Regulatory Guide 5.63

(Task SG 126-4) Physical Protection for Transient Shipments

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Issue date:	07/31/1982
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

July 1982 REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.63 (Task SG 1264)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR TRANSIENT SHIPMENTS

B. DISCUSSION

Section 70.20b of 10 CFR Part 70, "Domestic Licensing

1. BACKGROUND

of Special Nuclear Material," provides for general licensing of any person to possess transient shipments of formula General licensees under § 70.20b of 10 CFR Part 70 are quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).*

required to provide physical protection for transient A transient shipment is a shipment of nuclear material shipments of formula quantities of SSNM in accordance originating and terminating in foreign countries on a vessel with or equivalent to the physical protection requirements or aircraft that stops at a United States port. Persons carrying transient shipments are required under the general for similar types and quantities of material in domestic shipments. These requirements are stated in 10 CFR

license to provide physical protection, including the use of armed guards, for transient shipments while the shipment Part 73 in terms of general performance objective and requirements [paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b)] and perform remains in a U.S. port. The physical protection system ance capabilities [§ 73.25].

provided must be in accordance with or equivalent to that required for U.S. domestic shipments of formula quantities The general performance objective and requirements of SSNM under the applicable provisions of paragraphs indicate the level of protection to be provided by the

73.20(a) and (b) and § 73.25 of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical licensee's physical protection system relative to the design Protection of Plants and Materials."

basis threat (defined in § 73.1). The performance capabil ities define in a systematic way the capabilities the physical protection system must have in order to meet the general A general licensee for a transient shipment (e.g., a performance requirements. In addition, § 73.26 describes carrier) is not required to submit applications or security a "reference system" containing brief descriptions of plans for prior approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Com systems, subsystems, and procedures the NRC believes mission (NRC) as are licensees for domestic shipments of would generally be part of a physical protection system formula quantities of SSNM. However, the licensee is required to prepare such plans and to implement them that achieves the objective and meets the requirements of

§ § 73.20 and 73.25 for domestic shipments. However, the during stops at U.S. ports.

reference system does not necessarily describe a complete system that would meet all the physical protection require ments for U.S. domestic or transient shipments. Additional This guide describes measures acceptable to the NRC

or alternative measures may be needed depending on the staff that can be taken by the licensee to provide the particular circumstances under which protection is to be physical protection for scheduled and unscheduled tran provided.

sient shipments required by 10 CFR Part 70.

The level of protection to be provided would be equiva

• "Formule quantity" means strategic special nuclear material In lent to that afforded formula quantities of SSNMin domestic nuant5y of 5,000 grams ormore computed by the formula

=r.n*rm.contained Inrans shipments but may differ in detail depending on the circum U-.235) + 2.5(grams U-233 + inams pluto urm).

"Strategic special nuce4a material" means uranium-235 (contained stances peculiar to a given transient shipment. That is, the In uranium enriched to 20 percent or more In the U-23S Isotope), physical protection afforded a transient shipment would uranium-233., or plutonium.

have to satisfy the general performance objective and USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES

Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, Regulatory Guides are Issued to descilbe and make available to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Public methods acceptable to the NRC staff of implementing Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Washington, D.C. 20555, specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions:

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hem Is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set Products

2. Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation ut In the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities

6. Occupational Health

+/indings requisite to the Issuance oy continuance of a permit or 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review license by the Commission. 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General This guide was Issued after consideration of comments received from Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government the public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe guides are encouraged at all tImes, and guides will be revised, cific divisions Is available through the Government Printing Office.

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requirements of paragraphs 73.20(a) and (b) and the The regulatory position of this guide describes the performance capability requirements of § 73.25 but may measures that may be employed in meeting the physical be less complex because (1) the stopover times for transient protection requirements for transient shipments. Sections shipments are short, (2) there is no need to offload the I through 7 apply equally to scheduled and unscheduled shipment from the transport, and (3) the number of persons, transient shipments. Section 8 discusses the special con if any, required to have access to the shipment is limited. siderations applicable. to the physical protection require- K

ments for unscheduled transient shipments and notes

2. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR MEETING exceptions and alternative procedures for meeting such REQUIREMENTS requirements. Sections 1 through 7 provide an outline acceptable to the NRC staff for use by the licensee in General licensees for transient shipments of formula developing the required physical protection plan, although quantities of strategic special nuclear material may meet the no specific format is required for such plans.

physical protection requirements for such shipments in one of two ways: The bracketed references following each heading in the regulatory position denote the portions of the regulation

1. The licensee may contract for physical protection applicable to the physical protection measures discussed under that heading.

services from a person (or organization) already authorized by the NRC to protect formula quantities of SSNM in transit, or 4. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF

PLANS AND NOTICES

2. The licensee may undertake to directly provide the required physical protection in accordance with the provi The NRC has determined that the details of physical sions of the general performance requirements and per protection plans and programs submitted to the Commis formance capabilities of § § 73.20 and 73.25. sion should be withheld from public disclosure by the NRC

pursuant to Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of

3. PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN 1954, as amended. In addition, certain elements of such plans and programs and of the notices given the NRC in A physical protection plan in written form is required to accordance with paragraph 70.20b(d) of 10 CFR Part 70

be followed in providing physical protection for the tran may be considered classified as Confidential National sient shipment. Although this plan does not have to be Security Information (CNSI) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 95 approved by the NRC in advance of the shipment, it must (published in the Federal Register on March 5, 1980,

be provided along with the written notification to the NRC at 45 FR 14483). Any physical protection plans or pro staff required by paragraph 70.20b(d) before the shipment grams prepared and maintained by carriers operating in the*

first arrives in a U.S. port. United States or their agents toisatisfy the physical protec-'%..

