl th radioactive, aaterial* 1 .

4. Esta~U*h e1JMtrgancy,- procedures1 f

~ *.  :&tabllsh .Ua11on with all other departments and advli* tttm lrrmatter1 p,,rtaining to health and 1afety1

, * .S~perv1** 't)rje rec*lpt atid 1hipnent of all h81ardou1 aaterlat*,

• and teac h 11pe c:t1 of the hea lth

7. Provide curr lcul ua and 1a,f ety pro gr*1

• a. !1t1 bll1 h and maintain plan t fire brig ades trai ned to cope with radi atio n area fire sa

9. Conduct a continuing safe ty trai ning program all 111ploye111 for and safe t'l

10. Conduct insp ecti ons of all area s for firewhen nece ssar y, hazards and inst itut e corr ecti ve acti on

11. Viaintain complete, accu rate reco rds of personnel exposure, radi atio n-co ntam inat ion con ~itio ns in and ent around the plan t, and perform radi atio n inst rum cali brat ion.

Health and Safe ty Organization 9.14 Spe cifi c resp ons ibil iti*s for members of the Health and Safety group are as follow**

Health and Safe ty Dire ctor *

• rtment.,

Plan, organize and supervise the work of theg-* depa MalntMin clos e liai son with the Medical Dire ctor adv isin and seeking advice cancernlng the employees* hea lth and wel fare . Maintain cl~s e liai ,on with aini ng to hea lth :and'*saf ety.

• oth er departments and advise them in mat terst, pert personnel and *environmental Maintain complete, accu rate records of plan inister hea lth and s*af1tty aspe cts radl atio n-co ntam in~t ion con ditio ns. Adm t fire brigad.~s. Inap ect of trai ning programs. Organize and trai n plan pment~ ~repafe mat eria l for and llliintain fire figh ting and emergency equi insp ecti on,.

use in safe ty meetings. Conduct fire and safe ty Lead Ttch nlci a,i

• Perform rout ine. and non rout ine mon! tori ng.. task

~ at /dir ecte d.

observed C& Ji b.tit e and Writ* complete, accurate repo rts of con ditt ons t air samp lll'~'-* . JYerfol'i!i check monitoring inst ru,11er1ts. Obtain andt coun ty *trai ni~g 'prcgrams a~d safe ty ~nspections. Par ticip ate in shif safe ey. re~ord . fil, i.. Check

• ~fe ty meetings. Maintain exposure and surv are film badges for dist ribu tion 91111111 dosimeters and reco rd resu lts. Prep a~ _processing and record resu lts.

T9chn1cian

• Medical employees Perform routine and non rou*t ine medical test s on inc_luding processing bio- assa y specimen,.coun Receive environmental and aonf ~oring samples and 'prepare them for ting.

I*shn tc\an - Shtf t

• t11k1 a, ParfOl'II routi ne and non routi ne monitoring and inspe direc ted. Part icipa te in shif t safet y train

..,ting a. Wrtte complete, accu rate repo rts of 2:tiv ities ing progr ams ction and saff ty Radiation Area Work Procedures

. 9.1~ All radia tion area work ls governed by procedur es approved by responslb~e persons in Productio~ Plan t Engineeri ng and Health and Safe ty.

NFS polic y, to It is the inten t of these procedures, in accordar1ctoe *with maintain exposure of inco rpora te sound ind~ stria l ~afety prac tice and a tion at a leve l employees to ioniz ing aadi at!on and radio activ e,. contamio*

below the limi ts state d in 10 CFR 20.10 1 and appeniques dix B, through the use through the use of monitoring,decontamination .and shiel ding techn es and othe r safe ty of prot ectiv e cloth ing, resp irato ry prot ectiv e devic an~

equipment as requ it ed.

wing 9.16 For the purpose of defin ing radia tion area s, the follo

~es are estab lishe da Zone t All areas beyond the site perim eter boundary, Zone II All areas with in the site perimeter boundary which are normally free of radia tion- -con tami na-tion in *~ce ss of 500 d/m alpha and 0.05 mrad/hr beta-ganma 1 Zone III All areas wi~hln the cite perim eter bounamin dary

~hich may have dete ctab le radia tion- cont a-tion but !n which the radia tion leve l is normally less than 100 mrem/hr and the contam-inati on leve l is not sign lflca nt1 Zone IV All areas with in the site in which the sign radia tion leve l e>:ceeds 100 mrem /hr or in whic h ifi*

cant contamination exis ts.

Zoning of the plan t and site will be the resp onsi bilit y of He~lth and Safe ty.

9.17 The General Regulations for Radiation Area Work will apply equipment .

to all work prote dure s. See Appendix 9.17 for listi ng of General Regulations The minimum requirements for protect-ive cloth ing area

.a. For entry to Zones I and II, no prote ctive cloth ing is required J

b. for entry to Zone III area s, for inspe ction onlyLabo , the

• alnlaua prot ectiv e cloth ing required shal l bes ratory coat , shoe covers and glov esl

c. For entry to Zone III areas to perform work, the minimum pr~t ectlv e cloth ing requ ired shal l bea Cove ralls , shoe cove rs, glov es and cloth hatl

d. Prot ectiv e cloth ing requ ired for entry to Zone will IV will bo spec ified on a Spec ial Work Proc edure . No one be peX'llitted to ente r a Zone IV area unti l L Spec ial Work s

Procedure has been completed and signed and all prov ision of that procedure have been implemented~

the

• • Resp irato ry prote ction requirements will be posted in "hot " lobby.

The minimum requirements for personnel monitoring area

a. For entry to the Plan t, the minimum requirement for personnel monitoring shal l beJ *-Badge

b. For entry to Zone III area s, the minimum requieters rement for personnel monitoring shal l .beJ*-Sadge, dosim and dose rate type radia tion survey meter.

c. For entry to *zene IV area s, the personnel moniWork toring

• requirements will be spec ified on the Procedure.

The exiti ng ,rece 4ure 111 Spec ial

a. When leavi ng Ze~e IV areas the minimum requirement for personnel survey shal l be A complete cloth ing and body survey by Health and Safe ty Personnel,

b. When leavi ng Zone III areas the minimum requiremeyntatforthe personnel survey shal l be A complet& self surve boundaryf stati on monitors locat ed at the Zone III - Z~e II

c. When leav ing Plan t Zone II the minimum requireme nt for personnel survey shal l be A hand and shoe check using the ftand and shoe counters and stati on monitors befo in the build ing lobby. This surve y shal l also be made re ente ring the build ing lun:h room.

The rule s for radia tion area conduct area

a. 1o smoking, eatin g, drink ing, or chewing shalwhich l be permitted in Zones III and IV. Zone II Plan t area s in smoking 1* not permitted will be so designatedJ

b. l!ffl'Y *~(ace and every piece of equipment in Zones III

• and IV and every tool or article taken into th*** Zone,

,hall be regarded 11 being contaminated until surveyed and released by a representative of H*alth and SafetyJ

c. All the provisions of applicable work procedures shall be read. understood and followed explicitly by the per1onnel performing the work;

d. Each employee is responsible for the care and treatment of equipment issued to hiffl and for his conduct in the performance of assigned work. Careless or willful mis-handling of equipnent or misconduct on the job will not be tolerated and will constitute gr~unds for dismissal.

9.18 for work of a routine nature in areas normally free of I

significant radiation and/ or contamination and where conditions are known and the work to be performed will not cause any significant change in these conditions, work is governed by Extended Work Procedures which may be modified or terminated at any time by Health and Safety personnel. Such Extended Work Procedures are given a date of termination not exceeding twelve months from the date of issue. On, or in adv_ance of, the date of termination, the procedure is reviewed by responsible persons in Plant Engineering, Production, and Health and Safety, changed as necessary to reflect current working conditions, amd re-issued with a new termination date.

9.19 For work of a special or unusual nature or work in areas 0 or on equipment which does i nvolve significant radiation-contamination, .a Special Work Procedure* is issued. Eaeh Special Work Procedure is valid* for or.e shift only. Approval of responsible persons in Plant Engineering, Production and Health and Safety is required prior to the start of any work and befor* work can continue on succeeding shifts. *

• Job Planning and Scheduling 9.20 Each day responsible representatives of Plant Engineering, Production and Health and Safety meet to plan and schedule work for the following day. *A Work Schedule is prepared and distributed and Special Work Procedures are prepared and approved in ad~ance of the work. The

• Work Schedule lists the personnel assigned to each task, the time and place to 1111et for each job, the estimated duration of each. job, the applicable

, proced~res governing the work and other information of general interest.

9.21 The Plant Engineer is reiponsible fora

a. Estimating the time _and manpower required to accomplish each maintenanc* jobl

b.

• Assigning maintenance personnel to **ch scheduled main-tenance Jo~

c. Assuring that all maintenance personnel read and under-stand applicabl3 work procedures and are thoroughly trained ln radiation-contamination workl

ct. A11urln9 that scheduled ulnte nance persoMel und1r-1tand what work ls to be accoapllshed and *that the proper tool* and ~lpm ent, ln good condl tlon, are avall ablt ln advance of the job 1

• • A11urlng that assigned maintenance personnel are availa ble at th- place and time indica ted on the schedule.

9.22 The Production Manager ls respo nsible fora

a. Establishi.19 prior ity of mainLe,,ance ir, the plant1

b. Determining what the 9ffec t will be of scheduled ulnte nan~e work on plant opera tions,

c. Arranging for equipment or area shutdown as necessary to accomplish the scheduled work1

d. Arranging for pre-maintenance decontamination and/or shield ing 11 requi redJ

e. Assigning opera ting pel'sonnel to scheduled jobs as required'f'.

f. Assuring that all opera ting personnel read and under-stand applic able work procedures and are thoroughly

• train ed in radiat ion-co ntami nation work1

g. Assur ing.th at opera ting personnel understand what their dutie s will be for each scheduled job and that the necessary equipment, in good* condi tion, is availa ble in advance of the jobs

h. Assuring that assigned opera ting personnel are availa ble at the place and time indica ted on the schedul~1 .

1. Issuin g the work schedule following each planning and tchedullng meeting.

• 9.23 The Health and Safety Di~ector ls respo nsible for,

a. Determining what radiation-contamination conditions arwJ/or other speci al hazards will be encountered in performing the scheduled work1

b. !>etermlning whether or not a Special Work Procedure will be requir ed for each scheduled job and if not, which Extended Work Procedure will apply1

c. Deteralnln9 requ lr...nt1 for prot ectiv e clothwork ing

• ard/ or othe r 11fe ty equipment for scheduled a11urlng that such equipaent, in good cond ition , 11 avallU>le ln advance of tht work1

d. Scheduling and leading a pre-j ob confer,nc:e lf requ lrtd1 and

• • As1lgnlng Health Physics personnel to scheduled jobs as requlred1

f. A11uring that all Health Physlc1 personnel read and understand appl icab le work procedures, are thoroughl y train ed ln all phases of radla tlon- cont amln atlon work and are tr*ln ed and equipped to respond to unusual or

...rg,ncy condltlon11

g. A11urln9 that assigned Health Physics personnel are avai lable at the place and time indic ated on the achedul11

h. Inltl atin g Special Xork Procedures following each plannl~g and scheduling meeting.

Unco"\dltlo~al Release 9.24 Rtlt ast surveys of equipment are the resp onsl blllt y of III to go to Zone II ~

H11lth and Safe ty. Any item leaving Zone IV or Zone , must be accompanied or Zone I or any ltea leaving the plan t site from anyofZone the relea se accom panies by a coapleted Unconditional Release. The orig inal tht equipment, and on, copy (in the case of an item onsi leaving the plan t site) ble for enforcing 11 presented to the Pl~nt .Seeu rlty Guard who is resp 1Dercial vehi cles and this procedure. Thia procedure also appl ies to cOC1 radia tion- cont amin ation rallw*y cars . The Unconditional Release state s the ition s or leve l* on the lttms desc ribed , and relea ses them with no cond restr ictio ns 11 to th*t r use.

eonc:11t12n11 B*\****

9.25 Th* us* of. a Conditional Release la normally rest ricte d exam pli, a proc ess pump to equipment which 11 not to leave Zone III. for n Room or the Main-which ls to be taken to ~e Equipment Decontaminatio al Release. The Cond ition al tenance Shop for repa ir will r~ul re a Condition cont amin ation Relta 1* desc ribes the item relei sed, lists the radia tion- whic h must be taken statu s of the ittm and lists any spec ial precitemautio ns for handling, dismantling, and ~*pa iring the .

Loct and Tag Procedure 9.26 The Lock and Tag Procedure is used to lock out valv es, verte nt use of whic h could cont rol*, and swit ch**, the unautho~lzed or inad ment or perso nal inju ry.

c1u11 process upse t, damage to faci litie s and equip ble for appl ying

• . Each department will have ita own locks and will be re1pon1l

lock* to equipme nt** required for ..ploy** protectio n even if this practice

• re1ult1 ln aeveral locks on the,... switch. The responsi bility for removing locks will rest with the department head (or his delegated assistan t) of the departae nt * ~1pon1ibl* for applying the lock. Non :ompliance with this provision will not be tolerated . Maintenance locks are normally applied only during aalntenance work on equipaent and are removed when the work ls completed.

The tags are used to i~dicate the reason for the lock and to warn all personnel of the possible consequences of violating this procedure.

~fety Hazard Tao Procedure 9.27 Any !*S empl:,yee ls responsi ble for tagging or posting any equipment. or condition which represen ts a safety hazard and/or unsafe working condition . After taking .such action he should notify his foreman or supervisor so that the condition may be corrected promptly. The Supervisor or Foreman shall notify the Director of Health and Safety.

Radiation and Contamination Protectio n 9.28 In this paragraph there a:e dltcussed a r.umber ~f adainistr atlve limits of radiation exposure for t ~o NFS Plant. It ls expected that these limits may be modified as pl,nt experi4nce dictates .

NFS tmployees may be exposed to radiation up to the limits stated in the following table with the approval of the employee's lnmediate superviso rs Table 9.28 Rems Per calendar Quarter

a. Whole body1 head and trunk1 active bloc( fornlng organ11 ltns of 1y~11 or gon~ds------------------------------------------- 1-1/4

b. Hands and forearms feet and ankles- --------- --------- -------- ----18-3 /4

c. Skln of whole body***- --------- --------- -~------ --------- --------- 7-1/2 Whole body exposure to penetrati ng radiation in any 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period shall be llaited to 0.1 rem or, if approved in advance by the Health and Safety Director , 0.2 rem, Planned single exposures in excess of 0.2 rem must be approved in advance by the Plant Manager.

In emergencies involving the life of personnel, it shall be the resoonsl -

billty of the NFS Senior represen tative present to determine and authoriz e, if such be his decislo~, e~try into higher fields of radiation .

9.29 Th* whol* body dose and skin dose ls available from badge raadlngs. TI°'e dose to extremit ies ls controlle d in the field. If the dose rate to the hands and forearms or feet and ankles ls more than 1, times th* dose rate to the whole body, the time limit for the work ls bas i on th8 dose rate to the extremit ies. With p?'ior approval of the Plant Manager and the individua l concerned, an employee of NFS may be

• pendttld to recelv* 1 dose to the whole body greater than that permitted under paragraph 9.28 provided thats

a. Dur , g any calendar quarter the total whole body dose shall not exceed b.

3 rems, and The dose to the whole body, when added to the accumulated occupational dose to the whole body, shall not exceed~ (N-18) rems where "N" equals the employee's age in years at his last birthday; and

c. The employees accumulated occupational dose. to the whole body has been determined using Form AEC-4, in accordance with the instructions in paragraph 20.102 of 10 CFR-20.

9.30 The consequence for intentionally causing erroneous film badge or dosimeter readings is dismissal.

9.31 ~S employees, who have been certified in the use of radiation monitoring instruments by the Health and Safety 01:ector, may in the course of their normal duties, self monitor in areas where the dose rate does not exceed 100 mr/hr, except Zone IV areas. In areas in which the dose rate exceeds 100 mr/hr or in Mll Zone IV areas monitoring for any entry shall be by Health and Safety Technicians. In no case shall employ..s enter an area in which the dose rate exceeds 2 r/hr unless prior approval of the *?lant Manager has been obtained. (See 9.28)

Maximum Permissible Levels of Radioactivity 9.32

• The maximum ~llowable surface contaminations for the West Valley Plant are shown in Tacle 9.32a. The Maximum Permissible Concentrations in alr of some radionuclldes expected to be encountered in the West Valley Plant are shown in Table 9.32b. The Maximum Permissible Concentration in on-site. nonpotable water in Buttermilk Cre11k of some radionuclldes expected to be encountered at the West Valley Plant are shown in Tabl* 9.32c.

Air *sampling 9.33 The air sampling program provides for the ,valuation of alpha and beta-gamma air contamination in all building areas, the plant site and the site perimeter. Included in the program are ~4 in-plant area particulate samplers, 19 remote in-cell particulate samplers, 7 in-plant ccntinuous air monitors, 1 plant site sampler and 3 site perimeter air monitors. This equipment ls described in Appendix 9.33, is located as per Figure 6.67, and discussed in Paragraphs 6.66 to 6.67.

9.34 ll'ie -filter paper used for particulate sampling is Whatman #41 or equal, two inches in diameter. Whatman #41 filter paper has a collection efficier,ey of 98 per cent fvr 0.18 micron particulate or larger at a flow velocity of ~ centimet~rs per second. To obtain thla

• tow velocity a minimum flow rate of~ liters per alnute ls used for in-plant air sampl,rs. Self absorption in Whitman #41 paper ls zero for ~t* and. about 0.3 for alpha.

Table 9.32a

• Maxiaann Allowable Surface Contamination for West Valley Plant Smearable Non-Smearable

• Beta-Ganrna Alfha Beta-Gamma As ShownZ100 cm2 Altha dL{mlZ:100 cm2} As ShownZ100 cm2 Surface d!(m}Z:100 cm2}

Skin No Detectab le 500 100 c/m Personal Clothing No Detectab le 500 100 c/m Plant Clothing 500 100 c/m 1)000 2,000 c/m Plant Vehicles 500 100 c/m .

• 1,000 5,000 c/m Coanerci al Vehicles 500 100 c/m 500 0.4 mrad/hr *

• Zone I Zone I limits are per 10 CFR - 20, Appendix B, Table .:1

• Zone II Zone III Zone IV*

500 5,000 50,00C 100 c/m 10 mrad/hr 2 r/hr*.

