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{{#Wiki_filter:Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise
{{#Wiki_filter:Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                             2011 Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant REP Exercise AFTER ACTION REPORT Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Program Exercise
[FINAL]
October 19, 2011 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Published February 2012 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise


AFTER ACTION REPORT Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Program Exercise  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                            2011 Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise


[FINAL]
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
October 19, 2011 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Published February 2012 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise
AAR                                                                     2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Table of Contents Page Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................1 Administrative Handling Instructions ..............................................................................................3 Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................5 Section 1: Exercise Overview .........................................................................................................7 1.1    Exercise Details .............................................................................................................7 1.2    Exercise Planning Team ................................................................................................8 1.3    Participating Organizations ............................................................................................8 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ...........................................................................................11 2.1    Exercise Purpose and Design .......................................................................................11 2.2    FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities ...............................................................11 2.3    Scenario Summary .......................................................................................................14 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ...............................................................................................15 3.1    Exercise Evaluation and Results ..................................................................................15 3.2    Evaluation Summaries .................................................................................................15 3.2.1  State Of Tennessee ...........................................................................................15 3.2.1.1          State Emergency Operations Center ..............................................15 3.2.1.2          Dose Assessment ...........................................................................17 3.2.1.3          Field Coordination Center..............................................................18 3.2.1.4          Local Primary 1 (LP-1) EAS Station .............................................19 3.2.2  Joint Operations ...............................................................................................19 3.2.2.1          Central Emergency Control Center ................................................19 3.2.2.2          Joint Information Center ................................................................20 3.2.3  Risk Jurisdictions .............................................................................................21 3.2.3.1          Meigs County, Tennessee ..............................................................21 3.2.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................21 3.2.3.1.2 Traffic and Access Control Points .................................22 3.2.3.1.3 Backup Route Alerting ..................................................23 Table Of Contents                                                                                2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 1


This Page Is Intentionally Blank
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.2        McMinn County, Tennessee ..........................................................24 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................24 3.2.3.2.2 Traffic and Access Control Points .................................25 3.2.3.3        Rhea County, Tennessee ................................................................26 3.2.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................26 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic and Access Control Points .................................27 3.2.3.3.3 Waterway Clearance ......................................................28 Section 4: Conclusion ...................................................................................................................29 List of Appendices Appendix A:  Exercise Timeline (Table 1) ....................................................................................31 Appendix B:  Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Table 2) ...............................................33 Appendix C:  Exercise Evaluator and Assignments ......................................................................35 Appendix D:  Exercise Locations ..................................................................................................39 Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreement........................................................................................41 Appendix F:  Acronyms .................................................................................................................57 Table Of Contents                                                                            2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 2


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Table Of Contents 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 1 Table of Contents Page  Table of Contents .............................................................................................................
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
................1 Administrative Handling Instructions ..........................................................................................
AAR                                             2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Administrative Handling Instructions
....3  Executive Summary .............................................................................................................
: 1. This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant (WBN)
............5 Section 1:  Exercise Overview .................................................................................................
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Full Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
........7  1.1 Exercise Details .............................................................................................................7
Exercise is considered a public document.
: 2. Points of


===1.2 Exercise===
==Contact:==
Planning Team ................................................................................................8
Federal:                                            State of Tennessee:
Mr. Kevin Keyes                                      General Bassham North Section Chief                                  Director FEMA Region IV                                      TN Emergency Management Agency 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road                            3041 Sidco Drive Atlanta, Georgia 30341-4122                          Nashville, Tennessee 37204-1502 770/220-5378                                        616/741-0001 kevin.keyes@dhs.gov Meigs County:                                        McMinn County:
Mr. Tony Finnel                                      Ms. Betty Hamby Director                                            Director Emergency Management                                Emergency Management 14816 Hwy 58 South 1                                107 S. Congress Parkway Decatur, Tennessee 37322                            Athens, Tennessee 37303 meigsema@yahoo.com                                  mcminnema@comcast.net Rhea County:                                        Tennessee Valley Authority:
Mr. Bill Cranfield                                  Mr. Walter H. Lee Director                                            Manager Emergency Management                                Emergency Preparedness 8860 Back Valley Road                                1101 Market Street, LP 6B-C Evensville, Tennessee 37322                          Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 rheaema@volstate.net Handling Instructions                                          2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 3


===1.3 Participating===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Organizations ............................................................................................8
AAR                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 4


Section 2:  Exercise Design Summary ...........................................................................................
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
11  2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design .......................................................................................11 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities ...............................................................11
AAR                                                   2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Executive Summary On October 19, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a full plume exposure pathway exercise in the Emergency Planning Zone for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The plant site, consisting of approximately 1,800 acres, is located in Rhea County in southeastern Tennessee. The site is located on the west shore of the Tennessee River, approximately 50 miles north-northeast of Chattanooga, and 54 miles southwest of Knoxville. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
 
FEMAs overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at WBN. The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results based on the assessment of target capabilities. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMAs policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. The evaluation team conducted this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology.
===2.3 Scenario===
The previous Federal evaluated exercise was conducted on June 9, 2009.             The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 15-16, 1995.
Summary .......................................................................................................14
Officials and representatives from the State of Tennessee, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, and TVA, as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all the phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals who participated in the success of this exercise. FEMA would also like to acknowledge the enthusiasm and contributions of the exercise planning team during the design of the exercise. The introduction of new products and concepts into the design phase of the exercise was embraced by the team, and they exhibited an eagerness to improve emergency management and response at all levels.
 
The State and Risk counties successfully demonstrated the required REP criterion to accomplish and demonstrate the following capabilities: Emergency Operations Center Management, Emergency Public Information and Warning, Emergency Public Safety and Security Response and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.
Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities ..........................................................................................
During this exercise, FEMA did not identify Deficiencies or Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). Overall, State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Communications were identified as a general strength throughout the exercise. Not only was the communications equipment interoperable and functional, but the personnel utilizing it kept everyone well informed and helped to maintain situational awareness across the board. The evaluation team noted continuing progress in the coordination of activities between the State, counties, and all other response entities.
.....15  3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results ..................................................................................15
Executive Summary                                                   2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 5
 
===3.2 Evaluation===
Summaries .................................................................................................15
 
====3.2.1 State====
Of Tennessee ...........................................................................................15
 
3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center ..............................................15 3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment ...........................................................................17 3.2.1.3 Field Coordination Center..............................................................18 3.2.1.4 Local Primary 1 (LP-1) EAS Station .............................................19
 
====3.2.2 Joint====
Operations ...............................................................................................19
 
3.2.2.1 Central Emergency Control Center ................................................19 3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center ................................................................20
 
3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions .............................................................................................21
 
3.2.3.1 Meigs County, Tennessee ..............................................................21
 
3.2.3.1.1  Emergency Operations Center .......................................21 3.2.3.1.2  Traffic and Access Control Points .................................22 3.2.3.1.3  Backup Route Alerting ..................................................23
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Table Of Contents 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 2 3.2.3.2 McMinn County, Tennessee ..........................................................24 3.2.3.2.1  Emergency Operations Center .......................................24 3.2.3.2.2  Traffic and Access Control Points .................................25
 
3.2.3.3 Rhea County, Tennessee ................................................................26
 
3.2.3.3.1  Emergency Operations Center .......................................26 3.2.3.3.2  Traffic and Access Control Points .................................27 3.2.3.3.3  Waterway Clearance ......................................................28
 
Section 4:  Conclusion ........................................................................................................
...........29 List of Appendices Appendix A:  Exercise Timeline (Table 1) ....................................................................................31 Appendix B:  Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Table 2) ...............................................33 Appendix C:  Exercise Evaluator and Assignments ......................................................................35 Appendix D:  Exercise Locations ...............................................................................................
...39 Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreement ........................................................................................4 1 Appendix F:  Acronyms .........................................................................................................
........57
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Handling Instructions 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 3 Administrative Handling Instructions
: 1. This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant (WBN) Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Full Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Exercise is considered a public document. 
: 2. Points of Contact:
Federal:  State of Tennessee:
 
Mr. Kevin Keyes General Bassham North Section Chief Director FEMA Region IV TN Emergency Management Agency 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road 3041 Sidco Drive Atlanta, Georgia  30341-4122 Nashville, Tennessee  37204-1502
 
770/220-5378 616/741-0001
 
kevin.keyes@dhs.gov
 
Meigs County: McMinn County:
 
Mr. Tony Finnel Ms. Betty Hamby Director Director Emergency Management Emergency Management 14816 Hwy 58 South 1 107 S. Congress Parkway Decatur, Tennessee  37322 Athens, Tennessee  37303 meigsema@yahoo.com mcminnema@comcast.net
 
Rhea County: Tennessee Valley Authority:
Mr. Bill Cranfield Mr. Walter H. Lee Director  Manager Emergency Management Emergency Preparedness 8860 Back Valley Road 1101 Market Street, LP 6B-C Evensville, Tennessee  37322  Chattanooga, Tennessee  37402 rheaema@volstate.net Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 4 
 
This Page Is Intentionally Blank Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Executive Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 5 Executive Summary On October 19, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a full plume exposure pathway exercise in the Emergency Planning Zone for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The plant site, consisting of approximately 1,800 acres, is located in Rhea County in southeastern Tennessee. The site is located on the west shore of the Tennessee River, approximately 50 miles north-northeast of Chattanooga, and 54 miles southwest of Knoxville. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).  
 
FEMA's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at WBN.
The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results based on the assessment of target capabilities. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. The evaluation team conducted this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology.  
 
The previous Federal evaluated exercise was conducted on June 9, 2009. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 15-16, 1995.  
 
Officials and representatives from the State of Tennessee, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, and TVA, as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all the phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals who participated in the success of this exercise. FEMA would also like to acknowledge the enthusiasm and contribu tions of the exercise planning team during the design of the exercise. The intr oduction of new products and concep ts into the design phase of the exercise was embraced by the team, and they exhibited an eagerness to improve emergency management and response at all levels.  
 
The State and Risk counties successfully demonstrated the required REP criterion to accomplish and demonstrate the following capabilities: Emergency Operations Center Management, Emergency Public Information and Warning, Emer gency Public Safety and Security Response and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.  
 
During this exercise, FEMA did not identify Deficiencies or Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). Overall, State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Communications were identified as a general stre ngth throughout the exercise.
Not only was the communications equipment interoperable and functional, but the personnel utilizing it kept everyone well informed and helped to maintain situational awareness across the board. The evaluation team noted continuing progress in the coordination of activities between the State, counties, and all other response entities.  
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Executive Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 6 The objectives for the 2011 WBN REP Exercise were as follows:
* Objective 1:  Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center Management including Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Emergency Operations Centers.
* Objective 2:  Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
* Objective 3:  Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.
* Objective 4:  Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.
* Objective 5:  Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.
These objectives encompass the REP Exercise Eval uation Criteria as negotia ted in the Extent of Play Agreement.


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise The objectives for the 2011 WBN REP Exercise were as follows:
* Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center Management including Direction and Control through the Counties and State Emergency Operations Centers.
* Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
* Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.
* Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.
* Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.
These objectives encompass the REP Exercise Evaluation Criteria as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.
FEMA will provide an Improvement Plan (IP) to the State of Tennessee that detail strengths and Areas for Improvement observed during the exercise. The IP will be published under a separate cover and classified For Official Use Only (FOUO) in compliance with HSEEP standards.
FEMA will provide an Improvement Plan (IP) to the State of Tennessee that detail strengths and Areas for Improvement observed during the exercise. The IP will be published under a separate cover and classified For Official Use Only (FOUO) in compliance with HSEEP standards.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 1:  Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 7 Section 1:  Exercise Overview
Executive Summary                                                  2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 6


===1.1 Exercise===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Details Exercise Name 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise (2011 WBN REP Exercise)
AAR                                                2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1   Exercise Details Exercise Name 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise (2011 WBN REP Exercise)
Type of Exercise Full-Scale Exercise Exercise Date October 19, 2011 Locations See Appendix D for a complete listing of loca tions that supported exercise activities.
Type of Exercise Full-Scale Exercise Exercise Date October 19, 2011 Locations See Appendix D for a complete listing of locations that supported exercise activities.
Sponsors Tennessee Emergency Management Agency 3041 Sidco Drive  
Sponsors Tennessee Emergency Management Agency 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204-1502 Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Program FEMA REP Program Mission


Nashville, Tennessee 37204-1502
===Response===
 
Capabilities
Tennessee Valley Authority
 
1101 Market Street
 
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Program FEMA REP Program Mission Response  Capabilities
* Emergency Operations Center Management
* Emergency Operations Center Management
* Emergency Public Information and Warning
* Emergency Public Information and Warning
* Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
* Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
* Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Scenario Type REP, Full Plume Phase EPZ Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 8 1.2 Exercise Planning Team
* Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Scenario Type REP, Full Plume Phase EPZ Section 1: Exercise Overview                                       2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 7


===1.3 Participating===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Organizations The following agencies, organizations and units of government partic ipated in the 2011 WBN REP Exercise:
AAR                                                2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 1.2    Exercise Planning Team Role                         Name                     Agency Exercise Director             Gary Lima               TEMA Lead Controller               David Green             TEMA Lead Evaluator               Alejandro Sera           DHS/FEMA Region IV Exercise Logistics           David Nash               TEMA Evaluation Supervisor         Kevin Keyes             DHS/FEMA Region IV Scenario Development Lead     Kenneth King             TVA Agency Representative         Walt Lee                 TVA Agency Representative         Tony Finnell             Meigs County Agency Representative         Betty Hamby             McMinn County Agency Representative         Tom Trotter             McMinn County Agency Representative         Billy Cranfield         Rhea County Agency Representative         Bill Tittle             Hamilton County Agency Representative         Wayne Stuntz             Hamilton County Agency Representative         Jeff Gunter             Bradley County Agency Representative         Liz Flanagan             TN DHEC Agency Representative         Bruce House             TN DHEC 1.3    Participating Organizations The following agencies, organizations and units of government participated in the 2011 WBN REP Exercise:
Role Name Agency Exercise Director Gary Lima TEMA Lead Controller David Green TEMA Lead Evaluator Alejandro Sera DHS/FEMA Region IV Exercise Logistics David Nash TEMA Evaluation Supervisor Kevin Keyes DHS/FEMA Region IV Scenario Development Lead Kenneth King TVA Agency Representative Walt Lee TVA Agency Representative Tony Finnell Meigs County Agency Representative Betty Hamby McMinn County Agency Representative Tom Trotter McMinn County Agency Representative Billy Cranfield Rhea County Agency Representative Bill Tittle Hamilton County Agency Representative Wayne Stuntz Hamilton County Agency Representative Jeff Gunter Bradley County Agency Representative Liz Flanagan TN DHEC Agency Representative Bruce House TN DHEC State of Tennessee
State of Tennessee
* Military Department Tennessee Emergency Management Agency
* Military Department Tennessee Emergency Management Agency
* Tennessee Department of Envi ronment and Conservation Division of Radiological Health Division of State Parks
* Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Division of Radiological Health Division of State Parks
* Tennessee Department of Health Division of Food and General Sanitation
* Tennessee Department of Health Division of Food and General Sanitation
* Tennessee Department of Agriculture Division of Forestry
* Tennessee Department of Agriculture Division of Forestry
* Tennessee Department of Safety Tennessee Highway Patrol
* Tennessee Department of Safety Tennessee Highway Patrol
* Tennessee Department of Human Services
* Tennessee Department of Human Services
* Tennessee Department of Transportation
* Tennessee Department of Transportation
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* County Mayor
* County Mayor
* County Emergency Services Division
* County Emergency Services Division
* County Sheriff Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 1:  Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 9
* County Sheriff Section 1: Exercise Overview                                    2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 8
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                             2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise
* County Fire Services
* County Fire Services
* County EMS
* County EMS
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* County Fire
* County Fire
* County Rescue
* County Rescue
* County EMS Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 1:  Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 10
* County EMS Section 1: Exercise Overview                                  2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 9
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                               2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise
* County Public Works
* County Public Works
* County Board of Education
* County Board of Education
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* Salvation Army
* Salvation Army
* American Red Cross
* American Red Cross
* Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)  
* Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)
Section 1: Exercise Overview                                    2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 10


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 11 Section 2:  Exercise Design Summary  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
 
AAR                                                   2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1   Exercise Purpose and Design The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities.
===2.1 Exercise===
During these exercises State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.
Purpose and Design The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, Stat e, tribal and local governments impacted by the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) establ ished for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and  
The 2011 WBN REP Exercise was designed utilizing the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). HSEEP is a capabilities and performance-based exercise program which provides a standardized policy, methodology and terminology for exercises. The use of HSEEP is intended to ensure that the REP program conforms to established best practices and helps provide unity and consistency of effort for exercises at all levels of government. Prior to the exercise, the design team conducted planning meetings on a regular basis which focused on identifying objectives, designing the scenario, creating documentation, coordinating logistics, planning exercise conduct, and selecting an evaluation and improvement methodology.
 
The results of this exercise together with the review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visits enable FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final AAR to the NRC that State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.
approval of State, Tribal and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergenc y at the nuclear plant.  
The Tennessee Multi-Jurisdiction Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the WBN Plant was formally submitted to FEMA by the State of Tennessee on April 12, 1996.
 