tion requirements of the NRC for transient shipments and In the case of unscheduled transient shipments, i.e., the notifications given by such persons to the NRC in those resulting from exigent circumstances or route or accordance with paragraph 70.20b(d) are considered schedule changes that require stops at U.S. ports not on the classified and should be appropriately marked and handled transport's itinerary at the time the SSNM was loaded accordingly (see § 95.39). However, similar types of aboard, the licensee may not have the same opportunity for information generated by persons outside the United States advance planning as in the case of scheduled shipments, are not considered to be national security information if However, the licensee is required to notify the NRC and such information is not under the control of the United begin making physical protection arrangements immediately States Government. It is expected that the persons who after the decision is made to stop at the U.S. port. Although generate such information will in their self-interest protect at the time SSNM is loaded aboard an aircraft or vessel it from unauthorized access and public disclosure to the carriers may not intend to stop at a U.S. port, the knowl extent practicable. Detailed guidance regarding the elements edge (1) that they are carrying SSNM in formula quantity of plans that are considered classified can be found in and (2) that their itinerary brings them through or near Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 95. Part 95 contains informa U.S. territory (i.e., territorial waters or air space) should tion on the proper handling and transmittal of classified prompt them to do the necessary preplanning and make information.

appropriate prearrangements to meet the NRC's physical protection requirements should a stop at a U.S. port The following elements of the information required to become necessary. be provided the NRC in the notification of a transient shipment are considered classified as CNSI:

When NRC officials are notified of or discover an impending transient shipment of a formula quantity, they 1. Location of scheduled stops in U.S. territory.

will make preparations to inspect the carrier's physical protection system for the shipment while it is in port to 2. Arrival and departure times for scheduled stops.

ensure its adequacy or to take emergency measures if the required level of protection is not provided. The authority 3. Details as to the type and quantity of special nuclear to make such inspections is provided for in 10 CFR Part 70. material contained in the shipment.

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4. The numbers of guards who will protect the shipment. 1.2 Contingency Plans [Paragraphs 73.25(dXlXil)

and (111)]

5. Contingency plans for the response of security forces.

Safeguards contingency plans for transient shipments are not required to be submitted for approval in advance of Most of this information is considered declassified when shipments as they are for domestic shipments of formula

> it becomes operational. More details on the conditions quantities of SSNM. Contingency plans for transient ship under which this information may be declassified may be ments should be an integral part of the physical protection found in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 95. plan provided by the licensee. A typical transient shipment is likely to remain in port for a limited time, from several hours to several days, considerably reducing the complexity Arrangements can be made on a case-by-case basis to of the contingency plans needed to satisfy the requirements coordinate the protection of safeguards-sensitive informa of the regulation (compared with plans required for domestic tion regarding a transient shipment by contacting the road or multimode shipments that could involve several Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety different local law enforcement jurisdictions and changing and Safeguards, at the NRC headquarters in Washington, environments as the shipments move from one location to D.C. This contact can be made through the appropriate another along the planned routes). Contingency plans for NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73. domestic shipments are c&scussed in detail in Regulatory Guide 5.56, "Standard Format and Content of Safeguards

C. REGULATORY POSITION

Contingency Plans for Transportation."

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Contingency plans for include the following basictransient shipments are expected to features and items ofinformation:

1.1 Purpose and Scope The licensee physical protection plan is required to 1. Scope - A determination and identification of the ensure that the licensee has done sufficient planning to types of safeguards-related incidents covered and not physically protect transient shipments of formula quantities covered in the contingency plan. (For example, the plan of strategic special nuclear material according to the require may be designed to respond to armed attacks by small ments of the applicable regulations (i.e., § 70.20b, para groups but not to armed insurrections.)

graphs 73.20(a) and (b), and § 73.25 of 10 CFR Parts 70

and 73). The plan should be available to the licensee's personnel for reference purposes when implementation 2. Trigger Events - Those events that will be used to

> becomes necessary. signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contin gency according to how they are perceived initially by licensee personnel (e.g., discovery of a damaged SSNM

A transient shipment is defined in paragraph 70.4(v) as a container or broken seal, receipt of a written or telephoned shipment of nuclear material originating and terminating in threat against the shipment, discovery of attempted sabo foreign countries, on a vessel or aircraft which stops at a tage of the shipment).

U.S. port. The term "U.S. port" is intended to include all ports of entry that carriers would normally use in making such shipments but in unusual circumstances would also 3. Responses and Objectives - The actions that will be include the first landfall in U.S. jurisdiction, U.S. territories taken by licensee personnel in response to each of the included, regardless of the transport mode or location. It is trigger events and the objectives to be accomplished by the carrier's responsibility to determine whether the amounts each of the proposed actions. The persons within licensee of SSNM being carried constitute a formula quantity, and if management or the licensee security organization who will so, to provide the physical protection required by para perform the response actions should also be specified.

graph 70.20b(c) and the notification to NRC required by paragraph 70.20b(d).

4. Law Enforcement Assistance - A listing of the avail able local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) for the U.S.