500 5,000 50,000 100 c/m 100 mrad/hr

~ r/hr

• For personnel entry Conditio nal Release 1,000 5,000 c/m 5,000 10 mrad/hr Unconditional Release 500 100 c/m 500 100 c/m

Table 9.32b

• Maximum Permissible Concentration Cuc/ml)

Mixed fission Products No respirat o:-y protect ion l X 10-9 full face filter mask 2 X 10-8 Supp} 4.fd air mask *Above 2 x 10-8 I Strontium-90 No respira tory protect ion 3 x-10-lO full f~ce filter mask 6 X ,10-9 Supplied air mask Abovo 6 x 10-9 Cesium-137 No respira tory prote~t ion 1 X 10-8 Full face filter mask 2 X l0-7 Supplied air mask Above 2 x 10-1 Plutonium 239 No respira tory protect ion 2 X l0-12 full face filter mask 4 X 10-ll Supplied air mask Above 4 x 10-11 Natu+al Uranium .

No respira tory protect ion 6 X 10-ll full face filter mask 1 X 10-9 Supplied air mask Above 1 x 10-9 High Enri~hed Uranium No. respira tory. protect ion l X 10-10 2 X *10-9 .

full face filter mask Supplied- air mask Above 2 x 10-9 Iodine-131 N~ respira tory protect i on g *x io-9 Supplied *air mask Above 9 x 10-9 Krypton-85 No respira tory protect ion 1 X l0-5 Supplied air mask Above 1 x 10-5 Footnotes to Table 9. 32b Maximum Permissible Concentrations for other radio-n uclides is as indicate d in 10 CFR-20, Appendix B, Table I. When a mixture of radionu clides is encountered and the identity and concent ration of each radionu cli~e in the mixture are known, the Maximum Concentration is derived as followsa If radionu clides A, B, V, are present in concen trations Ca, Cb, Cc and the applica ble MPC~s. are MPCa, MPCb, and MPCc re*spect ively, than the concent rations shall be limited so that the following relatio nship exists a Ca + Cb i Cc MPCa MPCb MPCc .$ l

Table 9.32c

• Maximum Permissible Concentration (µg/ml}

On-Site-Buttermilk Creek

~

Off**S ite 4 X 10* 4 2 X 10*5 Cesium-137 1 X 10* 3 3 X 10*5 Coba lt-60 1 x. 10*1 3 X 10*3 Tritiu m 6 X 10*5 2 X 10*6 Iodine-131

. Plutonium-239 1 X 10* 4 5 X 10-6 2 X 10*3 8 X 10*5 Ruthenium-103 3 X 10* 4 1 X 10*5 Ruthenlum-106 4 X 10*6 l X 10*7 Stron tium- 90 5 X 10*4 2 X l0-5 Natu ral Uranium 8 .10* 4 3 X 10* 5 High Enriched Uranium X Footn otes to Table 9.32c as state d Maximum Perm issibl e Concentrations for other radio nucli des areencountered in 10 CFR-20,Appendix.B. When mixtures of radio nucli des are dure and the iden tity and conce ntrati ons of each is known, the proce MPC

• state d in the footn ote to Table 9.32b is used to determine the

9.~ Air samples are collec ted and analyr.ed for .r-adi-oactive mater ial according to the schedule shgwri in Table 9.35. Thistheoched ule I is subje ct to revisi ~n as experience is gained in opera tingprovide an . plant Continuous a}r monitora are used in some occupied areas to iamediate alal'f'l shoul d high air contamination exist . The other remote 's of samplers will be used occas lonall y to obtain very short , ~pct samph ers are:

air contamination co~di tions. in the c~lls . These remote sampl Minia ture Cell General Purpose Cell Chemical Process Cell Mechanical Cell X-Cell 2 X-Cell 3 Product Purif icatio n and Conce ntratio n Chemical Proce ss Cell Crane Decontamination Area Process Mechanical Cell Cr~ne Decontamination Area 9.36 As each sample is removed from the sample head it is placed in an envelope which is marked with the sampler locati on, date-t ime starte d, date-t ime changed and the flow rate. When all sample s have been changed, accoxding to the sched ule, they are brought into the Health Physics Lab, removed from the envelopes, placed in planchets and -survey ed with portab le beta-gamma and alpha detec tion instrll fflents (Appe ndix 9.36}. Any samples which show unusu ally high activ ity are segregated for speci al handling and prompt atten tion in the counting room.

9.37 Alpha, Beta propo rtiona l counters (Appendix 9.37} are used to analyze in-pla nt air "samples. All samples .recei ve a onetheminute counting alpha , beta count as soon as possi ble after being delive red to Since the room. The beta/a lpha ratio is determined based on this count .

possib le at beta/a lpha ratio is const ant for natur al activ ity, it may be emitt ers this time to make a prelim inary estim ate of the amount of long-l ived will be on the sample. The conce ntrati on of beta emitte rs on the sample d as shown in determined based on the initia l count . This is accom plishe Appendix 9.37a . All- samples receiv e a five minute alpha count count 23 five to seven hours after sampling and a second five minute. alpha -beta the alpha to 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after sampling. These counts are used to calcu latee. This is counts due to long- lived alpha activ ity (product} on the samplon the 24 accomplished as shown in Appendix 9.37b . Any samples which, beta are hour c,unt , show le~s than 1 c/m alpha and less than 1800 c/m

1 Table 9.35 .

Start Up Schedule for Air Sampling Shiftwise Daily Weekly Hot Lobby .GFC Operating ~isle**west n,trd Floor Offic@

Mechanical Operating Aisle-west GFC Operating

• Aisl~-east Se~ond Floor Office Ram Equipment Room Lower Warm Aisle-west Main Lobby Chemical Viewing Ai:le-north Lower Warm Aisle-east Maintenance Shop Ventilation Wash Room Acid Recovery Pump Aisle Utility Room Process Sample Enclosure-1 Scrap Removal Manipulator Repair Area Process Sample Enclosure-2 Mechanical Operating Aisle*east Product Packaging CAM Analytical Aisle X-Cell entrance air lock Fuel Storage CAM Extraction Sample Aisle-west U-Product cell EDR Viewing Station

• Extraction Sample Aisle-east Product purification cell t.cR Air Lock Ventilation Exhaust Cell Product Packaging l, 2 and 3 Ventilation Supply Room Pulser Aisle Fuel Storage 1 and 2 Ho.t Lobby CAM Chemical Viewing Aisle-south Mechanical Operating Aisle CAM Equipment Decontamination Room VSR Access Aisle Chemical Operating ~isle-north Off Gas Cell-3 Chemical Operating Aisle-south Analytical Cell Decon. ~.rea Lower Extraction Aisle-ea.s t Alpha Lab CAM Upper Warm Aisle-west Lab Access lisle Upper Warm Aisle-east . Control Room Off Gas Cell-2 Extraction Chemical Room CAY OGC-ARC Aisle Plant Area Chem Lab-east and west Perimeter-1 Product Lab Perimeter-2 Emission Spec. Lab Perimeter-3 Mass Spec. *tab GPC Crane Room Alpha Lab Mechanical Crane Room Stack Sampler Chemical Crane Room Upper Extraction Aisle-west Upper Extraction Aisle-east Extraction Chemical Room-east

'r:

Laundry

~ :---..;.~- ~-=--

discarded. These counts at maximum counting error, represent a~ut 1%

• of MAC for plutonium-239 and strontium-90 respectively. Samples which exce,d either or both of the counting limits will be held for a final count. The ftnal 30-minute count on in-pl~nt air samples is tak.en a minimum of four days after sampling to allow the natural activity to decay essentially to zero. All of the alpha counts are assumed to be counts due to product and the c~ncentrations are calculated as follows1 Alpha

~c/ml = c/m (1.31 x 10-12)

M3 Since the counting err~r for a 30-minute count at 95 percent confidence level is+/- 10% at 10 c/m, the minimum detectable alpha concentration on a 24-hour sample is1 10 (1.31 x 10- 12> = 1.5 x 10-13 with~ 10% accuracy 86.4 Beta-Gamma

~c/ml = c/m (9.19 x 10-13)

M3 .

9.38 Some in-plant air monitors are ~oving-filter type and the filter tape is not normally analyzed in the counting room. Portions I of the tape may be counted and/or gamma scanned if this information is 1*

needed.

9.39 The perimeter samples are changed weekly and are I

analyzed once as soon as practical after sampling and again four days

' after sampling. The samples are analyzed by counting for one hour in a low background aipha, beta proportional system (see ~ppendix 9.39a). The geometry of this system is 50% for beta and 35% for alpha. The background is about l c/m. The concentration of beta emitters is determined as shown in Appendix 9.39b and the concentration of alpha emitters is determined as shown in Appendix 9.39c. A log is kept of air sample results. These results become part of the permanent record of radiation-contamination conditions in and around the plant.

9.40 Radioiodine activated charcoal filters from the stack and p~rimeter ~tations are analyzed as follows: The filters are gamma .

scanned to dete~ine if there are other gamma emitting isotopes present and in what proportion. Since the radioiodine filter is preceded by a particulate filter, there will normally be no interference from other isotopes. The radioiodine filter is then counted in one of the propor-tional counting systems and the concentration is calculated as shown in Appendix 9.40

• of coun ters

• 9.41 The numbers used in this secti on for geometry and effic ienc y of and self abso rptio n in filte r paper are numbers furnish~d by the manu factu rers. The method used to deter mine9.37 actu al coun ter *geometry

). The colle ct!on is described in the calib ratio n secti on {Appendix ed by using a membrane effic ienc y of n~tman #41 filte r paper can be checkthe pene trati on under type filte r behind the Whatman #41 filte r to test abso rptio n of alpha in vario us cond ition s of use in the plan t. The self

e:: ~tf~ ! ~~~ !~1~ :!~~ ~~e: :ra~~~~!i~~dac~~~:r~; :~:s~

~:~~ ~ei~ e i~!t er, t coun t. These abso rptio n corr ectio n then becomes; filte r coun t/pla nche .

tests will be run on each batc h of filte r paper rece ived Radi ation - Contamination Survey Program 9.42 Beta-gamma film badges are supp lied to each emplfilm oyee and all visi tors to the plan t through an arrangementweek with a conunercial badge proc esso r. Badges are exchanged and read ly for most perso nnel; monthly for adm inist rativ e perso nnel . This schedule is subj ect to change as oper atin~ expe rienc e is gaine d. Immediate noti ficat ion by phone or of 100 mrem. Neutron

_wire ls given for badges which show a dose in excess badges are placed monitoring is accomplished on an area basi s. Neut ron

.in the prod uct stora ge and product packaging and handneut ling areas to estab lish The ron badges are and check the neutr on dose rate in these area s. chang ed to quar terly at a changed monthly* durin g start up but this may be

• late r date .*

• 9.43 Each prociuctio.1 employee and each visi tor is -issu the 0-20 0 mr g~a dosim eter which is read and the dose reco rded during shif t follo wing the shif t on which it is.us ed. The late th'l "Dosimeter Re~dings" form, and is trans ferre d

Record" card which is also used to reco rd padge read ings dose is recorded on ed a r to the "Exposure

. The 5 x.a* inch

, cont ains all card , designed to be used in a "Vic tor Visi ble" type file repre sents 13 of the infor mati on requ ired by AEC Form 5. Each cardosure Record" card weeks exposure data . See Appendix 9.43 for the "Exp refer ~ed to above.

9.44 A limit ed number of self read ing dosim eters are work*.

avai lable for use durin g "hot" area decontamination and maintenance nse *agai nst These dosim eters will be used as the second line of defe g, by Health and overexposure. The primary cont rol will be mon itorin keeping, by the Safe ty or by the indiv idua l performing the work, and* time indiv idua l or by a timekeeper assig ned t o the job.

9.45 Heal th and Safe ty resp onsi bilit y for prod uct shipments ature appr oval, enta ils checking the shipp ing papers for Production sign tion and surveying for product spec ifica tions , acco unta bilit y cert ifica all appl icab le fede ral, the shipp ing cont aine rs t~ insu re conformance with auth orize d Heal th and state , and loca l regu latio ns. The sign ature of ancons titut e approval to.

Safe ty repr esen tativ e on the ship.ping i,apers will ship*

• 9.46 With-the exception of Zone surveys a?e the responsibility of each employee.

aud.i t the frequency and adequacy of such surveys.

Zone II or Zone I area with contaminated clothing IV egress, personnel Health and .Safety will Personnel found in a may be subject to dismissal.

9.47 A regular schedule of routine surveys will be performed by Health and Safety. The routine survey program is designed to supplement the reports of radiation contamination conditions which are encountered during maintenance and other work, and to insure that all plant areas are surveyed on a regular basis. Each routine survey is described in consider-able detail on the "routine survey" form \See Appendix 9.47) which will serve as a guide for the Heal th and Safety person11el performing the survey.

A list of routine surveys is shown in. Table 9.47. A written record is made of every survP.y performed by Health and Safety personnel. This record which is executed on pre-numbered survey log sheets becomes part of the permanent record of radiation-contamination conditions in and around the plant.

Environmental Survey Program 9.48 The environmental survey program, pre-operational and post-operational is divided into three categories:

1. Atmospheric monitoring including air particulate monitoring;

• 2. Water monitoring including surface and -ground water 3.

sampling; Earth and biota monitoring including samples of silt, mud, -plankton, fish an.ci shellfish from Buttermilk Creek and Cattaraugus Creek; soil, vegetation and milk samples from the site and surrounding area *and small game from the site.

. . ' --..- ~ \,,._ V \ *. *,. 7

"~ ..... # . 4(.

• 9.49 The pre-operational progr e~ is divided into two phases; the first phase, started in the spring of 1963, to establish on site gross activity background with a few analyses for specific isotopes and the second phase, starting in the fall .of 1964, to include more analyses for specific isotopes. Phase II will continue into the post-operational period: Both Phases are detailed in Appendix 9.49. A summary of the Environmental Monitoring Program is presented in Tables 9.49a and 9.49b.

-Waste Disposal Control Program--Gaseous Waste 9.50 Gaseous waste control is accomplished by treatment of waste gases be(ore release, continuous monitoring at the point of release and environmental monitoring to determine the effect, if any, of released activity in the environment. Waste gas treatment is discussed in some detail in Section V~, Paragraphs 6.66 to 6.70. Prefilters, air sc: ubbers, silver reactors and high efficiency filters are used to minimize the amount of radioactive gases and particulates released routinely from the plant. It is anticipated that the routine releases will be well below the maximum ~llowable under applicable

Table 9.47

• Survey No.

Routine ~urveys Title Shift Assigned S-1 Check Dosimeters and Record Results 1,2,3 S-2 Pick up Air S~mples 1,2,3 5-3 Check Charts on Gamma Alarm, Sample

.System and Weather Monitoring SY.stem 1,2,3 S-4 Count Samples . 1,2,3 0-1 Check Station Monitors and Hand Countets 3 D-2 Calibrate Instruments 3 0-3 Spot Chack Laboratories 2 0-4 Surve~ Hot Lobby

• 3 D-5 Transfer Dosimeter Readings to Exposure Record Cards 1

• 0-6 0-7 Spot Check Sample Aisle, Pulser Aisle and Warm ~quipment Aisle Survey Lunch Room

. 3 2

0-8 Survey Step-off Pads 3 0-9 Prepare Control Samples for Counting 1 0-10 Prepare Environmental Samples for Counting 1 0-11 Spot Check Product, Packaging and Handling 2 W-1 Survey Alpha L_ab 1 W-2 Survey Chem Labs 1 W-3 Survey Spec Labs 1 W-4 Su~ey Product Lab 1 W-5 Survey Zone III offices 3

• W-6 S urvey Mens Locker Room 2

Table 9.47 con't Shift Su.rvay No. Title Assigned W-7 Survey Five Personnel 1,2,3 W-8 . Survey Ventilation Penthouse 3 W-9 Survey Upper Warm Equipment Aisle 3 w-10 Survey Access Aisle 2 W-11 Survey C~erating Aisles 2 W-12 Survey Sample* Aisle 3

\'t-13 Survey Fuel Receiving & Storage 3 W-14 Survey Product Packaging & Handling 2 W-15 Survey Decontamination Area 3 W-16 Survey Scrap Transfer Area 3 W-17 Survey Health Physics Lab 1 0

W-18 Survey Mechanical Cell Viewing Area 2 W-19 Survey Laundry 3 W-20 Obtain Environmental Samples 1 W-21 Survey Womens Locker Room l W-22 Survey Warm Equipment Aisle 3 W-23 Survey Mobile Equipment 1 W-24 Survey .Ventilation Equipment Rooms 2 M-1 Survey Analytical Viewing Ar~a 2 M-2 Survey Instrumept Shop 2 M-3 Survey Main Lobby 1 M-4 Survey Cold Chemical Penthouse 2 M-5 Survey Chemical Process Cell Viewing

• Area 2

Shift Survex Ho. Jltl* Assigned

• M*6 M-7 Survey Maintenance Shop Survey Guard House 2

1 M-8 Survey Tank Farm 1

• Survey Burial Ground 1 M-9 M-10 Survey Remote Operating Station 2 M-11 Survey Fi~st Aid 1 M-12 Obtain Environmental Samples -

M-13 Autoradiogr..1ph Env!ronmental Air Samples 1 Q-1 . Survey Ut111 ty Building 3 Q-2 Survey Roads, Walks, Farking lot and R.R. Spur 2 Survey Storage Lagoon and Hardstand

• o Q-3 Areas 1 Q-4 Survey Ory Wells 1 Q-~ Survey Zone II offices 3 Q-6 Obtain Environmental Samples 1 S = Shiftwi se 0 = Daily W= Weekly M = Monthly Q = Quarter1y

Table 9.49a Environmental Monitoring Phase I - Type of Analysis Weekly Monthly Semi-Annually Air Sampling Gross Alpha 3 Perimet er Gross Beta- ..

1 Plant Site Gamma Rain & Snow Gross Alpha

!Plant Site Gross Beta-Gallllla, Trltium I

I' Su3:face Water Gross Alpha 1 Erdman Brook Gross Beta:..