Title 44 CFR Part 350 approval was granted by FEMA on July 3, 1997.
The 2011 WBN REP Exercise was designed utilizing the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). HSEEP is a capabilities and performance-based exercise program which provides a standardized policy, methodology and terminology for exercises. The use of HSEEP is intended to ensure that the REP program conforms to established best practices and helps provide unity and consiste ncy of effort for exercises at all levels of government. Prior to the exercise, the design team conducted planning meetings on a regular basis which focuse d on identifying objectives, designing the scenario, creating documentation, coordinating logistics, planning exercise conduct, and selecting an evaluation and improvement methodology.
2.2    FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below Section 2: Exercise Design Summary                                  2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 11


The results of this exercise together with the review of the RERP s and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Ce rtification and staff assistan ce visits enable FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final AAR to the NRC that State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequa te to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.
* Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management: Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC Management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.
* Emergency Public Information and Warning: Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.
* Emergency Public Safety and Security Response: Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire and Emergency Medical Services.
* Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.
Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail. Based upon the identified exercise objectives, the following capabilities and associated activities were evaluated.
* Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center Management including Direction and Control through the Counties and State Section 2: Exercise Design Summary                                    2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 12


The Tennessee Multi-Jurisdiction Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the WBN Plant was formally submitted to FEMA by the State of Tennessee on April 12, 1996.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Title 44 CFR Part 350 approval was granted by FEMA on July 3, 1997.  
AAR                                                2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Operations Centers.
Capability: EOC Management - Activate EOC; Direct EOC Operations; and Provide EOC Connectivity
* Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
Capability: EOC Management - Support and Coordinate Response Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning - Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans and Issue Emergency Warnings
* Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and Counties emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.
Capability: EOC Management - Direct EOC Operations Capability: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response - Activate Public Safety and Security Response; Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene; and Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response Operations Capability: Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination - Assess Hazard and Evaluate Risk
* Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.
Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning - Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans; and Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications.
* Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.
Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning - Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications; Conduct Media Relations and Provide Public Rumor Control.
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary                                2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 13


2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities Capabilities-based planning allows for exer cise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 2:  Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 12 form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
* Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management:
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2.3   Scenario Summary This Exercise was conducted with the Watts Bar Plant Simulator in the interactive mode.
Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC Management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and r ecovery activities; c oordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication nece ssary for coordinating response and recovery activities.
Times given were for planning purposes only. Actual times did vary due to dynamic response of the Simulator.
* Emergency Public Information and Warning:  Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and no tification. It invo lves developing, coordinating, and disseminating informati on to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.
* Emergency Public Safety and Security Response:  Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene pres ervation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire and Emergency Medical Services.
* Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination:  Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attac
: k. It includes testing and id entifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontam ination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.
Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail. Based upon the id entified exercise object ives, the following capabilities and associated activities were evaluated.
* Objective 1:  Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center Management including Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 2:  Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 13 Emergency Operations Centers. Capability:  EOC Management - Activate EOC; Direct EOC Operations; and Provide EOC Connectivity
* Objective 2:  Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures. Capability:  EOC Management -
Support and Coordinate Response  Capability:  Emergency Public Information and Warning -
Manage Emergency Public Information and Wa rnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans and Issue Emergency Warnings
* Objective 3:  Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and Counties' emergency wo rkers and public through exercise demonstration. Capability:  EOC Management -  Direct EOC Operations  Capability:  Emergency Public Safety and Security Response - Activate Public Safety and Security Response; Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene; and Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response Operations Capability:  Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination - Assess Hazard and Evaluate Risk
* Objective 4:  Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.
Capability:  Emergency Public Information and Warning -
Manage Emergency Public Information and Wa rnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Noti fication Plans; and Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications.
* Objective 5:  Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.
Capability:  Emergency Public Information and Warning - Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notif ications; Conduct Me dia Relations and Provide Public Rumor Control.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 2:  Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 14 2.3 Scenario Summary This Exercise was conducted with the Watts Bar Plant Simulator in the interactive mode. Times given were for planning purposes only. Actual times did vary due to dynamic response of the Simulator.
Initial Conditions:
Initial Conditions:
Unit 1:
Unit 1:
Line 250: Line 199:
* 1B MDAFW pump is out of service for repairs.
* 1B MDAFW pump is out of service for repairs.
Unit 2:
Unit 2:
Time   Location Event 8:10 0:10 Watts Bar The CO2 tank in the diesel building explodes causing damages to the 1A Diesel Generator room wall causing concrete debris to fall on the diesel and the floor. 8:25 0:25 Watts Bar ALERT base on EAL 4.2 9:30 1:30 Watts Bar Main feed water regulating valve fail closed to the #1 steam generator which leads to a reactor trip signal on low level. The reactor fails to trip automatically or manually (ATWS). The injection of cold AFW water results in Steam Generator#1 having a tube rupture. When Operations attempts to close the steam supply to the TDAFW pump from SG#1 the steam supply valve 1-FCV-1-15 to SG#1 fails close. 9:45 1:45 Watts Bar Site Area Emergency declared base on EAL 2.3 10:30 2:30 Watts Bar A steam safety valve on #1 Steam Generator fails full open causing a release to the environment. The MSL radiation monitors reach the GE setpoint at the same time the release starts. He rad levels are maintained for the required 15 minutes in EAL 1.3.4. Gaseous Effluents. 10:45 2:45 Watts Bar General Emergency Declared base on EAL 7.1 11:45 3:45 Watts Bar A small fire occurs on the 1B Diesel Generator exhaust manifold due to prolonged running at no-load. 13:00   Endex Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 15 Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities
Time           Location       Event 8:10   0:10   Watts Bar       The CO2 tank in the diesel building explodes causing damages to the 1A Diesel Generator room wall causing concrete debris to fall on the diesel and the floor.
8:25   0:25   Watts Bar       ALERT base on EAL 4.2 9:30   1:30   Watts Bar       Main feed water regulating valve fail closed to the #1 steam generator which leads to a reactor trip signal on low level. The reactor fails to trip automatically or manually (ATWS). The injection of cold AFW water results in Steam Generator#1 having a tube rupture. When Operations attempts to close the steam supply to the TDAFW pump from SG#1 the steam supply valve 1-FCV-1-15 to SG#1 fails close.
9:45   1:45   Watts Bar       Site Area Emergency declared base on EAL 2.3 10:30   2:30   Watts Bar       A steam safety valve on #1 Steam Generator fails full open causing a release to the environment. The MSL radiation monitors reach the GE setpoint at the same time the release starts. He rad levels are maintained for the required 15 minutes in EAL 1.3.4. Gaseous Effluents.
10:45   2:45   Watts Bar       General Emergency Declared base on EAL 7.1 11:45   3:45   Watts Bar       A small fire occurs on the 1B Diesel Generator exhaust manifold due to prolonged running at no-load.
13:00           Endex Section 2: Exercise Design Summary                                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 14


===3.1 Exercise===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Evaluation and Results This section contains the resu lts and findings of the evalua tion of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 19, 2011 plume exercise. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstrat ion status of those cr iteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 3.1     Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 19, 2011 plume exercise. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:
* Met (No Deficiency or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assess and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)
* Met (No Deficiency or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assess and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)
* ARCAs assessed or unresolved ARCAs from previous exercises
* ARCAs assessed or unresolved ARCAs from previous exercises
* Deficiency assessed
* Deficiency assessed
* Plan Issues
* Plan Issues
* Not Demonstrated  
* Not Demonstrated 3.2     Evaluation Summaries 3.2.1 State Of Tennessee 3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
 
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activation, notification, staffing, direction and control, and coordination of response activities.
===3.2 Evaluation===
Effective and efficient procedures were used to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel in the SEOC and were accomplished successfully in a timely manner as specified in the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) Annex B-Notification and Warning Plan.
Summaries
Emergency Service Coordinators (ESC) had access to the appropriate amount of equipment, supplies and maps to support their needs also ESC and branches used WebEOC extensively to post actions and important information. Redundant communication systems insured the ESC had the ability to communicate with other agencies, as specified in the MJRERP Basic Plan, and Annex C-Communications Plan.
 
The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) demonstrated good direction and control through the exercise, as specified in the MJRERP Annex A-Direction and Control.
====3.2.1 State====
Protective Actions Recommendation (PAR) and Protective Actions Decision (PAD) were discussed and coordinated with the Risk Counties, questions and recommendations were Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                   2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 15
Of Tennessee  
 
3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center  
 
Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activation, notification, sta ffing, direction and control, and coordination of response activities.  
 
Effective and efficient procedures were used to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel in the SEOC and were accomplished successfully in a timely manner as specified in the Tennessee Mu lti-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) Annex B-Notification and Warning Plan.  
 
Emergency Service Coordinators (ESC) ha d access to the appropriate amount of equipment, supplies and maps to support their needs also ESC and branches used WebEOC extensively to post actions and important information. Redundant communication systems insured the ESC had the ability to communicate with other agencies, as specified in the MJRERP Basic Plan, and Annex C-Communications Plan.
 
The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) demonstrated good direction and control through the exercise, as specified in the MJRERP Annex A-Direction and Control. Protective Actions Recommendation (PAR) and Protective Actions Decision (PAD) were discussed and coordinated with the Risk Counties, questions and recommendations were Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 16 welcome by the DACO. During briefings all branches were polled as to their current status and had the branch representatives review their expected actions for potential future actions. 
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of th is capability and REP criteria:  1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1 and 2.b.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: TEMA successfully demonstrated the capability to alert/warn, and notify the risk counties by coordinating the timely activa tion of the fixed sirens system and the Emergency Alert Systems (EAS).
 
The warning of the general public is th e responsibility of local governments in coordination with the SEOC. The siren system located within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the EAS were used to disseminate emergency information and warnings, to the public in accordance with the plan and were evaluated under the same capability at the Risk Counties. The DACO coordinated with the Risk Counties the time in which the sirens system was going to be activated and which EAS message was going to be disseminated each time. 
 
The State Emergency Information Director (S EID) had the responsibility to assure all activities concerning the development, and coordination of emergency information was completed. The SEID under the direction of the DACO, prepared, coordinated and disseminated the correct EAS message to the Joint Information Center (JIC) and the Risk Counties. 


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise welcome by the DACO. During briefings all branches were polled as to their current status and had the branch representatives review their expected actions for potential future actions.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1 and 2.b.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
TEMA successfully demonstrated the capability to alert/warn, and notify the risk counties by coordinating the timely activation of the fixed sirens system and the Emergency Alert Systems (EAS).
The warning of the general public is the responsibility of local governments in coordination with the SEOC. The siren system located within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the EAS were used to disseminate emergency information and warnings, to the public in accordance with the plan and were evaluated under the same capability at the Risk Counties. The DACO coordinated with the Risk Counties the time in which the sirens system was going to be activated and which EAS message was going to be disseminated each time.
The State Emergency Information Director (SEID) had the responsibility to assure all activities concerning the development, and coordination of emergency information was completed. The SEID under the direction of the DACO, prepared, coordinated and disseminated the correct EAS message to the Joint Information Center (JIC) and the Risk Counties.
Public inquiry staff at the EOC monitored telephone calls and maintained a watch on social media sites using provided computers to identify trends. Rumors where quickly identified and addressed properly, in accordance with the MJRERP Annex D-Public Information.
Public inquiry staff at the EOC monitored telephone calls and maintained a watch on social media sites using provided computers to identify trends. Rumors where quickly identified and addressed properly, in accordance with the MJRERP Annex D-Public Information.
The State of Tennessee maintains its own web site for the public to obtain information and in addition uses Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other electronic means of both releasing information and monitoring public tr ends. The SEOC also allows the public to sign up for a service and receive information over cell phones, text messaging, and email.  
The State of Tennessee maintains its own web site for the public to obtain information and in addition uses Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other electronic means of both releasing information and monitoring public trends. The SEOC also allows the public to sign up for a service and receive information over cell phones, text messaging, and email.
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 16
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and RE P criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1  
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 17 3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
The State of Tennessee successfully demonstrated this capability through the State response at two fixed facilities and activities of field monitoring teams (FTs). The State organization that has the primary responsibility for this capability is the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and specifically the Division of Radiological Health (DRH). 
 
DRH personal were pre-positioned at their assigned locations in accordance with the Extent-of-Play agreement. All staff members were aware of the procedures that would be used to alert, notify and mobilize personnel in an actual event.
There were redundant communication systems available in the fixed facilities and for the field teams, as well as adequate equipment, supplies, dosimetry and KI for the responders. All staff members understood exposure and exposure rate limits, for themselves and teams in the field. 
 
DRH coordinated all offsite radiological monitoring. The St ate FTs were under the direct control of the staff in the Radiological Monitoring Coordinating Center (RMCC). RMCC staff members were aware of the location of the TVA offsite team and positioned the State FTs so that the most usef ul data could be obtained. 
 
The State FTs made measurements in a fashion to determine the edges of the radioactive plume and the FTs depended on TVA teams to determine plume maximum readings. This approach assured that the State FTs woul d not be exposed to doses approaching their emergency worker limits.
 
The FT reported their results to the RMCC which in turn reported the results to the Dose Assessment area in the SEOC. The Dose Assessment area staff also received WBN radiation monitoring instrument readings on a periodic basis along with TVA generated dose projections. 
 
The DRH Radiation Control Officer (RCO) at the SEOC reviewed all available data and developed a PAR which was provided to th e DACO. The RCO also reviewed all available data with the Medical Officer from the Department of Health to verify that the use of KI was appropriately implemented.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria:  1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2 and 4.a.3 


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 18 3.2.1.3 Field Coordination Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
TEMA successfully demonstrated the capabilit y to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and opera ting an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activ ation, notification, staffing, direction and control, and coordination of response activities.
AAR                                                         2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:
The State of Tennessee successfully demonstrated this capability through the State response at two fixed facilities and activities of field monitoring teams (FTs). The State organization that has the primary responsibility for this capability is the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and specifically the Division of Radiological Health (DRH).
DRH personal were pre-positioned at their assigned locations in accordance with the Extent-of-Play agreement. All staff members were aware of the procedures that would be used to alert, notify and mobilize personnel in an actual event. There were redundant communication systems available in the fixed facilities and for the field teams, as well as adequate equipment, supplies, dosimetry and KI for the responders. All staff members understood exposure and exposure rate limits, for themselves and teams in the field.
DRH coordinated all offsite radiological monitoring. The State FTs were under the direct control of the staff in the Radiological Monitoring Coordinating Center (RMCC). RMCC staff members were aware of the location of the TVA offsite team and positioned the State FTs so that the most useful data could be obtained.
The State FTs made measurements in a fashion to determine the edges of the radioactive plume and the FTs depended on TVA teams to determine plume maximum readings.
This approach assured that the State FTs would not be exposed to doses approaching their emergency worker limits.
The FT reported their results to the RMCC which in turn reported the results to the Dose Assessment area in the SEOC. The Dose Assessment area staff also received WBN radiation monitoring instrument readings on a periodic basis along with TVA generated dose projections.
The DRH Radiation Control Officer (RCO) at the SEOC reviewed all available data and developed a PAR which was provided to the DACO. The RCO also reviewed all available data with the Medical Officer from the Department of Health to verify that the use of KI was appropriately implemented.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2 and 4.a.3 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                        2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 17


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.3 Field Coordination Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
TEMA successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activation, notification, staffing, direction and control, and coordination of response activities.
Effective and efficient procedures were used to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel to meet the mission of the East TEMA Field Coordination Center (FCC) according to the MJRERP Annex B-Notification and Warning Plan.
Effective and efficient procedures were used to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel to meet the mission of the East TEMA Field Coordination Center (FCC) according to the MJRERP Annex B-Notification and Warning Plan.
The primary purpose of the FCC is to serve as a staging base to coordinate State and Federal resources sent to the area to support the local governments. The FCC coordinated with the RMCC in FTs and sampling efforts. The FCC has redundant communications systems to communicate with the Risk Counties and all the FCC Coordinators dispatched to the counties, in accordance with the MJRERP Annex C-Communications.  
The primary purpose of the FCC is to serve as a staging base to coordinate State and Federal resources sent to the area to support the local governments. The FCC coordinated with the RMCC in FTs and sampling efforts. The FCC has redundant communications systems to communicate with the Risk Counties and all the FCC Coordinators dispatched to the counties, in accordance with the MJRERP Annex C-Communications.
 
Personnel and resources coordinated by the FCC will include radiological monitoring teams, agriculture sample teams, physical security personnel, technical advisors, and other personnel as required. Incoming personnel from both State and Federal agencies may not be familiar with the assigned areas. The FCC is prepared to brief these personnel on the existing situation and provide maps, radio frequencies and procedures, and other essential information to enable them to function in the EPZ.
Personnel and resources coordinated by the FCC will include radiological monitoring teams, agriculture sample teams, physical security personnel, technical advisors, and other personnel as required. Incoming personnel from both State and Federal agencies may not be familiar with the assigned areas. The FCC is prepared to brief these  
The FCC Director dispatched Area Coordinators to the counties after the Alert ECL. The Area Coordinators were responsible to brief the director on resources needed for the counties. The FCC Director and Deputy Director provided frequent briefings on plant conditions, emergency classification levels, and response activities. They demonstrated strong leadership and thorough knowledge of the State Emergency Response Plan and procedures.
 
Designated personnel with leadership roles in the FCC provided consistent direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they were responsible. During the briefing they used checklists to ensure the FCC was following the plan. Each work station was equipped with a telephone, and laptop computer. Information Technology support was available on site and communications was sufficient to support operations.
personnel on the existing situation and provide maps, radio frequencies and procedures, and other essential information to enable them to function in the EPZ.  
There were copies of plans available. The FCC staff members` and others agencies clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their procedures, and performed their functions in a coordinated and timely manner.
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 3.a.1 and 4.a.2 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                   2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 18
The FCC Director dispatched Area Coordinators to the counties after the Alert ECL. The Area Coordinators were responsible to brie f the director on resources needed for the counties. The FCC Director and Deputy Di rector provided frequent briefings on plant conditions, emergency classifica tion levels, and response activities. They demonstrated strong leadership and thorough knowledge of the State Emergency Response Plan and procedures.
 
Designated personnel with leadership roles in the FCC provided cons istent direction and control to that part of the ove rall response effort for which they were responsible. During the briefing they used checklists to ensure the FCC was following the plan. Each work station was equipped with a telephone, and laptop computer. Information Technology support was available on site and communicati ons was sufficient to support operations. There were copies of plans available. The FCC staff members` and others agencies clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their procedures, and performed their functions in a coordinated and timely manner.
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of th is capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 3.a.1 and 4.a.2 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 19  3.2.1.4 Local Primary 1 (LP-1) EAS Station Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated dur ing an interview of the Station Manager. According to the State of Tennessee Statewide Emergency Alert System Plan (revised June 1998), WIVK Knoxville (AM-990 and FM 107.7) is the designated EAS LP-1 for the East Tennessee Area. 
 
The SEOC is linked with both the primary and alternate EAS stations as well as the NOAA Weather Radio station by individual dedicated telephone lines. When informed by the SEID and advised of the message(s) to be broadcast, the Emergency Alert System Coordinator-PIO (EASC-PIO) will contact and notify the NOAA station in Morristown to begin broadcasting EAS Message #2. Immediately following this notification, the EASC-PIO will contact the primary EAS station (WIVK, FM 107.7) and request that they prepare to record an emergency message for rebroadcast to the public, in accordance with WBN Supplement 1-Emergency Alert System.
 
WIVK's Station Manager was interviewed by telephone and demonstrated his knowledge, experience, and expertise on the process and procedur es established to activate the Emergency Alert System and WIVK's emergency plan for an event at WBN. 
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria:  1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.a.1 
 
====3.2.2 Joint====
Operations
 
3.2.2.1 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
The capability of Emergency Operations Center Management was successfully demonstrated at the CECC, this capability provides multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and opera ting an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. 
 
The evaluation included activ ation, notification, staffing, direction and control, coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs. 
 
Direction and Control was the responsibility of the utility operator and was accomplished in a professional and effective manner. The State and local government officials dispatched to the CECC served in a liaison capacity between the utility operator and their respective EOCs. The government officials in conjunction with the utility operators Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 20 Emergency Director, effectively communi cated, coordinated, and functioned as a cohesive response and recovery unit. 
 
The utility operator's assessment as well as the State's independent assessments of the offsite health and safety considerations supported the PADs, which were based on plant conditions, and an ongoing radiological rele ase. All PADs were based on sound technical analyses, which included environmental field measurements, computerized dose assessment models, plant conditions, a thorough understanding of the simulated emergency at hand, and effective interactions with the utility operator's senior staff.


