NRC Generic Letter 1992-04: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 08/19/1992
| issue date = 08/19/1992
| title = NRC Generic Letter 1992-004 - Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F)
| title = NRC Generic Letter 1992-004 - Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F)
| author name = Partlow J G
| author name = Partlow J
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 11
| page count = 11
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555August 19, 1992TO: ALL BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) LICENSEES OFOPERATING REACTORSSUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RELATED TO REACTOR VESSELWATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IN BWRs PURSUANT TO10 CFR 50.54(F) (GENERIC LETTER NO. 92-04)
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
                    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                            WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 19, 1992 TO:       ALL BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) LICENSEES OF
          OPERATING REACTORS
SUBJECT:   RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RELATED TO REACTOR VESSEL
          WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IN BWRs PURSUANT TO
            10 CFR 50.54(F) (GENERIC LETTER NO. 92-04)


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing thisgeneric letter to request information regarding the adequacy ofand corrective actions for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) waterlevel instrumentation with respect to the effects ofnoncondensible gases on system operation.Background and Safety ConsiderationsAs discussed in NRC Information Notice No. 92-54 "LevelInstrumentation Inaccuracies Caused by Rapid Depressurization,"the staff is concerned that noncondensible gases may becomedissolved in the reference leg of BWR water level instrumentationand can lead to a false high level indication after a rapiddepressurization event. The dissolved gases which accumulateover time during normal operation can rapidly come out ofsolution during depressurization and displace water from thereference leg. A reduced reference leg level will result in afalse high level indication. This is important to safety becausewater level signals are used for actuating automatic safetysystems and for guidance to operators during and after an event.On July 29, 1992, the NRC staff held a public meeting with theRegulatory Response Group (RRG) of the Boiling Water ReactorOwners Group (BWROG) to discuss the effect of inaccuracies in thereactor vessel level instrumentation system in BWRs. During themeeting, theBWROG and its consultant, General Electric Company(GE), presented the results of analyses assessing the safetyimplications of the postulated error in level indication. Theanalyses consisted of two basic parts: (1) an assessment of themechanism and potential magnitude of errors in the levelinstruments and (2) a review of the relevant licensing basistransients and accidents to determine the effect of this error onplant response, including post-accident operator actions.The BWROG analyses indicated that significant errors in levelindication can occur as a result of degassing the instrumentreference leg if noncondensible gas is dissolved in the referenceleg and if the reactor abruptly depressurizes below 450 psig.(9208190057 Z4r pli-4 /- t Generic Letter 92-04 -2 -August 19, 1992The NRC staff reviewed the BWROG analyses and selected designbasis accident scenarios which lead to a lowering of the reactorvessel water level and has concluded that automatic safetysystems will be actuated at pressures well above 450 psig, evenfor postulated worst-case noncondensible gas concentrations inthe reference legs. Therefore, the NRC is confident that allemergency cooling systems will initiate as they were designed todo. In addition, the BWROG discussed diverse signals which wouldalso initiate ECCS for reactor water level lowering events. TheNRC staff reviewed the backup systems and concluded that the ECCSwould be initiated by diverse signals as analyzed by the BWROG.After ECCS actuation, reactor water level indication is used bythe operators for long term actions (i.e., maintaining adequatereactor water level and ensuring adequate core cooling).Operators would not utilize only reactor vessel level indicationsto determine accident mitigation actions but would also utilizeother indications such as containment pressure, temperature, andhumidity to determine accident mitigation strategies.Additionally, events characterized by gradual depressurizationwould lead to a reduced error in the indicated level. There aretwo or four reference leg columns in each plant, depending onplant design. The amount of noncondensible gases dissolved ineach depends primarily upon system leakage and geometry. Becauseof this, a common mode, common magnitude level indication erroris unlikely. Operators would therefore see a mismatch inindicated level alerting them to a level indication problem.Finally, emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs) state that whenreactor vessel water level is indeterminate, operators shouldflood