The general license issued pursuant to. § 70.20b for ports at which the shipment will stop, and the methods transient shipments of formula quantities of SSNM is arranged to communicate with them in the event their effective from the time the shipment enters a U.S. port assistance is needed.

until the time the shipment exits that port. The planning and notification requirements obviously must be accom plished prior to the time the physical protection require

5. Other Considerations - Such items as constraints ments of the general license become effective. Specific imposed upon security organization members (i.e., guards)

considerations related to meeting the physical protection by local and State laws, company policies and practices, requirements for unscheduled transient shipments of and other factors, especially those relating to the use of formula quantities of SSNM are presented in Section 8. deadly force.

5.63-3

firearms off the plane or vessel without such permits.

1.3 Security Organization Training, Equipment, and Inclusion of foreign nationals under a common command Qualification [Paragraphs 73.25(dXIXi), (iv), and (v)] with other guards of local origin may hinder effective command and control of the guard force unless appropriate Normally, seven armed personnel should be provided to measures are taken to properly integrate the foreign nationals protect a transient shipment stopped at a U.S. airport, into the guard force.

while at least two armed individuals should be provided to K

protect a transient shipment .on a vessel (not offloaded). 3 Whether foreign nationals are utilized or not, the licensee

)

This i consistent with the provisions d paragraphs 73.26()( should be prepared to demonstrate that persons employed and (IX4). to protect the shipment meet training and qualification B

requirements equivalent to the portions of Appendix Personnel selected to be members of the licensee's to their assigned duties and that to 10 CFR Part 73 relevant security organization entrusted with the physical protection they can function effectively together to satisfy the general of of a transient shipment are required to be appropriately performance requirements and performance capabilities trained and qualified to perform all the tasks to which they § § 73.20 and 73.25. Although there is no requirement from are assigned. This includes being qualified and appropriately under the general license to obtain advance approval licensed by the local jurisdiction to use the weapons assigned the NRC regarding the adequacy of the training and qualifi ensure them and being sufficiently flbent in English to cations of guard force members, the licensee should be with the LLEA for pur such adequacy through appro rapid and clear communications prepared to demonstrate with poses of requesting assistance from and coordinating priate documentation upon request by the NRC inspector the LLEA response forces. Firearms, communications assigned to the shipment.

devices, and other equipment must be in good operating per Security Management [Paragraph 73.25(dXlXi)]

condition. To ensure that all security organization 1.4 and armed response personnel are properly trained sonnel and qualified, the licensee may arrange for the employment The plan should indicate the personnel (either by name of such personnel in one of three ways: or by position title) responsible for the physical protection is in of the transient shipment while the general license may be if applicable.

1. Use of LLEA personnel. Such personnel effect, including the chain of command, qualified with the weapons presumed to be properly the assigned to them while on official duty and to have 1.5 Testing and Maintenance Program skills necessary to perform guard duties. LLEA personnel [Paragraph 73.20(bX3)]

or may be used while functioning in their official capacity, they may be privately employed while off duty, depending Paragraph 73.20(bX3) requires testing and maintenance and the on local regulations governing such employment of the physical protection system's components and proce guard on willingness of the LLEA to provide temporary dures. This requirement covers all activities and devices services. physical protection system depends to which the licensee's shipment security. Its purpose is to ensure the maintain

2. Use of private guards provided by an organization continued availability of each component of the physical licensed or approved by the NRC to provide physical protection system. Since the physical protection system licensee).

protection of SSNM (such as for another NRC for transient shipments will normally be personnel oriented, will the testing and maintenance activity for such systems

3. Use of private guards who have been trained and consist mainly of ensuring that procedures are understand qualified by the licensee, its U.S. agent, or other organiza able and workable by the personnel involved in implement tion and have been determined by the licensee to be prepared ing them. The licensee should ensure that all equipment, good to perform the tasks assigned them according to the licensee's including communications devices and weapons, is in written physical protection plan. equipment and armed personnel are working order. If provided the carrier by another organization, the licensee Foreign nationals who accompany a transient shipment should obtain assurances from that organization that such be time into port as escorts for physical protection purposes may equipment is in proper operating condition at the to make up a portion of the guard force required are provided and the personnel provided are considered these services for protection of the shipment while in the U.S. port. trained and qualified. The licensee should also make this and However, several considerations apply particularly in certain from time to time that the arrangements made that such personnel are not unduly limited in provided for in the plan are current and case to ensure the procedures the extent to which they are able to contribute effectively practicable and applicable to the conditions antici remain ensured to the protection of the shipment. It should be pated in future transient shipments.

and lack of familiarity with local that language difficulties communications systems do not prevent their communicat 1.6 Security Records [Paragraph 73.70(g)]

ing rapidly and effectively with local law enforcement agencies or with other members of the guard force recruited The types of records that must be kept are identified in locally. Efforts should be made to secure weapons permits paragraph-73.70(g). They include the names and addresses in the in in advance allowing them to legally carry weapons of persons authorized access to the SSNM while it is located. In most local and inspections of jurisdiction in which the port is port, documentation of security tours may not legally carry their jurisdictions, these individuals

5.634

cne area containing the SSNM, and any other information 1.9 Notification [Paragraph 70.20b(d)]

obtained relating to the security of the shipment during the period of time the general license is in effect. Carriers of transient shipments planning to make sche duled stops at U.S. ports are required to notify the NRC of