The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria:   1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 2.b.1.  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.4 Local Primary 1 (LP-1) EAS Station Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated during an interview of the Station Manager.
According to the State of Tennessee Statewide Emergency Alert System Plan (revised June 1998), WIVK Knoxville (AM-990 and FM 107.7) is the designated EAS LP-1 for the East Tennessee Area.
The SEOC is linked with both the primary and alternate EAS stations as well as the NOAA Weather Radio station by individual dedicated telephone lines. When informed by the SEID and advised of the message(s) to be broadcast, the Emergency Alert System Coordinator-PIO (EASC-PIO) will contact and notify the NOAA station in Morristown to begin broadcasting EAS Message #2. Immediately following this notification, the EASC-PIO will contact the primary EAS station (WIVK, FM 107.7) and request that they prepare to record an emergency message for rebroadcast to the public, in accordance with WBN Supplement 1-Emergency Alert System.
WIVKs Station Manager was interviewed by telephone and demonstrated his knowledge, experience, and expertise on the process and procedures established to activate the Emergency Alert System and WIVKs emergency plan for an event at WBN.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.a.1 3.2.2  Joint Operations 3.2.2.1 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
The capability of Emergency Operations Center Management was successfully demonstrated at the CECC, this capability provides multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event.
The evaluation included activation, notification, staffing, direction and control, coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs.
Direction and Control was the responsibility of the utility operator and was accomplished in a professional and effective manner. The State and local government officials dispatched to the CECC served in a liaison capacity between the utility operator and their respective EOCs. The government officials in conjunction with the utility operators Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                    2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 19


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Director, effectively communicated, coordinated, and functioned as a cohesive response and recovery unit.
The utility operators assessment as well as the States independent assessments of the offsite health and safety considerations supported the PADs, which were based on plant conditions, and an ongoing radiological release. All PADs were based on sound technical analyses, which included environmental field measurements, computerized dose assessment models, plant conditions, a thorough understanding of the simulated emergency at hand, and effective interactions with the utility operators senior staff.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 2.b.1.
3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
The State of Tennessee successfully demonstrated the capability Emergency Public Information and Warning, at the JIC. The evaluation included activ ation, notification, staffing, direction and contro l and issuing of warnings.  
The State of Tennessee successfully demonstrated the capability Emergency Public Information and Warning, at the JIC. The evaluation included activation, notification, staffing, direction and control and issuing of warnings.
 
TVA provides the preponderance of support materials to facilitate JIC and media operations in the JIC operations room, the Citizen Information Center/Rumor Control/
TVA provides the preponderance of support materials to facilitate JIC and media operations in the JIC operations room, the Citizen Information Center/Rumor Control/
media monitoring location, the media update desk, media work area and media briefing room. All areas are well equipped and ha ve redundancy in communications with landlines, cell phones, facsimiles, internet connectivity and state and utility radio systems, all of which were operational.  
media monitoring location, the media update desk, media work area and media briefing room. All areas are well equipped and have redundancy in communications with landlines, cell phones, facsimiles, internet connectivity and state and utility radio systems, all of which were operational.
 
The JIC, a joint public and private sector organization, is lead by co-directors provided by the State and TVA. Upon activation, the JIC was the central location for the coordination and dissemination of emergency information while the SEOC maintains the responsibility for emergency instructions (e.g., protective action decision coordination/EAS message dissemination). The JIC Procedures clearly lay out the operations and roles of government and utility personnel assigned to this center.
The JIC, a joint public and private sector or ganization, is lead by co-directors provided by the State and TVA. Upon activation, the JIC was the central location for the coordination and dissemination of emergency information while the SEOC maintain s the responsibility for emergency instructions (e.g., protective action decision coordination/EAS message dissemination). The JIC Procedures clea rly lay out the operations and roles of government and utility personnel assigned to this center.
Effective implementation of the joint information system (JIS) requires close coordination between the State and local PIOs in the JIC and the respective SEOC/local EOCs. The degree of coordination observed was exceptional both internal to the JIC and with external agencies and offices. Protocols for the reviewing and approval of messages by both co-directors was adhered to and accomplished without adversely affecting timely message release. There was some question as to the manner of TVA/SEOC emergency information message coordination prior to the JIC activation. There were no risk county media releases before JIC activation. In addition to using press releases and EAS messages, both TEMA and the TVA have embraced social networking as a means to provide emergency information to the public and media.
 
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                   2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 20
Effective implementation of the joint information system (JIS) requires close  
 
coordination between the State and local PIOs in the JIC and the respective SEOC/local EOCs. The degree of coordination observed was exceptional both internal to the JIC and with external agencies and offices. Protocols for the reviewing and approval of messages by both co-directors was adhered to and accomplished without adversely affecting timely message release. There was some question as to the manner of TVA/SEOC emergency information message coordination prior to the JIC activation. There were no risk county media releases before JIC activation. In addition to using press releases and EAS messages, both TEMA and the TVA have embraced social networking as a means to provide emergency information to the public and media.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 21  The JIC was fully operational for a little over four hours during which 11 messages were prepared and two media briefings conducted. The coordination prior to the media briefings adequately prepared the TVA and government spokespersons to address pertinent topics regarding the safeguarding of the public. 
 
The role of the mock media was played and supported by a local community college journalism class. The students offered realism to this normally mundane part of the exercise. The questions were well formulat ed and challenged the Information Manager, as well as the spokespersons.
Although, the persistent ques tioning was not expected, it was well received by the spokespersons and adde d to overall success of the exercise. The Citizen Information Center/Rumor Control staff maintained an operational awareness that allowed them to respond to public queries, identify trends and respond to rumors in a timely manner.
 
The demonstration met the requirements of th is capability and cr iteria:  1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.b.1
 
3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions 3.2.3.1 Meigs County, Tennessee
 
3.2.3.1.1  Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide MAC for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, directi on, control, and coordination of response activities.
The Meigs County EOC (MCEOC) new remodeled space provides much needed space for the support and coordination of an emergency at Meigs County, the MCEOC had sufficient equipment and redundant communications systems fo r a successful operations, it was composed of representatives from va rious municipal and county agencies, they clearly understood th eir responsibilities, fo llowed their agency plans, and performed their assigned functions with high levels of proficiency. 
 
The MCEOC personnel were pre-positioned the Emergency Services Director (Director) explained the normal callout system and the ability to insure the EOC could be activated in a timely manner. 
 
Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were co nducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were ca rried out as identified in the plan. They demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the State, other risk counties, and Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 22 outside agencies. 
 
The Director provided outstanding directi on and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the ci tizens of Meigs County, by implementing the early protective actions fo r the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and reside nts that required special assistance. EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the MCEOC, as specified in the Meigs County Implementing Procedures. 
 
Meigs County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.


The demonstrations met the requirements of th is capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise The JIC was fully operational for a little over four hours during which 11 messages were prepared and two media briefings conducted. The coordination prior to the media briefings adequately prepared the TVA and government spokespersons to address pertinent topics regarding the safeguarding of the public.
The role of the mock media was played and supported by a local community college journalism class. The students offered realism to this normally mundane part of the exercise. The questions were well formulated and challenged the Information Manager, as well as the spokespersons. Although, the persistent questioning was not expected, it was well received by the spokespersons and added to overall success of the exercise. The Citizen Information Center/Rumor Control staff maintained an operational awareness that allowed them to respond to public queries, identify trends and respond to rumors in a timely manner.
The demonstration met the requirements of this capability and criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3  Risk Jurisdictions 3.2.3.1 Meigs County, Tennessee 3.2.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide MAC for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities.
The Meigs County EOC (MCEOC) new remodeled space provides much needed space for the support and coordination of an emergency at Meigs County, the MCEOC had sufficient equipment and redundant communications systems for a successful operations, it was composed of representatives from various municipal and county agencies, they clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their agency plans, and performed their assigned functions with high levels of proficiency.
The MCEOC personnel were pre-positioned the Emergency Services Director (Director) explained the normal callout system and the ability to insure the EOC could be activated in a timely manner.
Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. They demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the State, other risk counties, and Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                  2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 21


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                        2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise outside agencies.
The Director provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Meigs County, by implementing the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and residents that required special assistance. EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the MCEOC, as specified in the Meigs County Implementing Procedures.
Meigs County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.  
Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.
After the SEOC activated the siren system one siren was identified as failing (simulated) to function properly. The Director immediately initiated actions which successfully performed backup route alerting.
The Public Information Officer (PIO) continuously maintained contact with the Meigs County PIO at the JIC; press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director and the County Decision Team. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. There were no trends or rumors identified during the exercise.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.1.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the Meigs County Sheriff, Fire and Rescue Department and Decatur Police Department.
MCEOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed by each department. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the TCPs, provide coordination of un-manned roadlocks, and coordinate with the Meigs County Road Department to assist with road impediments and roadside services.
TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out of the area, diverting the public from the possible Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                        2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 22


After the SEOC activated the siren system one siren was identified as failing (simulated) to function properly. The Director immediat ely initiated actions which successfully performed backup route alerting.  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.
Representatives from each of the departments were interviewed and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.
Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2 3.2.3.1.3 Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to warn and disseminate emergency information to the public in the event of a Prompt Notification System (PNS) failure. Once the PNS is activated from the SEOC, the Sheriff will be notified of any siren(s) that fail to operate, and a deputy will be dispatched to the area of the failed siren to alert those residents.
Each vehicle and driver that will be utilized to perform this task will be equipped with a map that indicates the siren locations, the contour outline of the coverage of each siren, and the roads in the sound contour. When notified of a siren failure the driver(s) can determine the roads on which residents should be alerted based on the map.
The Meigs County Sheriff completed the task within the reasonable time, the County Fire Department and Decatur Police Department personnel were prepared to dispatch personnel as backup to the Sheriff Department.
Representatives from each of the departments were interviewed and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                    2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 23


The Public Information Officer (PIO) continuously maintained contact with the Meigs
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
 
AAR                                                       2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.2 McMinn County, Tennessee 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
County PIO at the JIC; press re leases generated by the JIC we re reviewed by the Director and the County Decision Team. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. There were no trends or rumors identified during the exercise. 
McMinn County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities.
 
Through discussion with the Emergency Management Director (Director) and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation. Recall would have been accomplished by telephone, text and pager systems.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria:  5.a.1 and 5.b.1  3.2.3.1.2  Traffic and Access Control Points
Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Redundant communications systems were established and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise.
 
The Director provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of McMinn County, by implementing the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and residents that required special assistance.
Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the McMinn County Emergency Operations Center (MEOC), as specified in the McMinn County Implementing Procedures.
This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the
Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. All MEOC agencies were very familiar with their own plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions, and support facilities were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.
 
McMinn County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.
Meigs County Sheriff, Fire and Rescue Department and Decatur Police Department. 
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                         2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 24
MCEOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed by each department. The local Sheriff has the res ponsibility to oversee all the TCPs, provide coordination of un-manned roadlocks, and coordinate with the Meigs County Road Department to assist with road impediments and roadside services. 
 
TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out of th e area, diverting the public from the possible Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 23 hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant. 
 
Representatives from each of the departments were interviewed and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosim etry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures. 
 
Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria:  1.d.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2
 
3.2.3.1.3  Backup Route Alerting
 
Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to warn and disseminate emergency information to the public in the event of a Prompt Notification System (PNS) failure. Once the PNS is activated from the SEOC, the Sheriff will be notified of any siren(s) that fail to operate, and a deputy will be dispatched to the area of the failed siren to alert those residents. 
 
Each vehicle and driver that will be utilized to perform this task will be equipped with a map that indicates the siren locations, the contour outline of the coverage of each siren, and the roads in the sound contour. When notified of a siren failure the driver(s) can determine the roads on which residents should be alerted based on the map.
 
The Meigs County Sheriff completed the task within the reasonable time, the County Fire Department and Decatur Police Department personnel were prepared to dispatch personnel as backup to the Sheriff Department. 
 
Representatives from each of the departments were interviewed and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosim etry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria:  1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 24 3.2.3.2 McMinn County, Tennessee  
 
3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center  
 
Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
McMinn County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operatin g an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management , direction, control, and coordination of res ponse activities.  
 
Through discussion with the Emergency Manageme nt Director (Director) and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation. Recall would have been accomplished by telephone, text and pager systems.  
 
Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Redundant communications systems were established and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise.  
 
The Director provided outstanding directi on and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the h ealth and safety of the citizens of McMinn County, by implementing the early protective act ions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and resident s that required special assistance.  
 
EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the McMinn County Emergency Operations Center (MEOC), as specified in the McMinn County Implementing Procedures.  
 
Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were co nducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were ca rried out as identified in the plan. All MEOC agencies were very familiar with their own plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions, and support facilities were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.
McMinn County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.  
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of th is capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 25 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
McMinn County successfully demonstrated the capability to deve lop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public. 
 
Although the sirens and EAS messa ges are initiated at the SEOC, the Director monitored siren activation status and content of EAS messages for accuracy. 
 
The McMinn County Mayor closely coordinated and maintained contact with the McMinn County PIO at the JIC; press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director and the County Mayor. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. 
 
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and RE P criteria:  5.a.1 and 5.b.1  3.2.3.2.2  Traffic and Access Control Points
 
Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the McMinn County Sheriff Department. MEOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed in case of an evacu ation order. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the traffic cont rol points, provide coor dination of un-staffed roadblocks, and coordinate with the McMinn County Highway Department to assist with road impediments and roadside services. 


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
McMinn County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.
Although the sirens and EAS messages are initiated at the SEOC, the Director monitored siren activation status and content of EAS messages for accuracy.
The McMinn County Mayor closely coordinated and maintained contact with the McMinn County PIO at the JIC; press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director and the County Mayor. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.2.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the McMinn County Sheriff Department. MEOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed in case of an evacuation order. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the traffic control points, provide coordination of un-staffed roadblocks, and coordinate with the McMinn County Highway Department to assist with road impediments and roadside services.
TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out diverting the public from the possible hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.
TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out diverting the public from the possible hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.
Representatives from the Sheriff Department were interview and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.  
Representatives from the Sheriff Department were interview and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.
 
Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.
Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.  
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                     2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 25
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 26 3.2.3.3 Rhea County, Tennessee
 
3.2.3.3.1  Emergency Operations Center
 
Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operatin g an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management , direction, control, and coordination of res ponse activities. 
 
Through discussion with the Emergency Management Director and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation. Recall would have been accomplished by telephone, text and pager systems. 
 
Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Redundant communications systems were established and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise. 
 
The Director and the county Executive Officer provided outstanding di rection and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Rhea County, by implementi ng the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of enda ngered schools and resi dents that required special assistance. 
 
EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the Rhea County Emergency Operations Ce nter (REOC), as specified in the Rhea County Implementing Procedures.
Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were co nducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were ca rried out as identified in the plan. All REOC agencies were very familiar with their own plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions, and support facilities were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.
 
Rhea County demonstrated their ability to e ffectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.
The demonstrations met the requirements of th is capability and REP criteria:  1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3:  Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 27 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public. 
 
Although the sirens and EAS messa ges are initiated at the SEOC, the Director monitored siren activation status and content of EAS messages for accuracy. 


The Director and the PIO closely coordinated and maintained contact with the Rhea County PIO at the JIC, press releases ge nerated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. PIO operations also included a Spanish speaking interpreter available to field calls and to assist the PIO where needed.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and RE P criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
AAR                                                        2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.3 Rhea County, Tennessee 3.2.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the Rhea County Sheriff Department. REOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed in case of an evacuation orde
Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities.
: r. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the traffic control points, pr ovide coordination of un-staffed roadblocks, and coordinate with the Rhea County Road Department and Traffic Assist Teams, to assist with road impediments and roadside services. 
Through discussion with the Emergency Management Director and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation. Recall would have been accomplished by telephone, text and pager systems.
Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Redundant communications systems were established and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise.
The Director and the county Executive Officer provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Rhea County, by implementing the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and residents that required special assistance.
EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the Rhea County Emergency Operations Center (REOC), as specified in the Rhea County Implementing Procedures.
Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. All REOC agencies were very familiar with their own plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions, and support facilities were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.
Rhea County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                        2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 26


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:
Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.
Although the sirens and EAS messages are initiated at the SEOC, the Director monitored siren activation status and content of EAS messages for accuracy.
The Director and the PIO closely coordinated and maintained contact with the Rhea County PIO at the JIC, press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. PIO operations also included a Spanish speaking interpreter available to field calls and to assist the PIO where needed.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the Rhea County Sheriff Department. REOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed in case of an evacuation order. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the traffic control points, provide coordination of un-staffed roadblocks, and coordinate with the Rhea County Road Department and Traffic Assist Teams, to assist with road impediments and roadside services.
TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out, diverting the public from the possible hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.
TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out, diverting the public from the possible hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.
Representatives from the Sheriff Department were interview and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities,   dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.  
Representatives from the Sheriff Department were interview and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.
 
Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.
Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.  
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                   2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 27
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 28 3.2.3.3.3  Waterway Clearance Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to warn and disseminate emergency information to the public, on a waterway.


A representative from the Rhea County Sheriff Department was interview and provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosim etry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures. The officer also demonstrated extensive knowledge and understa nding of river operations, the equipment used, routes and areas of special interest.  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.3.3 Waterway Clearance Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:
Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to warn and disseminate emergency information to the public, on a waterway.
A representative from the Rhea County Sheriff Department was interview and provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures. The officer also demonstrated extensive knowledge and understanding of river operations, the equipment used, routes and areas of special interest.
The Sheriffs Department Officer demonstrated the capability to communicate and coordinate actions through dispatch and was aware of procedures to conduct after completion of the mission to include reporting to the EOC and decontamination requirements if necessary.
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criterion: 5.a.3.
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities                                2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 28


The Sheriff's Department Officer demonstrated the capability to communicate and coordinate actions through dispatch and was aware of pr ocedures to conduct after completion of the mission to include reporting to the EOC and decontamination requirements if necessary.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criterion:  5.a.3.
AAR                                                        2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 4: Conclusion Officials and representatives from the State of Tennessee, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, and TVA, as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all the phases of the exercise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals who participated in the success of this exercise. FEMA would also like to acknowledge the enthusiasm and contributions of the exercise planning team during the design of the exercise.
Overall, State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Communications were identified as a general strength throughout the exercise. Not only was the equipment interoperable and functional, but the personnel utilizing it kept everyone well informed and helped to maintain situational awareness across the board. The evaluation team noted great progress in the coordination of activities between the State, counties, and all other response entities. During this exercise, FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or ARCAs.
Appendix B contains two tables. Both tables provide a summary of exercise results for all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Table 2 presents the status of REP exercise criteria that were demonstrated during this exercise. Exercise criteria are listed by number. Table 3 presents the status of target capabilities and activities that were demonstrated during this exercise.
The demonstration status of the criteria and capabilities is indicated by the use of the following letters:
M        -      Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved Deficiency or ARCAs remain from prior exercises)
D        -      Deficiency assessed A        -      ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)
N        -      Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)
Section 4: Conclusion                                                    2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 29


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 4:  Conclusion 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 29 Section 4:  Conclusion Officials and representatives from the State of Tennessee, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, and TVA, as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all the phases of the exercise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals w ho participated in the success of this exercise. FEMA would also like to acknowledge the enthusiasm and contributions of the exercise planning team during the design of the exercise. 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                     2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 30


Overall, State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Communications were identified as a general strength throughout the exercise. Not only was the equipment interoperable and functional, but the personnel utilizing it kept everyone well informed and helped to maintain situational awareness across the board. The evaluation team noted great progress in the coordination of activities between the State, counti es, and all other response entities. During this exercise, FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or ARCAs.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Appendix B contains two tables. Both tables provide a summary of exercise results for all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Table 2 pres ents the status of REP exercise criteria that were demonstrated during this exercise. Exercise cr iteria are listed by number. Table 3 presents the status of ta rget capabilities and activities that were demonstrated during this exercise.
AAR                                        2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix A: Exercise Timeline (Table 1)
The demonstration status of the criteria and capabilities is i ndicated by th e use of the following letters:
Table 1: Exercise Timeline Appendix A: Exercise Timeline                            2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 31
M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved  Deficiency or ARCAs remain from prior exercises)