1 Butterm ilk Creek Gama, 1*r1t1um 1 Cattara ugus Creek Gross Alpha Mud ~Si_l t 1 Erdman Brook Gross Beta-1 Butterm ilk ,~~ek Gama 1 Cattara ugus C1*eek

• Well Water Gross Alpha f 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Galmla, Tritium Vegetation Gross Alpha 3 Perimet er Gross Beta-Garrma I-*131 Sr-90 Milk Gross Beta

~eighboring Farm Gamma I-131 Sr-90 Small Game ., Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Gama I-131 Sr-90

I  !'d>le ?-49b Environmental Monitoring Phase II - Type of Analysis Weekly Monthly Semi-Ann..Y,1Ally Air Sampling Gross alpha 3 PeriH ter Gross Beta- Ganma Scan 1 Plant Site Gama Rain and Snow Gross Alpha l Pl~nt Site Gross Beta- Sr-90 Ganma Tritium Surfac e Water Gross Alpha -

l Erdman Brook Gross Beta-1 Butter milk Creek Ganma, Tritium l Cattara ugus Creek

• Mud and Silt l Erdman Brook l Butter milk Creek 1 Cattara ugus Creek Gross Alpha Gross Beta-Ganma Sr-90 Well Water Gross Alpha 1 Plant Site Gross Beta-Garrma, Tritium Vegetation Gross Alpha 3 Perime ter Gross Be't a- Sr-90 Gamma I-131 Milk Gross Alpha LJ iant Site 1 Gross Beta- Sr-90 Ganma I-131 Fish and Shellf ish 1 Cattara ugus Creek Gross Alpha Gross Beta-Gaaaa I-131 Small Game Gross Alpha l Plant Site Gross Beta-Ganma I-131 Sr-90

.. \

fed era l*in d sta te reg ula tion s. Spare hig uni ts and aut01r,atic con trol s are used h lev el bur sts of act ivit y caused

~* necessary to pre ven t the escape of *

• by major equipment fai lur e.

9.5 1 A continuous stac k gas m~ ~to~c/m is used to d~~ect con cen trat ion s of 3 x gaama par ticu late act ivi ty and aboion of 10-r, des crib ed in Appendix 9.5 1, l or les s of gro ss bet a-ut the same~con cen tr~t ion of I-13 1. A eith er par ticu late s or rad ioio din e sig nif ica nt inc rea se in con cen trat room. The exa ct alarm pos itio ns wil l cause an alarm in the pla nt con trol ng experience1 they wil l be kept at wil l be fiel d sele cte d based on ope ratithe ear lies t pos sibl e warning* of off -

the lowest pra ctic al lev el to provide stan dar d condt tion s.

ne the eff ect s on the 9.5 2 Environmental monitoring to determi environment of waste gas dis pos al isandc.orain ncentl'ated in air sampling and out . Three site per ime ter sampling of soi l, veg eta tion , milk esta blis hed to determine con cen trat ion s continuous air mon itor ing sta tion s are of ~ad ioa ctiv e par ticu late s and rad ioiothe din e at the se sta tion s. One station pla nt, the second sta tion is is loc ated 3,lr O meters sou th-e ast of pla nt and the thir d sta tion is loc ated loc ated 2,1 00 meters nor th-e ast of thepla nt. This plac es a monitoring 4,0 00 meters nor th-n orth -we st of thent to Buttermilk Valley and, accord!ng sta tion at eith er. end of and adj ace ce one of the thre e monitors down to pre vai ling wind .pa tter ns, wil l pla the time.

wind of the stac k n,a rly 60 per cen t of and rain out sampling 9.5 3 Th6 rou ti~e . soi l, veg etat ion , milk ent ire sampling program is sub jec t program is def ine d in Table 9.4 9 b. The

• to change as ope rati ng exp erie nce is gain cha nge s wil l be min or in nat ure stac k monito*t ind ica tes an alarmdat (see* Appendix 9;53 } wil l supply dire ctio n of trav el of stac k fumes. and Spe cial ed but it is expected tha t any samples wil J b~ analyzed lf the cond~ti on. The weather monitoring the a which may be used to dete rmi ne the dist anc e at which the maximum ile motor-generator sampler set itat ion s, ground lev el con cen trat ion occ urs A mobk reg ard less of wind con diti ons .

wil l allo w sampling down wi nd of the stac Waste Waste Disposal Control Program -- Liquid 9.5 4 The primary contro l of high levthe el liqu id was.te is in itse lf, con cre te sau cer for the f aci liti es provided. The waste tank lty till " formation and the spa re secondary containment, *the impervious of"siconfidence in the system. See tank all con trib ute to a high degree 8, 7.2 5 - 7.3 7. Fac ilit ies are Paragraphs 5.~ o - 5.5 6, 7.1 0, 7.1 4 -7.1 annular space between the tank provided for monitoring or sampling l inbethe performed in the wel ls loc ated and the vau lt. Routine surveys wil tinuous water sampler loc ated ngar the adj ace nt to the waste tan ks. A con Creek wil l serve as a thir d monitoring confluence or Erdman Brook and ~ua rry *

• poi nt of con trol of liqu id waste.

harged to Cattaraugus 9.5 5 Low lev el liqu id waste wil l be disc Creek via Erdman Brook and But term ilk Creek. Waste water at a volume of about 40,000 gal lon s per ope rati ng day is received in the inte rce pto r, harged to a ser ies of holding batch neu tral ize d if nec ess ary , and disc 50,000 gal lon s and the ponds

~ oonds. The inte rce pto r volume is about

provi dt holdup for 4,000,000 gallon s or 100 opera ting days above the two minimum

• overflow ~int ,. Overflow point s between ponds are a valved line at feet above th* bottom to ~ovid e for solid s colle ction , and anvalved open overflow at one foot from the top.* The discha rge line to the creek is so the amount of waste discha rged may be regul ated.

9.~ Stream gauging and sampling statio ns are provided near the g confluence of Quarry Creek and Erdman Brook ~nd on Cattar augus Creek . Gaugin is performed in order to determine the rate at which waste soluti ons ted may be metered into Erdman Brook. Samples from these Gtatio ns will be collec and.!!'alyzed_weekly~ Analyses will includ e gross alpha , beta and gamma, tritiu m and speci fic isotop e analy ses as requir ed for contr ol. (Appendix 9.56)

Waste Disposal Contr ol Program--High Level Solid Waste 9.57 A buria l area for waste gener ated in the plant will be mai~tained in an area north of the plant between the waste tank farm and the confluence of ~uarr y Creek and Erdman Brook. This area will be reserved for proce ss scrap and discar ded proce ss equipm ent. Proce ss scrap , fuel eiement end pieces and leached hulls , will be packagtraile ed in 30 gallon drums, loaded into a shield ing cask on a carry -all type the buria r Parag raph 7.14. ) At l and transp orted to the buria l area. (See will b~

area a truck mounted crane with remote contr ols, 100 feet away, used to lift *the lid of the cask, remove the scrap drum and requir place it in al the trenc h. At the end of each buria l opera tion, which may usede tosever trips , the crane clam attachment or front end loade r, will the be backf ill where neces sary to maintain an exposure rate at secur ity fence of 2 mrem/hr. The drums will be covered with suffic ient dirt to r*duc e

• the exposure rate .at ~he edge of the trench to 200 mr/hr . will Final be backf illing when the trench , or a portio n of the trench , is full ng will to a radia tion level of 1 mr/hr or less. The minimu m dirt coveri be four feet thick .

9.~8 A simil ar procedure will be followed for buria l of process ed equipment. The *equipment, after decontamination, will be suitab ly packag orted and loaded on the truck in the Equipment Decontamina tion Room, transp to the buria l area, loaded into the trench with the crane and bac~f illed.

Packaging techniques will vary depending on the equipment itself and the a

radlai lon-co ntami natlon co,,di tions . Gener ally a sprayed-on coatin g or cover ing of plast ic film wiU be used. .

Medical Program 9.~9 The medical program, under the direc tion of the Medical Direc tor, will consi st of a very thorough pre-employment medic al histor y and physi cal examination for each prosp ective employee. The medic al partic ular histor y will be aimed at not only past illnes ses and injuri es but

\ ~ , ~ atten tion wlll be paid to histo ry of past radia tion~exposu re, allerg ies,

~e *~ c r a s i a s , tumors and any evidence of emoti onal insta bility . The labora tory studie s on all applic ants will consi st of a minimum ity of complete

~1:' ,r~

1 1

-t"* blood count , serolo gy, urina lysis, chest x-ray end vital capacnationdeter yearly

• minat ions. Each employee will hav9 a complete physi cal exami t:::::te J P A.

4 . ! . S 04

A complete blood count will be done twi~e yearly s clinicstudi al urina lysis monthly.

The pre-employment physi cal* examination and labora tory es will be repea ted on each indivi dual leavin g the fi4ploy of th~ company.

9.60 B10-1 111y1 will be scheduled for employees using an employee "acro ss-the -plan t statis tical survey" plan. The number of timesd each on his Nork is sampled ear~ year and the type analy ses performed will depen fissio n locati on. Offic e employees annua lly, for totai alpha and grossSafety techn i-produ cts; mechanical head end, extra ction opera tors, Healt htotal &

• a lph*a and cians , mai,.tenance and utilit y opera tori semi- annua lly for gToss fissio n produ cts; produ ct purif icatio n and packa ging opera tors quart erly be obtain ed to for plutonium and total uranium. Addit ional samples will inhala -

confirlil any positi ve resul t and speci al samples will be obtain ed when tion or inges tion is suspected for any employee.

9.61 Thyroid monitoring of employees will be performed at le*ast al once eac~ year in conju ction with the annual physi cal examination. Speci ts.

monitoring will be performed as indica ted b~ air sample count ing resul 9.62 A dispe nsary will be maintained for care of ordin ary minor on-th e-job injur ies. There will be facil ities for inten siveinatio first- aid n

care of severe injuri es such as burns , fractu res and gross contam e with radio active mater ials. Irmnunizati~n again st tetanu s will be routin for all employees.

9.63 Close liaiso n with the Healt h and Safet y Department will be maintained. The Medical Direc tor will assis t in health handandsafety Safety traihi ng and indoc trinat ion. He will review with the Healt Direc tor, all indus trial radia tion exposure record s; air, water and plant

. radia tion survey record s. He will coope rate with the Healt h and Safety Direc tor. in plant inspe ctions . as Radiation exposure data for each employee sh~ll be kept on form AEC-5

~rt of the permanent record of each employ~e. nent A permanent chec~ off list shall be attach ed to each employee's perma record covering all of the plants

• requir~ments regar di;;g physi cal well examinations and pe~ onal radia tion exposur~ record ing and contr ol as as all requirements uf 10CFR-20.

Emergency Procedure

• Fire Prote ction Organ izatio n 9.64 The Healt h and Safet y department has ~he primary respon*sibil i ty for traini ng personnel and auditi ng procedures and ng activ ities on for fire preve ntion as well as for fire fighti ng. The fire fighti tedfuncti in will be carrie d out through shift fire brigad es organized as indica Appendix 9.64.

Organization for Radiation Emergencies 9.6~ There are a very large number of combinations of condi tions which might const itute or cause an emergency. It is, there fore, not possi ble are to prescr ibe inflex ible procedures* for emergency action . However, there EI egg [ C'

.1 ral procedures may be stat ed

• ~ad cate gori es of emergencies for which gene and cert ain gene ral rule s which apply in near ly . the ~11 cise s. In any radi atio n primary resp onsi bilit y

...rgency, the Hea lth and Safe ty Department haslem and to recommen~ a cour se to defi ne the magnitude and exte nt of the prob s promptly and safe ly.

of acti on wh' ch will rest ore the affe cted area group (Pro duct ion 9.66 In

• any radi atio n emergency the resp onst bleexis ts must take ition or Ana lytic al} in the area in which the emerge~cl cond iaae diat e step s to accomplish the followings area s and take

a. Prot ect plan t ,.>ersonnel by evac uatin g affo cted e or moderate the caus e.

acti on to conf ine the cond ition and elim inat

b. Noti fy the Hea lth and Safe ty Dire ctor (or Tech nician on off shif t) tion of the givi ng all poss ible deta ils about the natu re and loca emergency.

c. If the emergency invo lves prop erty uctio damage, pers onal inju ry, sign ifica nt radi atio n leve ls, prod n inte rrup tion , or poss ible s

off- site contamination, the following must be noti fied He~lth and Safe ty Dire ctor Medical Dire ctor Laboratory or Production Manager Plan t Manager & Assi stan t Plan t Manager Ass istan t to the Plan t Manager

• Secu rity Offi cer Plan t Engineer

d. following the survey by Hea lth and Safety~y. barr affe cted area to prev ent inad vert ent* entr icad e and post the the requ ired men

e. Dev i** **a plan for rest orin g the area and assemble and mat eria ls.

an 9.67 Gen erall y, the following rule s apply in hand ling emergency cond ition s

a. If inci dent invo lves wreckage and a person is belie ved to be aliv e and trap ped, make every poss ible effo rt to rescority ue him. The usua l of the seni or radi atio n -r ule$ may be abrogated upon the auth person pres ent.

b. Segregate and deta in for furt her examinati on thos e persons who eria l. Parform have had poss ible cont act with the radi oact ive mat and inst itut e complete contamination surveys of such pers onne lcould resu lt from a sure decontamination at once if sign ifica nt expodecontamination to dela y. ~ormally, it is best to leav e skin tion .

thos e persons with spec ific train ing in this func

o. Remove inju red persons from the scene withmed as litt le dire ct pers onal

• cont act as *pos sibl e. Limit firs t aid and ical procedures to

tho1e that must be done promptly until the docto r is prese nt.

• d. Do only what is necessary to preser ve life and prope rty prior to the arriv al of Healt h and Safety speci alists .

e. Wor within the framework of any applic able SOP*s cover ing a speci fic type of emergency.

Plant Maintenance Program 9.68 The Nuclear Fuel Servi ces maintenance program has been planned to insure continued safe opera tion of the plan~ co111nensurateconom e with ic Paragraphs 9.13 to 9.41, with a minimum of downtime consi stent with consi derati ons.

9.69 The routin e inspe ction and maintenance program is simil ar to that for a noi,nal chemical plant , except where modified to reflemainte ct more of the plant . The nance string ent requirements for the nucle ar aspec ts ures for program is based upon utiliz ing conventional methods and proced to performing conta ct maintenance work. Speci al contr ols are incorp orated inated cover work within contamination and radia tion zones. Work on contam Safety equipment or syste~ s is done under the surve illanc e of the Healt h &

-Department which recoamends requir ed contr ol measures. C~refction ul plann ing, prewr itten job procedures, and close coord inatio n with Produ opera and Technical Servic es Departments assure safe and effic ient plant tion.

Normal inspe ction contemplates period ic shutdo wns to permi t inspe ction and maintenance of those portio ns of the plant not readi ly acces sible

• during routin e opera tion *

. 9.70 Certa in equipment is deemed vital to the safe and continuous opera tion of the plant . This equipment is define d as 1., equip ment that could become critic ally unsafe from a nucle ar* stand

2. any malfunctioning piece of equipment which could reason ably requi point and re the shutdown of the plant .

A list, referred to as the Vital Equipment List initia ted bi Manag the Production is and Technical Servic es Departments and approved by the Plant The er, list compiled and issued to the Production Department. (See 9.82) of states the requirements to be met before the equipment is thken outequip -

servic e, and what tests and requirements are to be met bef9r e the fica1l y de1sig nated on ment is return ed to servic e. All equipment not speci be taken out the Vital Equipment* List is considered as non critic al and may rd of servic e, repair ed, and return ed to servic e according to normal standa maintenance pract ice.

Q!' ganiz ation 9.71 Maintenance work on Nuclear Fuel Servi ces equipment and nsible systems ls performed by ?lant Engineering. Plant Engineering is respo Each of for all mechanical, instru ment and elect rical mainte nance work.

ration these categ ories is und,r the direc tion of a group leade r. Close coope rve man-between these groups is maintained to facil itate sched uling, conse pow , and minimize downtime.

• Under normal conditi ons, mechanical and electri cal maintenance is accomplished on a day schedul e, five days per weik~ Much of the routine instrument main-tenance ls carried out on a similar schedule; however, instrument. technic ians are normally on shift with operati ons personnel.

Plant Engineering Section Personnel 9.72 . Plant Engineering is composed of a plant enginee r, mechanical enginee rs, maintenance mechanics, instrum ent technic ians, and stenographer.

The Plant Engineer is respons ible for,

1. Planning, schedul ing, and control ling personn el, materia ls, equipment and tools.

2. Initiati ng trainin g and educati onal programs for maintenance personn el.

3. Establi shing and supervi sing the maintenance of a readily accessi ble file of design .and vendor informa tion, parts dat2, .preven tive main-tenance records , and histori cal records .

4. Supervi sion of all maintenance assignments, includin g instruc tions to cover *safe working practic es, radiatio n protect ion measures and

• as>proved maintenance repair procedures *

5. Making technic al studies on maintenance of mechanical, instrument and electri cal equipment, and making reconimendations on design changes.

6. Preparing labor and mate~ial costs estimat es for non routine work.

The Plant Engineer is primari ly assisted by two mechanical engineers to whom any of the above respon sibiliti es may be delegat ed. Technical

~upport is availab le from the Technical Service s and the Health and Safety Departments which will provide special ists as require d.

Facilit ies 9.73 The .Plant Engineering Section and shop faciliti es are organized primari ly to perform field maintenance work. On site shop work consist s basical ly of minor repairs , replacement of defectiv e components and checkout of equipment. The bulk of the work is of *short duratio n and minor complexity, and the shops are equipped accordi ngly. Machine, electri c, instr\.!fflent, pipe, carpent ry and welding shops are provided.

• In cases where maintenance functio ns require faciliti es not provided at the site, private ly operated*

shops in nearby Buffalo , New York will b~ utilized where possibl e

• Instrwpent Maintenance

• Personnel 9.74 The maintenance of instr umen tatio n and cont rol sy~te the resp onsi bilit y of the Plan~ Engineer assis ted by the These resp onsi bilit ies are as follo ws, ms is Instrument Engineer.

r

1. Adequacy of the maintenance faci litie s and the train ing of personnel to meet all requirements, both routi ne and emergency; in coop erati on

2. Planning and scheduling of all instr umen t maintenance with mechanical maintenance perso nnel ;

all cont rol

3. Establishment of a prev entiv e maintenance programonforthose invo lving systems and components, with part icula r emph asis the safet y of the .plan t.

4. Planning and maintenance of a file system th~t cont ains the info r-mation necessary to analy ze, desig n, orde r spare parts and components, apply prev entiv e maintenance procedures and prov ide histo ry of n with repa irs on all equipment. This will be done in conjunctio mechanical maintena~ce.

Instrument Shop Faci litie s 9.75 The instr umen t shop is equipped with serv ices, (wat er, air, o* elec trici ty, tools and test equipment) necessary for the maintenance of eithe r pneumatic or elec tron ic instr umen ts.

calib ratio n and Maintenance Categories 9.76 Plan t Engineering performs three categ ories ofnon work; ce and routi ne preventive maintenance and insp ectio n, rout ine maintenan lve hazardous cond ition s maintenance * .Any of these categ ories of work niay invo in performing this due to radia tion or contamination. The procedures used ee of hazard inv~lved work depend on both the category of work and the degr dures will be subj ect due to dire ct radia tion or contamination. These proce s involving to approval by the Heal th and Safe ty Dire ctor in those case radia tion haza rds.