1.7 Reports to NRC [§ 73.711 their plans to do so prior to the arrival of the shipment.

The notification should be sent by U.S. Mail to be received Section 73.71 requires that the NRC be made aware of by the NRC at least 7 calendar days before the first sched any security-related incidents that occur during the period uled stop in the United States. The notifications should of the general license. The plan may specify procedures for be addressed to the Director of the appropriate Nuclear reporting security incidents to the NRC when NRC inspec Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement tors are not present on the scene. When NRC inspec Regional Office listed in Appendix A to Part 73. This same tors are present, this requirement is satisfied by communi office must be notified by telephone 7 calendar days in cating such incidents directly to them. advance of the first scheduled stop at a U.S. port to inform the NRC that a shipping notice has been sent by mail

1.8 Redundancy and Diversity [Paragraphs 73.20(bX2) and whether any changes have been made in the shipment's and 73.25(dX4)] U.S. itinerary relative to the information contained in the mailed notification.

The physical protection system is required to be designed with redundant and diverse measures. Redundancy means The licensee should take steps to ensure the confi providing two or more measures that perform the same dentiality of the itinerary information and other informa function. This would prevent failure of the entire system tion contained in the written notification since such informa should there be a failure of one or more key system elements. tion could be used to assist in planning a theft or diversion Diversity means providing several types of measures that attempt. In the case of domestic licensees or others who contribute to the performance of a particular security generate such information under the jurisdiction of the function. If these measures have a common purpose but United States Government, the notification may come under different performance characteristics (e.g., sensitivities, the requirements of 10 CFR Part 95, which require that it failure modes, strengths, weaknesses), the system may be be handled according to specific procedures designed to able to continue functioning adequately despite particular protect it as Confidential National Security Information adverse operational conditions or an attempt to exploit a (CNSI).

particular component's performance characteristics.

The notification is required to include the following information:

> Since the physical protection system for a transient shipment is generally expected to be less hardware oriented 1. Location of all scheduled stops in U.S. territory.

than that for a U.S. domestic shipment, the means of ensuring redundancy in the system will be less involved. 2. Arrival and departure times for all scheduled stops in Licensees may focus their efforts at ensuring redundancy U.S. territory.

and diversity in the system by primarily addressing the communications functions and firearms capabilities. This 3. A description of the transport vehicle (ship or air may be done in several different ways. craft) used for the transient shipment. This would include additional transport vehicles to be used if transshipment (transfer of the SSNM to another transport vehicle) is Alternative communications capabilities should be contemplated. The description should be given in sufficient provided so that more than one person can contact the detail to allow the NRC to unambiguously identify the LLEA to request assistance, and the communications transport vehicle for purposes of inspection when the equipment should be of different types in case one type shipment arrives in port.

becomes inoperable as a result of equipment failure, adverse broadcast conditions or jamming, or injury to one of the 4. A description of the nuclear materials in the ship guards. Also, the means provided for alternative communi ment (elements, isotopes, enrichments, etc..).

cations should be physically separated so that it would be unlikely that an adversary force would be able to destroy 5. The number and types of containers of SSNM.

both capabilities for contacting the LLEA in a single attack.

A single guard who is isolated from other guards should be 6. The name and telephone number of the carrier's equipped with a personal duress alarm that annunciates at a representative in the U.S. at each location in U.S. territory location occupied by other guards. at which a scheduled stop will be made. If the carrier does not have a regular U.S. representative at a given U.S. port Guards should have shotguns and rifles available for use, facility, he may name such a representative after making as well as individual handguns, to ensure that they will be temporary arrangements with the representative for another able to respond effectively to adversaries attacking from carrier, or he may indicate that no U.S. representative has

.either short or long range. been designated.

5.63-5

7. A physical protection plan for implementing the and personnel (e.g., parking an aircraft at an isolatet requirements of paragraph 70.20b(c). The plan is required location on the airfield away from the passenger and freight to include the use of armed personnel to protect the terminals), and taking steps to facilitate the timely perform shipment during stops made at U.S. ports. This plan may be provided in one of two ways:

ance of any functions (e.g., repairs) that necessitated the stopover (to minimize the time spent in port).

K

a. The plan may be included in full with other An important part of the planning process is the arrange information required to be included in the 7-day notifica ment made with the LLEA. Policies of these agencies differ tion, or with regard to the degree of involvement to which they are willing to commit themselves in the event of a transient ship b. The carrier may refer the NRC to a physical secu ment. The extent of potential LLEA involvement should be rity plan already submitted to the NRC by another licensee determined in advance, and the physical protection system or by the same licensee for a previous shipment. The licensee designed to ensure that an adequate level of protection is may intend to implement this plan directly or arrange for provided. Where standing arrangements are in effect, previous another organization to use the plan to protect the transient arrangements with the LLEA should be reconfirmed just shipment. When a previously submitted plan is to be used, prior to a planned shipment's arrival to take account of any the carrier should ensure that the plan is specific to each intervening changes in circumstances at a given port facility.