the reactor vessel using at least one pump guided by theunaffected diverse instrumentation (i.e., high containmentpressure indication). Reactor operators are trained to deal withthese situations should they occur.Upon reviewing the information provided by the BWROG and thestaff's assessment, the staff concluded that interim plantoperation is acceptable. The bases for the staff's conclusionare as follows: 1) the level instrumentation is expected toinitiate safety systems prior to a significant depressurizationof the reactor; 2) emergency procedures which are currently inplace in conjunction with operator training are expected toresult in adequate operator actions; and 3) an abruptdepressurization event resulting in a common mode, commonmagnitude level indication error is unlikely.For longer term operation however, the staff considers potentialwater level instrumentation inaccuracies an important issuebecause level indication has safety and control functions in all Generic Letter 92-04-3 -August 19, 1992modes of BWR operation. Furthermore, since the analyses providedare of a generic nature and the magnitude of possible errorsdepends strongly upon plant-specific factors such as systemleakage and geometry, it is important that the analyses bereviewed promptly by all individual licensees.Basis for Compliance DeterminationThe level errors that could result from the effects ofnoncondensible gas may prevent the level instrumentation systemsin BWRs from satisfying the following regulations:(1) General Design Criterion (GDC) 13, "Instrumentation andcontrol," which requires that "Instrumentation shallbe provided to monitor variables and systems over theiranticipated ranges for normal operation, foranticipated operational occurrences, and for accidentconditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety."Existing instrumentation may not accurately monitorreactor vessel water level under accident conditions.(2) GDC 21, "Protection system reliability and testability,"which requires that "The protection system shall bedesigned for high functional reliability...commensuratewith the safety function to be performed." Theinstrumentation may not be reliable under rapiddepressurization conditions.(3) GDC 22, "Protection system independence," which requiresthat "The protection system shall be designed to assurethat the effects of natural phenomena, and of normaloperating, maintenance, testing, and postulatedaccident conditions...do not result in loss of theprotection function." The natural phenomena ofdegassi'ng may cause a loss of the reactor vessel waterlevel indication function following a rapiddepressurization.(4) Section 50.55a(h) of Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR 50.55a(h)), which requiresthat protection systems, for those plants withconstruction permits issued after January 1, 1971,shall meet the requirements stated in editions of theInstitute of Electrical and Electronics EngineersStandard "Criteria for Protection Systems for NuclearPower Generating Stations" (IEEE-279). Section 4.20 ofIEEE-279 requires that "The protection system shall bedesigned to provide the operator with accurate, Generic Letter 92-04-4 -August 19, 1992complete, and timely information pertinent to its ownstatus and to generating station safety." The waterlevel instrumentation for the reactor vessel may not beaccurate after a rapid depressurization event.Requested Actions1. In light of potential errors resulting from the effects ofnoncondensible gas, each licensee should determine:a. The impact of potential level indication errors onautomatic safety system response during all licensingbasis transients and accidents;b. The impact of potential level indication errors onoperator's short and long term actions during and afterall licensing basis accidents and transients;c. The impact of potential level indication errors onoperator actions prescribed in emergency operatingprocedures or other affected procedures not covered in(b).2. Based upon the results of (1), above, each licensee should-notify the NRC of short term actions taken, such as:a. Periodic monitoring of level instrumentation systemleakage; and,b. Implementation of procedures and operator training toassure that potential level errors will not result inimproper operator actions.3. Each licensee should provide its plans and schedule forcorrective actions, including any proposed hardwaremodifications necessary to ensure the level instrumentationsystem design is of high functional reliability for longterm operation. Since this instrumentation plays animportant role in plant safety and is required for bothnormal and accident conditions, the staff recommends thateach utility implement its longer term actions to assure alevel instrumentation system of high functional reliabilityat the first opportunity but prior to starting up after thenext refueling outage commencing 3 months after the date ofthis letter.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to request information regarding the adequacy of and corrective actions for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) water level instrumentation with respect to the effects of noncondensible gases on system operation.