Preventive Maintenance and Insp ectio n izes shutdowns and 9.77

• The prev entiv e maintenance program minimcalib g ratio ns or breakdowns by syste mati cally insp ectin g equipment, makin re failu re occu rs.

befo adjustment, and scheduling repa irs and over haulsand a schedule of routi ne Each piece of equipment ls stud ied thoro ughl y, wing c~as sific ation ss insp ectio ns is determined and estab lishe d under the follo

a. A-Class, Major insp ectio n (complete check of equiplly ment,)

Usua made quar terly

b. B*Classa A "mid dle-o f-the -road " insp ectio n.

to semi-annually and, on occa sions , monthly~

• c. C-Classa . A minor insp ectio n (ord inari ly visu al and frequ ent.) Usually made monthly to quar terly and, on occa sions , weekly.

As each piece of equipment ls studie d, a complete list of items to inspec-be checked

• on each inspe ction is made. A contr al contr ol system indicl ates when tions are due. If inspe ctions do not interf ere with norma plant opera tion, ance with work loads th~ inspe ctions are scheduled and carrie d out ~n accord or interf ere in the secti on. Inspe ctions that requi re shutdown of equipm~nt tment.

with normal plant opera tions are coord inated with the Production Depar After an inspe ction is completed, inform ation is transf erred fromrs the are inspe ction sheet to a card as a contin uing record . If any repainance and neces sary, such repai rs fall in1'o the catego ry of routin e mainte

~e scheduled ~ccording to the urgency requi red. o Routine Maintenance 0 9.78 Routine maintenance includ es all maintenance work on or equipnent or systems which is ' direc ted toward restor ing the equipment system to its normal functi oning capab ility, witho ut alteri ng its basic design functi on. Routine maintenance is conducted during norma l plant opera tion, as well as during scheduled shutdowns. ction Depart-Normal routin e maintenance work is eithe r reque sted by the Produ is ment or resul ts from the preve ntive maintenance program. Because there to gener ally a backlog of work, all work is given a level of prior ity facil itate effec tive sched uling. Prior ity is based on safeguards consi derati ons, production loss resul ting from the equipment being shut. down, or the e proba bility of a breakdown if a repai r is not made, with consequent damag to equipment. *

!,on Routine Maintenance 9.79 Non routin e maintenance includ es modif icatio ns or additi ement to systems or proce sses ~s differ entia ted from repai r or replacwork, main-faulty equipment. Depending ~pon the nature and exten t of tne Plant Engineering tenance or const ructio n forces are used. In the latte r case, that it of ons is respo nsible for maint aining close conta ct with the .work to seeestim ate, and is performed in accordance with . speci ficati ons, within the cost repor ting on the progr ess of the job during the const ructio n period .

Administrative Procedures for Carrying Out Program I

9.80 All work performed in the variou s categ ories of the main-tenance program, includ ing those of the* Plant Engineering Sectioance n both during normal plant opera tion and during plant shutdown, ~re in accordadminwith istrati ve estab lished admin istrati ve procedures descri bed below. These be satisf ied procedures deal with the condi tions or requirements that must to initia te and complete a maintenance opera tion rathe r than to exerc ise contr ol over the actua l repa~ r work.

• Non Vital Components 9.81 Admi nistra tively contr olled maintenance procedures are not requir ed on non vital components for safe opera tion of the tions facili ty.

There fore, preve ntive maintenance or routin e mainte nance opera on non vital components is carrie d out by the maintenance sectio ns in accord ance

with normal stand ard maintenance prac tice, exce ptcoor as noted in Sect ion 9.83 .

The maintenance work on non vita l components is dina ted with the Prod uctio n proc edur es f~r most Department to minimize downtime. Deta iled maintenanc~writ ten by maintenance piece s of equipment are provided by the vendor or are be alter ed and is perso nnel ; for hazardous cond ition s the oper ation may9.83 . Non routi ne

..adm inist rativ ely cont rolle d as desc ribed in Sect ion ion 9.84 .

maintenance of a non vita l component is discu sse~ in Sect Vita l Components es are 9.82 Adm inist rativ ely cont rolle d maintenance proc edurTher efore ,

faci lity.

requ ired on vita l components for safe oper ation of the main tenan ce, it is prio r to performing prev entiv e maintenance or routi ne tenance work. Such nece ssary to evaiu ate the effe ct of performing the main ment. The Vita l an evalu ation is made on all item s liste d as vita l equip t and the Tech nical Equipment List is prep ared by the Prod uctio n Departmen If the maintenance Serv ices Department and approved by the Plan t .Manager. haza rd, the work is work does not invo lve a radia tion or conta mina tion initi ated afte r appro val by the Prod uctio n Manager. ce If a radia tion or job, it is nece ssary conta mina tion haza rd is asso ciate d with the maintenan Non rout ine maintenance to alte r the oper ation as desc ribed in Sect ion 9.83 .

of vita l components is discu ssed in Sect ion 9.84 .

Hazardous Maintenance to alte r

. 9.S3 When hazardous cond ition s exis t, it is nece ssary In all case s, is initi at~d .

normal maintenance procedures befo re maintenance proce dure is obta ined and a Spec ial Work Procedure is requ ired. This work use. of this perm it is admi niste red as desc ribed in Parag~aph 9.17 . The mana gement take adeq uate er and prov ides maximum assur ance that both the work or conta mina tion asso ciate d step s to mini,nize the *consequences of radia tion .

with the job. s~ary to fulf ill the In all case s invo lving haza_rdous main tenan ce, it is e.nece Afte r this is done, requ irem ents set forth in the Spec ial Work Proc edure with Sect ions 9.81 the maintenance oper ation is performed in accordanc and 9.82 * .

Non routi ne Maintenance desig n 9.84 Non routi ne maintenance invo lves changes in basic type of rm this or addi tions to equipment. When it is nece ssary to perfo such maintenan is ce maintenance, on eith er. vita l or non vita l components,a change is conducted not carri ed out unti l a complete eval uatio n of such proc edur e is approved, and approved by the Crit Jcal ity Committee. Afterdanc r the the maintenance oper ation s are performed in* acco e with Sect ions 9.81 9.82 or 9.83 .

• Work Completion n and Tech nical 9.85 Repr esen tativ es of Plan t Engi neeri ng, Prod uctio lved) obse rve ts (if invo Serv ices (if invol ved) and Heal th and Safe ty Departmen s or syste m invol ved in the tes ting and retur n to oper ation of the comp onent

• maintenance

• Production Department

• 9.86 The Production Department ls resp onsi ble for and maintenance of the proc essin g plan t and its rtme provide safe ty to the publ ic and plan t pers onne and maintenance of the faci lity with in the operinatin rel~ ted proc the oper atio n ess serv ices .

nt has been planned to The organ.za tion and adm inist ratio n of the depa l and to effe ct oper atio n g lice nse limi tatio ns.

pres crib ed limi tatio ns, In orde r to effe ctiv ely oper ate the plan t with the groups to achieve effe ctiv e the Production Department has been broken downpinto downs are as followsz cont rol of the nece ssary oper atio ns. The grou break

"* "a - rz . ' ' s

a. Fuel and Mechanical Handling;

b. Chemical Proc essin g; S" ., -!- , ~ i ~ 2 I 1

c~ Plan t Engineering; ., 1 F, -.1 ~ er I I - 1:3

d. Util itie s and Process Serv ices . ~ ¥~ * :

9.87 The Fuel and Mechanical Handling group is spor *resp orisi ble

.tran t, hand ling for the Fuel Receiving and Storage area inclu dingofcask *the FRS wate r trea tmen t fuel asse mbli es, tran sfer and stora ge; oper ation ding fuel assembly tran sfer ,

faci litie s; Proc.ess Mechanical Cell oper ation inclu s, fuel shea ring , hand ling hand ling , disassembly by saw or *mechanical meanequi pment repa ir or repl ace-of scrap~ util ity se~v ices to the area and hot hand ling , stor age and ment; General Purpose Cell inclu ding the load ing, and equipment util ity tran sfer oper atio ns of fuel bask ets, scra p mate rial ination Room incl udin g serv ices ; Chemical Process Cell-Equipment Deco ntam the charge of fuel into and disc harg e of leached hull s out of the diss olve rs, oper atio ns with in the CPC

• replacement of equipment, and remote hand ling ling and the EDR; Scrap removal inclu ding the hand of wast e and mate rials into and out of the mechani Acc ount abili ty and mate rial cont rol coor dina tion cons Department requ irem ents .

and tran sfer oper atio ns cal head end iaci litie s.

isten t with Prod uctio n inclu de feed 9.88 Chemical Processing group resp onsi bilit iesprod uct puri fi-diss olut ion, solv ent extr acti on, solv ent reco very systems, cold chemical make up, catio n and conc entr atio n, acid reco very , samp l ing, ess off gas systems, buil ding waste conc entr ation and rework oper atio ns, proc isten t with Prod uctio n vent ilati on and acco unta bilit y in thes e area s cons Department requ irem ents .

9.89 The Plan t Engineering group is resp onsi ble for the main-tenance of the faci lity as necessary to main tain cont inui ty of oper atio n as desc ribe d in deta il in Paragraphs 9.68 through 9.85 des the 9.90 The Util itie s and Process Serv ices group inclu oper ation s of: all util ity systems with in the for util ity room, plan t area and soli ds and liqu ids; off- plan t faci litie s; non radi oact ive systems andboth scra p removal from the oper ation of the conv entio nal low leve l buri al t, hand ling , warehouse and plan t; mate rial hand ling inclu ding the tran sporired for plan t oper atio ns; dist ribu tion of equipment and supp lies as requ ded under othe r groups; decon tami natio n of area s and faci) itie s not inclu ut and inpr oces s mat eria l i:ate rial cont rol inclu ding reco rds of inpu t, outp source mate rial an~

nece~$ary to effe ct cont rol; and acco unta bilit y of '

Production Department

• 9.86 The Production Department ls resp onsi ble for and maintenance of the proc essin g plan t and its rtme provide safe ty to the publ ic and plan t pers onne and maintenance of the faci lity with in the operinatin rel~ ted proc the oper atio n ess serv ices .

nt has been planned to The organ.za tion and adm inist ratio n of the depa l and to effe ct oper atio n g lice nse limi tatio ns.

pres crib ed limi tatio ns, In orde r to effe ctiv ely oper ate the plan t with the groups to achieve effe ctiv e the Production Department has been broken downpinto downs are as followsz cont rol of the nece ssary oper atio ns. The grou break

"* "a - rz . ' ' s

a. Fuel and Mechanical Handling;

b. Chemical Proc essin g; S" ., -!- , ~ i ~ 2 I 1

c~ Plan t Engineering; ., 1 F, -.1 ~ er I I - 1:3

d. Util itie s and Process Serv ices . ~ ¥~ * :

9.87 The Fuel and Mechanical Handling group is spor *resp orisi ble

.tran t, hand ling for the Fuel Receiving and Storage area inclu dingofcask *the FRS wate r trea tmen t fuel asse mbli es, tran sfer and stora ge; oper ation ding fuel assembly tran sfer ,

faci litie s; Proc.ess Mechanical Cell oper ation inclu s, fuel shea ring , hand ling hand ling , disassembly by saw or *mechanical meanequi pment repa ir or repl ace-of scrap~ util ity se~v ices to the area and hot hand ling , stor age and ment; General Purpose Cell inclu ding the load ing, and equipment util ity tran sfer oper atio ns of fuel bask ets, scra p mate rial ination Room incl udin g serv ices ; Chemical Process Cell-Equipment Deco ntam the charge of fuel into and disc harg e of leached hull s out of the diss olve rs, oper atio ns with in the CPC

• replacement of equipment, and remote hand ling ling and the EDR; Scrap removal inclu ding the hand of wast e and mate rials into and out of the mechani Acc ount abili ty and mate rial cont rol coor dina tion cons Department requ irem ents .

and tran sfer oper atio ns cal head end iaci litie s.

isten t with Prod uctio n inclu de feed 9.88 Chemical Processing group resp onsi bilit iesprod uct puri fi-diss olut ion, solv ent extr acti on, solv ent reco very systems, cold chemical make up, catio n and conc entr atio n, acid reco very , samp l ing, ess off gas systems, buil ding waste conc entr ation and rework oper atio ns, proc isten t with Prod uctio n vent ilati on and acco unta bilit y in thes e area s cons Department requ irem ents .

9.89 The Plan t Engineering group is resp onsi ble for the main-tenance of the faci lity as necessary to main tain cont inui ty of oper atio n as desc ribe d in deta il in Paragraphs 9.68 through 9.85 des the 9.90 The Util itie s and Process Serv ices group inclu oper ation s of: all util ity systems with in the for util ity room, plan t area and soli ds and liqu ids; off- plan t faci litie s; non radi oact ive systems andboth scra p removal from the oper ation of the conv entio nal low leve l buri al t, hand ling , warehouse and plan t; mate rial hand ling inclu ding the tran sporired for plan t oper atio ns; dist ribu tion of equipment and supp lies as requ ded under othe r groups; decon tami natio n of area s and faci) itie s not inclu ut and inpr oces s mat eria l i:ate rial cont rol inclu ding reco rds of inpu t, outp source mate rial an~

nece~$ary to effe ct cont rol; and acco unta bilit y of '

al nuc lea r ma teri al as nec ess ary for Production Department req uire me nts .

• sp eci 9.91 The bas ic pla nt ope rati on andsup con tro l is ~ar ried out shi ft erv iso rs; however, in a phy sic ally by the process ope rato rs and NFS pla nt, add itio nal sup por t inc lud ing lar ge proce, ing complex such as themo nito ring , acc oun tab ilit y, maintenance tec hni cal. and ana lyt ica l ser vic es, pro per ope rati ons . The groups, list ed and con tro l is necessary to ass ure duction sup erv iso rs, have been est abl ish ed in Paragraph 9.8 6 and sta ffe d by pro provide the def ine d por tion s of thi s ~

wit hin the Production Department to to ma inta in an up- to- dat e inti ma te sup por t. The ir primary function is of res pon sib ilit y. These sta ff fun ctio ns knowledge of the ir res pec tive are as ir are as, how ever, adm inis trat ive con tro l have fun ctio nal res pon sib ilit y for the is maintained ~y the Production Manag er or an As sis tan t Production Manager.

This type of org ani zat ion providestral a dec ent rali zed typ e of fun ctio nal res pon sib ilit y, yet maintains cen ize d con tro l over ope rati ons .

all det ail s of pla nt 9.9 2 To the maximum pra ctic al exts.entThese inc lud e Standard ope rati on are con tro lled by wri tten clu procedure ting Pro ced ure s, Run She ets (in din g adm inis trat ive con tro ls) and Opera cedures are maintained in a cur ren t Let ter s of Au tho riza tion . These pro through 9.7 and 9.9 4.

sta tus as described in Paragraphs 9.5 9.93 The Standard Operating Proced ures inc lud e a det aile d ope rati on of each pie ce of equipment ste p-b y-s tep .procedure for fun ctio nal nt. The format for SOP toy eth er wit h a and /or process function in the pla s covered by SOP are shown in App end ix gen ,ral list ing of the major systemsco pe encompassed, a gen era l des inison cri pti

3. Inc lud ed in eac h SOP is the -

9.9 s to be observed in ope rati ons ; adm of the ope rati on inv olv ed, cau tion ope rati on, ref ere nce s to rel ate d SOP tra tiv e con tro ls req uire d during the ctio ns for fun ctio nal ope rati on of the or oth er procedures, det aile d ins truthe mechanical lim itat ion s of the equ ip-equipment and ,ins ofa r as pos sib le,e ins tan ces , more app rop riat ely be inc lud ed ment. This las t item may, in som in Run She ets.

• 9.94 Run Sheets are ano the r set ofope procedures used to maintain pla nt ope rati on. The y lis t the rati ng con diti ons for the con tro l of the campaign of a par ticu lar fuel beginn ing wit h mechanical pro ces sin g andupper con tinu ing through the process to pro duct sto rag e. They inc lud e the imum and lower lim its for each flow of pla nt pro ces sin g. For example, max ven t min imu m flow rat es are list ~d for each inf lue nt stream to each solShe ets and ired ope rati ng flow. Sep ara te Run The ext rac tion column as well as a des ize under the ope rati ng lice nse .

are used for each flowsheet aut horthed shi ft sup erv iso r and his ope rato rs published Run Sheets ava ilab le to n tho se per mis sib le under the ope rati ng are gen era lly more res tric tiv e tha e st~ ict-enforcement and con tro l of the lice nse . This pra ctic e allows mor iso r cannot ope rate out sid e the spe cif ied pla nt ope rati on. The shi ft sup erv ext ens ion of the se lim its may be made, lim its of the R;Jn She et. HaNeveng r, wit hin the lim its of the ope rati lice nse , by an approved Let ter ofhin the Au tho riza tion . If the sup erv iso r the cannot maintain the ope~~tion wit on must lim it spe cifi ed by the Run Sheet aff ect ed por tion of the ope rati is cor rec ted or approval to modify the run be shu t down unt il the con diti on and ame nde d as she et is rec eiv ed. Run Sheets are ons reviewed per iod ica lly the is the .pl ant ope rate d out sid e

• deemed necessary. Under no con diti the opera~ing lice nse .

tec hni cal spe cif ica tio ns included in

9.~ Letter* of Auth oriza tion are an admi nistra tive procedure

• dlrec ting actua l plant opera tion as descr ibed in Paragraph used to autho rize

• apecl fic Run Shee t and/o r auxil iary to cedur

~tlc ular proc111ln9 campaign and in iddit ion, are used All the re1tr lctlv e procedures estab lishe d for plant contr ol.