U.S. port at which a stop is to be made or should submit additional information to indicate how the plan is to be As part of the preplanning for transient shipments, a dia adapted to any other port at which a stop is to be made. gram of the important features of particular port facilities may be provided in the physical protection plan to facilitate If U.S. Mail service is not directly available to the implementation of the plan by the carrier's personnel or licensee, the licensee should use other means to ensure that others.

the written notification will be received by the NRC at least

7 days prior to the first scheduled stop of the transient 3. DETECTION AND DELAY OF UNAUTHORIZED

shipment within the United State

S. INTRODUCTION

BY

STEALTH OR FORCE*

The licensee is also required to place a followup call to the same NRC regional office to confirm that the required 3.1 Establishment of Controlled Access Areas**

notification information has been received in accordance [Paragraph 73.25(bX2)]

with the 7-day notification requirement.

Paragraph 73.25(b)(2) requires that controlled access

2. SHIPMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL areas be established surrounding the SSNM or its transport to isolate the SSNM and decrease the number of persons,

2.1 Preplanning of Shipment Itineraries materials, equipment, and vehicles allowed to come in

[Paragraph 73.25(b)(IXi)] contact with the transport or the SSNM.

It is recognized that, in the case of transient shipments, Controlled access areas must have some means of demar physical security objectives may not be the determining cating the restricted area's boundaries that is clear to factor in the planning of the itinerary of the transport carry both authorized and unauthorized personnel.

ing the shipment. Also, the time may often be too short for carriers to make changes to accommodate such objec There must be some way of controlling access to the tives and still meet their contractual commitments to other area at all times to ensure that unauthorized persons are not shippers. However, sufficient planning could be done in admitted. Aircraft and seagoing vessels that enter U.S. port advance to ensure that all NRC physical protection require facilities need not be protected while they are in motion if ments can be met when a transient shipment is planned. it is determined that the SSNM on board is not accessible to unauthorized personnel during such motion. Thus, in most Carrier's agents at U.S. ports should be informed of the instances, armed response personnel will be required to NRC requirements so that they can make the necessary protect the SSNM only from the moment the transport advance generic arrangements for the LLEA and private comes to rest within the port until it starts on its way out guard organizations to be available as needed. These of the port (see Section 8 regarding unscheduled transient arrangements and the plan for physical protection could be shipments). This greatly simplifies the physical protec used by more than one carrier in case an agent represents tion system for transient shipments that use U.S. ports in numerous carriers.

"*"Stealth" means methods used to attempt to gain unauthorized Physical protection plans should be made as uncompli access, introduce unauthorized materials, or remove SSNM where the fact of such attempt Is concealed or an attempt is made to cated as possible to accommodate the necessity for using conceal it. "Force" means violent methods usedby an adversary to guard personnel who may have little familiarity with special attempt to steal SSNM or sabotage a nuclear facility, or violent methods used by response personnel to protect against such procedures for protecting SSNM. This can be done by pro adversary actions.

hibiting offloading of the SSNM from the transport unless **"Controlled access area" means any temporarily or permanently absolutely necessary, arranging to isolate the transport or established clearly demarcated area access to which is controlled and that affords Isolation of the material, equipment, or persons within shipment as much as possible from other transports, vehicles, it.

5.63-6

having to focus attention on two different areas at the same comparison with the protection for domestic shipments time).

(i.e., those that originate or terminate within United States territory). The physical protection plan should recognize, Physical protection requirements for shipments of however, that the cargo compartment containing the SSNM,

formula quantities of SSNM other than transient shipments or the SSNM itself, should be placed under immediate sur include requirements for the emplacement and periodic veillance as soon as the transport comes to rest in port to inspection of tamper-indicating devices on transports and ensure that the SSNM remains inaccessible to unauthor cargo containers. For transient shipments, carriers are not ized personnel. Airport ground crews, warehousemen, responsible for the emplacement of seals or other devices dockworkers, and other personnel should not be permitted but are responsible for ensuring that the seals or other to approach the transport or its cargo compartment unless tamper4ndicating devices put in place by the shipper con surveillance is provided in accordance with § 73.25.

tinue to function during the period the general license is in effect. Seals are not specifically required by the NRC in The plan should describe the approximate dimensions of the case of transient shipments but they may be employed the controlled access area that would be established relative by the shipper in accordance with requirements of the to the transport of SSNM and the means that would be International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for shipments used for its demarcation.

subject to IAEA safeguards. Paragraph 73.70(g) requires appropriate records to be kept of seal inspections during It should also indicate how attempts to penetrate the the time the transient shipment is in port.

controlled access area without authorization will be detected, assessed, and communicated to ensure a response capable of

4. DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OR

preventing unauthorized removal of the SSNM. Procedures MATERIALS INTRODUCTON BY DECEIT*

for accomplishing these tasks should be related to the response functions and communications capabilities de

4.1 Access Authorizations [Paragraphs 73.25(b)(3Xi)

scribed elsewhere in the plan. The plan should also detail and (c)(IXi)]

the procedures that will be used to establish a controlled access area. Specific suggestions regarding measures to Access authorizations are required to determine the time establish a controlled access area may be found in the and conditions of access for persons who are authorized to reference system for U.S. domestic shipments [Para be admitted to a controlled access area or for introduction graphs 73.26(fX2), (i)(7), (jX3), (kXl), and (1X3)].

of materials, vehicles, or equipment into such area

s. Access

3.2 Transport Features To Delay Access authorizations are also required for entry into the transport.

> [Paragraph 73.25(cX2Xi)] In the case of a transient shipment, there are expected to be few authorizations necessary. The number of individuals authorized access to the SSNM should be miminized.