Generic Letter 92-04-5. -August 19, 1992Required Information --Because of the importance of plant-specific aspects of this issueand the potential magnitude of the-errors, the staff requires,-pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54.(f) and Section 182 of the Atomic EnergyAct, that you provide a response to this letter by September 27,1992.Merely committing to evaluate the safety significance as part ofthe individual plant examination (IPE) program is not an -acceptable alternative to the actions rdescribed herein; since thelicensee should resolve this issue as a matter of compliance.
Background and Safety Considerations As discussed in NRC Information Notice No. 92-54 "Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Caused by Rapid Depressurization,"
the staff is concerned that noncondensible gases may become dissolved in the reference leg of BWR water level instrumentation and can lead to a false high level indication after a rapid depressurization event.    The dissolved gases which accumulate over time during normal operation can rapidly come out of solution during depressurization and displace water from the reference leg.    A reduced reference leg level will result in a false high level indication.      This is important to safety because water level signals are used      for  actuating automatic safety systems and for guidance to    operators        during and after an event.
 
On July 29, 1992, the NRC staff held a public meeting with the Regulatory Response Group (RRG) of the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) to discuss the effect of inaccuracies in the reactor vessel level instrumentation system in BWRs.                During the meeting, theBWROG and its    consultant,          General  Electric  Company (GE), presented the results    of  analyses        assessing  the safety implications of the postulated error in level indication.                The analyses consisted of two    basic  parts:        (1) an  assessment  of the mechanism and potential  magnitude      of  errors  in  the level instruments and (2) a review of the relevant licensing basis transients and accidents to determine the effect of this error on plant response, including post-accident operator actions.
 
The BWROG analyses indicated that significant errors in level indication can occur as a result of degassing the instrument reference leg if noncondensible gas is dissolved in the reference leg and if the reactor abruptly depressurizes below 450 psig.
 
p
(9208190057    Z4r li-4                          t                      /-
 
Generic Letter 92-04          - 2 -      August 19,      1992 The NRC staff reviewed the BWROG analyses basis accident scenarios which lead to a and selected design vessel water level and has concluded that lowering of the reactor systems will be actuated at pressures well automatic safety for postulated worst-case noncondensible      above 450 psig, even the reference legs. Therefore, the NRC is  gas  concentrations in emergency cooling systems will initiate as  confident    that all do. In addition, the BWROG discussed diverse they    were  designed to also initiate ECCS for reactor water level        signals  which would NRC staff reviewed the backup systems and    lowering    events.  The would be initiated by diverse signals as concluded that the ECCS
                                            analyzed by the BWROG.
 
After ECCS actuation, reactor water level the operators for long term actions (i.e., indication is used by reactor water level and ensuring adequate maintaining adequate Operators would not utilize only reactor core cooling).
to determine accident mitigation actions vessel level indications but would also utilize other indications such as containment pressure, humidity to determine accident mitigation            temperature, and Additionally, events characterized by gradualstrategies.
 
would lead to a reduced error in the indicated depressurization two or four reference leg columns in each          level. There are plant design. The amount of noncondensible  plant,    depending on each depends primarily upon system leakage    gases    dissolved in of this, a common mode, common magnitude      and  geometry.    Because is unlikely. Operators would therefore see level    indication  error indicated level alerting them to a level      a  mismatch    in indication problem.
 
Finally, emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs)
reactor vessel water level is indeterminate,      state that when flood the reactor vessel using at least one      operators    should unaffected diverse instrumentation (i.e.,      pump    guided  by the pressure indication). Reactor operators      high  containment these situations should they occur.        are trained to deal with Upon reviewing the information provided by staff's assessment, the staff concluded that  the BWROG and the operation is acceptable. The bases for the interim plant are as follows: 1) the level instrumentationstaff's conclusion initiate safety systems prior to a significant is expected to of the reactor; 2) emergency procedures which depressurization place in conjunction with operator training        are currently in result in adequate operator actions; and      are    expected to
                                          3)
depressurization event resulting in a common  an  abrupt magnitude level indication error is unlikely. mode, common For longer term operation however, the staff water level instrumentation inaccuracies        considers potential an because level indication has safety and controlimportant    issue functions in all
 
Generic Letter 92-04          - 3 -    August 19, 1992 modes of BWR operation. Furthermore, since the analyses provided are of a generic nature and the magnitude of possible errors depends strongly upon plant-specific factors such as system leakage and geometry, it is important that the analyses be reviewed promptly by all individual licensees.
 