Auth oriza tion ar* approved as discu ssed in Parag raph 9.7.

pr_o 9.7. They are es for a modify any of Lette rs of 9.96 The actua l opera tion of the complete proce ssing plant ls performed by personnel licen sed as descr ibed in Parag raph 9.9 through 9.11. The basic areas of opera tor respo nsibi lity are broke n down into t with produ ction plant speci fic catag ories or areas of the plant cons isten by opera tors cons isten t opera ting techn iques . The speci fic ar~~s are manned shift with their group licen se. The speci fical ly-as signe d areas for each are as follow s,

1. Central Cont rol Room;

2. Process Mechanical Cell; 3; General Purpos.e Cell;

4. Fuel Receiving and Storage-Chemical Processing Cell;

!>. Sampling;

6. Chemical Makeup;

7. Product Packaging and Handling;

8. Waste Handling. areas ,

In addit ion, non licen sed personnel are assigned to the following

1. Utili ty Room;

2. Yards and ground, et~.

A brief -desc riptio n of each of these areas outli ning the basic opera tor s,

0 respo nsibi lities for the respe ctive areas is as follow

1. Centr al Control Room The Chemical proce ssing porti on of the plant is contr olled from a Cent ral Control Room locat ed on the fourt h floor of the process gh build ing. Proce ssing adjus tmen t, beginning with disso lver opera tions and continuJ.ng throu and feed stora ge are solve nt extra ction , product purif icati on, conc entra tion* ss is exerc ised

_qperated from this locat ion. Complete contr ol of the proce tio~s such as from the contr ol room with the exception of non routi nentsopera which are locat ed J!!l_ny_al_block_y_alyes for the process servi ce requireme in the Upper and in the Upper and Lower Extra ction Aisle s. Manual valvi ngs at the reque st Lower Extra ction Aisle s is performed by other indiv idual of the contr ol room opera tors or shift super visor s. The contr ol room panel is a semi-graphic type for ease of ident ifica tion and efficmany ient opera tion.

of the In addit ion to posti ng the Run S~ee ts in the contr ol room, s of opera tion.

instru ment s are indiv idual ly posted showi ng the limit

2. Process Mechanical Cell

a. Fuel assembly trans fer and hand ling.

b. Fuel assembly disassembly usi~g saw or mecha nical means.

c. Removal of extraneous hardware.

d. Make up of fuel modules and shear ing.

e. Handling indiv idual fuel elements. e.

f. Scrap hand ling, cell decontamination and in-ce ll remote maintenanc

a pre1cribe d detailed form listing the constitue nt concentr ation, and total amounts of each tolution. The aolutton la then sampled and held for certi-fication . Following certifica tion, and upon process demand, the solution la then transferr ed to a tun tank for subsequent introduc tion to the process or, in acme cases, directly into the process vesselJ.

8. Product i>ackaging and Handling

a. Load out of plui~nium product into bird cages and interim storage in the process building . *

b. Load out of high enriched uranium into bird cages and interim storage.

c. Load out of low enriched uranium product to transpor t v,lssel.

All operation s are conducted on a batch basis following specific instructi ons by the shift superviso r.

9. Supporting Areas I

a. Scrap Removal Areas, including the receiving and transfer to t.~e burial area of leached. hulls and other head-end scrap generated during processin g,

. and transfer of new material s to the General Purpose Cell for head-end p~ocessing. *

b. Equipment Decontamination Room, including the mechanical handling to and from the chemical process cell.

c. Process Laundry for decontamination of the anti-cont aminatio n clothing

.use~ in the facility.

10 * .!!1!,!ity Room Operation--All Plant Services Contained Within the UtJ..11ty Room Complex

a. Water-**raw, filtered, process, demineralized, and potable.

b. AiT--process, instrume ntation.

c. Steam--eq-,Jipment, process and heating.

d. Electrica l--norma l and emergency, Ct C .... SU ,. -

Before the UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COi.MISSION Washington, o. C.

In the Matter of the Application of NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC.

For Licenses for a Spent Fuel Prpcessing Plant Under Sections 53, 63, 81, 104{b), and 185 of the Atomic Energy Act AEC Docket No. 50-201 Submission No. 21 - Final Safety Analysis Report Paragraphs 9.~7 through 9.117 of Section IX of the Safety Analysis, Revision of Table of Contents for Chapter IX, and Paragraph 1.91 October 26, 1964 5067 .

• .COjTENJS continued Section Paragraph Number IX PLANT OPERATION Organization 9.1 Administration 9.4 7raining of Plant Personnel 9.9 Training of Outside Organizations 9.12 Health and Safety Program 9.13 Emergency Procedures 9.64 Plant Maintenance Program 9.68 Production Oepartr.~nt 9.86 Process Maloperation 9.97 D

Revision l, October 26, 1964

JX PLANT Af'EBAJJ<J,I 1.91 Included in thls section are details relating to the foll~ tng subjects* Plant Organization, Plant Admini~tration, the training of plant personnel, the Plant Health and Safety Program, the Plant Emergency Program, the _Plant Maintenaryce Program, the operation a.nd function of the Production Department, and a discussion of Process .Maloperations.

1.92 Plant Organization discusses the duties of the Plant Manager, Production Manager, Health and Safety Director.

Technical Service Manager and Plant Criticality committee.

1.93 Operating Procedures, Letters of Authorization, the procedures involved in initiating and changing same, and the methods used. to insure that these procedures and Letters of Authori-zation are being followed are discussed in the Administration Section.

1.94 The Plant Training Program at various levels throughout the plant is covered under this topic. The Appendix to this section lists the curriculum to be employed in performing this training. *

• 1.9~ The Health and Safety section defines the responsi-bilities of the Health and Safety Department, the general regulations and procedures for performing radioactive work, the maximum -allowable levels of radiation jn the plant (by zones), the monitoring sampling procedures, and the medical program.

• 1.96 Details of the fire protection organization and general procedures to be followed in the event of radiation emergencies are defined in this se*c tlon.

1.97 The operation of the Plant Maintenaoce Department, its organization, duties and functions are defined in this section.

1.98 Prcduction Department operations, including administrative controls within the Production Department, a break-down and a description of the operations in the plant by major areas are described in this section.

1.99 Process maloperations; results, the method determining the maloperation and the corrective action to be taken is presented, largely in tabular form, in this section.

Revision 1. October 26, 1964

Proc;;a,, Miloperattoo 9.97 lllch design, operating information, and experience exists on the chemical processing of spent reactor fuel, particularly on processing by solvent extraction. *The Purex-type of extraction process, which will be used in the NFS plant, is a thoro49hly tested process and one which .is ex-pected to operate without unusual difficulty. Plant operation is predicated upon the "norm" or usual condition where the equipment operates as designed and no *human mistakes are {Jlade. Obviously, such ideal conditions will no~

always exist. This section discusses possible maloperation in various areas of the plant, the results of such rnaloperation, the method of determining c maloperation, and the corrective action to be taken in the case of the particular maloperation. This information is largely presented in tabular form for ease in review and *assimilation. A list of abbreviations used in the discussion is found in Table 9.97.

Mechanical Cttead End} Processing.

9.98 Maloperations that may occur in the head-end processing are mechanical in nature.

• M>st of the maloperations envisioned involve a failure of a manipulator grapple during the transfer of f~el elem*nts or f baskets and constitute little or no hazard, as such, but rather an incon-venience and time loss during processingr Maloperations in the FRS, PM:,

GPC, and CPC are itemized in table ,.,sa, b, c, and d.

I Dissolution - Feed *Adjustment.

9.99 Dissolution-Feed Adjustment steps Jnder normal condi-tions are discussed in Sections 4.21 through 4.34. The nature of a mal-operation can vary with the f ue-1 be lng processed. For dis cuss ion purposes, the fuels will be divided into (1) ceramic UC>i or Th<?:2 fuels, cylindrical in form,. clad in stainless steel or Zircaloy tubing (as repre-eented by Consolidated-Edison, Yankee, Commonwealth-Edison, and Northern States Power Fuels), (2) uranium-aluminum alloy fuels (MI'R type), and (3) Zr-U alloy* fuels (STR type). Maloperations in dissolving these types of fuels will be fairly representative of difficulties that can be encountered in all types of fuels processed. by NFS.

A summary of dissolution maloperation for these three fuel types, is given in tabl~ 9.99. Contents of this table are discussed in the following paragraphs a Ceramic Fuels, Stainless- or Zirc;aloy-Clad.

• Yankee, Commonwealth-Edison, and Northern States PaNer fuels are practically identical in processing. These fuels are chopped, loaded into baskets, and the baskets placed in the dissolvers, as described in Section IV. Dissolvent acid of the appropriate strength is added to the dissolvers, the solution heated, and the dissolution of the fuel proceeds . Too low or too high a dissolvent concent~ation or too little or too ~uch dissolvent added to the dissolver are the maloperations most likely to occur. The r~sults of, and corrective actions

• required by, such a maloperation are given in table 9.99.

.. Table *9.97 INSTRlllENT FtK:TIONS (Nomenclature used in Maloperation Dlscusalon) i:

~ .::.*

~

°,3 Display Devices Z Cont:lling Device*

J'~

~~

,..~

l1 '1*

%~

_p'.;

~'b f. ~li

~

~O) ~ ~ ~o. ~*.#

I

. § G~ ~~

g"' ..., s ~ . *'fi "J-1\.~,f' ~* 8 l'

~

~ a l! .:f 1 ~

~~ -v -v o" -.."' ,

I I Measured Variable I A..,~ ~ A$ ~ C?~ow

• NI nh Column Pulse C CIC . CAL CAH (Frequency-Pressure)

Density D DI DR DR: DAL DAIi .

Flow F FI FR FFC FG FAL Interface Position IRC IAH/L I IAH/L I (LFC- (hihh-low)

(Column) T~\

Liquid Level L LI LR *LIC LFC LAL LAH Pressure P . PI Pli Dl:r PAH

-~ -** * - - I I I - - *1 .I . ..... I I PG

- I I I Pressure Differential Pd PdR Pcl:L PdAL PdAH I Te-rature 'T TI TR TIC TIC 1G . TAL TAH

Table 9.98a MALOPERATION IN FlEL RECEIVING AND smt\GE AREA (FRS)

JA-~,-~ - 1,, ..," ,,4' Maloperation Result Indication A /corrective* Ac.tion

. 1. I Grapple f allure during Fuel element drops to floorl Visual. Special underwater ex*

fuel transfer. of cask unloading pool. tenaio, wrenchee and tongs used to retrieve R" \e ci ~ ~ .......,C "0 J r,

<,o.t

~ , \/

j"'*~,~ fue 1. W ....~ w * .,/~ ~ -,o

2. Fuel element cannot be re- Inconvenience and time lossJ Poor visibility or binding Cask cover replaced and trieved from floor of cask - , - t. '/:. ** between cask and pool wall cask removed to ~-,,**

. () ((Cf..'" (/

unloading pool. or canisters. tamination area to pro-fl l. r . e,c.. , l U*

t. -

41.-

vide working space.

3. I Fuel element stuck in in- I Inconvenience and time lossJ Visual. Use underwat~r working dividual shipping *slot. tools or fabricate equipment for removal.

Table 9.98b

• MALOPERATION IN ~C:X::ESS MECHANICAL CELL AREA (AC) .

Maloperation Result Indication r.o== - -~1ve Ar-t'.'"'"

1. Major breakdown of shear Inoperative shear Visual. HQld fu~l element or during operation. mechanism. segment in PIC as l!.)ng as necessary, mon1°r-ing temperature oc-casionally. If temper*

ature is too high, water

. cool with spray nozzle*

in shear magazine.

Repair shear.

2. Saw cut through fuel Saw cuttings containing Visual. Coolant will be proces*

element (wet cutting). fuel particles drawn into krw~ sed if desirable.

saw coolant. . ..

3. Saw cut through fuel Saw cuttings containing Visual. Remove filter to fuel element (dry. cutting). fuel p~rticles are drawn ~7,. basket for subsequent i nto blower system filter. processing in dissolvers if economics dictates

. recovery of fuel

• I

Table 9.98c MAI.OPERATION IN GENERAL PURPOSE CELL AREA (GPC)

Maloperation Result Indicat ion . ive Action Correct Part of fuel may be spilled Visual. *Power Manipulator

~rap ple failure during (2V-73) brought in and transfe r of loaded fuel onto floor of G~.

basket. pieces retriev ed one at

. a time

• o fuel basket *

• Notes Same procedure is , sed to retriev e spille~ leac ried hulls.

2. Fines dropped .on cell Lost fines I inconvenience . Visual. Wash down cell floor to floor from dropped fuel* and time loss. critica lity safe sump*

.basket! Remove s~p pan and

. place fines in fuel basket.

3. Sheared fuel lodged in Stuck fuel piece in reducer ~ Ganma monitor (2-LAH-1) at Remove fuel basket and reducer during descent . 9-inch diamete r point in fuel chute tip1 remove reducer . fuel pieces with master slave manipulator& or

.. power manipu lator

• l I

. I .

f

.Ii I. I

~

I

.. I I

Table 9.98d MALOPERATION IN THE CHEMICAL PROCESS CELL AREA (CR:)

Malo ration Result 1 1na1ca~1on I Lorrccsixc OE~IBQ

1. Grapple failure during Fuel or leached hulls Visual. Recover pi~ces with transfer of fuel basket spilled on floor of cell. power manipula~or.

or leached hulls to or from Dissolvers 3:-1 and 3:-2.

I

p. This fuel Cons olida ted-E dison fuel is the exce ption in this grou requ ires a much cont ains mixed thorium-uranium oxid es in the fuel and clad -oxid e-fue l high er nitri c acid conc entra tion than othe r fuels oft to disso lve the type , plus .04 Ai hydr ofluo ric acid in the disso lven inclu de all the thori um oxid e. Poss ible malo pfrat ions in this case of, the hydr o-above case s plus insu ffici ent, or exce ss, or omis sion fluo ric acid .

~idat ed-E dison Bori c acid is also added to the disso lven t on the Conso onent is a fuels . Omission or change in conc entra tion of this comp VI.

criti cali ty cons idera tion and is discu ssed in Sect ion Aluminym-uraniuo Alloy Fuels These fuels , prim arily of the MrR type , are chargnli ed into the bask ets with out chopping. They *a re disso lved in 5.4 1:1 ric acid in which

.00~ M mercur,i c nitra te serve s as a disso lutio n catatoo lyst. Malopera-high a con-tions would inclu de the use of acid with too low or conc entra tion, cent ratio n, ,too littl e or too much acid of the . corr ect of the cata lyst.

the addi tion of too l ittle , too much, or the omis sion, These malo perat ions too, are show~ in table 9.99 .

lver is un-

• The addi tion -of too much or too littl e acid to theasdisso requ ired and is likel y since the disso lven t is made op batch wise cert ified prio r to tran sfer in tota l to the diss olve rs. The rema in-n requ ired ing malo perat ions, thei r consequences and corr ectiv e actio are given in table 9.99 .

• Zirconium-Ura~i*~ Alloy Fuels Diss oluti on of fue l s of this type is accomplished byha~k the appr opria te ets of un-addi tion of 1.01 *nitr ic acid to the disso lver wfth hydr oflu0 ric acid chopped fuel in plac e, and to which is added 27.6 M ion ls prese nt at a suff icien tly slo'N rate that littl e free fluo' ride Afte r completion (fluo ride is complexed by the disso lving zirco niu~ ). tion is added of the disso lutio n, aluminum nitra te-ch romi c acid solu the Zirca loy) to furth er complex the fluor ide and to oxid ize tin (from ce state s*

and uranium to thei r high er, and more solu ble, valen Molo perat ion can occu r from inco rrect quan titie s and conc entra tions ces of, and bf the three solu ti ons ~dded to the diss olve r. Conseq~en tions , are given corr ectiv e measures to be taken afte r, such malo peraprod uct-f eed in table 9.99 . Stab ility regio ns for the disso lver solu tions are give~ in TID-10089.

Other Fuels removed with The SCRUP fuel is clad in aluminum and this cladd ing is Excess de*

an NaOH-NaN03 solu tior befo re disso lutio n of the fuel. this solu tion cladd ing solu tion or high component conc entra tions in es but will

• • will resu lt in high er-th an-n orma l wast e solu tion volum have no serio us proc ess consequences. Insu ffici ent decla ddin g

• u

• Table 9.99 MAI.OPERATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION OlMlt<<i DISSOLUTIOk (X:*l or X:*2)

~ ** 1 TVD8 Ualo~-ration Dae.111 + I --*4ua 4 r +4""

1. ICeramic1 Stainless Steel1 Zirconium Clad.

I dissolvent.

Low acid concentration in i

Low concentration of fertile material in dis-Recti.rge dlaaolver with additional dlasolvent ,and.

, solver product, all fuel complete i la1olutlon.

~vt dissolved1 low acid. Acid adjustaent in 30-1 *.

2. Ceramlc1 Stainless Steel1 Too high an .acid concentra-1 High acid in extraction Dilute high acid 1n 30-11 Zirconium Clad. tion in dissolvent, . feed1 low decontamination run w1 th low concentra-factors if run. tions of uraniua, thoriua, end plutonium through tha partitign cycle.

-*,------------+-------------+-------------+----------

3. Ceramic1 Stainless Steel1 Insufficient dissolvent.

LAL-21 LCL-i1 high concen- Adjust concentrations 1n Zirconium Clad.

• tration of fertile and 30-1 into HAf specifica-fissile materials in dis- tions1 add additional solver product. Low acid solvent to dissolver.

concentration.

4. Ceramic1 Stainless Steel1 *Excess solvent. High acid and low metals Dilute to proper acJd Zirconium Clad*~ content of dissolver concentration in 30-11 product. run to extraction syatea with low *tali content.

• If filled too high, could loverllow to the other diaaol~r or to 3D-l. In this event, a batchwise adjustment of the solution of all thilee vessels' contents in 30-1 lwould be necessary.

~. Uranium-aluminum alloy. Low acid concentration in dissolvent.

Low aluminum concentration Add additional diaaolvent in dissolvent productr to X:-1 and 3C-2 if Acid deficient product. necessary to complete .

Some fuel may be undis- . d1ssolut1on. If *neces-solved. sai'f,* add acid to 30-1.

Boil down to correct NJTE1 The indication in cill of the above maloperat1on~ is by sample analysis.

aluminum concentration.

. i'?'__ _ _

~ -.*- *- ~~~ """""'*

---

*"~

Table 9.99 Continued MALOPERATION AND cmRECTIVE ACTION DllUNG DISSOLUTION (3C*l or 3C-2)

J:uel Tvoe Malooeration Aoc.11\t. r.n~rectiv* A~t.fftn

6. Uranium- aluminum alloy. High acid concentration in High acid in dissolvent Add Al(N0:3) 3 to 30-1 and dissolvent . product1 low saltine.,

• adjust t 1 extraction feed strength for extractiop. specificati~ns. -

7. IUranium-al\JIDlnum alloy Low Hg(N03) 2

• Dissolution incomplete1 Retain solution in dl1-dissolver solution low in solver1 add Hg(N0..:.) 2 and ,

aluminum, high in HN03

• continue dissolutron.

a.* IUranium-aluminum alloy. High- Hg(~)2* No process consequences? Adjust wastea boil off however, may limit concen- if necessary.

tration of waste.