The requirement for a transport to have features that By limiting the number of authorized persons, the author delay access to the SSNM will usually be satisfied, for ization subsystem may be kept relatively unsophisticated transient shipments, by such physical barriers as locked yet effective.

cargo compartments. To the extent that the transport lacks delay.causing features (for example, during periods when Access authorizations would normally be provided in the cargo compartment is opened for loading or unloading other cargo), the physical protection system must provide written form, naming the individual to be granted access or the item to be introduced. It would also detail the criteria compensating features (for example, stationing guards at the entrance) to ensure that the general performance for entry (e.g., time, place, circumstances) and specify the requirements of § 73.20 are satisfied. reasons for which access is granted (e.g., to perform service on the transport, to load or unload other cargo). Written

3.3 Access Detection for Transports authorizations may be obviated by implementing an escort

[Paragraphs 73.25(cX2)(ii) and (iii)] procedure. Under this procedure, all persons requiring temporary access would be escorted by an armed guard The requirement for a capability to detect attempted during such access to ensure that only authorized activities are being performed. Section 73.70 requires that written penetrations of the transport containing the SSNM was records be kept to document each occasion on which intended to provide SSNM shipments with defense in depth temporary access is permitted.

an added level of protection beyond that provided for by the controlled access area-which becomes especially important when many personnel must be allowed access The physical protection plan may detail the procedures to be used by guards to determine which persons or mate into the controlled access area for servicing vehicles, hand rials are authorized access to (1) a controlled access area or ling other cargo, etc. In the case of a transient shipment,

(2) the transport or the SSNM.

there would generally be very few persons authorized to have access to the SSNM or the cargo compartment in which it is contained. The same guards who administer the controlled access area procedures could be used to keep the

"Deceit" means methods used to attempt to gain unauthorized SSNM or the transport under surveillance to detect unauthor access introduce unauthorized materials, or remove SSNM, where ized attempts to gain access provided these two require the aitempt involves falsification to present the appearance of authorized access.

ments did not impose conflicting duties on a guard (e.g.,

5.63-7

4.2 Access Control at Entry Control Points is removed to a more vulnerable situation outside the

[Paragraphs 73.25(bX3Xii) and (eXIXii)] transport. Additional guidance regarding acceptable procedures for removal of SSNM from the transport may be Access control procedures are required to be imple obtained from Regulatory Guide 5.57, "Shipping and mented to ensure that only authorized individuals are Receiving Control of Special Nuclear Material."

admitted to controlled access areas or given access to the transport or the SSNM. These procedures involve three 5.2 SSNM Removal Controls [Paragraphs 73.25(cX3Xii)

distinct subfunctions: (1) identification, (2) verification of and (iii)]

identification, and (3) assessment against authorizations.

Where few persons or materials are expected to be allowed Removal controls are procedures followed in removing access, as in the case of most transient shipments, these SSNM from the transport in which it has been contained.

subfunctions can be performed quite simply without resort They are required both for routine (planned) and emer to some of the more sophisticated access control hardware gency situations and may include such activities as verifica and procedures used at fixed-site facilities or for domestic tion of the identities of persons performing the removal road shipments. operation and persons to whom custody of the SSNM is to be transferred. The identity of the SSNM being removed The main problem arising in providing physical protec and integrity of the containers and any seals are also items tion for a transient shipment will be to allow positive -to be verified. These procedures act as a filtering process to identification of the LLEA or other guard personnel who ensure that the proper conditions exist and appropriate are actively involved in the implementation of the carrier's personnel have been positively identified prior to the physical protection plan. The carrier's agent may also have removal. Response measures to ensure that deceitful to be positively identified. The plan should detail the attempts at unauthorized removal of SSNM will be detected means that will be used to identify these persons before the and communicated to responsible persons are intertwined carrier permits them access to the transport or the SSNM.

with removal controls and may be described in the main The carrier should be capable of immediately communicat body of the plan or referred to a more detailed description ing to the LLEA information concerning persons present in the contingency plan.

ing themselves as contract guards, LLEA personnel, or other members of the security organization who are dis 6. DETECTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF

covered to be impostors. SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS BY STEALTH OR FORCE

Once the composition of the security organization is

6.1 Transport Features to Delay Removal confirmed, these persons will assume the responsibility for

[Paragraph 73.25(cX4Xi)]

further implementation of the physical protection system according to the licensee's physical protection plan.

Transport features to delay unauthorized removal of SSNM from the transport by stealth or force should be The means used to positively identify the members of considered an integral part of the physical protection the security organization who are to meet the shipment at system. When such features are designed into the transport, the time it arrives in a U.S. port must be designed to limit the physical protection system may take credit for the the opportunity for successful use of false credentials or amount of delay provided by them. To the extent that the other deceitful actions. This would apply equally to other.

transport has features that provide for only a slight delay persons who may be authorized access to controlled access capability, other components of the physical protection areas or to the SSNM. system must be strengthened to compensate for the lack of sufficient delay afforded by the transport. The balancing S. PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF

of these delay and other factors (e.g., response time, size of SSNM FROM TRANSPORTS BY DECEIT guard force) is a matter of judgment by the licensee and ultimately the NRC inspection staf

f. The general guidance

5.1 Authorization for Removal of SSNM from Transports is that these factors must be balanced in such a way that

[Paragraph 73.25(cX3)i)] general performance requirements of § 73.20 can be satisfied.