D - Deficiency assessed
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 32


A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                                          2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Table 2)
Table 2: REP Criteria Evaluation Result Summary ELEMENT/Sub-Element                                                            SEOC      Dose    RMCC  FMTs FCC  JIC  LP-1 CECC Meigs  McMinn  Rhea Assessment                                  County County County
: 1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1.a.1. Mobilization                                                          M        M      M      M    M    M        M    M      M      M 1.b.1. Facilities                                                                                                                M 1.c.1. Direction and Control                                                  M        M      M          M    M        M    M      M      M 1.d.1. Communications Equipment                                              M        M      M      M    M    M    M    M    M      M      M 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations                            M        M      M      M    M    M    M    M    M      M      M
: 2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control                                      M        M      M          M                    M      M      M 2.b.1. Rad Assessment & PARs Based on Available Information                            M      M          M              M 2.b.2. Rad Assessment and PADs for the General Public                        M        M                                        M      M      M 2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations                                                                      M      M      M 2.d.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure 2.e.1. Rad Assmt & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry & Return
: 3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control                                                    M                          M      M      M 3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions                                                                M                          M      M      M 3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations                                                                            M      M      M 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools                                                                                        M      M      M 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control                                                                              M      M      M 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control                                                                  M      M      M 3.e.1. Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Information 3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies & Instru. Mater.
3.f.1. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions
: 4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment                                            M 4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management                            M      M          M 4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures                                          M 4.b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis 4.c.1. Laboratory Operations 5 . EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFO 5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification                            M                                      M          M      M      M 5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert &Notification Backup Alert &Notification                                                                    M 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for the Public and the Media          M                                  M              M      M      M
: 6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES 6.a.1. Monitoring & Decon of Evacuees &EWs & Registration of Evacuees 6.b.1. Monitoring and Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment 6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees 6.d.1. Transport and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation                                          2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 33


N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Table 3: Target Capability Evaluation Result Summary Meigs  McMinn  Rhea Capability / Activity                            SEOC  Dose  RMCC    FMT  FCC  JIC  LP-1 CECC County County County Emergency Operation Center Management Activate EOC                                      X                                                X      X      X Direct EOC Tactical Operations                    X                                                X      X      X Gather and Provide Information Identify and Address Issues Prioritize and Provide Resources Provide EOC Connectivity                          X                                                X      X      X Support and Coordinate Response                                                              X    X      X      X Emergency Public Information and Warning Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning                                    X Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning and Notification                                                    X    X Establish JIS Issue Emergency Warnings                          X                                X    X          X      X      X Conduct Media Relations Provide Public Rumor Control                      X                                X              X      X      X Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Activate Public Safety and Security Response                                                      X      X      X Command and Control Public Safety and Security


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 30 
===Response===
Control Traffic, Crowd and Scene                                                                  X      X      X Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Site Management and Control                            X      X      X      X Hazard Assessment and Risk Evaluation                   X      X      X      X Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 34


This Page Is Intentionally Blank Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix A:  Exercise Timeline 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 31 Appendix A:  Exercise Timeline (Table 1)
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Table 1:  Exercise Timeline Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 32 
AAR                                               2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator and Assignments Location                     Evaluation Team           Capability and Activity Tennessee State Emergency Operations   Gerald McLemore (FEMA)     EOC Management Center (SEOC)                Joe Harworth (FEMA)         1. Activate SEOC (1a1, 1e1)
 
Kiori Flores (FEMA)          2. Provide SEOC Connectivity (1d1)
This Page Is Intentionally Blank Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix B:  Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 33 Appendix B:  Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Table 2)
Gary Bolender (ICF)          3. Direct SEOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2)
Table 2:  REP Criteria Evaluation Result Summary ELEMENT/Sub-Element SEOC Dose Assessment RMCC FMTs FCC JIC LP-1 CECC Meigs County McMinn County Rhea County 1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1.a.1. Mobilization M M M M M M  M M M M 1.b.1. Facilities M  1.c.1. Direction and Control M M M  M M  M M M M 1.d.1. Communications Equipment M M M M M M M M M M M 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations M M M M M M M M M M M 2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control M M M  M    M M M 2.b.1. Rad Assessment & PARs Based on Available Information    M M  M  M    2.b.2. Rad Assessment and PADs for the General Public M M        M M M 2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations          M M M 2.d.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure            2.e.1. Rad Assmt & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry & Return            3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control    M    M M M 3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions    M    M M M 3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations        M M M 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools        M M M 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control        M M M 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control        M M M 3.e.1. Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Information            3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies & Instru. Mater.            3.f.1. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions            4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment    M        4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis  Management  M M  M      4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures    M        4.b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis              4.c.1. Laboratory Operations            5 . EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC  INFO 5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification  M      M  M M M 5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert &Notification Backup Alert &Notification          M 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for the Public and the Media M    M  M M M 6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES 6.a.1. Monitoring & Decon of Evacuees &EWs & Registration of Evacuees            6.b.1. Monitoring and Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment            6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees            6.d.1. Transport and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals           
Emergency Public Information & Warning
 
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1)
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix B:  Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 34  Table 3:  Target Capability Evaluation Result Summary Capability / Activity SEOC Dose  RMCCFMTFCC JIC LP-1 CECC Meigs County McMinnCounty Rhea County Emergency Operation Center Management Activate EOC X  X X X Direct EOC Tactical Operations X X X X Gather and Provide Information Identify and Address Issues Prioritize and Provide Resources Provide EOC Connectivity X X X X Support and Coordinate Response X X X X Emergency Public Information and Warning Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning X  Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning and Notification X X  Establish JIS Issue Emergency Warnings X X X X X X Conduct Media Relations Provide Public Rumor Control X X X X X Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Activate Public Safety and Security Response X X X Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response  Control Traffic, Crowd and Scene X X X Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Site Management and Control X X X X  Hazard Assessment and Risk Evaluation X X X X Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 35 Appendix C:  Exercise Evaluator and Assignments Location Evaluation Team Capability and Activity Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
Gerald McLemore (FEMA) Joe Harworth (FEMA) Kiori Flores (FEMA) Gary Bolender (ICF)
EOC Management
: 1. Activate SEOC (1a1, 1e1)  
: 2. Provide SEOC Connectivity (1d1)  
: 3. Direct SEOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2) Emergency Public Information & Warning  
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1)  
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
Dose Assessment, Radiation Protection Section, SEOC Joseph Keller (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
Dose Assessment, Radiation   Joseph Keller (ICF)       HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Protection Section, SEOC                                  1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1) 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 2b1, 2b2,4a2)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 2b1, 2b2,4a2)
Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center (RMCC) John Fill (FEMA)
Radiological Monitoring       John Fill (FEMA)           HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Coordination Center (RMCC)                                  1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)
HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)  
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 3a1, 4a2)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 3a1, 4a2)
Radiological Field Monitoring Team 1 Marcy Campbell (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
Radiological Field Monitoring Marcy Campbell (ICF)       HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 1                                                      1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1) 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
Radiological Field Monitoring Team 2 Michael Henry (ICF)   HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
Radiological Field Monitoring Michael Henry (ICF)         HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 2                                                      1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1) 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
Radiological Field Monitoring Team 3 Dave Stuenkel (ICF)   HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
Radiological Field Monitoring Dave Stuenkel (ICF)         HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 3                                                      1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1) 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 35


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix C:  Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 36 Location Evaluation Team Capability and Activity Radiological Field Monitoring Team 4 William B. McRee (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1) 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
AAR                                                   2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Location                         Evaluation Team           Capability and Activity Radiological Field Monitoring   William B. McRee (ICF)     HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 4                                                            1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)
East TEMA Field Coordination Center (FCC) Roger Jobe (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination  
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)
: 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)  
East TEMA Field Coordination     Roger Jobe (ICF)             HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Center (FCC)                                                      1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 3a1, 4a2)
: 2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 3a1, 4a2)
Joint Information Center (JIC) Bob Spence (FEMA) Lisa Rink (FEMA) Bill Larrabee (ICF)  Emergency Public Information & Warning
Joint Information Center (JIC)   Bob Spence (FEMA)           Emergency Public Information & Warning Lisa Rink (FEMA)               1. Activate Emergency Public Information, Bill Larrabee (ICF)                Alert/Warning & Notification Plans (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)
: 1. Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning & Notification Plans (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)  
: 2. Manage Emergency Public Information &
: 2. Manage Emergency Public Information & Warning (1c1)  
Warning (1c1)
: 3. Issue Emergency Warnings (5b1)  
: 3. Issue Emergency Warnings (5b1)
: 4. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
: 4. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
WIVK (LP-1) Knoxville Lorenzo Lewis (FEMA) Emergency Public Information & Warning  
WIVK (LP-1)                     Lorenzo Lewis (FEMA)       Emergency Public Information & Warning Knoxville                                                      1. Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning (1d1, 1e1)
: 1. Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning (1d1, 1e1)  
: 2. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings &
: 2. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings & Notifications (5a1)
Notifications (5a1)
Central Emergency Control Center / Emergency Operations Facility (CECC) Bob Trojanowski (NRC)   EOC Management  
Central Emergency Control Center Bob Trojanowski (NRC)         EOC Management
: 1. Support and Coordinate Response (No EOP)
/ Emergency Operations Facility                                1. Support and Coordinate Response (CECC)                                                              (No EOP)
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix C:  Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 37  RISK COUNTIES Meigs County (MCEOC) Emergency Operations Center Michael Dolder (FEMA) Jon Sandburg (FEMA) Alex Sera (FEMA) J. T. Ackerman (FEMA)  EOC Management
Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments                          2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 36
: 1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)  
 
: 2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
: 3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)  
AAR                                               2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise RISK COUNTIES Meigs County (MCEOC)
: 4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) *3a1 and 3b1 for Back Up Route Alerting* Emergency Public Information & Warning  
Emergency Operations Center Michael Dolder (FEMA)     EOC Management Jon Sandburg (FEMA)         1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)  
Alex Sera (FEMA)            2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)
J. T. Ackerman (FEMA)        3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)
: 4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) *3a1 and 3b1 for Back Up Route Alerting*
Emergency Public Information & Warning
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
Traffic Control Points (interview)
Traffic Control Points                               Emergency Public Safety & Security Response (interview)                                              1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1)
Emergency Public Safety & Security Response  
: 2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)
: 1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1) 2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)
Backup Route Alerting                               Emergency Public Information & Warnings
Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information & Warnings  
: 1. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings &
: 1. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings & Notifications (5a3)
Notifications (5a3)
McMinn County (MEOC) Emergency Operations Center Matt Bradley (FEMA) Walt Cushman (FEMA)
McMinn County (MEOC)
EOC Management
Emergency Operations Center Matt Bradley (FEMA)       EOC Management Walt Cushman (FEMA)         1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)
: 1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)  
: 2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)
: 2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)  
: 3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)
: 3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)  
: 4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2)
: 4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) Emergency Public Information & Warning  
Emergency Public Information & Warning
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)  
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
Traffic Control Points (interview)
Traffic Control Points                               Emergency Public Safety & Security Response (interview)                                              1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1)
Emergency Public Safety & Security Response  
: 2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)
: 1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1) 2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)  
Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 37


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix C:  Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 38  Rhea County (RCEOC) Emergency Operations Center Robert Nash (FEMA) Odis Spencer (FEMA) Ron Shaw (FEMA)  EOC Management
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
: 1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)  
AAR                                               2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Rhea County (RCEOC)
: 2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)  
Emergency Operations Center Robert Nash (FEMA)       EOC Management Odis Spencer (FEMA)         1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)
: 3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)  
Ron Shaw (FEMA)              2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)
: 4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) *3a1 and 3b1 for Waterway Warning* Emergency Public Information & Warning  
: 3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)  
: 4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) *3a1 and 3b1 for Waterway Warning*
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1) Traffic Control Points (interview)
Emergency Public Information & Warning
Emergency Public Safety & Security Response  
: 1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)
: 1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1) 2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)
: 2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)
Waterway Warning Emergency Public Information & Warnings  
Traffic Control Points                                 Emergency Public Safety & Security Response (interview)                                              1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1)
: 1. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings & Notifications (5a3)  
: 2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)
Waterway Warning                                     Emergency Public Information & Warnings
: 1. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings &
Notifications (5a3)
Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 38


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix D: Exercise Locations 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 39  Appendix D:  Exercise Locations Locations Locations SEOC: 3041 Sidco Dr.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Nashville, TN 37204  
AAR                                       2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix D: Exercise Locations Locations                               Locations SEOC:                                   CECC:
3041 Sidco Dr.                          1101 Market St.
Nashville, TN 37204                     Chattanooga, TN 37402 RMCC:                                    LP-1:
TEMA-East Region                          WIVK (LP-1) 803 Concord St.                          4711 Kingston Pike Knoxville, TN 37919 Knoxville, TN 37919 FCC:                                    Joint Information Center (JIC):
TEMA-East Region                        1101 Market St.
803 Concord St.                          Chattanooga, TN 37402 Knoxville, TN 37919 Staging Area for Field Monitoring        Meigs County EOC Teams and Mobile Laboratory:            14816 Hwy. 58 South TEMA-East Region                        Decatur, TN 37322 803 Concord St.
Knoxville, TN 37919 Rhea County EOC                          McMinn County EOC 8860 Back Valley Rd.                    1107 S. Congress Pkwy.
Evensville, TN 37322                    Athens, TN 37303 Appendix D: Exercise Locations                          2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 39


CECC:  1101 Market St.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Chattanooga, TN 37402 RMCC: TEMA-East Region 803 Concord St.
AAR                                    2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 40


Knoxville, TN 37919
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                                      2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreement EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT WATTS BAR NUCLEAR STATION FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 19, 2011 All selected activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans with the below listed exceptions. It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it isnt disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.
CAPABILITY: Emergency Operations Management Activity 1:          Activate EOC Definition: In response to activation, perform incident notifications, recall essential personnel, and stand-up EOC systems to provide a fully staffed and operational EOC.
1.1        OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
(Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* TEMA Operations will receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner.
Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), through the Operations section in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP.
Facilities will be considered operational at the START OF EXERCISE (STARTEX) with assigned personnel at the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (to include Field Monitoring Teams), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC)
* Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs);
already pre-positioned and in-place no later than 8:00 AM Eastern/7:00 AM Central
* SEOC, CECC, and Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location
* The SEOC DACO, and Risk County EMA Directors will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                                                          2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 41


LP-1:  WIVK (LP-1)
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
 
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 1.2   Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H.,
4711 Kingston Pike Knoxville, TN 37919 FCC: TEMA-East Region
J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).
 
803 Concord St.
 
Knoxville, TN 37919
 
Joint Information Center (JIC):
1101 Market St.
Chattanooga, TN 37402 Staging Area for Field Monitoring Teams and Mobile Laboratory:
TEMA-East Region
 
803 Concord St.
 
Knoxville, TN 37919
 
Meigs County EOC 14816 Hwy. 58 South Decatur, TN 37322 Rhea County EOC 8860 Back Valley Rd.
 
Evensville, TN 37322
 
McMinn County EOC 1107 S. Congress Pkwy.
Athens, TN 37303
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 40 
 
This Page is Intentionally Blank Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 41 Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreement EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT WATTS BAR NUCLEAR STATION FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 19, 2011 All selected activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans with the below listed exceptions. It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it isn't disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.
CAPABILITY:  Emergency Operations Management Activity 1: Activate EOC Definition:
In response to activation, perform incident notifications, recall essential personnel, and stand-up EOC systems to provide a fully staffed and operational EOC.
 
===1.1 ORO's===
use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
  (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criteri on 1.a.1:  NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)
* SEOC,  Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* TEMA Operations will receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), through the Operations section in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP. Facilities will be considered operational at the START OF EXERCISE (STARTEX) with assigned personnel at the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (t o include Field Monitoring Teams), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC)
* Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) Em ergency Operations Centers (EOCs); already pre-positioned and in-place no later than 8:00 AM Eastern/7:00 AM
 
Central
* SEOC, CECC, and Risk Counties (McMi nn, Meigs and Rhea)  EOCs assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location
* The SEOC DACO, and Risk County EMA Dir ectors will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 42 1.2 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
(Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* The SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties EOCs will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
* The SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties EOCs will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
Activity 2:   Pr ovide Connectivity Definition: Upon notification, initiate interoperable system operations, in addition to maintaining, managing, and assuring protection of the interoperable communications systems until the SEOC is ordered to be  
Activity 2:   Provide Connectivity Definition: Upon notification, initiate interoperable system operations, in addition to maintaining, managing, and assuring protection of the interoperable communications systems until the SEOC is ordered to be deactivated.
 
2.1   At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
deactivated.
(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
2.1 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
  (Sub element 1.d, Communications, Cr iterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* The SEOC will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.
* The SEOC will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.
* The Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems
* The Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems
* Communications capability will in clude telephone, NAWAS MNET voice over IP, 800 MHz radio, WEBEOC and email Activity 3:   Direct EOC Operations Definition: Following activation of the SEOC system, staff and organize the SEOC in accordance with the comprehensive emergency management  
* Communications capability will include telephone, NAWAS MNET voice over IP, 800 MHz radio, WEBEOC and email Activity 3:   Direct EOC Operations Definition: Following activation of the SEOC system, staff and organize the SEOC in accordance with the comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) - TVA MJRERP and the requisite policies, procedures, and directives.
 
3.1   Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
plan (CEMP) - TVA MJRERP and the re quisite policies, procedures, and directives.
(Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)
3.1 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effo rt for which they are responsible. (Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Contro l, Criterion 1.c.1:   NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 42
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties  


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 43
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
* The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) at the SEOC will assume primary responsibility for direction and control work ing in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOC Directors. The state will discuss the DACO's role at the FEMA (REP)/State briefing 3.2 OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protec tive action guides. (Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1:
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise
* The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) at the SEOC will assume primary responsibility for direction and control working in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOC Directors. The state will discuss the DACOs role at the FEMA (REP)/State briefing 3.2   OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
(Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1:
NUREG-0654, K.4.)
NUREG-0654, K.4.)
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 3.3 A decision-making process involved cons ideration of appropr iate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommenda tion for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 3.3   A decision-making process involved consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
  (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action  
(Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)
 
Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be coordinated with the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs  
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be coordinated with the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 3.4    Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.
(Sub-element 2.c., Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations, Criterion 2.c.1: NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.c.d.e.g).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs for understanding and implementation. Lists of the special needs as well as the resources necessary and available for evacuation are maintained by local EMA Directors and when requested, will be provided to the evaluator.
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 43


===3.4 Protective===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.   (Sub-element 2.c., Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations, Criterion 2.c.1: NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.c.d.e.g).
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Organizational procedures for executing protective actions will be discussed with evaluators. Contact with the Public School System will be actual (See Criterion 3.c.2.)
Activity 4:    Support and Coordinate Response Definition: Once requested, provide resource, technical, and policy support to the Incident Command by coordinating the actions of off-site agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions, implementing MAAs, and requesting higher-level assistance.
4.1    The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs for understanding and implementa tion. Lists of the special needs as well as the resources necessary and available for evacuation are maintained by local EMA Directors and when requested, will be provided to the evaluator.
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits 4.2    KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 44 Organizational procedures for executing prot ective actions will be discussed with evaluators. Contact with the Public School System will be actual  (See Criterion 3.c.2.)
(Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).
Activity 4:  Support and Coordinate Response Definition: Once requested, provide resource, technical, and policy support to the Incident Command by c oordinating the actions of off-site agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions, implementing MAAs, and requesting higher-level assistance.
4.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accord ance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on th e appropriate exposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.)  EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)  EOCs  will be available to evaluators  for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thre sholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits 4.2 KI and appropriate instructions are ava ilable should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.
* Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. EWs receive KI in an EW kit upon issue. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs and, if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                               2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 44
  (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1:  NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Depa rtment of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. EWs receive KI in an EW kit upon issue. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)
EOCs and, if the ge neral population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 45 Officer and other staff in the SEOC/ Ri sk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)  EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators     


===4.3 Protective===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.  
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Officer and other staff in the SEOC/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)
(Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c. d.e.g,)
EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators 4.3   Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.
(Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c. d.e.g,)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Demonstration of this process by sta ff in the SEOC, FCC and Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be based on projected contamination exposure levels. Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs for understanding and implementation.
* Demonstration of this process by staff in the SEOC, FCC and Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be based on projected contamination exposure levels. Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs for understanding and implementation.
Implementation of protective actions will be simulated, however procedural discussions between staff in the SE OC/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be discussed with the evaluators. Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will provide the FEMA Evaluator with a list of  
Implementation of protective actions will be simulated, however procedural discussions between staff in the SEOC/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be discussed with the evaluators. Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will provide the FEMA Evaluator with a list of transportation dependent individuals (special needs cards) and a list of transportation providers 4.4   OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.
 
(Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.2: NUREG-0654, J.10.d. g.)
transportation dependent individuals (special needs cards) and a list of transportation providers  
 
4.4 OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.2: NUREG-0654, J.10.d. g.)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Actual calls will be made to school officials for evaluation purposes. A list of endangered schools and telephone numbers will be provided by the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOC Directors  
* Actual calls will be made to school officials for evaluation purposes. A list of endangered schools and telephone numbers will be provided by the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOC Directors 4.5   Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d.,
 
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.)
===4.5 Appropriate===
traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
(Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated.
* Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated. However, EWs tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed in the parking lot at each of the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs. When a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover all aspects of TCPs.
However, EWs tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed in the parking lot at each of the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs. When a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover all aspects of TCPs. EWs will be equipped with everything needed to establish and maintain traffic Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 46 and access control points. Real time communications will be conducted with the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)  EOCs
EWs will be equipped with everything needed to establish and maintain traffic Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                               2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 45


===4.6 Impediments===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
to evacuation ar e identified and resolved. (Sub-element 3.d., Criterion 3.d.2: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise and access control points. Real time communications will be conducted with the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 4.6   Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
(Sub-element 3.d., Criterion 3.d.2: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Impediments will be discussed. Staff personnel at the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to discuss procedures with the  
* Impediments will be discussed. Staff personnel at the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to discuss procedures with the evaluators.
 
CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning Activity 1:   Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans Definition: Activate key personnel, facilities, and procedures.
evaluators.  
1.1   OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4, D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)
 
CAPABILITY: Emergency Pub lic Information and Warning Activity 1: Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans Definition:
Activate key personnel, facilities, and procedures.  
 
===1.1 ORO's===
use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
(Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUR EG-0654, A.4, D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)
* JIC
* JIC
* The Joint Information Center (JIC) pers onnel including the State/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 9:00 AM Eastern/8:00 AM Cent ral. All JIC assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location.
* The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel including the State/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 9:00 AM Eastern/8:00 AM Central. All JIC assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location.
* The TEMA JIC Co-Director will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.
* The TEMA JIC Co-Director will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.
1.2 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.  
1.2   At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Cr iterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
* JIC, LP-1
* JIC, LP-1
* The JIC will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.  
* The JIC will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 46


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 47
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
* Communications capability will in clude telephone, NAWAS MNET voice over IP, 800 MHz radio, WEBEOC and email
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise
* Communications capability will include telephone, NAWAS MNET voice over IP, 800 MHz radio, WEBEOC and email
* The SEOC is linked with both the primary and alternate EAS stations (LP-1) as well as the NOAA Weather Radio station by individual dedicated telephone lines.
* The SEOC is linked with both the primary and alternate EAS stations (LP-1) as well as the NOAA Weather Radio station by individual dedicated telephone lines.
1.3 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
1.3   Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).
  (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Crite rion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).
* JIC, LP-1
* JIC, LP-1
* The JIC will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
* The JIC will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
* LP1 will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
* LP1 will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
Activity 2: Manage Emergency P ublic Information and Warnings Definition:
Activity 2:   Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings Definition: In response to need for public notification, provide overall management and coordination of Emergency Public Information and Warning capability.
In response to need for public notification, provide overall management and coordination of Emergency Public Information and Warning capability.
2.1   Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
2.1 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effo rt for which they are responsible. (Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Contro l, Criterion 1.c.1:   NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)
(Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)
* JIC
* JIC
* The TVA and TEMA Co-Directors will assume primary responsibility for joint information coordination, for State, Local Jurisdictions and TVA. They will discuss their procedures and demonstrate one voice for public information through press releases from at the TVA/State briefings.
* The TVA and TEMA Co-Directors will assume primary responsibility for joint information coordination, for State, Local Jurisdictions and TVA. They will discuss their procedures and demonstrate one voice for public information through press releases from at the TVA/State briefings.
2.2 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accord ance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the read ings on the appropriate e xposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
2.2   The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
* Meigs County (ONLY)
* Meigs County (ONLY)
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 48 and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs  will be available to evaluators  for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thre sholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits.
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                               2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 47
Activity 3: Issue Emergency Warnings Definition:
Upon receiving Protective Action Decisions, issue emergency public warnings through established warning systems.
 
===3.1 Activities===
associated with primary al erting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the in itial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situ ation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by FEMA REP guidance.
  (Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.1:  10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1., 4., 5., 6., 7.)
* SEOC,  LP-1, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* The Emergency Alert System (EAS) will be activated simultaneously with the initial activation (silent test) of the Watts Bar Prompt Notification System (PNS) sirens with the simulated broadcast of a test message (EAS Message #1). After the initial activation of the PNS sirens a nd broadcast of the special test message, subsequent PNS activations and contact with the LP-1 EAS control station will be simulated.
Should there be a difference between the State and TVA System Status Monitors (SSMs) or if siren failu re/s is/are indicate d, backup route alerting for the affected coverage areas will be simulated; except for Meigs County demonstrating a FEMA/TEMA selected route. Risk County law enforcement personnel will be available to discuss the routes and procedures that would be utilized in an actual emergency situation. 


===3.2 Backup===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by HBR SEP of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits.
  (Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.3: NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)
Activity 3:    Issue Emergency Warnings Definition: Upon receiving Protective Action Decisions, issue emergency public warnings through established warning systems.
3.1    Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by FEMA REP guidance.
(Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.1: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1., 4., 5., 6., 7.)
* SEOC, LP-1, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* The Emergency Alert System (EAS) will be activated simultaneously with the initial activation (silent test) of the Watts Bar Prompt Notification System (PNS) sirens with the simulated broadcast of a test message (EAS Message #1). After the initial activation of the PNS sirens and broadcast of the special test message, subsequent PNS activations and contact with the LP-1 EAS control station will be simulated. Should there be a difference between the State and TVA System Status Monitors (SSMs) or if siren failure/s is/are indicated, backup route alerting for the affected coverage areas will be simulated; except for Meigs County demonstrating a FEMA/TEMA selected route. Risk County law enforcement personnel will be available to discuss the routes and procedures that would be utilized in an actual emergency situation.
3.2   Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by HBR SEP of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
(Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.3: NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* One (1) law enforcement officer will discuss with the evaluators procedures for back up route alerting (one (1) law enforcement officer will discuss TCPs under Criterion 3.d.1.) Only Meigs County will deploy (actual demonstration) a law enforcement officer with a FEMA eval uator to travel al ong a pre-designated evacuation route affected by Sire n # (FEMA/TEMA selected).  
* One (1) law enforcement officer will discuss with the evaluators procedures for back up route alerting (one (1) law enforcement officer will discuss TCPs under Criterion 3.d.1.) Only Meigs County will deploy (actual demonstration) a law enforcement officer with a FEMA evaluator to travel along a pre-designated evacuation route affected by Siren # (FEMA/TEMA selected).
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                                2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 48


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 49
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
* Waterway Warning will be demonstrated by Rhea County. One (1) boat (Fire and Rescue) will demonstrate the task. The FEMA evaluator will meet the Rhea County EM at the RCEOC, them will deploy to the boat ramp/dock. Real time communications will be conducted with the EOC.  
AAR                                                   2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise
 
* Waterway Warning will be demonstrated by Rhea County. One (1) boat (Fire and Rescue) will demonstrate the task. The FEMA evaluator will meet the Rhea County EM at the RCEOC, them will deploy to the boat ramp/dock. Real time communications will be conducted with the EOC.
3.3 OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media. (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of  
3.3   OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media. (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay).
 
(Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)
urgency and without undue delay).  
* SEOC, JIC, and Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
(Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the  
 
Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)
* SEOC, JIC, and Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Press Releases will not be issued without the approval of the affected risk county authority.
* Press Releases will not be issued without the approval of the affected risk county authority.
* Emergency instructions/information will originate from the SEOC prior to JIC activation; after activation, information will be disseminated from the JIC while emergency instructions will continue to be disseminated from the SEOC via the EAS. Activity 4: Provide P ublic Inquiry Control Definition:
* Emergency instructions/information will originate from the SEOC prior to JIC activation; after activation, information will be disseminated from the JIC while emergency instructions will continue to be disseminated from the SEOC via the EAS.
Upon activation of the JIS, track inquiries for rumors.
Activity 4:   Provide Public Inquiry Control Definition: Upon activation of the JIS, track inquiries for rumors.
4.1 OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media.
4.1   OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media.
  (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the  
(Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)
* SEOC, JIC, and Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Rumor Control will be coordinated from the State with the JIC and disseminated to the Counties.
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                                  2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 49


Media, Criterion 5.b.1:  NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
* SEOC, JIC,  and Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise CAPABILITY: Public Safety and Security Response Activity 1:   Activate Public Safety/Security Response Definition: Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to begin operations.
* Rumor Control will be coordinated from the State with the JIC and disseminated to the Counties.
1.1   At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 50 CAPABILITY: Public Safety and Security Response Activity 1: Activate Public Safety/Security Response Definition: Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to begin operations.
1.1 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* The Risk County McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.
* The Risk County McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.
Activity 2: Command/Control Public Safety/Security Response Definition: In response to a notificati on for security assets, establish the management and coordination of the Public Safety and Security Response, from activation through to demobilization.
Activity 2:   Command/Control Public Safety/Security Response Definition: In response to a notification for security assets, establish the management and coordination of the Public Safety and Security Response, from activation through to demobilization.
2.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accord ance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the read ings on the appropriate e xposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
2.1   The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thre sholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits.
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits.
2.2 KI and appropriate instructions are ava ilable should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.
2.2   KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.
  (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 51 0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).
(Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 50
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                                   2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Depa rtment of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. EWs receive KI in an EW kit upon issue. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EO Cs and, if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical  
* Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. EWs receive KI in an EW kit upon issue. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs and, if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical Officer and other staff in the SEOC/ Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)
 
EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators.
Officer and other staff in the SEOC/ Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators.
Activity 3:     Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene Definition: Direct/redirect traffic and pedestrians out of the affected area(s). Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to deter criminal conduct and maintain law and order.
Activity 3: Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene Definition: Direct/redirect traffic a nd pedestrians out of the affected area(s). Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to deter criminal conduct and maintain law and order.
3.1   Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d.,
 
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.).
===3.1 Appropriate===
traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.).
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated.
* Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated. However, EWs tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed in the parking lot at each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs. When a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover all aspects of TCPs. EWs will be equipped with everything needed to establish and maintain traffic and access control points. Real time communications will be conducted with the EOCs.
However, EWs tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed in the parking lot at each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs. When a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover all aspects of TCPs. EWs will be equipped with everything needed to establish and maintain traffic and access control points. Real time communications will be conducted with the EOCs.  
3.2   Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
 
(Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.2:
===3.2 Impediments===
to evacuation are identified and resolved.
  (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffi c and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.2:
NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
* Impediments will be discussed. Staff personnel at the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to discuss procedures with the evaluators.  
* Impediments will be discussed. Staff personnel at the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to discuss procedures with the evaluators.
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                                2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 51


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 52 CAPABILITY: HAZMAT (Radiological)
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
Response and Decontamination Activity 1: Site Ma nagement and Control Definition:
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise CAPABILITY: HAZMAT (Radiological) Response and Decontamination Activity 1:   Site Management and Control Definition: In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene and initiate response operations to manage and secure the physical layout of the incident.
In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene and initiate response operations to manage and secure the physical layout of the incident.
1.1   OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)
 
===1.1 ORO's===
use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
(Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUR EG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)
* SEOC (Dose), RMCC and FCC
* SEOC (Dose), RMCC and FCC
* TEMA Operations will receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner. Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), through the Operations section in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP. Facilities will be considered operational at the START OF EXERCISE (STARTEX) with assigned personnel at the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (t o include Field Monitoring Teams), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
* TEMA Operations will receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner.
* The State/local and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 9:00 AM Eastern/8:00 AM Central. SEOC, FCC, RMCC, CECC, assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per seni or leadership, by f acility location.
Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), through the Operations section in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP.
Facilities will be considered operational at the START OF EXERCISE (STARTEX) with assigned personnel at the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (to include Field Monitoring Teams), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
* The State/local and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 9:00 AM Eastern/8:00 AM Central. SEOC, FCC, RMCC, CECC, assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location.
* The SEOC DACO, FCC Director and RMCC Coordinator, will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.
* The SEOC DACO, FCC Director and RMCC Coordinator, will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.
1.2 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effo rt for which they are responsible. (Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Contro l, Criterion 1.c.1:   NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)
1.2   Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
(Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)
* SEOC (Dose), RMCC and FCC
* SEOC (Dose), RMCC and FCC
* The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) at the SEOC will assume primary responsibility for direction and control work ing in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County EOC Directors. The State will discuss the SEOC (Dose) Assessment Supervisor, RMCC-RMC Coordinator and FCC Director's role at the FEMA (REP)/State briefing.  
* The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) at the SEOC will assume primary responsibility for direction and control working in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County EOC Directors. The State will discuss the SEOC (Dose) Assessment Supervisor, RMCC-RMC Coordinator and FCC Directors role at the FEMA (REP)/State briefing.
1.3    At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 52


1.3 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 53 and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
  (Sub element 1.d, Communications, Cr iterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
AAR                                               2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC and Field Teams
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC and Field Teams
* The SEOC, FCC/RMCC and Field Teams will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems. The communications network between the DRH field teams and RMCC and the RMCC and SEOC/CECC will be evaluated at the RMCC   1.4 Equipment, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.  
* The SEOC, FCC/RMCC and Field Teams will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems. The communications network between the DRH field teams and RMCC and the RMCC and SEOC/CECC will be evaluated at the RMCC 1.4   Equipment, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
(Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1:
(Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1:
NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).
NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC and Field Teams
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC and Field Teams
* The SEOC (Dose), FCC, RMCC and Field Teams will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures. KI will be simulated.
* The SEOC (Dose), FCC, RMCC and Field Teams will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures. KI will be simulated.
Activity 2: Hazard Assessment Risk Evaluation
Activity 2:   Hazard Assessment Risk Evaluation


== Description:==
== Description:==
Assess the hazards present, evaluate the level of risk to both responders and the public, and develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP) to address the response problem.
Assess the hazards present, evaluate the level of risk to both responders and the public, and develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP) to address the response problem.
2.1 OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or prot ective action guides.  
2.1   OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
(Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1:
(Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1:
NUREG-0654, K.4.)
NUREG-0654, K.4.)
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC and FCC/RMCC.  
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC and FCC/RMCC.
2.2    Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information including: plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
(Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 53


===2.2 Appropriate===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
protective action recomm endations are based on available information including: plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.
AAR                                                 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.1: NUREG-0654, I.8., 10, and Supplement 3.)
  (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 54 Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.1: NUREG-0654, I.8., 10, and Supplement 3.)
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC, RMCC, CECC and Division of Radiological Health (DRH) pers onnel at the SEOC. This will be done in concert with TVA in the CECC, will perform dose assessment and independently validate dose projections. Radiological data for the field teams will  
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC, RMCC, CECC and Division of Radiological Health (DRH) personnel at the SEOC. This will be done in concert with TVA in the CECC, will perform dose assessment and independently validate dose projections. Radiological data for the field teams will be inserted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the RMCC.
 
Projections will be based on plant data provided by TVA and field radiation measurements.
be inserted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the RMCC. Projections will be based on plant data provided by TVA and field radiation measurements.
2.3   A decision-making process involved consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
2.3 A decision-making process involved cons ideration of appropr iate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommenda tion for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
(Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)
  (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action  
 
Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be coordinated with the local EOCs.
* Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be coordinated with the local EOCs.
2.4 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accord ance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the read ings on the appropriate e xposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
2.4   The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.
(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).
* Field Teams
* Field Teams
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertai ns to direction and control.)
* Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.)
2.5 KI and appropriate instructions are ava ilable should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.
2.5   KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 55  (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 54
 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                               2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).
* Field Teams
* Field Teams
* Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Depa rtment of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers. The Chief Medical Officer and other staff in the SEOC/Local EOCs will be available for  
* Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers. The Chief Medical Officer and other staff in the SEOC/Local EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators.
 
2.6   The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.
procedural discussions with evaluators.    
(Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.1: NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)
 
2.6 The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.1: NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)
* Field Teams
* Field Teams
* Five (5) Field Teams, four (4) to be eval uated and one (1) in training, will utilize appropriate instrumentation and guidelines as established in DRH Standard Operating Procedures.  
* Five (5) Field Teams, four (4) to be evaluated and one (1) in training, will utilize appropriate instrumentation and guidelines as established in DRH Standard Operating Procedures.
2.7    Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.
(Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.2: NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. All field teams will be under the direction of the RMCC.
2.8    Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.
(Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.3: NUREG-0654, I.9)
* Field Teams Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 55


===2.7 Field===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to contro l radiation exposure.
AAR                                                  2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise
  (Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.2: NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)
* Four (4) field-monitoring teams will be evaluated. Each field team will obtain at least one air sample with a minimum sample volume of 10 cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bagged, labeled and transported to a collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data will be injected by controllers supporting the exercise, and be transmitted by the teams to the RMCC over the normal communications network (portable hand-held/vehicle mounted radios). Cellular telephones will be utilized for back-up communications.
* SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
* The 45th CST will be in training (observer status). The number of teams TBD.
* Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. All field teams will be under the direction of the RMCC.
Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements                              2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 56


===2.8 Ambient===
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.
AAR                                         2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix F: Acronyms Acronym              Meaning
  (Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.3: NUREG-0654, I.9)
                µC/gm  Micro Curies per Gram AAC  After Action Conference AAR  After Action Report ARC  American Red Cross ARCA  Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES  Amateur Radio for Emergency Services CECC  Central Emergency Coordination Center CFR  Code of Federal Regulations DACO  Direction and Control Officer DEI Dose Equivalent Iodine DHS  Department of Homeland Security DOF  Tennessee Division of Forestry DRD  Direct Reading Dosimeter DRH  Department of Radiological Health EAL  Emergency Action Level EAS  Emergency Alert System ECL  Emergency Classification Level EEG  Exercise Evaluation Guide EM  Emergency Management EMD  Emergency Management Director EMS  Emergency Medical Services EOC  Emergency Operations Center EPZ  Emergency Planning Zone ERC  Emergency Response Coordinator ESF  Emergency Support Function EST  Eastern Standard Time EWD  Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination EXPLAN  Exercise Plan FCC  Field Coordination Center FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT  Field Monitoring Team FNF  Fixed Nuclear Facility FOUO  For Official Use Only Appendix F: Acronyms                                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 57
* Field Teams Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E:  Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 56
* Four (4) field-monitoring teams will be evaluated. Each field team will obtain at least one air sample with a minimum sample volume of 10 cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bagged, labeled and transported to a collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data will be injected by c ontrollers supporting th e exercise, and be transmitted by the teams to the RMCC over the normal communications network (portable hand-held/vehicle mounted radios). Cellular telephones will be utilized for back-up communications.
* The 45 th CST will be in training (observer status). The number of teams TBD.


Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix F:  Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 57 Appendix F:  Acronyms Acronym Meaning µC/gm Micro Curies per Gram AAC After Action Conference AAR After Action Report ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES Amateur Radio for Emergency Services CECC Central Emergency Coordination Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations DACO Direction and Control Officer DEI Dose Equivalent Iodine DHS Department of Homeland Security DOF  Tennessee Division of Forestry DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DRH Department of Radiological Health EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EEG Exercise Evaluation Guide EM Emergency Management  EMD Emergency Management Director EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERC Emergency Response Coordinator ESF Emergency Support Function EST Eastern Standard Time EWD Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination EXPLAN Exercise Plan FCC Field Coordination Center FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT Field Monitoring Team FNF Fixed Nuclear Facility FOUO For Official Use Only Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix F:  Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 58 Acronym Meaning GE General Emergency GIS Geographic Information System HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HCHD Hamilton County Health Department HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program ICS Incident Command System IOF Initial Operating Facility IP Improvement Plan IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone JIC Joint Information Center JIS Joint Information System KI Potassium Iodide LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LP-1 Local Primary -1 MAC Multi-Agency Coordination MACC Multi-Agency Coordination Center MCC Mission Control Center MJRERP Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan MOU Memorandum of Understanding mR milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hour NAWAS National Warning System NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIMS National Incident Management System NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOUE Notification of Unusual Event NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness  
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                         2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Acronym               Meaning GE   General Emergency GIS Geographic Information System HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HCHD   Hamilton County Health Department HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program ICS Incident Command System IOF Initial Operating Facility IP Improvement Plan IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone JIC Joint Information Center JIS Joint Information System KI Potassium Iodide LOCA   Loss of Coolant Accident LP-1 Local Primary -1 MAC   Multi-Agency Coordination MACC   Multi-Agency Coordination Center MCC   Mission Control Center MJRERP Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan MOU   Memorandum of Understanding mR   milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hour NAWAS   National Warning System NGO   Non-Governmental Organization NIMS National Incident Management System NOAA   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOUE   Notification of Unusual Event NRC   Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria 0654  for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 OOS  Out-of-Sequence ORO  Offsite Response Organization Appendix F: Acronyms                                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 58


in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                            2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Acronym                Meaning PAD    Protective Action Decision PAG    Protective Action Guide PAR  Protective Action Recommendation PIO  Public Information Officer PNS  Prompt Notification System PPE  Personal Protective Equipment PRD  Permanent Record Dosimetry R    Roentgen R/h  Roentgen(s) per hour RAC    Regional Assistance Committee RACES  Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RCP  Reactor Coolant Pump REM    Roentgen Equivalent Man REP  Radiological Emergency Preparedness REPP  Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program RERP  Radiological Emergency Response Plan RMC    Radiological Monitoring Coordinator RMCC    Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center RO    Radiological Officer SAE  Site Area Emergency SEID  State Emergency Information Director SEOC  State Emergency Operations Center SIP  Shelter-in-Place S-JICD  State JIC Director SOG    Standard Operating Guide SOP  Standard Operating Procedure WBN    Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant SRD  Self-Reading Dosimeter TCL  Target Capabilities List TCP  Traffic Control Point TDEC  Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation TLD  Thermoluminescent dosimeter TVA    Tennessee Valley Authority TVA-JICD TVA JIC Director UTL  Universal Task List Appendix F: Acronyms                                        2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 59


1980 OOS Out-of-Sequence ORO Offsite Response Organization Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix F:  Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 59 Acronym Meaning PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PNS Prompt Notification System PPE Personal Protective Equipment PRD Permanent Record Dosimetry R Roentgen R/h Roentgen(s) per hour RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RCP Reactor Coolant Pump REM Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RMC Radiological Monito ring Coordinator RMCC Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center RO Radiological Officer SAE Site Area Emergency SEID State Emergency Information Director SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIP Shelter-in-Place S-JICD State JIC Director SOG Standard Operating Guide SOP Standard Operating Procedure WBN Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant SRD Self-Reading Dosimeter TCL Target Capabilities List TCP Traffic Control Point TDEC Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter TVA  Tennessee Valley Authority TVA-JICD TVA JIC Director UTL Universal Task List Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix F:  Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 60 Acronym Meaning VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters VSRS Volunteer State Rescue Service Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 61 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
AAR                                         2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Acronym             Meaning VOAD   Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters VSRS Volunteer State Rescue Service Appendix F: Acronyms                                      2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 60


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Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)
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Latest revision as of 21:29, 5 December 2019

FEMA Watts Bar, Final Exercise Report, Exercise Date - October 19, 2011
ML12101A353
Person / Time
Site: Watts Bar  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/01/2012
From:
Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Cecere, Bethany NSIR/DPR 415-6754
References
Download: ML12101A353 (63)
v • d • e


Text

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant REP Exercise AFTER ACTION REPORT Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Program Exercise

[FINAL]

October 19, 2011 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Published February 2012 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Table of Contents Page Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................1 Administrative Handling Instructions ..............................................................................................3 Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................5 Section 1: Exercise Overview .........................................................................................................7 1.1 Exercise Details .............................................................................................................7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team ................................................................................................8 1.3 Participating Organizations ............................................................................................8 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ...........................................................................................11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design .......................................................................................11 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities ...............................................................11 2.3 Scenario Summary .......................................................................................................14 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ...............................................................................................15 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results ..................................................................................15 3.2 Evaluation Summaries .................................................................................................15 3.2.1 State Of Tennessee ...........................................................................................15 3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center ..............................................15 3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment ...........................................................................17 3.2.1.3 Field Coordination Center..............................................................18 3.2.1.4 Local Primary 1 (LP-1) EAS Station .............................................19 3.2.2 Joint Operations ...............................................................................................19 3.2.2.1 Central Emergency Control Center ................................................19 3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center ................................................................20 3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions .............................................................................................21 3.2.3.1 Meigs County, Tennessee ..............................................................21 3.2.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................21 3.2.3.1.2 Traffic and Access Control Points .................................22 3.2.3.1.3 Backup Route Alerting ..................................................23 Table Of Contents 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 1

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.2 McMinn County, Tennessee ..........................................................24 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................24 3.2.3.2.2 Traffic and Access Control Points .................................25 3.2.3.3 Rhea County, Tennessee ................................................................26 3.2.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................26 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic and Access Control Points .................................27 3.2.3.3.3 Waterway Clearance ......................................................28 Section 4: Conclusion ...................................................................................................................29 List of Appendices Appendix A: Exercise Timeline (Table 1) ....................................................................................31 Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Table 2) ...............................................33 Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator and Assignments ......................................................................35 Appendix D: Exercise Locations ..................................................................................................39 Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreement........................................................................................41 Appendix F: Acronyms .................................................................................................................57 Table Of Contents 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 2

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Administrative Handling Instructions

1. This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant (WBN)

Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Full Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)

Exercise is considered a public document.

2. Points of

Contact:

Federal: State of Tennessee:

Mr. Kevin Keyes General Bassham North Section Chief Director FEMA Region IV TN Emergency Management Agency 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road 3041 Sidco Drive Atlanta, Georgia 30341-4122 Nashville, Tennessee 37204-1502 770/220-5378 616/741-0001 kevin.keyes@dhs.gov Meigs County: McMinn County:

Mr. Tony Finnel Ms. Betty Hamby Director Director Emergency Management Emergency Management 14816 Hwy 58 South 1 107 S. Congress Parkway Decatur, Tennessee 37322 Athens, Tennessee 37303 meigsema@yahoo.com mcminnema@comcast.net Rhea County: Tennessee Valley Authority:

Mr. Bill Cranfield Mr. Walter H. Lee Director Manager Emergency Management Emergency Preparedness 8860 Back Valley Road 1101 Market Street, LP 6B-C Evensville, Tennessee 37322 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 rheaema@volstate.net Handling Instructions 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 3

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 4

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Executive Summary On October 19, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a full plume exposure pathway exercise in the Emergency Planning Zone for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN). The plant site, consisting of approximately 1,800 acres, is located in Rhea County in southeastern Tennessee. The site is located on the west shore of the Tennessee River, approximately 50 miles north-northeast of Chattanooga, and 54 miles southwest of Knoxville. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

FEMAs overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at WBN. The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results based on the assessment of target capabilities. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMAs policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. The evaluation team conducted this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology.

The previous Federal evaluated exercise was conducted on June 9, 2009. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 15-16, 1995.

Officials and representatives from the State of Tennessee, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, and TVA, as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all the phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals who participated in the success of this exercise. FEMA would also like to acknowledge the enthusiasm and contributions of the exercise planning team during the design of the exercise. The introduction of new products and concepts into the design phase of the exercise was embraced by the team, and they exhibited an eagerness to improve emergency management and response at all levels.

The State and Risk counties successfully demonstrated the required REP criterion to accomplish and demonstrate the following capabilities: Emergency Operations Center Management, Emergency Public Information and Warning, Emergency Public Safety and Security Response and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.

During this exercise, FEMA did not identify Deficiencies or Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). Overall, State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Communications were identified as a general strength throughout the exercise. Not only was the communications equipment interoperable and functional, but the personnel utilizing it kept everyone well informed and helped to maintain situational awareness across the board. The evaluation team noted continuing progress in the coordination of activities between the State, counties, and all other response entities.

Executive Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 5

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise The objectives for the 2011 WBN REP Exercise were as follows:

  • Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center Management including Direction and Control through the Counties and State Emergency Operations Centers.
  • Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
  • Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.
  • Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.
  • Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.

These objectives encompass the REP Exercise Evaluation Criteria as negotiated in the Extent of Play Agreement.

FEMA will provide an Improvement Plan (IP) to the State of Tennessee that detail strengths and Areas for Improvement observed during the exercise. The IP will be published under a separate cover and classified For Official Use Only (FOUO) in compliance with HSEEP standards.

Executive Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 6

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise (2011 WBN REP Exercise)

Type of Exercise Full-Scale Exercise Exercise Date October 19, 2011 Locations See Appendix D for a complete listing of locations that supported exercise activities.

Sponsors Tennessee Emergency Management Agency 3041 Sidco Drive Nashville, Tennessee 37204-1502 Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Program FEMA REP Program Mission

Response

Capabilities

  • Emergency Operations Center Management
  • Emergency Public Information and Warning
  • Emergency Public Safety and Security Response
  • Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Scenario Type REP, Full Plume Phase EPZ Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 7

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Role Name Agency Exercise Director Gary Lima TEMA Lead Controller David Green TEMA Lead Evaluator Alejandro Sera DHS/FEMA Region IV Exercise Logistics David Nash TEMA Evaluation Supervisor Kevin Keyes DHS/FEMA Region IV Scenario Development Lead Kenneth King TVA Agency Representative Walt Lee TVA Agency Representative Tony Finnell Meigs County Agency Representative Betty Hamby McMinn County Agency Representative Tom Trotter McMinn County Agency Representative Billy Cranfield Rhea County Agency Representative Bill Tittle Hamilton County Agency Representative Wayne Stuntz Hamilton County Agency Representative Jeff Gunter Bradley County Agency Representative Liz Flanagan TN DHEC Agency Representative Bruce House TN DHEC 1.3 Participating Organizations The following agencies, organizations and units of government participated in the 2011 WBN REP Exercise:

State of Tennessee

  • Tennessee Department of Health Division of Food and General Sanitation
  • Tennessee Department of Agriculture Division of Forestry
  • County Mayor
  • County Emergency Services Division
  • County Sheriff Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 8

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise

  • County Fire Services
  • County EMS
  • County Highway Department
  • County Schools
  • County Human Services
  • County Department of Health
  • County Public Information Officer
  • City of Decatur Mayor
  • City of Decatur Police
  • City of Decatur Fire
  • American Red Cross, Hiwassee Chapter
  • County Mayor
  • County Emergency Services Division
  • County Sheriff
  • County Fire
  • County Rescue
  • County EMS
  • County Public Works
  • County Board of Education
  • County Human Services
  • County Health Department
  • County Department of Health
  • County Radiological Officer
  • County Public Information Officer
  • County Meteorologist
  • County Animal Services
  • County Procurement
  • City of Decatur Mayor
  • City of Decatur Police
  • City of Decatur Fire
  • American Red Cross, Hiwassee Chapter
  • ARES / RACES
  • City of Athens Police Department
  • City of Athens Fire Department
  • County Mayor
  • County Emergency Services Division
  • County Sheriff
  • County Fire
  • County Rescue
  • County EMS Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 9

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise

  • County Public Works
  • County Board of Education
  • County Human Services
  • County Health Department
  • County Public Information Officer
  • American Red Cross, Hiwassee Chapter
  • ARES / RACES
  • Civil Air Patrol
  • Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • FEMA RIV Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Salvation Army
  • American Red Cross
  • Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)

Section 1: Exercise Overview 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 10

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities.

During these exercises State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The 2011 WBN REP Exercise was designed utilizing the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). HSEEP is a capabilities and performance-based exercise program which provides a standardized policy, methodology and terminology for exercises. The use of HSEEP is intended to ensure that the REP program conforms to established best practices and helps provide unity and consistency of effort for exercises at all levels of government. Prior to the exercise, the design team conducted planning meetings on a regular basis which focused on identifying objectives, designing the scenario, creating documentation, coordinating logistics, planning exercise conduct, and selecting an evaluation and improvement methodology.

The results of this exercise together with the review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visits enable FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final AAR to the NRC that State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

The Tennessee Multi-Jurisdiction Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the WBN Plant was formally submitted to FEMA by the State of Tennessee on April 12, 1996.

Title 44 CFR Part 350 approval was granted by FEMA on July 3, 1997.

2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 11

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.

  • Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management: Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC Management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.
  • Emergency Public Information and Warning: Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.
  • Emergency Public Safety and Security Response: Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire and Emergency Medical Services.
  • Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail. Based upon the identified exercise objectives, the following capabilities and associated activities were evaluated.

  • Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center Management including Direction and Control through the Counties and State Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 12

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Operations Centers.

Capability: EOC Management - Activate EOC; Direct EOC Operations; and Provide EOC Connectivity

  • Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Capability: EOC Management - Support and Coordinate Response Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning - Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans and Issue Emergency Warnings

  • Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and Counties emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

Capability: EOC Management - Direct EOC Operations Capability: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response - Activate Public Safety and Security Response; Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene; and Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response Operations Capability: Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination - Assess Hazard and Evaluate Risk

  • Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning - Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans; and Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications.

  • Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.

Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning - Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications; Conduct Media Relations and Provide Public Rumor Control.

Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 13

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 2.3 Scenario Summary This Exercise was conducted with the Watts Bar Plant Simulator in the interactive mode.

Times given were for planning purposes only. Actual times did vary due to dynamic response of the Simulator.

Initial Conditions:

Unit 1:

  • Operating at 100% power for the last 200 days.
  • The core is at MOL.
  • The Boron concentration is 747 ppm.
  • 1B MDAFW pump is out of service for repairs.

Unit 2:

Time Location Event 8:10 0:10 Watts Bar The CO2 tank in the diesel building explodes causing damages to the 1A Diesel Generator room wall causing concrete debris to fall on the diesel and the floor.

8:25 0:25 Watts Bar ALERT base on EAL 4.2 9:30 1:30 Watts Bar Main feed water regulating valve fail closed to the #1 steam generator which leads to a reactor trip signal on low level. The reactor fails to trip automatically or manually (ATWS). The injection of cold AFW water results in Steam Generator#1 having a tube rupture. When Operations attempts to close the steam supply to the TDAFW pump from SG#1 the steam supply valve 1-FCV-1-15 to SG#1 fails close.

9:45 1:45 Watts Bar Site Area Emergency declared base on EAL 2.3 10:30 2:30 Watts Bar A steam safety valve on #1 Steam Generator fails full open causing a release to the environment. The MSL radiation monitors reach the GE setpoint at the same time the release starts. He rad levels are maintained for the required 15 minutes in EAL 1.3.4. Gaseous Effluents.

10:45 2:45 Watts Bar General Emergency Declared base on EAL 7.1 11:45 3:45 Watts Bar A small fire occurs on the 1B Diesel Generator exhaust manifold due to prolonged running at no-load.

13:00 Endex Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 14

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 19, 2011 plume exercise. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

  • Met (No Deficiency or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assess and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)
  • ARCAs assessed or unresolved ARCAs from previous exercises
  • Deficiency assessed
  • Plan Issues
  • Not Demonstrated 3.2 Evaluation Summaries 3.2.1 State Of Tennessee 3.2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activation, notification, staffing, direction and control, and coordination of response activities.

Effective and efficient procedures were used to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel in the SEOC and were accomplished successfully in a timely manner as specified in the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) Annex B-Notification and Warning Plan.

Emergency Service Coordinators (ESC) had access to the appropriate amount of equipment, supplies and maps to support their needs also ESC and branches used WebEOC extensively to post actions and important information. Redundant communication systems insured the ESC had the ability to communicate with other agencies, as specified in the MJRERP Basic Plan, and Annex C-Communications Plan.

The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) demonstrated good direction and control through the exercise, as specified in the MJRERP Annex A-Direction and Control.

Protective Actions Recommendation (PAR) and Protective Actions Decision (PAD) were discussed and coordinated with the Risk Counties, questions and recommendations were Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 15

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise welcome by the DACO. During briefings all branches were polled as to their current status and had the branch representatives review their expected actions for potential future actions.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1 and 2.b.2 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

TEMA successfully demonstrated the capability to alert/warn, and notify the risk counties by coordinating the timely activation of the fixed sirens system and the Emergency Alert Systems (EAS).

The warning of the general public is the responsibility of local governments in coordination with the SEOC. The siren system located within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the EAS were used to disseminate emergency information and warnings, to the public in accordance with the plan and were evaluated under the same capability at the Risk Counties. The DACO coordinated with the Risk Counties the time in which the sirens system was going to be activated and which EAS message was going to be disseminated each time.

The State Emergency Information Director (SEID) had the responsibility to assure all activities concerning the development, and coordination of emergency information was completed. The SEID under the direction of the DACO, prepared, coordinated and disseminated the correct EAS message to the Joint Information Center (JIC) and the Risk Counties.