9.* Zirconiwn-uranium alloy.* High HNOJ concentration. Possible precipitation from Dilute solution in dis-feed upon long standing. solver or in feed adju1t-ment tank if dissolution has already occurred.

• Nitric acid fs added to d~ssolvers batchwi~e. Hydrofl*Lr1c * ~cid is metered separatJly into the nitric acid.

Stability ranges are givef\ in Uo:Dl9J for zirconium-uradtum dissolution.

10. Zirconium-uranium alloy. Low ffN0:3 concentration. Lowered solubility of Add concentrated~ to zirconium in dissolver solu* dissolver or to feed

• tion. adjustment tank if dis-solution has already taken place.

11. IZirconium-uranium alloy. Excess HF. Aluminum precipation in . Dilute diasolveT product feed adjustment. High with water or-additional equipment corrosion. HN03 as stability region permits.

t<<>l'Ea The indication in ab.l of the above maloperationsf is by sample analysis

• Table 9.99 Continued MALOP£RATI~ AND CCJUlECTIVE ACTI'* WUNG DISSOLUTION (~-1 or ~-2)

..-w.-.. .... ..,.... *a.6Vl,IIIIIJ .& Cl 1,,.A.VII

.............. ,...-.......... -~*---., .

Insuff icient HF. Zirconium precip itation 1n If solutio n 11 1tlll in 12 * . Zirconium-uranium alloy. di11ol .ar, ~ additional dissol ver or feed adjust ~

ment

• All alloy may not HF, heat, and apuge .

. Add HF at contro lled dissol ve.

rate, using dilutio n air.

Excess A_l(N03) 3

• Aluminum precip ates. Add additi onal Hf to

13. Zirconium-uranium alloy. bring composition into stable range.

Insuff icient Al(N03) 3

• Zirconium precip itate& J Ad~ad dition al Al(~ ) 3

14. Zirconium-uranium alloy. to dissol ver or feed high corros ive rates on stainl ess steel equipment. adjustment accou ntabil ity tank as requir ed

• ls by sample analys is.

NOJ'S* The indica tion in a* l of the above malop eration s

• solu tion or low component conc entra tions in this solu tion will resu lt lutio n may be in-in only part ial jack et r~moval. As a resu lt, disso the decla ddin g complete or perhaps may not even star t. A rep,eat of ld not be step ,i ll be nece ssary in this case . Oecladding shou ed from the atteq ,ted unti l all prev ious disso lver solu tion is remov ot be formed.

disso lver so that prec ipita tes of sodium diura nate cann be very simi lar Maloperation durin g the actu al fuel disso lutio n ldwill red to for to that for the oxide fuels and table 9.99 shou be refer ions in the feed poss ible consequences and corre ctive step s. Maloperat prim arily with adjustment and acco unta bilit y tanks are conc erned invo lve the failu re human erro r. The most important of these erro rs the solu tion to add the proper cold chemicals or to thoroughly mix deta iled in prio r to sampling. These and othe r maloperations areions will also table 9.99 for tank s 30-1 and 40-1 . These malo perat y tanks and to othe r apply to othe r feed adjustment and acco unta bilit downstream feed adjustment and neut raliz er tank s.

Extraction Column (4C-l);

Sglyent Extraction - Partition Cyc1°; Mete Feed PvwP Pots C'lC-lJa and 1Jb); and r H~ad Pot (4y-1a}

9.100 The most likel y maloperations that can occur onssed in the be discu column, the feed pump ~ts , and the meter head pot, will this secti on.

columns

~~s Many of these maloperations will be co1Trnon to .a.l.l.topulse down stream and tabu latio :1s made (or this column will be appl icabl e

• flowsheet columns as well . Furt her, it is .recognizedhere some of the downstream columns. A discu ssion of sequ

• will not be made here ; this discu ssion will be used dcwnstream columns. The plan t oper ating and surv eilla that maloperation

, will affe ct of this column, in a cascade system such as is used entia l diff icul ties as being typic al of nce procedures are sign ifica ntly deuigned to ~ete ct ma1operations befo re consequences

• can upse t any colu~n.

icabl e to The maloperations that will be tabu latad and which are appl othe r columns follows

1. Inco rrect pulse amplitude-frequency setti r.gs;

2. Inco rrect flow ratio s between the vario us strea ms;

3. Inco rrect stream compositions;

4. Int~r face crud and orga nic qual ity;

5. Column flood ing;

6. Loss of column jack et cool ing wate r;

7. Nozzle plate fouli ng.

t, can resu lt in high Pulse amplitude-frequency setti ngs, if into rrecflood column waste losse s, or column insta bilit y and varia ing combined with high waste losse s.* Figure 9.100 illus trate s the tion of HETS (Height Equivalent to~ Theo retic al Stage) with. varying pulse amplitude setti ngs.

l: the combination of the column desig n and flowsheet requirements are column pulse met by cond ition s at poin t A (which repre sents shee t), HA minim um

• amplitude requirements for the Yankee fuel flow then oper ation to

Table 9.99 Continued MALOPERATION OF fc'ED ADJUS1MENT AND ACX:OtMTABILITY TANK (30-1)

Malo;-.;;.. ac.inn Dacul+ Tn,H.caf'.ion r.- ..... " * - & ..... , "'""

1. Low steam in coils. Poor temperature control. TI-2-51 LR-61 DR-41 Sample Hold solution in tank Cannot evaporate solution 3C. until sample *hows it for concentration correct- is of correct concen-ion. trationa add cold chemicals to proper '

concentration.

. . ~

2. Low cooling water in coils Poor temperature control TI-251 DR-4 * . Check cooling water for jetting. valvei hold solution in

. tank until proper condl* '

tions are achieved. i

3. Condense.r water not on. Loss of solution (vapors) TI-2-4 in .condensates LR-5 Check cooling water valve.

to vent system. in 30-~.

4. Incorrect cold chemical Incorrect concentration of Sample 3Ca LR-61 DR-4. Hold solution in tank1 addition. solution. add proper concentration I of cold chemicals to bring ,;

the solution to proper "

concentration.

I

5. Air sparger off.* Poor mixin~1 incorrect Sample ~I K:-24. I Turn on air1 hold solu- I sample. tion in T~nk IC-"24 until

• concentration is correct *

~ ,-

~

- i L I #I 4

• c , '

L @ - - _ h _JI &3. 3 4 A ;a 111!!11'1111 Table 9.99 Continued MAI.OPERATION OF FEED TANK 10 PARTITION CiCLE ( 40-1) aa.a.u~.i-01,.1...,11 1,vaw.a..., ......... ... __,.,..

~

1. Low cooling water. Poor temperature control1 Tl-2-14. Increase cooli-~ water high feed temperature, re- flow.

sulting in poor column -

efficiency if HAF is too hot

• No air sparging.

. Poor mixing, which results tc-29 off1 manual check of Tum on Hand Control 2.

in a bad sample. hand control valve. v~lve fTom air supply 1 (1£-29) 1/2 hour prior to taking sample.

3. Incorrect cold chemical Wrong solution composition, Sample .4C. Certification and adlain-addition. which can cause a loss to . istrative check of proper product to thf HAW stream or poor~ ~ .

amounts of cold chemical to bring the solution ta

• the proper concentration

. I

• the left of this point would result in poor contact ing, higher HETS values, fewer stages, and consequ ently high fissile materia l losses to the waste stream and .poor deconta minatio n of product . Point A in figure 9.100 represe nts minimum pulse amplitu de-frequ ency conditi ons. The maxil1'Alm amplitu de-frequ ency situatio n would be represe nted by point B.

Amplitudes above B would result in increas ed stage heights due to in-

.adequa te phase disengagement or other effects . Hence, for a given pulse frequency~ the amplitu de operati ng range would fall between points A

• aQd B. Op~rati ng outside ~hese ranges would be conside red maloper atio~

• Figure 9.100 HETS VARIATION WITH PULSE AMPLITUDE - HA O)LUIM At a particu lar frequen cy (cycles per minute) .(See note)