Authorizations for removal of SSNM from a transport would follow the same pattern established for access Some transport features that delay access may also delay authorizations. For transient shipments, removal of SSNM

removal. Features that were not previously discussed as while in U.S. ports will normally not be necessary. However, delaying access should be included in this part of the plan if unscheduled removal of the SSNM from the transport along with descriptions of those aspects of previously becomes necessary as a result of some unusual circum described features that help to delay removal as well. These stance, removal authorizations would be determined on a features may include arrangements for securing the SSNM in contingent basis. The removal would be carried out under the transport vehicle (e.g., securing heavy equipment neces the direction of the carrier (or the person designated to sary for removal of the SSNM, binding together the indi assume responsibility for shipment) according to procedures vidual packages of SSNM so as to make a one-step removal detailed in the contingency plan. Removal procedures cumbersome, and binding the SSNM containers to the struc should be designed to ensure that no imminent or apparent threat exists to the safety of the shipment before the SSNM

ture of the transport). These features may or may not be K,.

present on board the transport vehicle for a transient

5.63-8

shipment. In some cases, these features may be present for 7.2 Communications Between Guard Force Commander safety or other purposes rather than for physical protection and Security Control Center purposes. To the extent that the physical protection [Paragraph 73.2S(dX2Xii)]

system depends on such features to delay unauthorized removal, the licensee should describe which of these features In the case of transient shipments, the requirement are utilized on board the particular transport vehicle used expressed in paragraph 73.25(dX2Xii) translates to the for the subject transient shipment. If such features are not following: a continuous communications capability should actually employed, the licensee should take action to be maintained between the guard force assigned to protect employ them or take compensatory action to ensure the transient shipment and a remotely located security satisfaction of the general performance requirements. control center manned by personnel employed by the licensee to monitor the status of the shipment while it is in port. This security control center could be located in the

6.2 Detection of SSNM Removal Attempts offices of the carrier's U.S. agent orat some other temporary

[Paragraph 73.25(cX4Xii)] location in the area of the port. The security control center should maintain knowledge of the status of the shipment at Detection of SSNM removal attempts for transient all times during the period the general license is in effect.

shipments could be performed in most cases by the same This could be accomplished through an intermediary such personnel assigned to detect unauthorized access to the as an airport control tower or the harbor master's office controlled access area, the transport, or the SSNM. The during times the transport is in motion within the port.

licensee should be careful to ensure that these duties, when assigned to particular guard personnel, are not in conflict Communications between the guard force commander with other duties assigned them. and the security control center need not be continuous, but the capability for immediate two-way communications by either the security control center or the guard force should

7. TRANSMISSION OF DETECTION, ASSESSMENT, exist while the shipment is in port.

AND OTHER SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION

7.3 Liaison with and Notification of Local Law Enforce Various requirements for communications capabilities ment Authorities (LLEA) [Paragraphs 73.25(dX2Xili)

are described in the regulations relating to detection and and (dX3)]

assessment; requests for assistance from response forces or the LLEA are described earlier in this guide. The communi Both the armed guards for the transient shipment and cations capabilities described in this part of the plan would the security control center personnel are required to possess support the performance of these other physical protection the capability for direct communications with the LLEA to

.. ,functions.

notify them of the need for assistance if necessary. The need for such communications is underscored by the basic philosophy of the licensee physical protection system. The

7.1 Communications Among Guard Force Personnel guard force for the transient shipment need not be designed

[Paragraph 73.25(dX2)(i)] to defeat potential attackers in an aggressive mode, but only to protect the shipment and guard personnel from A continuous communications capability is required attack. Its primary objective should be to delay the adver between members of the transient shipment's guard force. sary from completing any act of theft of SSNM or sabotage This capability is needed for routine purposes as well as for until the LLEA forces arrive. The system should be designed implementation of emergency procedures detailed in the to interface closely with LLEA forces whose responsibility contingency plan. Communications could be conducted it is to enforce local and State laws regarding thefts and using citizens band hand-held transceivers or other similar other criminal acts. The capability of the guard force to equipment where face-to-face unassisted voice communica call LLEA forces into action when such assistance is needed tions are not practical. On board docked oceangoing is of great significance to the success of the physical protec vessels, the ship's hardwire communications system may be tion system and deserves to be protected with- an appro used, especially where metal shielding would not allow the priate level of redundancy and diversity. Liaisons with use of transceivers. The communications function is an LLEA personnel should be consummated in advance extremely important one with regard to the overall effec of the shipment or as soon as possible following arrival in tiveness of the physical protection system, so that its port.

redundancy and diversity needs to be addressed. Trans 8. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNSCHEDULED

ceivers capable of using more than one channel should be utilized to ensure that some form of communications with TRANSIENT SHIPMENTS

the LLEA is possible at all times in the event of a safe guards incident. Dividing the guard force into two or more 8.1 Purpose and Scope different groups to ensure their survivability in case of a single attack has been suggested as one procedure to ensure The purpose of the physical protection system for that the communications function will be performed. (See unscheduled transient shipments does not differ from that Section C.1.8 of this guide.) for scheduled transient shipments. However, the scope of

5.63-9

protection may differ owing to the unpredictability of the disaster that may appear to pose a threat to the safety of circumstances that would require the transport to make an the shipment (e.g., increased risk from mob actions).

unscheduled stop at a U.S. port facility. There are essen Another factor is the extent to which there is public tially two differences. knowledge of the transient shipment entering the port and how much advance knowledge could have been obtained by

1. The randomness of stops made at U.S. ports would potential adversaries. Generally, physical protection make them difficult for the adversary to predict so that, for measures should be implemented within two hours after a period of time following arrival in port, the shipment would arrival at the port. NRC inspectors or headquarters personnel have a degree of protection arising solely from the randonmess would make the final determination based on what is reason of the event. As the time in port grows longer, the ability able in the light of local conditions and other circumstances.

of the adversary to assemble or regroup his forces and trans port them to the port from another location increases also. In the event physical protection of an unscheduled This will affect the timing of implementation of the physical transient shipment becomes necessary, the licensee will be protection system for the transient shipment. required to arrange for protection by armed personnel.