Basis for Compliance Determination The level errors that could result from the effects of noncondensible gas may prevent the level instrumentation systems in BWRs from satisfying the following regulations:
    (1) General Design Criterion (GDC) 13, "Instrumentation and control," which requires that "Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety."
        Existing instrumentation may not accurately monitor reactor vessel water level under accident conditions.
 
(2) GDC 21, "Protection system reliability and testability,"
          which requires that "The protection system shall be designed for high functional reliability...commensurate with the safety function to be performed." The instrumentation may not be reliable under rapid depressurization conditions.
 
(3) GDC 22, "Protection system independence," which requires that "The protection system shall be designed to assure that the effects of natural phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions...do not result in loss of the protection function." The natural phenomena of degassi'ng may cause a loss of the reactor vessel water level indication function following a rapid depressurization.
 
(4) Section 50.55a(h) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.55a(h)), which requires that protection systems, for those plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, shall meet the requirements stated in editions of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (IEEE-279). Section 4.20 of IEEE-279 requires that "The protection system shall be designed to provide the operator with accurate,
 
Generic Letter 92-04          - 4 -    August 19, 1992 complete, and timely information pertinent to its own status and to generating station safety." The water level instrumentation for the reactor vessel may not be accurate after a rapid depressurization event.
 
Requested Actions
1.  In light of potential errors resulting from the effects of noncondensible gas, each licensee should determine:
    a. The impact of potential level indication errors on automatic safety system response during all licensing basis transients and accidents;
    b. The impact of potential level indication errors on operator's short and long term actions during and after all licensing basis accidents and transients;
    c. The impact of potential level indication errors on operator actions prescribed in emergency operating procedures or other affected procedures not covered in (b).
2.  Based upon the results of (1), above, each licensee should
    -notify the NRC of short term actions taken, such as:
    a. Periodic monitoring of level instrumentation system leakage; and, b. Implementation of procedures and operator training to assure that potential level errors will not result in improper operator actions.
 
3.  Each licensee should provide its plans and schedule for corrective actions, including any proposed hardware modifications necessary to ensure the level instrumentation system design is of high functional reliability for long term operation. Since this instrumentation plays an important role in plant safety and is required for both normal and accident conditions, the staff recommends that each utility implement its longer term actions to assure a level instrumentation system of high functional reliability at the first opportunity but prior to starting up after the next refueling outage commencing 3 months after the date of this letter.
 
Generic Letter 92-04           - 5. -   August 19, 1992 Required Information       - -
Because of the importance of plant-specific aspects of this issue and the potential magnitude of the-errors, the staff requires,- pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54.(f) and Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, that you provide a response to this letter by September 27,
1992.
 
Merely committing to evaluate the safety significance as part of the individual plant examination (IPE) program is not an       -
acceptable alternative to the actions rdescribed herein; since the licensee should resolve this issue as a matter of compliance.


==Backfit Discussion==
==Backfit Discussion==
In accordance with NRC procedures, the actions requested hereinare considered a backfit to assure that facilities are incompliance with existing regulatory requirements discussed above.Thus, a backfit analysis is not-required by 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i),and the staff performed a-documented evaluation as discussed in10 CFR 50.109(a) (6) .The-documented evaluation is provided inthe preceding discussions.Burden InformationThis request is covered by Office of Management and BudgetClearance Number 3150-0011, which expires May. 31, 1994. Theestimated average number of burden hours is 200 person hours foreach licensee response, including the time required to assess thequestions, search data sources, gather and analyze the data, andprepare the required response. These estimated average burdenhours pertain only to the identified response-related matters anddo not include the time for actual implementation of therequested actions. Comments on the accuracy of this estimate andsuggestions to reduce the burden may be directed to Ronald Minsk,Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011), NEOB-3019, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503 andto the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information andRecords Management Branch, Division of Information SupportServices, Office of Information and Resources Management,Washington, D.C. 20555.Although no specific request or requirement is intended, thefollowing information would be helpful to the NRC in evaluatingthe cost of complying with this generic letter:(1) the licensee staff time and costs to perform requestedinspections, corrective actions, and associated testing;(2) the licensee staff's time and costs to prepare the requestedreports and documentation;  
In accordance with NRC procedures, the actions requested herein are considered a backfit to assure that facilities are in compliance with existing regulatory requirements discussed above.
Generic Letter 92- 04 -6 -August 19t 1992(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of theinspection findings such as the costs of the correctiveactions or the costs of down time; and(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will beincurred in the future as a result of implementingcommitments such as the estimated costs of conducting futureinspections or increased maintenance.Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.Nuclear Reguiatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk,Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(a) of the NRC'sregulations.Sincerely,James G. PartlowAdsociate Director for ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:List of recently issued generic letters.
 