• Maximuo accepta ble HETS

~~~~O perati ng Rang e-~~~ ~~~

Pulse Amplitude NOTEs Differe nt frequen cies would generat e a family of curves with similar charac teristic s.

For satisfa ctory operati ng conditi ons, low frequen cies are necessa rily com-bined with high amplitu des and high frequen cies with lo~ amplitu des.

W~rkable. operati ng combina tions .will be establis hed for each column and flowshe et. Malope ration would be due to human error or equipment failure

• and the correct ion needed would be obvious in each case *

• Flow ratios of the organic-aqueous streams (0/A ratio) have direct bearing on waste losses and decontamination factors. Losses from the HA column, as well as thP IA, IO, and IIA columns, will decrease with increasing 0/A ratios. The magnitude of 0/A increase is limited, however, by the increased flow or ratio change possible in the downstream column, or by flooding the column in question. TFor example, the 0/A ratio in the HA column for the Yankee flowsheet is normally about 1.7. If this ratio is decreased by increasing A (or the feed rat~, to approximately 0.80, the waste losses in the HAW stream will start exceeding the economically permissible value of 0.1% of the uranium in the fuel. Likewise, increasing the 0/A ratio (by increasing organic - the HAX stream) by a factor of 2.0 would result in a flooding condition in the column and again high uranium in the HAW and, additionally, organic phase in this stream.

Operating limits on the 0/A ratios will be set on each of the columns in the system as discussed for the HA column above. Operation outside these limits would be considered maloperation and would be the result of human error, failed or *erratic flowmeters, or metering pump.

• In each of the above, pulse or flow-ratia maloperation, the most probable result is high fissile losses i~ the raffinate stream. Recovery of fissile *material will be discussed under the operation of the rework system. Column maloperations are tabulated in table 9.100.

Maloperati-0ns in the Partition Cycle Feed Pump Pots and 1,,eter .Head Pots are mainly concerned with flow -rates to *and from the column. These are also discussed in table 9.100.-

Plytooium Cycle Feed Conditioner Tack {4D-6}

9.101 Maloperations of the ?lutonium Cycle Feed Conditioner Tank {40-6) are shown in table 9.101. The maloperations are as described

• in paragraph 9.99.

Feed Conditioner to First Uranium Cy; 1 ~ (40-9}

9.102 Maloperations o*f the :=eed Conditioner Tank for the First Uranium Cycle (40-9) are shown in table 9.102. The malop~rations are as described in para9raph 9.99.

Second Uranium Cycle Fe d Conditione; (40-12}

0 9.103 Maloperations of the Se.cond _Uranium Cycle Feed Conditioner Tank (40-12) are shown in table 9.103. The maloperations are as described in paragraph 9.99.

Plutonium Purification c 11 0

9.104 The operation of the ?lutonium Purification Cell is disc~ssed in paragraphs 4.73 to 4.75. ~4loperations that have been con-sidered consist in general of human errors. These include th~ over-I flowing of tanks, improper solution adjustment, improper valving, and failure to operate Plutonium Ion Exchangers 5C-1A, 5C-1B, and 5C-1C properly. These maloperations are tabulated in table 9.104.

Table 9.10 0 Continued MALOPERATION OF HA COLll&N ( C-1 )

Result . ,... Jndi cat\ on , . corre;tiye Actieo

, MaJoperatlon 1 Reduce column throu gh*

Flooding. Organic leave s ttae column Inter face cont rolle r LR:-29

1. will fiis t become erra tic put rate s and/ or pulN r through the normal *aqueous frequency and amplitude.

efflu ent line *and aqueous then will decr ease load ing pres sure tu pot 4Y-15 sig* Rework mate rial as nece ,-

thr~ugh the normal orga nic sary . Organic which efflu ent line if allowed -to nific antl y allowing orga nic to flow out HAW line . left through the HAW cont inue . This allow s line will be sepa rated prod uct to the waste stream DR-23 (Pxt racti on secti on and fissi on prod uct to the dens ity) will incre ase in* in the deca nter 4Y-l prod uct strea m. Both will dica ting laye r build -up of and retur ned to the requ ire rework of mate rial. aqueous in the column. The No. 1 solv ent system.

laye r of aqueous may break

• occa sion ally showing a sharp retu rn to near normal of DR-23 read ing with a following grad ual build -up.

PR-8 (column stati c pres su*

will be erra tic but will show a subs tanti ally high er read ing, indic ating incre a-sed aqueous in the column.

DR-22 (den siiy in top dis-engaging head) will in-crea se sign ifica ntly when aqueous repla ces the orga nic in this secti on.

When aqueous flows to surge pot 4Y-5 and thence to HBX column <<:-2 , the inter face cont rolle r, LRC-33 will be unst able due to incre ase in aqueous flow to that column

• u Table 9.100 Continued MALOPERATION OF HA COLUMN (C-1)

Malope ration Result Indicat ion Corre_~tive Action la. Fl~oding caused by high Same as item 1. .Sam& as item 1. Reduce flow rates.

flow rates.

Flooding caused by poor Same as item 1. Indicat ion will be same as Stop floodin g as in lb. item 1. Correct disenga ging time of item l in column. If organic . organic disenga ging time is organic problem by the cause, analyti cal samp- solvent wasting or les will indicat e poor dis- replace solvent .

engaging time or *organi c degr~d ation:

Flooding caused by pulser! Same as' item 1. Same as item 1 for column Adjust RPM of pulser le. motor or adjust pulser amplitu de-freq uency. instrum entatio n. Pulser frequen_cy can be counted surge tank pressur e.

on oscilla tions of PR-8 or by countin g RPM of pulser poppet cam shaft. Pulser amplitu de determined by maximum pressur e on pulser surge tank (pulse stroke) .

2. Cyclic floodin g. Probabl e larger amounts of Interfa ce control ler LRC-29 Reduce flow rates or re-entrain ed organic in HAW will be erratic , caused by duce pulser frequen cy-stream. Exc_e ssive product a repeate d build-u p and amplitu de. Check analy-loss to HAW and poor de- breakin g of an aqueous tical data for organic contam inatic~ in column. layer in the extract ion sec* disenga ging time.

tion of the column. This will reflect an erratic be-havior of DR-23 also. PR-8 will increas e slowly as the aqueous layer builds up, then orops sharply to normal as it breaks.

• 0 Table 9.100 Continued MAI.OPERATION OF HA COL~ (C-1) 1 _ _Jn~J.a1l2n cgrrectiva ActJoo

3. Pula:: ::::~i.on - - *---- l Col~ wi~~si~di-at~-ly ~;* XA-19 pulser alarm will Shut down n*rtltlon .

into a total flooded condi- sound. Oscillation effect cycle colUAnnt b111tditt.ly.

tion as in item l. of pulser on instruments Restart 1fter pul.Mr

• PR-8, LR:-29 will stop. trouble ia corrected.

Erratic behavior of instru* Rework material**

ments described in item l necessary.

will not occur~ PR-8 will show increas& as aqueous builds up in column displac*

ing organic. DR-23 will in crease, finally showing total aqueous * .O,r ganic flow to -Surge .Pot 4¥-5 will decrease to, approximately 1/2 since flow will be equal to aqueous influent only. LJC-29 loading pressure ~will oecrease sig-nificantly ~o allow organic to flow .out HAW line.

4. Loss of HAF. Loss of product in normal Zero readirig on LR-28; In- If not re,tored within stream. Pos$ible carry- terface Controller LR:-29 five minutes, shut down over of excess fission will decrease sharply until partition ~ycle.

product to subsequent . controller adju~ts to bring cycles.

• level back to desir,d point-DR-23 will decreas~; DR-22 I will decrease; PR-8 will I

decrease *

5. Loss of HAX. Loss of product to waste ~I FAL-9, FIC-22 on HAX; flow f Shut down partition system. i to Surge Pot 4Y-5 stops; , cycle iamediately.

• i LIC-30; DR-23 and PR-8 will f Rework as necessary.

1 increase.

I

• 0 Table 9.100 Continued MALOPERATION OF HA COLlllN (C-1)

Malor:>eration Result Indic._ation Cn i+fva lr.t'.f.ftn

.. 6~ Losa of HAS

• Decontamination will reduce FAL-7, FR:*l on HAS1 LAC-29 If not restored within by a factor of 10 to 100. will decrease sharply until 5 minutes, shut down Fission produ_c ts will be controller adjusts for re- partition cycle.

carried to dQwnstream duced aqueous flow. DR-23 cycles. and PR-8 will decrease.

1. High HAF flow rate. Loss of product to HAW. LR-28 increase (HAF measur- Lower HAF feed rate

.ing pot). PR-8, DR-23, and (FRC*l~). Rework material DR-22 increase, LR:-29 as necessary.

lower loading pressure.

e. Low HAF feed rate ~ Possible stripping of excess LR-28 decrea$e (HAF measur- Increase HAF feed rate fission produ~t and carry- ing pot). PR-8, DR-23, and (FRC-16).

over to subsequent cycles. DR-22 decrease, LR:-29 hlcjler loading pressure.

9. High HAX feed rate. Same as item 8 FRC-22 (HAX) increase, Decrease HAX rate with PR-8, DR-23, DR-22 will FIC-22.

decrease.

10. I Low HAX flow rate. Same as item 7. FRC-22 (HAX) decrease, Increase HAX rate with PR-8, DR-23, DR-22 will FIC-22.

I increase.

11. I HSg\ HAS* flow rate. Increase wast~ volume of HAWtFIC-1 on HAS1 PR-8, DR-23 Reduce HAS flow with FR:-1.

P~ssible loss of product to _ will increase1 LRC-29 load- Rework material as necea-iwaste.

• ing pressure will decrease. sary.

12. I Low HAS flow rate.

. .scrubbed from organic in scrub section of column.

I Fission rrCtducts w:J 1 not be FR::-1 on HAS1 PR-8, DR-23 I Increase HAS flow with will decrease, LR:-29 load- FIC-1.

,ing pressure will increase.

I I

Table 9.100 Continued MALOPERATION OF HA COL\lti ( C-1)

Malooeratlon Result Indlcatlo n . .- .,- Correcti ve Action

13. Lo11 of salting agent from Same as 1t~m 12. Wlll al&o cause refluxing in colunn 101-1 and lab analyst, on 140-171 PR-8, DR-23, and 2

Certiflc atlon of HAS make-up 1olutlon befo~

HAS.

and loss of product to waste DR-22 will decrease .

u,*.

stream.

14. INo cooling water on HA Depending on temperat ure of !Cooling water valvee close~ Ope~ cooling water column 4C*l jacket. influent streams, may cause Sample analysis of effluen~ valves.

less efficien t decontamina- streams.

tion factor and waste loss.

1~. Excess interface crud. Increase disengaging time. Sample analysis of effluent If severe enough to Possible poor decontaminatkr streams. HAW anc' uranium affect product apeclfic a*

• of Zr and Nb

• and plutonium streams from tion3, increaae aolvent subsequent columns. clea~up to laprove dl1-engaging time. If trouble still prevail* , displace interface to HAW syat.. by Standard Operating Proc.lJn .

16. IFouling of column nozzle Reduce ~ontact of organic Can only be determined by Clean out system and try

• plates. aqueous and number o.f column critical analysis of all to remove fouling mater-stages with resulting loss factors affecting column ial by chemical flushes.

of column efficienc y. operatio n. If unsucces sful, replace column.

j II I

Table 9.100

. FEED Pll&P POTS (C*l3A

• 138)

MAI.OPERATION OF PARTITION .CYCLE

_ Maloperation R11u}t Indlc1tion Cou,ctiyt Action

1. -1 Air aupply ls high. f Cause high flow of HAP I LR-28 on Meter Head Pot I Correct Mtt1nga on stream. 4Y-14 and FJC-16 on air Lft..28 and Fll:-16 aupply. inatn..,.nts.

2. I Low air supply. Cause low flow of HAF strea1' LR-28 on Meter Head. Pot Correct 5'.t ting on 4Y-14 and rJC-16 on air LR-28 and *FtC-lt supply. in&truMnts.

3. I Loss of pot due to crud Low or l .o ss of HAF stream. I LR-281 .fJC-16. Switch to ai-r lifts for in check valves. HAF *feed.

Table 9,100 IW.OPERAnOO OF METER iEAO POT ( 4Y.. }4)

__ ,.. _____ .. _ ..-.w .........

1. High level in pot. ~ solution will go throuj, L~*281FIC*l6. Lll:*28 will adJuat au the overflow line to Tank flow to puap ,.ota c-m 40-1 until malo~ration ls and 1381 naet lnatiu-corrected. aa.nt, if nece11ary.

2. Low level in pot. Low flow to HA column.

LR:*281 FR:-16.

3A I

Table 9.101 . / - ).

MAI.OPERATION OF PLUTQUlll-c'a'CLE FEED Ca.DITIM R TANK...{40-6) .

. -----~ ________ ----**

1. High level in tank.

• • ---- - **....--~v .... ..,. ** _..,.

Cause overflow to 6D-3. Lll:-ls sample in Vent Syst~m Catch Tanlc 60-3.

Correct flowa in and out of tank , ld recycle product from vent 1yata to rework.

2. Low oxidant concentr ation Results in insuffi'c ient FR1 FAL on cold chemical Add oxidant to correct of *cold chemicals. oxidation of plutonium, feed tank1 ,sample 9Ca~DR-l. concentr ation and recycle

, which causes the plutonium (

IIAW from 40-8 to rework.

. product to go with the. IIAW stream. .

3. No air spargin91 poor Poor tank mixin91 poor .Air Supply Valve te-11 thin Open te-1 1/2 hour prioz mixing. sample. line on uc-1. to sampling1 check and 1og opening of spare valve

• Table 9.102 MAI.OPERATIC* Of FEED C~DI TI<RR ':0 FIRST lRANllll CYCLE (4D-CJ)

Resul t Indic ation - ctive Action Corre Maloperation -- *-

Cause wrong feed conce ntra- ~~31 saq>le ~ . Corre ct conce ntrati on and

1. Wrong cold chemical recyc le I IAW to the N 1ft addit ion. tion to Uranium Cycle and eystem.

loss Qf product to IAW or

. poor df

• on ~oolera Open valves on coole r.

2. Low cooling water on cooleJ Poor teq>e rature contr ol ma) Valves closed 4E-4. cause poor col\.l'lln efficieOC)I column efflue nt saq>l es.

Poor mixing, resul ting in a tc-4 offs sample 22C1 DIC-3 hour Insure aparger on for 2

3. Air sparg ar off. prior to saapll ng bad sample and poor concen-tratio n contr ol on IAF.

Table 9.103 IIALOPERATIO. OF ~ D lRANILIA C'tCLE FEED CCWDITIC*ER (40-12) llalo ration Result

1. I Incorrect cold chemical Wrong feed concentration, FR*on Cold Chemical Feed Correct concentration addition to 40-12. resulting in poor extraction Tanlca sample 26B1 DR-'7 on in tenk a'td recycle IDI and loss of product to ~ar 40-12. f J'OI\. 41).13 to nwort.

or* poor df.

2. IHigh level in tank 40-12. l0verflow of tank1 product to 60-3.

loss of

• LR-221 LAH-6 in Tank 40-12.

Adjust flows into and out of tank and recycle frCII I I off-gas system to rework.

3. I Low level in Tank 40-12. I Loss of iDF -'Ilow.

• LR-12 in Tank 40-12. Adjust flow into ar.d out of Tank 40-12.

4. I Low cooling water to IPoor IDF temperature control Valves closed on coolers I Open valves on cooler.

Cooler 4E-5. column effluent samples.

5. I No air sparging. )Poor mixing of IDF. tc-8 off1 saarple 26B. I Tum on tc-8.

Table 9.104 IW.OPERATION IN PLUTOUllA P~lFICATION CEU. (PPC)

Maloperation Result Indication Corrective Action

1. Plutonium Ion Exchange Overflow goes to Ion Ex- LAH-12 and LR-14 on 5>-h Start flow through one Feed Conditioner !ID-1 has change Recycle Waste Tank LR-1 on 50-2. of the Plutonlua. Ion been allowed to overflow. 50-2 and then to the Exchanger* !C*lA, !C*lB, Plutonium Feed Conditioner or ~-le.

Taruc 40-6 for rework.

2. I Improper Plutonium Ion MaxilllWll plutonium absorption,TIC-3 on 5D-i1 TIC-4 on Readjust temperature and Exchange Feed.Conditioner by the anion resin will not 50-20. refer to *s tandard

~ l temperature and/or be accomplished if the 60 Ct Operating Procedures if temperature at Plutonium 10 C plutonium Ion Exchanger necessary1 check 5>-20 Ion Exchangers !C-lA* temperature is not malntai for necessary -water levela *

!C-18, and !C-lC due to At higher and lower tempera- adjust proper temperature pump ~-7 not operating or tures. resin exchange ef- with TIC-4.

improper heating of hot ficiency is lost.

water tank 50-20.

3. Improper Plutonium Ion Without .proper sparglng. 1381 l4B* 158, and 168 Adjust NaN0:2 and HNO Exchange feed concentra- proper adjustment of feed in samplers give effluent con- addition to tank s,-f if tion (50-1) due to poor 50-1 car.not be obtained. If centration1 sparging indi- product does not meet sparging or improper feed HNO is not adjusted cated by variation in level specifications.

adjustment of H~ and to ~.2 !! or the plutonium is recorder1 failure to add N~. not oxidized by sodium indicated by FR-91 nitrite, some plutonium will by LR-14.

pass through the Ion Ex-changers (~-lA. ~-10. or

!C-lC) during the loading

!cycle. to the Ion Exchange aste Tank 50-2 and will have to be returned to the Plutonium Feed Conditioner ank (40-6) for rework.

I I ..-..

Table 9.lOI Continued 1W.OP£RATI0N IN. PLlm>>nllA PlRIFlCATION CELL (PPC) llaloperation Result lndlcatlon r~n~,. .. , u. a,-+f ftft

4. Improper valve open during Excess plutonium* will be elutriation cycle of Ion ca~led to the Recycle Waa J Sample 5Y*l4, 5Y-16, or 5Y-18.

Double ctwck cornet valve upon *t*rt of Exchange11,::-1A, ,::-18, Tank ~2. . cycle.

and ,::-1c.

~. Improper valve open during Impurities and f1111on pro- LAH-13, LAH-14, LAH*l5 on loading or wash cycle of ducts w111 be carried to Ion Exchange Column11LR*l9 Corre~t valve poaltlon,.

Ion Exchanger (,::-1A, the Plutonium Product Feed on 50-4.

,::-18, ,::-1c). Evaporator Tank 5D-4. This material can be sent back tc the Plutonium Ion Exchange Feed Conditioner Tank (50-1:

for rework.

6. Qait wash cycle of Off product specification. Sample 148, 158, or 168 on Rework product to tank Plutonium Ion Exchangers ~-lA, ,::-18, or ,::-1c and 50-1.

,::-1A, ,::-18, ~-1c. Sampler 178 on tank 50-4.

1. No~ or less than 0.2511 formation of plutonium Tank 141)-46 .analyses, no Certification* of acid ffNO:J elutriant used in - polymers which might plug flow by LI-27 and LRG28. concentration before elutriatlon-cycle PlutoniUJ resin bed. UHe Ion Exchanqe Recycle Waste Tank.

a. Overflow of Plutoni\.lD Ion Overflow will be carried LAH-l or LR-1 on Tank 50-2. Steam Jet 51-32 to the Exchange Recycle Waste through vent line to the Plutonium Waste catch Tank (50-2). Vessel Off-Gas Catch Tank Tank 41>-8 or by grav1ty (60-3) where it can be re- flow to 40-6.

worked or sent to waste.

9. Improper use of Steam Jet May result in transferring LR-22 on Plutonium Waste Shut off !IH-32 and re-5H-32 (Pump-Out Ecluctor on pluton!um product into Catch Tank (40-8) and sam- work 40-81 .send to tank

&>-2). Plutonium Waste Catch Tank ple analysis of 40-8. 70-8.

40-8.

Table9.l04 Continued MALOPERAnON IN PLUTOUI.M Pl.RIFICATION CELL (PPC) llalooer atlon Result _ Indicat ion Corr.ct !,,. Action

10. Plutonium Product Plutonium carried to PR: LR-19 on 50-41 LAH-16 on Start Pullp eo-10 to Evaporator Feed Taruc 50-4 &\lftS> and to Solvent Waste S\1Dp* evapora tor or atc,p flow pverflo w. Taruc (130-8) by l~-8 Steam into 50-4.

Eductor . ~ and floor are sized to be safe for largest vessel in PR:. Taruc 130-8 has boron Raschig rings and is cri tically safe.

11. l>lutoni\lD Product Liquid ls returne d to Tank DR-17 and LIC-20 on ~-2 Stop pump ~-101 return evapora tor ~-2 ls allowed 5D-4; some liquid may carry and _~-10 respect ively. SD-6 solutio n to 5>-4

~o overflow . over through condenser to with tc-41.

SD-6.

12. I Product boil-down to a Plutonium concen tration is LIC-20, TI-2-31 , and DR-17 1watch DR-17 clo1ely 1 high concen tration in too hi gh. on ~-2. dilute with dilute acid *

• Evapora tor ~-2. in ~-2.

ITI-2-32, LAH-16, and LR-21 Route to rework 70-8 or

13. I Plutonium Evapora tor Con- ~onden sate is carri~d waste 7D-2.

densate TanJc &>-6 overflow through overflow vent to on 5D-61 LR-2 on 60-3.

Vessel Off-Gas Catch Tank

~D-3. It can be handled at 1

that point as *require d.

14. I Insuffi cient HN03 in SD-4. If.lay form plutonium polymer l5D-4 sample analysi s. Add HOO.:. ' if polymer ha*

in ~-2. formed In ~-2 and digest until in solutio n.

15. IExcess fission product s int#on 't meet product 150-4 sample. Return to 50-1 with P',1111)

&>-4. lspeclf~ cations . ~-10 for rework.

• 0 e*

Table 9.104 Continued MALOPERATION IN PLUTONIUM Pt.lUFICATION CELL (PPC) 1:n.....-.a. ..T,v* * .,...,..,,,.,,.

Ma1ooera-c1.on ttesu.1~ 1no1ca't.1nn

16. Resin degradation ~-lA, Excessive product in 50-2. 50-2 sample. Replace .resin as

~-lB, ~-1c. specified i n s ~.

Operatin~ ~ror.~du~

cove'r ing ion -exchange column oper~tion.

17. Improper discharge of Solution directed to wrong LAH-16 on TanJc 50-6. Ensure that tanJc conten,ti contents of Plutonium tanJc. are known prior to Evaporator Condensate Tank discharge.

( 50-6). .

I

~

Uranlwn Product BJrlflcattao

9. l~ Uranium Product Purificat ion is discussed in paragraph s 4.67 to 4."72. This discussio n in~ludes the operation of the Uranium Product E **~orator , the Silica-G el Beds, and the storage of ~ranium product. Again*~ ihe malopera,t ions discussed concern ptrimarily those associate d with ..human errors. These include high and low levels of solutions in tanks, improp~r valving, imp~oper f vaporato r operation ,

' and improper sampling . ln~s9 ~~lopera tioos are li sted in table 9.105.

9.106 In* the iroduct 1>icka~i.ng .an"l Shipping Area, product pluionium solutfo:1 if. plac~d in small bottles f~r shipment . High-en-richad ur~lum prpduct is also packagPd in this lrea and low-enric hed ui;&nium 1s era- sferred to tank trailers from this area. Due to the pos,ibtlL ty, of t:tazard f rora alpha contamln ation in the *Product Packaging antfS hippine area; much of the qqulpment is enclc,sed in glove boxes a-nd el-!ctrlc: al 1!\terlock* controls are in*:i.talled t'a, l:1sure proper operator p~~csdure a~d ventilati on cont~\-t. Mala~~ra tions in ~he Product F-~ckaging ar1d Shipp,ing Ar~a include any spillaqe of more' tran a minute