Public inquiry staff at the EOC monitored telephone calls and maintained a watch on social media sites using provided computers to identify trends. Rumors where quickly identified and addressed properly, in accordance with the MJRERP Annex D-Public Information.

The State of Tennessee maintains its own web site for the public to obtain information and in addition uses Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other electronic means of both releasing information and monitoring public trends. The SEOC also allows the public to sign up for a service and receive information over cell phones, text messaging, and email.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 16

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.2 Dose Assessment Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:

The State of Tennessee successfully demonstrated this capability through the State response at two fixed facilities and activities of field monitoring teams (FTs). The State organization that has the primary responsibility for this capability is the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and specifically the Division of Radiological Health (DRH).

DRH personal were pre-positioned at their assigned locations in accordance with the Extent-of-Play agreement. All staff members were aware of the procedures that would be used to alert, notify and mobilize personnel in an actual event. There were redundant communication systems available in the fixed facilities and for the field teams, as well as adequate equipment, supplies, dosimetry and KI for the responders. All staff members understood exposure and exposure rate limits, for themselves and teams in the field.

DRH coordinated all offsite radiological monitoring. The State FTs were under the direct control of the staff in the Radiological Monitoring Coordinating Center (RMCC). RMCC staff members were aware of the location of the TVA offsite team and positioned the State FTs so that the most useful data could be obtained.

The State FTs made measurements in a fashion to determine the edges of the radioactive plume and the FTs depended on TVA teams to determine plume maximum readings.

This approach assured that the State FTs would not be exposed to doses approaching their emergency worker limits.

The FT reported their results to the RMCC which in turn reported the results to the Dose Assessment area in the SEOC. The Dose Assessment area staff also received WBN radiation monitoring instrument readings on a periodic basis along with TVA generated dose projections.

The DRH Radiation Control Officer (RCO) at the SEOC reviewed all available data and developed a PAR which was provided to the DACO. The RCO also reviewed all available data with the Medical Officer from the Department of Health to verify that the use of KI was appropriately implemented.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2 and 4.a.3 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 17

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.3 Field Coordination Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

TEMA successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. This capability included EOC activation, notification, staffing, direction and control, and coordination of response activities.

Effective and efficient procedures were used to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel to meet the mission of the East TEMA Field Coordination Center (FCC) according to the MJRERP Annex B-Notification and Warning Plan.

The primary purpose of the FCC is to serve as a staging base to coordinate State and Federal resources sent to the area to support the local governments. The FCC coordinated with the RMCC in FTs and sampling efforts. The FCC has redundant communications systems to communicate with the Risk Counties and all the FCC Coordinators dispatched to the counties, in accordance with the MJRERP Annex C-Communications.

Personnel and resources coordinated by the FCC will include radiological monitoring teams, agriculture sample teams, physical security personnel, technical advisors, and other personnel as required. Incoming personnel from both State and Federal agencies may not be familiar with the assigned areas. The FCC is prepared to brief these personnel on the existing situation and provide maps, radio frequencies and procedures, and other essential information to enable them to function in the EPZ.

The FCC Director dispatched Area Coordinators to the counties after the Alert ECL. The Area Coordinators were responsible to brief the director on resources needed for the counties. The FCC Director and Deputy Director provided frequent briefings on plant conditions, emergency classification levels, and response activities. They demonstrated strong leadership and thorough knowledge of the State Emergency Response Plan and procedures.

Designated personnel with leadership roles in the FCC provided consistent direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they were responsible. During the briefing they used checklists to ensure the FCC was following the plan. Each work station was equipped with a telephone, and laptop computer. Information Technology support was available on site and communications was sufficient to support operations.

There were copies of plans available. The FCC staff members` and others agencies clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their procedures, and performed their functions in a coordinated and timely manner.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 3.a.1 and 4.a.2 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 18

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.4 Local Primary 1 (LP-1) EAS Station Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

This capability was successfully evaluated during an interview of the Station Manager.

According to the State of Tennessee Statewide Emergency Alert System Plan (revised June 1998), WIVK Knoxville (AM-990 and FM 107.7) is the designated EAS LP-1 for the East Tennessee Area.

The SEOC is linked with both the primary and alternate EAS stations as well as the NOAA Weather Radio station by individual dedicated telephone lines. When informed by the SEID and advised of the message(s) to be broadcast, the Emergency Alert System Coordinator-PIO (EASC-PIO) will contact and notify the NOAA station in Morristown to begin broadcasting EAS Message #2. Immediately following this notification, the EASC-PIO will contact the primary EAS station (WIVK, FM 107.7) and request that they prepare to record an emergency message for rebroadcast to the public, in accordance with WBN Supplement 1-Emergency Alert System.

WIVKs Station Manager was interviewed by telephone and demonstrated his knowledge, experience, and expertise on the process and procedures established to activate the Emergency Alert System and WIVKs emergency plan for an event at WBN.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.a.1 3.2.2 Joint Operations 3.2.2.1 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

The capability of Emergency Operations Center Management was successfully demonstrated at the CECC, this capability provides multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event.

The evaluation included activation, notification, staffing, direction and control, coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs.

Direction and Control was the responsibility of the utility operator and was accomplished in a professional and effective manner. The State and local government officials dispatched to the CECC served in a liaison capacity between the utility operator and their respective EOCs. The government officials in conjunction with the utility operators Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 19

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Director, effectively communicated, coordinated, and functioned as a cohesive response and recovery unit.

The utility operators assessment as well as the States independent assessments of the offsite health and safety considerations supported the PADs, which were based on plant conditions, and an ongoing radiological release. All PADs were based on sound technical analyses, which included environmental field measurements, computerized dose assessment models, plant conditions, a thorough understanding of the simulated emergency at hand, and effective interactions with the utility operators senior staff.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 2.b.1.

3.2.2.2 Joint Information Center Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The State of Tennessee successfully demonstrated the capability Emergency Public Information and Warning, at the JIC. The evaluation included activation, notification, staffing, direction and control and issuing of warnings.

TVA provides the preponderance of support materials to facilitate JIC and media operations in the JIC operations room, the Citizen Information Center/Rumor Control/

media monitoring location, the media update desk, media work area and media briefing room. All areas are well equipped and have redundancy in communications with landlines, cell phones, facsimiles, internet connectivity and state and utility radio systems, all of which were operational.

The JIC, a joint public and private sector organization, is lead by co-directors provided by the State and TVA. Upon activation, the JIC was the central location for the coordination and dissemination of emergency information while the SEOC maintains the responsibility for emergency instructions (e.g., protective action decision coordination/EAS message dissemination). The JIC Procedures clearly lay out the operations and roles of government and utility personnel assigned to this center.

Effective implementation of the joint information system (JIS) requires close coordination between the State and local PIOs in the JIC and the respective SEOC/local EOCs. The degree of coordination observed was exceptional both internal to the JIC and with external agencies and offices. Protocols for the reviewing and approval of messages by both co-directors was adhered to and accomplished without adversely affecting timely message release. There was some question as to the manner of TVA/SEOC emergency information message coordination prior to the JIC activation. There were no risk county media releases before JIC activation. In addition to using press releases and EAS messages, both TEMA and the TVA have embraced social networking as a means to provide emergency information to the public and media.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 20

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise The JIC was fully operational for a little over four hours during which 11 messages were prepared and two media briefings conducted. The coordination prior to the media briefings adequately prepared the TVA and government spokespersons to address pertinent topics regarding the safeguarding of the public.

The role of the mock media was played and supported by a local community college journalism class. The students offered realism to this normally mundane part of the exercise. The questions were well formulated and challenged the Information Manager, as well as the spokespersons. Although, the persistent questioning was not expected, it was well received by the spokespersons and added to overall success of the exercise. The Citizen Information Center/Rumor Control staff maintained an operational awareness that allowed them to respond to public queries, identify trends and respond to rumors in a timely manner.

The demonstration met the requirements of this capability and criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3 Risk Jurisdictions 3.2.3.1 Meigs County, Tennessee 3.2.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide MAC for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities.

The Meigs County EOC (MCEOC) new remodeled space provides much needed space for the support and coordination of an emergency at Meigs County, the MCEOC had sufficient equipment and redundant communications systems for a successful operations, it was composed of representatives from various municipal and county agencies, they clearly understood their responsibilities, followed their agency plans, and performed their assigned functions with high levels of proficiency.

The MCEOC personnel were pre-positioned the Emergency Services Director (Director) explained the normal callout system and the ability to insure the EOC could be activated in a timely manner.

Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. They demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the State, other risk counties, and Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 21

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise outside agencies.

The Director provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Meigs County, by implementing the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and residents that required special assistance. EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the MCEOC, as specified in the Meigs County Implementing Procedures.

Meigs County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.

After the SEOC activated the siren system one siren was identified as failing (simulated) to function properly. The Director immediately initiated actions which successfully performed backup route alerting.

The Public Information Officer (PIO) continuously maintained contact with the Meigs County PIO at the JIC; press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director and the County Decision Team. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. There were no trends or rumors identified during the exercise.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.1.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the Meigs County Sheriff, Fire and Rescue Department and Decatur Police Department.

MCEOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed by each department. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the TCPs, provide coordination of un-manned roadlocks, and coordinate with the Meigs County Road Department to assist with road impediments and roadside services.

TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out of the area, diverting the public from the possible Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 22

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.

Representatives from each of the departments were interviewed and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.

Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2 3.2.3.1.3 Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Meigs County successfully demonstrated the capability to warn and disseminate emergency information to the public in the event of a Prompt Notification System (PNS) failure. Once the PNS is activated from the SEOC, the Sheriff will be notified of any siren(s) that fail to operate, and a deputy will be dispatched to the area of the failed siren to alert those residents.

Each vehicle and driver that will be utilized to perform this task will be equipped with a map that indicates the siren locations, the contour outline of the coverage of each siren, and the roads in the sound contour. When notified of a siren failure the driver(s) can determine the roads on which residents should be alerted based on the map.

The Meigs County Sheriff completed the task within the reasonable time, the County Fire Department and Decatur Police Department personnel were prepared to dispatch personnel as backup to the Sheriff Department.

Representatives from each of the departments were interviewed and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 3.a.1 and 5.a.3.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 23

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.2 McMinn County, Tennessee 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

McMinn County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities.

Through discussion with the Emergency Management Director (Director) and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation. Recall would have been accomplished by telephone, text and pager systems.

Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Redundant communications systems were established and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise.

The Director provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of McMinn County, by implementing the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and residents that required special assistance.

EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the McMinn County Emergency Operations Center (MEOC), as specified in the McMinn County Implementing Procedures.

Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. All MEOC agencies were very familiar with their own plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions, and support facilities were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.

McMinn County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 24

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

McMinn County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.

Although the sirens and EAS messages are initiated at the SEOC, the Director monitored siren activation status and content of EAS messages for accuracy.

The McMinn County Mayor closely coordinated and maintained contact with the McMinn County PIO at the JIC; press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director and the County Mayor. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.2.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the McMinn County Sheriff Department. MEOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed in case of an evacuation order. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the traffic control points, provide coordination of un-staffed roadblocks, and coordinate with the McMinn County Highway Department to assist with road impediments and roadside services.

TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out diverting the public from the possible hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.

Representatives from the Sheriff Department were interview and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.

Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 25

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.3 Rhea County, Tennessee 3.2.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This included: EOC activation, notification, staffing, management, direction, control, and coordination of response activities.

Through discussion with the Emergency Management Director and review of county recall rosters provided, it was determined the county has an effective recall system with all key and essential positions identified for each county level of activation. Recall would have been accomplished by telephone, text and pager systems.

Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations in the county. Redundant communications systems were established and utilized during the exercise. Communications systems were effective and uninterrupted throughout the exercise.

The Director and the county Executive Officer provided outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise and demonstrated the ability to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Rhea County, by implementing the early protective actions for the children, which included re-location of endangered schools and residents that required special assistance.

EAS activations, PAR and PADs were discussed with the SEOC prior to implementation by the Rhea County Emergency Operations Center (REOC), as specified in the Rhea County Implementing Procedures.

Frequent staff briefings and round table discussions were conducted to ensure that all essential emergency response elements were carried out as identified in the plan. All REOC agencies were very familiar with their own plans and procedures and conducted their assigned responsibilities seamlessly. Plant conditions, air monitoring reports, road conditions, and support facilities were consistently monitored to ensure the safety of the public and emergency workers.

Rhea County demonstrated their ability to effectively coordinate with the SEOC, other risk counties and outside agencies, for the response to an emergency at WBN.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 26

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public.

Although the sirens and EAS messages are initiated at the SEOC, the Director monitored siren activation status and content of EAS messages for accuracy.

The Director and the PIO closely coordinated and maintained contact with the Rhea County PIO at the JIC, press releases generated by the JIC were reviewed by the Director. Public inquiries were answered with accurate and up to date information. PIO operations also included a Spanish speaking interpreter available to field calls and to assist the PIO where needed.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 5.a.1 and 5.b.1 3.2.3.3.2 Traffic and Access Control Points Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

This capability was successfully evaluated during the exercise via an interview of the Rhea County Sheriff Department. REOC has pre-identified and mapped all the TCPs that would be staffed in case of an evacuation order. The local Sheriff has the responsibility to oversee all the traffic control points, provide coordination of un-staffed roadblocks, and coordinate with the Rhea County Road Department and Traffic Assist Teams, to assist with road impediments and roadside services.

TCPs not only assisted traffic flow out, diverting the public from the possible hazards, but also discouraged theft and vandalism from occurring in the evacuation quadrant.

Representatives from the Sheriff Department were interview and each provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures.

Vehicles were equipped with sufficient safety equipment to aid in traffic direction and had multiple communication systems, along with computer aided dispatch technology to receive and transmit essential information.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criteria: 1.d.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 27

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 3.2.3.3.3 Waterway Clearance Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

Rhea County successfully demonstrated the capability to warn and disseminate emergency information to the public, on a waterway.

A representative from the Rhea County Sheriff Department was interview and provided thorough information as to emergency worker responsibilities, dosimetry reading, record keeping, turn back values and KI ingestion procedures. The officer also demonstrated extensive knowledge and understanding of river operations, the equipment used, routes and areas of special interest.

The Sheriffs Department Officer demonstrated the capability to communicate and coordinate actions through dispatch and was aware of procedures to conduct after completion of the mission to include reporting to the EOC and decontamination requirements if necessary.

The demonstrations met the requirements of this capability and REP criterion: 5.a.3.

Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 28

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Section 4: Conclusion Officials and representatives from the State of Tennessee, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region II, and TVA, as well as numerous volunteers participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all the phases of the exercise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals who participated in the success of this exercise. FEMA would also like to acknowledge the enthusiasm and contributions of the exercise planning team during the design of the exercise.

Overall, State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. Communications were identified as a general strength throughout the exercise. Not only was the equipment interoperable and functional, but the personnel utilizing it kept everyone well informed and helped to maintain situational awareness across the board. The evaluation team noted great progress in the coordination of activities between the State, counties, and all other response entities. During this exercise, FEMA did not identify any Deficiencies or ARCAs.

Appendix B contains two tables. Both tables provide a summary of exercise results for all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Table 2 presents the status of REP exercise criteria that were demonstrated during this exercise. Exercise criteria are listed by number. Table 3 presents the status of target capabilities and activities that were demonstrated during this exercise.

The demonstration status of the criteria and capabilities is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved Deficiency or ARCAs remain from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)

Section 4: Conclusion 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 29

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AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 30

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix A: Exercise Timeline (Table 1)

Table 1: Exercise Timeline Appendix A: Exercise Timeline 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 31

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AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 32

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AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Table 2)

Table 2: REP Criteria Evaluation Result Summary ELEMENT/Sub-Element SEOC Dose RMCC FMTs FCC JIC LP-1 CECC Meigs McMinn Rhea Assessment County County County

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1.a.1. Mobilization M M M M M M M M M M 1.b.1. Facilities M 1.c.1. Direction and Control M M M M M M M M M 1.d.1. Communications Equipment M M M M M M M M M M M 1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations M M M M M M M M M M M
2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control M M M M M M M 2.b.1. Rad Assessment & PARs Based on Available Information M M M M 2.b.2. Rad Assessment and PADs for the General Public M M M M M 2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations M M M 2.d.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Ingestion Exposure 2.e.1. Rad Assmt & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry & Return
3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control M M M M 3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions M M M M 3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations M M M 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools M M M 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control M M M 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control M M M 3.e.1. Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Information 3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Showing Strategies & Instru. Mater.