These may be armed guards provided by a commercial guard

2. Since the unpredictable factors of weather, equip service or personnel provided by the LLEA. Whether LLEA

ment failures, or other unusual circumstances may result in personnel will be available will depend on the operating the shipment arriving at a U.S. port at which the carrier policies of the LLEA at the particular port. If the port has neither has made previous arrangements for physical pro its own security force of armed personnel, it is likely that their tection nor has a U.S. agent or representative, the physical services could be obtained, either temporarily until other protection system may have to'be implemented by the arrangements can be made, or for the duration of the stop.

carrier with little specific knowledge of the port. This will require a much greater dependence on the port's LLEA for 8.4 Physical Protection Plans cooperation in the early period following arrival in port. [Paragraphs 70.20b(dX7) and (e)(1)]

8.2 Notification Requirements [Paragraph 70.20b(eXl)] In the event a carrier finds it necessary to bring a tran sient shipment into a U.S. port with minimal preparation, For unscheduled transient shipments, it may be impos carriers are required to indicate immediately after the sible for the licensee to notify the NRC 7 calendar days decision to enter a U.S. port the means they will use to prior to the arrival of the transport in a U.S. port, as is ensure the physical protection of the shipment. Plans for required for scheduled transient shipments. However, the providing this physical protection may become available to carrier is required to notify the NRC of its intent to bring a NRC inspectors in a number of different ways:

transient shipment of a formula quantity of SSNM into a U.S. port by telephone, radio, or other means immediately upon the carrier's decision to enter a U.S. por

t. The notifi

1. Carriers may prepare and have on board their own plans in accordance with the regulations and the guidance K

cation should contain the same types of information included contained herein. Carriers transporting SSNM of formula in the 7-day notification required for scheduled transient ship quantities with itineraries bringing them within iange of ments [as described in paragraph 70.20b(d)] except that some U.S. ports might anticipate use of these ports for emer information regarding the name and address of the carrier's gency stops and plan ahead to meet such contingencies.

U.S.-based representative and the physical protection plan may be unavailable. The carrier may, in fact, not have a

2. Carriers may have on board, or on file with their U.S.-based representative or agent at the port in question agents at a U.S. port or ports, physical protection plans and may have little choice of which port to use, especially prepared by themselves or their U.S. agents that (a) may be if the stop is made beciuse of adverse weather conditions or adapted specifically to particular ports at which they may equipment failure. In such situations, the carrier may choose make emergency stops or (b) may be generically designed to name a member of the crew who would assume immediate to be adapted to any port as circumstances require. The responsibility for the transient shipment's physical protec latter alternative will leave the carrier with the necessity for tion and make other arrangements after landing. making final arrangements for physical protection as the need arises for any given port situation.

8.3 Implementation of Physical Protection Plans for Unscheduled Transient Shipments 3. Carriers who have done no advance planning for

[Paragraph 70.20b(eX2)] physical protection can still comply with the regulation by preparing ad hoc plans while approaching port, if time Physical protection plans may not need to be imple allows, or shortly after entering the port. They may pre mented immediately upon arrival of a transient shipment at pare their own plans in response to the guidance contained a U.S. port. However, the time that would be allowed to in this guide, or they may attempt to obtain the services of elapse before physical protection plans must be implemented a U.S. tiased agent who may be more familiar with the NRC

would depend on a number of factors such as the amount physical protection requirements for transient shipments.

of time during which the shipment is expected to remain in port, whether it will be necessary to transfer the SSNM to NRC inspectors may require the licensee to take certain another transport, or whether there has been any civil actions in order to protect the SSNM if they determine that unrest (e.g., protest demonstrations) or a recent natural the protection provided by the licensee is inadequate.

5.63-10

VALUE/IMPACT STATEMENT

A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared in the proposed amendments when the final rule was

> for this regulatory guide. The guide was developed to published.

provide guidance to persons subject to physical protection requirements for transient shipments contained in 10 CFR

The major conclusions of the value/impact analysis were Parts 70 and 73. These requirements were promulgated by that the required physical protection could be provided at amendments to NRC regulations published in the Federal reasonable cost and minimal impact to the parties concerned, Register on February 13, 1981 (46 FR 12193). A value/ that the costs of providing such protection are essentially impact analysis was prepared for the amendments originally independent of the technical and procedural alternatives proposed for the physical protection of transient shipments considered, and that the overall level of impacts, including on January 8, 1980 (45 FR 1625), a copy of which was those to the NRC, other government organizations, industry, placed in the Public Document Room at that time. This workers, and the public, and also the impact on inter analysis is also appropriate to the final amendments and to national relations, will be minimal because of the small this regulatory guide since only minor changes were made number of potential licensees.

5.63-11

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