~V)tity of plutonlu~ solutl~n t cross conta~in atton of the product3 with

~ny foraign matarial , 1nd any act that could cause a critical arrBy. All equipment used for hig~-~nri cned uranium and plut~nium is geometri cally safe~ i~cluding the sumps in the handling area. Here again, malopera -

tions invo.t.*,e- human *e rrors and are discusgec i in taole 9.106

• 9.107 The rework ~ystcm con~lsts of an evaporato r , conden-ser, feed tank, and asso~iate d oiping. The rew~rk system is used to boil down and adjust any o~e of the *a~eous waste streams that ar~ sampl'!d afid found t~ be tQ.Q hi9.h in product ta discard ' before

• rerunning tnrough the eolvent extrac;io n syst &m. OrgJ~ic streams arP. not r~n through the te..,,or!c system.

Tho stre&ms reactilnq tMo rework system will vary f rom very dilute so i utlons approa cC1!ng water, to strongec solutions containin g up to 6.0 !1 HN03. Some streams will have only a few grams ~r liter uranium in themt oth~rs will be of o.,c~ higher concentr ~tion, and plutonium may also be present, Wh~"' ni9h-enrl ched fuel is pro*c essed, these streams may cont~in some of *~he stru~tur al alloys of the fuels, such as aluminum and z\rconium . Thort~m-may al~~ be present during thorium fuel processin g.

Since the fee:-J material entering the rework syst~m will vary wide l y in compositlol'\~ each batch w.ll l rEquir~ special considera t:ion and operating 1

instructi oi,v. Any serious d0vlation from these instructi ons would con-stitute a malopera tion and WQuld result in a product stream unsuitab le or less than optimum in ccmpo1!t ion for return to the extractio n system.

Off-~pec ific*atlon feed to the extractio n systfim will result in loss of prtiuct a~d/or further rework operatio ns. If so~~tion s should be over-cort~enta ate(~tn the l'&Wor~ sy~tem, a nuclear critical ity incident could resQ1t ~ Preventio n of su~n incident s, however, is assured by certain

-~~~A~~~~~""t~

Table 9,1~

MALOPeRATIOH Of ~IUM PROOLCT PUUflCATION Malos,eration

.LAH*l91 UC-26.-

Result Indication Corractlve Action

=

1. High l*vel in Ura.ilium Tanlt ov~rflowa to 6D-31 Shut down *xtr-actloo Product Evaporator Feed

• tank ~7.

tanlt uy boil,: no. adverse effect unless ignored, for

• until exe*** §Qlutlon in ~7 c~n be procaaaed.

long period. *This 'tank 1&

not no~il.Y. ~e~ted.

- ~ - , - -- ~ - - - ~ ~ ~ -

2. Low *~iched uraniU!i' . -,

• Possible ~gradation of Tank lnventory1LAH-241n Lock out hi9h enrlc:btd transferred* from !)[)..7 w * ! .high enriched uranium 5Q-9. uranium t~nsfe~airllfta

~ -9 *~ mistake. I

• produ~t solytlora. when proceaal~ low enriched uraniua.

3. Ht,gh enriched u~~~ium Possible to appr~~ch criti-'LJC-27 on ~-4. When procesalng hlg'n en-

~oduc~ misdirected to Lo. cal *concentration* (see riched uranium in_~.._,,

Enriched U~anium Product iection *@n ~cl$ar Safety). steam will be loclced out 0 Evapor~tor !C-4. of service; alr llft sup*

ply will be blank~~*

4 High level in product Poor operatill9, beh&v1_9r of Htgh readings on LJC-27 Re&et control point to evapol'ators. evaporators. (low enriched uranium) and loar val~ on UC.

ur::-28 (high enriched uranluaa).

~. Hlgh density ln product

, evapoi:ator.

Poss,i ble free:e-up of evapor~t.9:r.

High D1r::-20* readingi high TR-1-3 readlng ( low entlct.4 Reset Dir: to lower control point. DR: autoaatically

])IC-21 a~d TR-1-1 (high dilutes high density I enriched). product in evaporator.

6. Lo. den~1ty product in Low product concentr.stion. -'Low DR:-20 readin91 low Reset Dir: to hl9her

• ev~rator.

J TR-1-3 .reading ( low enrlclwd control point.

high product volume1 DIC-21

• • I and TR-1-4 (hlgh enriched). t I

II I I

... ,. ' l . ~

Table <110~ Contlm&ed

~ERATlON OF \.llANllll PRODtCT P<<lllFICATION llaloperat*l on . Raault ,ndlcatlan Co~ctlve Action

7. Too auch* ,eoof l~g *ter to Pll.l99lng of evaporator , High *va~rator levela Wara .pl'Odµc.t *1lne wl th

~vaporator dl,charge *11ne* prod.uet discharge line* lf pl'Oduct volUMI UC-27 (low 1teu or hot *ter vi*

j1dcet.*

• over concentration of enrlchacl)a UC-28 (high teaporuy ~ttlon.

uranlua. enriched). Operate eqporator at la.er e ,ncentntlon.

a. Too little cooling water *1V*.por to vent systems High -.ter ~rature on Reset TIC to l0wtr temperature.

to product evaporator possible urani\.111 loss to Condenser TIC-~ ( low coodens,rs. vent syst..,. enriched) and TIC*9 (hlgh enrlched)a *high teaperature ln ~~ * ( Tl-2-36 ) .

9. Hlgh level ln Uranium Overflow to vent systema LAH-20 on .&>-8; UC-29. Stop evaporator, saapl~

Product Evaporator c~- loss of uranium. *a naly,is will detendne densate -Tank ~8. dlsposltlon.

10. Low level in &>-8~ Lack of strip feed for firstlLAL-211 F~L-28 on ICX feed. Supply .solution fraa c;old u?anium cycle. make-up area * ..

11. .High leve~ in* Uranium Overflow to *~ent system to LAH-24 in 50-91 LR-2 on '6D-~.Increase rate settl119 of Product Surge ..TanJc. ~9. 60-3.

• pumps ~-2 and !:G-2A aaJ/

or stop influent flows *

• ~

12. Low level *in ~9. Tank runs dryJ no ~ve*r&e LAL-25 in 50-9. Adjust pump rate on 5i-2 results~ or ~-2A at lower Mttlng

, or stop pump.

13. High temperature in S>-9. 1Imp~ / f~ed temperatun, tolJ'll:>!!ll high on 50-9. Reset nc-111-. ~.. cooling silica .~t Uiltlts .. 'water if neces1ary1 chtct I cooling water. to 5':-10.

14. I High feed~&~~ to silica

-*~._.;./.

Excess sole1ti6~ "*t !~ -

back Hig h reading on PR-9 or 1Decrease Feed Pullp !G-2, gel beds ~-6A and ~--68 .. to 51>-~g *no advert?e effect.

I'P-R~lO

~-30~

on Head Pots* 5y.29 or

~-2A rate setting.

I I

I

~~"~~~

.. - - -'..*oa,,..~._---~esnttr-~,,. - _.,.._ ,.*.,.,,.;**.~;ca,;,,:;:

- .:..--_~1r~e:-;i:.: *~,.....

...~,.-

... a:~)lc-------

~

I Table 9.10~ Continued ,

IW.OPERATl<* OF l.RAiUlM PROQJCT Ffji(lfl~Tlc>>f llalfunctlon Result Indication COrrectlv* Action .

l~. Ltne bl1nd1 ~and, valve1 **1.Poaslble dlver~lon of WJ'On9 on elllca gel unit. produ~t to rework.

Vilvea .are interlocked to insure proper settlng11 Adlainl 1tratlve*. *procedure will 1',l~f'e 'iOJffCt visual observation of blind po*1Jlonl"9 :of blincla befoq _elther loading or regenerating alllc* gel I

beds.

• 16 ,I, Hlgh level* 1n )i,lgh E~- Ov~rfl<>lfi to Tank !C-138 or I LAH-4 on &>-13A. Transfer solution to rlched Evaporato;- Pl'Oduct ,;-13Ca possible rework of 50-1381 &hut down Product SUrge* Tank, ~13A. product. Evas>9rator ~~~.

p ..

17. (, Off*Ss,.elfication pi-<;duct I Product must be reworke~. I Sample analysis. Transfer to !C*l3C.

18.

in ~13A.

Transfer of 51?-i3A. to

!D-138 or 50-13C by error*

before sa_~ llng. .

I POS$lb1e rework 'Of pro.duct."! Level inventory on tank&a LAH-5 or ~-138 or LA-6 or 50-lX.

• Resample and -rework lf required.

19. I High level in High En-r.1ched Uranium Storagt Overflow to 5D-13A and *

• so-1x; possible rework.

I LAH-4 in 5D-13A1 LAH-5, on 50-138 -or UH:..6 on 5D-13C.

Rttsample 1 'rework 1 f necessary.

Tank**50-1~.

20. I High level in 5D-13C. Overflow to 5D-13A or l3B; I U.H-6. Resample all* three tanks possible .rework. ($13A, B, and C) and rework if required.

21. High temperature in *No adverse effect; eductor High(TI-2-22 on 5D-13A or 1*Check cooling water to 5D-13A or 138. transfer may be difficult. T1~2-23 on 50-13B)readlng~a 5E~ll; all~ tanks to inoperable eductors or purip. _cool by ~ir aparglng.

22. l ' High levels in Low En- Overflow to 60-3 V!ssel Off-I LAH-7 *on 50-12A; *LAH-8 on Transfer flcn11rto eapty riched Uranium Product Gas Condensate Catch Tank; I 50-128. tank; transfer full tank S~a.,le Tanks 5D-12A or t possible rework of solution to 51}-158 after ~sampling1 128. re sample tanks 'involve.d in overflow; rework if neces11

• 0

• Table 9 .10!> Continued MAL.OPERATIC* OF lJIANlt.11 PR<D.CT PllUFlCATIC*

---

~* ..*--** ........... ..................... --------*- ----- -*

• ter .

adver se resul ts1 posii ble High reading on TI 2~ on Tum on cooli ng

23. High teape ratun s in No

!ID-ol2A1 Tl 26 on 5D-12B.

5D-12A 01' 128. bolli ng in tank.

Poor sample1 *1nco rrect LR-6 on Tank 5D-12A ahow1 Operator aust follo . pro-

24. Failu re to sparg e tanks tank was or was not sparged per sapl ing proce Jun1

&>-12A or 128 before analy sis. reaample tanks tum on sampling (See note) . by linet race1 LR-7 on Tank 50-128. sparge air 1/2 hour prior ring ,amp llng. to sampling.

NoteaThis malo perat ion pro cedure appli es to all produc~ tanks requi 1 Re&ample tank& as required

• 2~. Solut ion put into wrong Possi ble rework 9f product Level inven tory on tanks tank (e.g. 5D-12A inste ad and resam pling . LR-6 on ~l2A 1 LR-7 on of 50-128. 5D-12Bslf too full, LAH-7 or 5D-12A e>r LAH-8 on 50-128.

Resample and trans fer

26. High level in Low-Enriched Overflow to off-s pecif icatio n LAH-9. solut ions as requ ired.

Uranium Stora ge Tank compartment in 50-1 ~.

~l~A .

- Tum on cooli ng wate r to

27. H~gh temp eratu re in No adver se resu lts, possi ble High TI 27 readi ng. coils .

5D-15A. boili ng of solut ion.

Overflow to 5D-15A off- LAH-11. Resample and take lnven to J')'l

28. High level in Low-Enriched rework as requi red.

Uranium Stora ge Tank spec ifica tion comp artme nt, 50-1 ~. resampllng requl redJ posslble rework.

No adver se resu lts, auto- When Pump ~-6 stops , low Walt for more solut ion to

29. Low level in 50-158. lev&l is recor ded. accumulate or trans fer ao1ft matlc shutdown of produ ct solut ion from 50-12A or B pump $"."6.

LI-141 scale weig ht. Tran sfer to next tank true:k.

30. High level in Low-Enriched More solut ion than requi red Uranium Produ ct Weight to f111i tank trail er.

Tank 5V-l.

nium Sample analy sis of 50-12A Rework if neces sary a re-

31. Degradation of silic a gel. Failu re to remove zircom and 50-128. gene rate or repla ce silic a and niobium from uraniu produ ct. gel beds.

I '

Table9.106 MAI.OPERATION OF Tl£ PRODU::T PACKAGIOO AA.O SHIPPING AREA (PPS) llaloperatlon Results Indication Corrective Action

1. Plutonium product bottle Plutonium solution will Visual observation* of spil* Close valves on filling overfilled or fill line spil l in bottle filling lage and/or measuring pot heads move to drip con*

miaconnected. station sump * . to a volume > 10 11 ters. tainer1 transfer spill to 50-4 with eductor1 clean up area w1 th de*

contamination washe1.

2. Enriched uranium product Spillage of enriched uranlu; Visual observation of Close fill valves and bottle overfilled or im- in fill area. spillage. transfer spill to En-proper connection of fill riched Uranium Product Stor~e Tank 50-138.

3.

head.

(plutonium or enriched I

t Two filled product bottles May approach a critical array {See section on I .Radiation alarm. All equipment and oper-ating procedures have been designed to prevent uranium) brought together. Nuclear Safety.)

more than one uncaged product bottle from being in the area at one tl**

If the radiation alarm sounds, area will be evacuated at once *

4. ICross-over valves opened Cross contamination of Radiation alarm1 product These valves will be between plutonium and products. Plutonium alpha analysis. lo~ed at all times un-uraniun spill transfer 1 contamination of uranium less a $pecial situation lines. product fill area. requires their use1 material returned to rework.

5. IGlove rupture. Personnel hand contaminat ~ Visual. Negative pressure on glove

• box will prevent leakage

.. of contamination from box.

Hand decontaminatio.n as prescribed by Health and Safety. Replace glove *

" IW.OPERATION Of Table 9.106 Continued TIE PROOOOT PACKAGit<<; AND SHIPPING AREA (PPS)

6. Improp erly stoppe red Gross contamination of the Monitor ing prior to Immediate evacua tion of product bottle . birdca ge. shipment. area1 decontae1nation of birdca ge \Wier Health and Safety auperviaion1 de-contam.irwtion procedure, as prescr ibed by Health and Safety .

. . ~

procedur&s and administrative controls, which are discussed in the chapter on Nuclear Safety. The rework system receives solutions into the Rework Evaporation Feed Tank (70-8) from seven other collection tanks (40-2, 40-8; 40-10, .40-13, 60-3, 70-10, and 130-8). The solutions in these seven tanks have been sampled; hence, they are of known composition. These analyses determine which solutions shall be routed to Tank 70-8. On the basis of these known co, positions and extraction feed requirements, a procedure is followed for reworking 9ach batch. If soluble neutron poison is required, as determined by analysis, it is added from Tank 140-32 in the cold solu-tion area. Acid, or other reagents, could be added from the same tank, if required. Solution in Tank 70-8 is air-sparged and transferred by steam-jet eductors to the R!work Evaporator 70-4; Because of criticality considerations, Evaporator 70-4 is operated on a batch basis only. A

.low-ievel alarm anJ control prevent ,overconcentration in the evaporator.

Condensate from the rework e*:aporator flows to the Low* Level Waste Evaporator feed Tank. This material will be very dilute acid with some activity in it. the bottoms

• from the rework evaporator are transferred by steam transfer eductor to the Partition Cycle feed Tank (30-1).

Solutions may also be transferred to the Low-Level Waste Accountability and Neutralizer Tank. Various possible maloperations of the Rework Evaporator sy,tem, togeiher with possible *consequences, alarms, indica-tions, and corrective measures,are listed in table 9.107.

Higb-Levei wa,te Evaporator' System 9.108 A schematic representation of the High-Level Waste Evaporator Syst~m is shown in figure 4.81. the system consists of Tank 7D-l (th~ High-Level Waste Evaporator feed

• Tanij, 7C-l (the Low-Level Waste Evaporate~, 7E-5 (the High-Level Waste Evaporator Con-dense~,. and 70-4 (the High-Level Waste Accountability and Neutralizer Tank). the system is fabricated of stainless steel except for the heat transfer tube bundle, which is made of titanium. Wast& from the parti-tion cycle or from the rework evaporator can be transferred to the High-Level Waste Evaporator Feed ~ank. Solution may be t~ansferred to the

• evaporator by air lift or by 1et. It is intended that the ovaporator bottoms be operated at an acid concentration no grea~er than 8.M HN03*

Maloperutlons in this system are detdlled in table 9.108. The evaporator* bottoms, after analys,is, are either neutralized with caustic and pumped to the tank f~rm for storage or are recycled, if necessary.

Jaer-u:vei Jaste Evaporator Sys\\e'D 9.109 A schematic representation of the Low-Level W~&te Evaporator System is shown in figure 4.83. The system consists of Tank 7D-2 (the L<lw-Level Waste Evaporator \Feed ranij, -X:-2 (the Low-Level Waste Evaporato~, 7E-7 (the Low-Level Waste Evaporator Condense~; and 70-10 (the Low-Level Waste Accountability' an*d Neutralizer Tank. the system ls fabricated of stainless stee~ except for the heat transfer tube bundle which is made of titanium. The lo#*Level Evaporator System evaporates the overheads from the High-Level Evaporator System, ~he aqueour waste streams from all of the solvent extraction steps except

Table 9.107 IIALOPERATION SlMIARY OF REWmK EVAPCIIA'l'm SYSTEM Result Indica tion Cornc tiw A~tlon llalo~ ration O\;erflow of 70-8 to Tank LAH-7 on 70-81 PAH-3. Tum off ate* to tranl*

1.1 Tranaf er of too mch fer educt "'ft causing **ce..

solutio n from any one of 40-10 and 40-13. one of the -

seven fffds _to 70-8. transf er.

Nven feed* to 7D-8.

LAL-8 on 70-8. Shut down of Evapo ntor 2.1 Transfer of insuff icient 170-8 will run dry when 7C*4 11 autoaailca supply solutio n to 70-8. evaporator ls running.

more soluti on t.o 70-8 lf availa ble.

3.1 Transf er of 0?1Janic to 70-8 (*~ note).

J Organic will flow to 7C-41 DI1 low densit ies in aeven

• Jet some solven t degradation ma feeds (70-8 and 7C-4).

out organi c t.o waste tank aft.er using apecu l occur. wash soluti on to 1trip out any product froa the organi c.

!!2Y,1 Hydraulics of equiPlnent and piping is designed 1 preven t -O%ganic reaching anL one of tlae Nven feed to 7D-8. Conce ntratio n of adl.d used !n 7C-4 will not cau:C seriou s solven 7D-8.

I 4.1 Trand er of wrong tank to Boll cl-. of wro_

incorr ect rework product t nitrat ion.

invent ory will show wrong I

ng 1olut1on1 Sample analys lsJ tank level Revhe boU.. i-n andaat.e procedure to compen

.-zit for differ ent soluti on.

composition. tank has been transf erred.

tr::-5 off1 LR on 70-8 will I Tum on tr::-5.

5. I Insuff icient air sparge t1 Pcx;r mixing in 70-81 this i draw thin. even line. . .

70-8. only seriou s when widely d I fering compositions from twci or more tanks are mixed or neutron poison is requir ed.

6. I Failur e to add neutron poison to 70-8 when I LIC-4 and LAL-9 on 1C-4 will provide contro l and alarm t Level invent ory on 7D-B and IAGll nbtrat lve procad 140-32 1 also admin istrati ve design ed to provid e un two required. preven t possib le critic al condit ion.

checlc and data sheet.

I or more independent chtck*

in such caae1 to insure poison has been added. SN sectio n on Nuclear Safety .

~

Taille 9.107 Continued IIALOFERATIC:>>t StlUMRY OF REW<llK EVAPCRATCR SYSTEM luloperation Real!lt Indlcatlon * &_.;::th,a Actlftll 7~ . *ugh level in 7C-4. Solution overflows to 31>-l before it ta properly LAH tn 30-1.

Level control ln Ht too hlgb or ate*

?C**

adjusted. 1upply too low - n ..t.

~

a. Level too low in 7C-4. Concentration too high or LAL-9. Dilute a ... ne~aaary.

' steaa coll _not covered, resulting in low capacity.

9. Air 1parger on 7C*4 turned Ne adverse resul tsJ boiling None other ~n position of None nece11ary.

off. will supply ample mixing. air valve.

10. Cooling water to Condenser Water and nltrlc acid vapor Hlgh temperature on TR-l-81 Increa&e water .flow to .

7E*8 too low or turned off in Vessel Vent System. high temperature in Ve1&el 7E*8.

entirely. Vent Systems excess conden-sate in Vessel Vent System *

- I

~ *~----.......~....~jlillaal------~--~--- ---- ~

Table 9.108 TANK (71).1)

IW.OPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE EVAPalATtll FEED

. TrvH -"*+1 A f t r.n - ;- * * - a ....., """

u .... ,,11:

111111- - ~ 1ftft Automatic cutb tck of

1. Feed lift to 7C*l working 1C-l leve l rise s due to in- LIC- 6 in 7C- l. air flow.

too fast . crea sed now.

LR:-6 in 7C- l. Automatic incr ea.. ot

2. Feed lift to 7C*l working 1C-l leve l c:uops due to ....

air flow .

too slowly. decreased flow.

Shftt off alr lift . saw,t

3. Liquid leve l too* low in Liquid leve l will drop in LAL-!>.

down steam to evaporate,r .

70-1 . evap orat or 1C-1.* 7C*l to avoid overcoccen-trat ion.

Shut off steam jet fr

4. Liquid leve l too high in If alarm is ignored and no LAH*4. 40-21 incr ease stea a and 70-1 . acti on take n, will overflow air jets in 70-1 , re-back to 40-2 , the Part ition moving liqu id as much s Cycl~ Waste Hold TanJc. nece ssar y (bot h even t ally feed 7C- l).

~- Rate jet fall s or is plugged.

7C-l leve l drop s. uc- 6.

Sample of tank 7~4 .

Use air lift as alte r-nate tran sfer mechani ...

No expl osio n will occ

6. Tran sfer of orga ni~ when Organic will d~composv in because steam is 11111 ted usin g rate jet 7H-4. 7C-l with subsequent tran s- to 25 psig1 the tempe fer to underground tanJc. atur e ls then below flas h poin t organlc1 when usin g 7H-4t tank 70-1 will not be coari ,t*

ely emptied.

. l l

1 I '

Table 9.108 Continued MAI.OPERATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE EVA~TCE (7C-l)

......... '"' ...... v,, * *- -- .._ .

-.. .w*-- 6 V . . .I. V'* * **v-11...-*., ~V.&.A'liJ,-*

1. Not enough steam in heat- Insuffic ient amount of TR-1-6 in 7C-l I UC-6 in 70- l Increase 1teaa flow ing coils. liquid boiled off1 liquid LR-9 in 70-41 DR-5 decrease . through coils with level rises, which auto- FIC-3. Stop steam jet snaticall y shuts off air lift from 70-1.

from high-lev el waste evap-orator feed tank (70-1)1 level in high-leve ~ waste accounta bility and neutral-izer tank (70-4) rises by solution traveling through cverflow pipeline from 7C-l to 70-4 if on continuous processin g.

2 * . Too mch ,team in heating coila.

Too much liquid boiled off1 LRC-6, TR-1-6 in 7C-11 liquid level drops1 liquid m-5. Turn down steam to coil with FIC-31 use batch temperat ure rises1 density transfer jet 7H-4 if rises; level recorder con- necessar y.

trol will automati cally draw more feed from High-Level Waste Evaporat or Feed Tank

\70-1)

• Liquid level too high in Level recorder control will IJC-61 check flow from 70-6. t 3.

7C-l. automati cally reduce flow from High-lev el Waste Evap- .. te orator Feed Tank (7D-l).

ng I . I f

f I

r I I I

i