3.f.1. Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment M 4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management M M M 4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures M 4.b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis 4.c.1. Laboratory Operations 5 . EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFO 5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification M M M M M 5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert &Notification Backup Alert &Notification M 5.b.1. Emergency Info and Instructions for the Public and the Media M M M M M
6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES 6.a.1. Monitoring & Decon of Evacuees &EWs & Registration of Evacuees 6.b.1. Monitoring and Decon of Emergency Worker Equipment 6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees 6.d.1. Transport and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 33

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Table 3: Target Capability Evaluation Result Summary Meigs McMinn Rhea Capability / Activity SEOC Dose RMCC FMT FCC JIC LP-1 CECC County County County Emergency Operation Center Management Activate EOC X X X X Direct EOC Tactical Operations X X X X Gather and Provide Information Identify and Address Issues Prioritize and Provide Resources Provide EOC Connectivity X X X X Support and Coordinate Response X X X X Emergency Public Information and Warning Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning X Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning and Notification X X Establish JIS Issue Emergency Warnings X X X X X X Conduct Media Relations Provide Public Rumor Control X X X X X Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Activate Public Safety and Security Response X X X Command and Control Public Safety and Security

Response

Control Traffic, Crowd and Scene X X X Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Site Management and Control X X X X Hazard Assessment and Risk Evaluation X X X X Appendix B: Results Summary of Exercise Evaluation 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 34

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator and Assignments Location Evaluation Team Capability and Activity Tennessee State Emergency Operations Gerald McLemore (FEMA) EOC Management Center (SEOC) Joe Harworth (FEMA) 1. Activate SEOC (1a1, 1e1)

Kiori Flores (FEMA) 2. Provide SEOC Connectivity (1d1)

Gary Bolender (ICF) 3. Direct SEOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2)

Emergency Public Information & Warning

1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1)
2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)

Dose Assessment, Radiation Joseph Keller (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Protection Section, SEOC 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 2b1, 2b2,4a2)

Radiological Monitoring John Fill (FEMA) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Coordination Center (RMCC) 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 3a1, 4a2)

Radiological Field Monitoring Marcy Campbell (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 1 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)

Radiological Field Monitoring Michael Henry (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 2 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)

Radiological Field Monitoring Dave Stuenkel (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 3 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)

Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 35

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Location Evaluation Team Capability and Activity Radiological Field Monitoring William B. McRee (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Team 4 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (3a1, 3b1, 4a1, 4a3)

East TEMA Field Coordination Roger Jobe (ICF) HAZMAT Response & Decontamination Center (FCC) 1. Site Management & Control (1a1, 1c1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation (2a1, 3a1, 4a2)

Joint Information Center (JIC) Bob Spence (FEMA) Emergency Public Information & Warning Lisa Rink (FEMA) 1. Activate Emergency Public Information, Bill Larrabee (ICF) Alert/Warning & Notification Plans (1a1, 1d1, 1e1)

2. Manage Emergency Public Information &

Warning (1c1)

3. Issue Emergency Warnings (5b1)
4. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)

WIVK (LP-1) Lorenzo Lewis (FEMA) Emergency Public Information & Warning Knoxville 1. Manage Emergency Public Information and Warning (1d1, 1e1)

2. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings &

Notifications (5a1)

Central Emergency Control Center Bob Trojanowski (NRC) EOC Management

/ Emergency Operations Facility 1. Support and Coordinate Response (CECC) (No EOP)

Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 36

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AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise RISK COUNTIES Meigs County (MCEOC)

Emergency Operations Center Michael Dolder (FEMA) EOC Management Jon Sandburg (FEMA) 1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)

Alex Sera (FEMA) 2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)

J. T. Ackerman (FEMA) 3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)

4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) *3a1 and 3b1 for Back Up Route Alerting*

Emergency Public Information & Warning

1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)
2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)

Traffic Control Points Emergency Public Safety & Security Response (interview) 1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1)

2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)

Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Information & Warnings

1. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings &

Notifications (5a3)

McMinn County (MEOC)

Emergency Operations Center Matt Bradley (FEMA) EOC Management Walt Cushman (FEMA) 1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)

2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)
3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)
4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2)

Emergency Public Information & Warning

1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)
2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)

Traffic Control Points Emergency Public Safety & Security Response (interview) 1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1)

2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)

Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 37

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Rhea County (RCEOC)

Emergency Operations Center Robert Nash (FEMA) EOC Management Odis Spencer (FEMA) 1. Activate EOC (1a1, 1e1)

Ron Shaw (FEMA) 2. Provide EOC Connectivity (1d1)

3. Direct EOC Operations (1c1, 2a1, 2b2, 2c1)
4. Support & Coordinate Response (3a1, 3b1, 3c1, 3c2, 3d1, 3d2) *3a1 and 3b1 for Waterway Warning*

Emergency Public Information & Warning

1. Issue Emergency Warnings (5a1, 5b1)
2. Provide Public Inquiry Control (5b1)

Traffic Control Points Emergency Public Safety & Security Response (interview) 1. Activate Public Safety & Security Response (1d1)

2. Control Traffic, Crowd & Scene (3d1, 3d2)

Waterway Warning Emergency Public Information & Warnings

1. Issue Public Information, Alert/Warnings &

Notifications (5a3)

Appendix C: Exercise Evaluator & Assignments 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 38

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix D: Exercise Locations Locations Locations SEOC: CECC:

3041 Sidco Dr. 1101 Market St.

Nashville, TN 37204 Chattanooga, TN 37402 RMCC: LP-1:

TEMA-East Region WIVK (LP-1) 803 Concord St. 4711 Kingston Pike Knoxville, TN 37919 Knoxville, TN 37919 FCC: Joint Information Center (JIC):

TEMA-East Region 1101 Market St.

803 Concord St. Chattanooga, TN 37402 Knoxville, TN 37919 Staging Area for Field Monitoring Meigs County EOC Teams and Mobile Laboratory: 14816 Hwy. 58 South TEMA-East Region Decatur, TN 37322 803 Concord St.

Knoxville, TN 37919 Rhea County EOC McMinn County EOC 8860 Back Valley Rd. 1107 S. Congress Pkwy.

Evensville, TN 37322 Athens, TN 37303 Appendix D: Exercise Locations 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 39

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page is Intentionally Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 40

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreement EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT WATTS BAR NUCLEAR STATION FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 19, 2011 All selected activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans with the below listed exceptions. It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it isnt disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.

CAPABILITY: Emergency Operations Management Activity 1: Activate EOC Definition: In response to activation, perform incident notifications, recall essential personnel, and stand-up EOC systems to provide a fully staffed and operational EOC.

1.1 OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

(Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

  • SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • TEMA Operations will receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner.

Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), through the Operations section in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP.

Facilities will be considered operational at the START OF EXERCISE (STARTEX) with assigned personnel at the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (to include Field Monitoring Teams), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC)

  • Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs);

already pre-positioned and in-place no later than 8:00 AM Eastern/7:00 AM Central

  • SEOC, CECC, and Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location
  • The SEOC DACO, and Risk County EMA Directors will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 41

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 1.2 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H.,

J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

  • SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • The SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties EOCs will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.

Activity 2: Provide Connectivity Definition: Upon notification, initiate interoperable system operations, in addition to maintaining, managing, and assuring protection of the interoperable communications systems until the SEOC is ordered to be deactivated.

2.1 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

  • SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • The SEOC will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.
  • The Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems
  • Communications capability will include telephone, NAWAS MNET voice over IP, 800 MHz radio, WEBEOC and email Activity 3: Direct EOC Operations Definition: Following activation of the SEOC system, staff and organize the SEOC in accordance with the comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) - TVA MJRERP and the requisite policies, procedures, and directives.

3.1 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)

  • SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 42

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise

  • The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) at the SEOC will assume primary responsibility for direction and control working in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOC Directors. The state will discuss the DACOs role at the FEMA (REP)/State briefing 3.2 OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

(Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1:

NUREG-0654, K.4.)

  • SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC and Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 3.3 A decision-making process involved consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

(Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)

  • SEOC, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be coordinated with the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 3.4 Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups.

(Sub-element 2.c., Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations, Criterion 2.c.1: NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.c.d.e.g).

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs for understanding and implementation. Lists of the special needs as well as the resources necessary and available for evacuation are maintained by local EMA Directors and when requested, will be provided to the evaluator.

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 43

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Organizational procedures for executing protective actions will be discussed with evaluators. Contact with the Public School System will be actual (See Criterion 3.c.2.)

Activity 4: Support and Coordinate Response Definition: Once requested, provide resource, technical, and policy support to the Incident Command by coordinating the actions of off-site agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions, implementing MAAs, and requesting higher-level assistance.

4.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits 4.2 KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.

(Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. EWs receive KI in an EW kit upon issue. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs and, if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 44

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Officer and other staff in the SEOC/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)

EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators 4.3 Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J.9., 10.c. d.e.g,)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Demonstration of this process by staff in the SEOC, FCC and Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be based on projected contamination exposure levels. Decisions will be coordinated through affected Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs for understanding and implementation.

Implementation of protective actions will be simulated, however procedural discussions between staff in the SEOC/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be discussed with the evaluators. Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will provide the FEMA Evaluator with a list of transportation dependent individuals (special needs cards) and a list of transportation providers 4.4 OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools.

(Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, Criterion 3.c.2: NUREG-0654, J.10.d. g.)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Actual calls will be made to school officials for evaluation purposes. A list of endangered schools and telephone numbers will be provided by the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOC Directors 4.5 Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d.,

Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated. However, EWs tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed in the parking lot at each of the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs. When a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover all aspects of TCPs.

EWs will be equipped with everything needed to establish and maintain traffic Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 45

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise and access control points. Real time communications will be conducted with the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs 4.6 Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(Sub-element 3.d., Criterion 3.d.2: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Impediments will be discussed. Staff personnel at the Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to discuss procedures with the evaluators.

CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning Activity 1: Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans Definition: Activate key personnel, facilities, and procedures.

1.1 OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4, D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

  • The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel including the State/ Risk Counties (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 9:00 AM Eastern/8:00 AM Central. All JIC assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location.
  • The TEMA JIC Co-Director will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.

1.2 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

  • The JIC will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 46

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise

  • Communications capability will include telephone, NAWAS MNET voice over IP, 800 MHz radio, WEBEOC and email
  • The SEOC is linked with both the primary and alternate EAS stations (LP-1) as well as the NOAA Weather Radio station by individual dedicated telephone lines.

1.3 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

  • The JIC will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.
  • LP1 will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures.

Activity 2: Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings Definition: In response to need for public notification, provide overall management and coordination of Emergency Public Information and Warning capability.

2.1 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)

  • The TVA and TEMA Co-Directors will assume primary responsibility for joint information coordination, for State, Local Jurisdictions and TVA. They will discuss their procedures and demonstrate one voice for public information through press releases from at the TVA/State briefings.

2.2 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

  • Meigs County (ONLY)
  • Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 47

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits.

Activity 3: Issue Emergency Warnings Definition: Upon receiving Protective Action Decisions, issue emergency public warnings through established warning systems.

3.1 Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by FEMA REP guidance.

(Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.1: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.1., 4., 5., 6., 7.)

  • SEOC, LP-1, Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • The Emergency Alert System (EAS) will be activated simultaneously with the initial activation (silent test) of the Watts Bar Prompt Notification System (PNS) sirens with the simulated broadcast of a test message (EAS Message #1). After the initial activation of the PNS sirens and broadcast of the special test message, subsequent PNS activations and contact with the LP-1 EAS control station will be simulated. Should there be a difference between the State and TVA System Status Monitors (SSMs) or if siren failure/s is/are indicated, backup route alerting for the affected coverage areas will be simulated; except for Meigs County demonstrating a FEMA/TEMA selected route. Risk County law enforcement personnel will be available to discuss the routes and procedures that would be utilized in an actual emergency situation.

3.2 Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by HBR SEP of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

(Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.3: NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • One (1) law enforcement officer will discuss with the evaluators procedures for back up route alerting (one (1) law enforcement officer will discuss TCPs under Criterion 3.d.1.) Only Meigs County will deploy (actual demonstration) a law enforcement officer with a FEMA evaluator to travel along a pre-designated evacuation route affected by Siren # (FEMA/TEMA selected).

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 48

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise

  • Waterway Warning will be demonstrated by Rhea County. One (1) boat (Fire and Rescue) will demonstrate the task. The FEMA evaluator will meet the Rhea County EM at the RCEOC, them will deploy to the boat ramp/dock. Real time communications will be conducted with the EOC.

3.3 OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media. (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay).

(Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

  • SEOC, JIC, and Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Press Releases will not be issued without the approval of the affected risk county authority.
  • Emergency instructions/information will originate from the SEOC prior to JIC activation; after activation, information will be disseminated from the JIC while emergency instructions will continue to be disseminated from the SEOC via the EAS.

Activity 4: Provide Public Inquiry Control Definition: Upon activation of the JIS, track inquiries for rumors.

4.1 OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media.

(Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

  • SEOC, JIC, and Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Rumor Control will be coordinated from the State with the JIC and disseminated to the Counties.

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 49

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise CAPABILITY: Public Safety and Security Response Activity 1: Activate Public Safety/Security Response Definition: Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to begin operations.

1.1 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • The Risk County McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems.

Activity 2: Command/Control Public Safety/Security Response Definition: In response to a notification for security assets, establish the management and coordination of the Public Safety and Security Response, from activation through to demobilization.

2.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.) EWs with assignments in the 10-mile EPZ and those involved in radiological monitoring and/or decontamination are issued EW dosimetry kits. Two (2) EWs in each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to evaluators for interview as to knowledge of recording dosimetry readings and actions to be taken when certain thresholds are reached, especially if the established turn-back value (2.5 R [5 R TEDE]) is met or exceeds exposure limits.

2.2 KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.

(Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 50

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise 0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons and the general public. EWs receive KI in an EW kit upon issue. When a decision is made, instructions will be relayed through the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs and, if the general population is included, distribution of KI to shelters will be simulated. The Chief Medical Officer and other staff in the SEOC/ Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea)

EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators.

Activity 3: Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene Definition: Direct/redirect traffic and pedestrians out of the affected area(s). Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to deter criminal conduct and maintain law and order.

3.1 Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d.,

Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j., k.).

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Deployment of traffic and access control personnel will be simulated. However, EWs tasked with performing such duties will be interviewed in the parking lot at each of the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs. When a roadblock or access point would be established, the EWs will be dispatched to the EOC rather than the location in the field. Interviews will cover all aspects of TCPs. EWs will be equipped with everything needed to establish and maintain traffic and access control points. Real time communications will be conducted with the EOCs.

3.2 Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, Criterion 3.d.2:

NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

  • Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties
  • Impediments will be discussed. Staff personnel at the Risk County (McMinn, Meigs and Rhea) EOCs will be available to discuss procedures with the evaluators.

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 51

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise CAPABILITY: HAZMAT (Radiological) Response and Decontamination Activity 1: Site Management and Control Definition: In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene and initiate response operations to manage and secure the physical layout of the incident.

1.1 OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

  • TEMA Operations will receive the emergency notification from TVA, verify the notification, contact, alert, and mobilize key personnel in a timely manner.

Notification to adjacent states will also be demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), through the Operations section in accordance with the appropriate notification checklist as contained in the Watts Bar MJRERP.

Facilities will be considered operational at the START OF EXERCISE (STARTEX) with assigned personnel at the SEOC, Field Coordination Center (FCC), Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) (to include Field Monitoring Teams), Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).

  • The State/local and TVA, will be pre-positioned and in place no later than 9:00 AM Eastern/8:00 AM Central. SEOC, FCC, RMCC, CECC, assigned personnel will remain on duty until END OF EXERCISE (ENDEX). Release of personnel will be phased and in accordance with performance measures and training objectives, determined as met per senior leadership, by facility location.
  • The SEOC DACO, FCC Director and RMCC Coordinator, will discuss with evaluators agency capabilities/procedures to alert and mobilize staffs.

1.2 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, Criterion 1.c.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a.b.)

  • The Direction and Control Officer (DACO) at the SEOC will assume primary responsibility for direction and control working in concert with the FCC, JIC, and Risk County EOC Directors. The State will discuss the SEOC (Dose) Assessment Supervisor, RMCC-RMC Coordinator and FCC Directors role at the FEMA (REP)/State briefing.

1.3 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 52

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(Sub element 1.d, Communications, Criterion 1.d.1: NUREG-0654, F. 2.)

  • SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC and Field Teams
  • The SEOC, FCC/RMCC and Field Teams will demonstrate primary and alternate communications systems. The communications network between the DRH field teams and RMCC and the RMCC and SEOC/CECC will be evaluated at the RMCC 1.4 Equipment, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

(Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1:

NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

  • SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC and Field Teams
  • The SEOC (Dose), FCC, RMCC and Field Teams will be set up in accordance with established plans and procedures. KI will be simulated.

Activity 2: Hazard Assessment Risk Evaluation

Description:

Assess the hazards present, evaluate the level of risk to both responders and the public, and develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP) to address the response problem.

2.1 OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.

(Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1:

NUREG-0654, K.4.)

  • SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
  • Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC and FCC/RMCC.

2.2 Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information including: plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions.

(Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 53

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.1: NUREG-0654, I.8., 10, and Supplement 3.)

  • SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
  • Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC, RMCC, CECC and Division of Radiological Health (DRH) personnel at the SEOC. This will be done in concert with TVA in the CECC, will perform dose assessment and independently validate dose projections. Radiological data for the field teams will be inserted by Controller injects and sent to the SEOC via the RMCC.

Projections will be based on plant data provided by TVA and field radiation measurements.

2.3 A decision-making process involved consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).

(Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, Criterion 2.b.2: NUREG, J.9, 10.M.)

  • SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
  • Demonstration will be accomplished by staff in the SEOC. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health, after consultation with DRH, will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers, institutionalized persons, and the general public. When a decision is made, instructions will be coordinated with the local EOCs.

2.4 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

(Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).

  • Field Teams
  • Determination of Emergency Worker (EW) exposure control will be done by interview with the evaluators (as pertains to direction and control.)

2.5 KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not general public) is maintained.

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 54

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, Criterion 3.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.7., J., 10.e.f.).

  • Field Teams
  • Demonstration by staff in the SEOC will be based on projected exposure. The Chief Medical Officer for the Tennessee Department of Health is located at the SEOC. After consultation with DRH, the Chief Medical Officer will make all decisions concerning the administration of KI to emergency workers. The Chief Medical Officer and other staff in the SEOC/Local EOCs will be available for procedural discussions with evaluators.

2.6 The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates.

(Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.1: NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)

  • Field Teams
  • Five (5) Field Teams, four (4) to be evaluated and one (1) in training, will utilize appropriate instrumentation and guidelines as established in DRH Standard Operating Procedures.

2.7 Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

(Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.2: NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

  • SEOC (Dose), FCC/RMCC
  • Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. All field teams will be under the direction of the RMCC.

2.8 Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

(Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.3: NUREG-0654, I.9)

  • Field Teams Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 55

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise

  • Four (4) field-monitoring teams will be evaluated. Each field team will obtain at least one air sample with a minimum sample volume of 10 cubic feet. The particulate filter and absorber media cartridge will be bagged, labeled and transported to a collection point for simulated transport to a laboratory. Field monitoring data will be injected by controllers supporting the exercise, and be transmitted by the teams to the RMCC over the normal communications network (portable hand-held/vehicle mounted radios). Cellular telephones will be utilized for back-up communications.
  • The 45th CST will be in training (observer status). The number of teams TBD.

Appendix E: Extent of Play Agreements 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 56

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Appendix F: Acronyms Acronym Meaning

µC/gm Micro Curies per Gram AAC After Action Conference AAR After Action Report ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES Amateur Radio for Emergency Services CECC Central Emergency Coordination Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations DACO Direction and Control Officer DEI Dose Equivalent Iodine DHS Department of Homeland Security DOF Tennessee Division of Forestry DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DRH Department of Radiological Health EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EEG Exercise Evaluation Guide EM Emergency Management EMD Emergency Management Director EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERC Emergency Response Coordinator ESF Emergency Support Function EST Eastern Standard Time EWD Emergency Worker and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination EXPLAN Exercise Plan FCC Field Coordination Center FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FMT Field Monitoring Team FNF Fixed Nuclear Facility FOUO For Official Use Only Appendix F: Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 57

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Acronym Meaning GE General Emergency GIS Geographic Information System HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HCHD Hamilton County Health Department HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program ICS Incident Command System IOF Initial Operating Facility IP Improvement Plan IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone JIC Joint Information Center JIS Joint Information System KI Potassium Iodide LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LP-1 Local Primary -1 MAC Multi-Agency Coordination MACC Multi-Agency Coordination Center MCC Mission Control Center MJRERP Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan MOU Memorandum of Understanding mR milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hour NAWAS National Warning System NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIMS National Incident Management System NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOUE Notification of Unusual Event NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria 0654 for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 OOS Out-of-Sequence ORO Offsite Response Organization Appendix F: Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 58

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Acronym Meaning PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PNS Prompt Notification System PPE Personal Protective Equipment PRD Permanent Record Dosimetry R Roentgen R/h Roentgen(s) per hour RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RCP Reactor Coolant Pump REM Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RMC Radiological Monitoring Coordinator RMCC Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center RO Radiological Officer SAE Site Area Emergency SEID State Emergency Information Director SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIP Shelter-in-Place S-JICD State JIC Director SOG Standard Operating Guide SOP Standard Operating Procedure WBN Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant SRD Self-Reading Dosimeter TCL Target Capabilities List TCP Traffic Control Point TDEC Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter TVA Tennessee Valley Authority TVA-JICD TVA JIC Director UTL Universal Task List Appendix F: Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 59

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise Acronym Meaning VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters VSRS Volunteer State Rescue Service Appendix F: Acronyms 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 60

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2011 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant REP Exercise This Page Intentionally Left Blank 2011 WBN Plant REP Exercise 61

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