Thus, a backfit analysis is not-required by 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i),
and the staff performed a-documented evaluation as discussed in
10 CFR 50.109(a) (6) . The-documented evaluation is provided in the preceding discussions.
 
Burden Information This request is covered by Office of Management and Budget Clearance Number 3150-0011, which expires May. 31, 1994. The estimated average number of burden hours is 200 person hours for each licensee response, including the time required to assess the questions, search data sources, gather and analyze the data, and prepare the required response. These estimated average burden hours pertain only to the identified response-related matters and do not include the time for actual implementation of the requested actions. Comments on the accuracy of this estimate and suggestions to reduce the burden may be directed to Ronald Minsk, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011), NEOB-
3019, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503 and to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information and Records Management Branch, Division of Information Support Services, Office of Information and Resources Management, Washington, D.C. 20555.
 
Although no specific request or requirement is intended, the following information would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating the cost of complying with this generic letter:
(1)   the licensee staff time and costs to perform requested inspections, corrective actions, and associated testing;
(2)   the licensee staff's time and costs to prepare the requested reports and documentation;
 
Generic Letter 92- 04         - 6 -       August 19t 1992
(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the costs of the corrective actions or the costs of down time; and
(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will be incurred in the future as a result of implementing commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.
 
Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.
 
Nuclear Reguiatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.   20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(a) of the NRC's regulations.
 
Sincerely, James G. Partlow Adsociate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of recently issued generic letters.


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Timothy E. Collins, NRR.. (301) 504-2897 IENCLOSURELIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED GENERIC LETTERSGenericLetter No.Date ofSubiect IssuanceIssued To90-02SUPPLEMENT1ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENTSFOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN THEDESIGN FEATURES SECTION OFTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS07/31/92ALL LWR LICENSEESAND APPLICANTS87-02SUPPLEMENT 1SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTNO. 2 ON SQUG GENERICIMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE,REVISION 2.05/22/92ALL USI A-46LICENSEES WHOARE SQUG MEMBERS92-03COMPILATION OF THE CURRENTLICENSING BASIS: REQUESTFOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATIONIN PILOT PROGRAM03/19/92ALL NUCLEAR POWERPLANT APPLICANTSAND LICENSEES92-01REVISION 1REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURALINTEGRITY, 10CFR50.54(f)3/06/92ALL HOLDERS OF OPLICENSES OR CONST.PERMITS FOR NUCLEARPWR PLANTS (EXCEPTYANKEE ATOMIC FORYANKEE NUC PWR STA.)92-0292-01RESOLUTION OF GENERIC 03/06/92ISSUE 79, UNANALYZED REACTORVESSEL (PWR) THERMAL STRESSDURING NATURAL CONVECTIONCOOLDOWNREACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL NOT ISSUEDINTEGRITY, 10CFR50.54(f) RevisionListedAboveALL HOLDERS OF OPLICENSES OF CONST.PERMITS FOR PWRsALL HOLDERS OF OPLICENSES OR CONST.PERMITS FOR NUCLEARPWR PLANTS (EXCEPTYANKEE ATOMIC FORYANKEE NUC PWR STA.)* 89-10SUPPLEMENT 4CONSIDERATION OF VALVEMISPOSITIONING IN BWRs02/14/92ALL LICENSEES OF OPNUC PWR PLANTS ANDHOLDERS OF CONSTRUC.PERMITS FOR PWRPLANTS* NOTE: 89-10 Supp. 4 -Accession No. 9202070037 has been changed to 9202250311.
Timothy E. Collins, NRR
  ..                 (301) 504-2897


Generic Letter 92- 04-6 -August l19, 1992(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of theinspection findings such as the costs of the correctiveactions or the costs of down time; and(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will beincurred in the future as a result of implementingcommitments such as the estimated costs of conducting futureinspections or increased maintenance.Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk,Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(a) of the NRC'sregulations.Sincerely,James G. PartlowAssociate Director for ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:List of recently issued generic letters.
ENCLOSURE        I
                  LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED GENERIC LETTERS
Generic                                      Date of Subiect                      Issuance    Issued To Letter No.
 
ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENTS      07/31/92    ALL LWR LICENSEES
90-02
            1  FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN THE                AND APPLICANTS
SUPPLEMENT
              DESIGN FEATURES SECTION OF
              TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
              SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT      05/22/92    ALL USI A-46
87-02 NO. 2 ON SQUG GENERIC                    LICENSEES WHO
SUPPLEMENT 1 IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE,                ARE SQUG MEMBERS
              REVISION 2.
 
COMPILATION OF THE CURRENT    03/19/92    ALL NUCLEAR POWER
92-03 LICENSING    BASIS: REQUEST              PLANT APPLICANTS
                FOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION              AND LICENSEES
                IN PILOT PROGRAM
                REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL    3/06/92    ALL HOLDERS OF OP
92-01                                                  LICENSES OR CONST.
 
REVISION 1      INTEGRITY, 10CFR50.54(f)
                                                        PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR
                                                        PWR PLANTS (EXCEPT
                                                        YANKEE ATOMIC FOR
                                                        YANKEE NUC PWR STA.)
                RESOLUTION OF GENERIC        03/06/92  ALL HOLDERS OF OP
92-02 ISSUE 79, UNANALYZED REACTOR              LICENSES OF CONST.
 
VESSEL (PWR) THERMAL STRESS              PERMITS FOR PWRs DURING NATURAL CONVECTION
                COOLDOWN
                REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL    NOT ISSUED  ALL HOLDERS OF OP
92-01 INTEGRITY, 10CFR50.54(f)      Revision  LICENSES OR CONST.
 
Listed    PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR
                                                Above    PWR PLANTS (EXCEPT
                                                          YANKEE ATOMIC FOR
                                                          YANKEE NUC PWR STA.)
                CONSIDERATION OF VALVE      02/14/92    ALL LICENSEES OF OP
 
* 89-10
                MISPOSITIONING IN BWRs                  NUC PWR PLANTS AND
SUPPLEMENT 4 HOLDERS OF CONSTRUC.
 
PERMITS FOR PWR
                                                          PLANTS
 
* NOTE:  89-10 Supp.  4 -
          Accession No. 9202070037 has been changed to 9202250311.
 
Generic Letter 92- 04           - 6 -       August l19, 1992
(3)   the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the costs of the corrective actions or the costs of down time; and
(4)   an estimate   of the additional long-term costs which will be incurred in   the future as a result of implementing commitments  such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections  or increased maintenance.
 
Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn:       Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.     20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(a) of the NRC's regulations.
 
Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of recently issued generic letters.


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Timothy E. Collins, NRR(301) 504-2897EDITED:DATE:J. MAIN8/13 /92SRXB:DST*TCollins:Bah8/17/92AD:PNR @JPartlo SI8/\1%/92 8DISTRIBUTIONSRXB R/FAThadaniJPartlowCollinsCollins R/FSRXB:DST*RJones8/17/92GC*Lewis/ /92SICB/DST*SNewberry8/17/92D:ADT*WRussell8/1 /92D:DST*AThadani8/18/92C:DOBA*GMarcus8/18/92* See previous concurrenceSNewberryGMarcusSLewisWRussellRJones Generic Letter 92--6 -(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of theinspection findings such as the costs of the correctiveactions or the costs of down time(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will beincurred in the future as a result of implementingcommitments such as the estimated costs of conducting futureinspections or increased maintenance.Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk,Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC'sregulations.Sincerely,James G. PartlowAssociate Director for ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:List of recently issued generic letters.
Timothy E. Collins, NRR
                        (301) 504-2897 EDITED:   J. MAIN
DATE:     8/13 /92 SRXB:DST*        SRXB:DST*    SICB/DST*    D:DST*       C:DOBA*
TCollins:Bah    RJones      SNewberry    AThadani      GMarcus
8/17/92          8/17/92     8/17/92      8/18/92      8/18/92 AD:PNR @      GC*           D:ADT*    
* See previous concurrence JPartlo    SILewis          WRussell
8/\1%/92    8/   /92        8/1 /92 DISTRIBUTION
SRXB R/F          SNewberry AThadani        GMarcus JPartlow          SLewis Collins          WRussell Collins R/F      RJones
 
Generic Letter 92-               - 6 -
(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the costs of the corrective actions or the costs of down time
(4)   an estimate   of the additional long-term costs which will be incurred in   the future as a result of implementing commitments  such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections  or increased maintenance.
 
Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC's regulations.
 
Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of recently issued generic letters.


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Timothy E. Collins, NRR(301) 504-2897EDITED: J. MAINDATE: 8/13/92SRXB:DST*TCollins:Bah8/17/92AD:PNRR 0JPartlow SI8/ /92 8DISTRIBUTIONSRXB R/FAThadaniJPartlowCollinsCollins R/FSRXB:DST*RJones8/17/92GCLewis/ /92SNewberryGMarcusSLewisWRussellRJonesSICB/DST*SNewberry8/17/92WRussell8/Y / 92D:DST*AThadani8/18/92C:DOBA*GMarcus8/18/92* See previous concurrence Generic Letter 92--6 -Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk,Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC'sregulations.Sincerely,James G. PartlowAssociate Director for ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:List of recently issued generic letters.
Timothy E. Collins, NRR
                        (301) 504-2897 EDITED:   J. MAIN
DATE:     8/13/92 SRXB:DST*         SRXB:DST*  SICB/DST*    D:DST*    C:DOBA*
TCollins:Bah      RJones      SNewberry    AThadani  GMarcus
8/17/92          8/17/92    8/17/92      8/18/92    8/18/92 AD:PNRR      0 GC                     
* See previous concurrence JPartlow    SILewis          WRussell
8/ /92      8/    /92      8/Y / 92 DISTRIBUTION
SRXB R/F          SNewberry AThadani          GMarcus JPartlow          SLewis Collins          WRussell Collins R/F      RJones
 
Generic Letter 92-                   - 6 -
Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn:         Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.     20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC's regulations.
 
Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
  List of recently issued generic letters.


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Timothy E. Collins, NRR(301) 504-2897EDITED: J. MAINDATE: 8/13/92.a,SRXB:DST*TCollins:Bah8/17/92SRXB:DST* SICV/DST* D:DS'RJones SNewberry ATh7j8/17/92\ 8/17/92 8I fPNRR \vD:ADTrtlow OGC C ,85. iRussell/92 8/11/92 8/ /92rlani/92C:DOBAGMarculom8/g7/92ERAS~--af /9`2AD:]JPar8/DISTRIBUTIONSRXB R/FAThadaniJPartlowCollinsCollins R/FRJonesN
Timothy E. Collins, NRR
Generic letter 92--6 -Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk,Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC'sregulations.Sincerely,James G. PartlowAssociate Director for ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:List of recently issued generic letters.
                          (301) 504-2897 EDITED:   J. MAIN        .
  DATE:     8/13/92 a,
  SRXB:DST*       SRXB:DST*     SICV/DST*     D:DS'r    C:DOBA
  TCollins:Bah    RJones       SNewberry     ATh7j lani GMarculom
  8/17/92          8/17/92\     8/17/92       8If /92    8/g7/92 AD:]PNRR        \vD:ADT
  ERAS~      JPar rtlow        OGC C ,85. iRussell
--af  /9`2    8/ /92           8/11/92     8/ /92 DISTRIBUTION
  SRXB R/F
  AThadani JPartlow                                  N
  Collins Collins R/F
  RJones
 
Generic letter 92-                   - 6 -
Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn:             Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.       20555 pursuant   to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC's regulations.
 
Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of recently issued generic letters.


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Timothy E. Collins,(301) 504-2897SRXB: DS1bTCollins:Bah8/17/92D:DOEA AERossi 3]8/ /92 8ig DSTJ6nes8/1 /92D: PNRR?artlow/ /92DISTRIBUTIONSRXB R/FAThadaniJPartlowCollinsCollins R/FRJonesSI3SN rrySr1 /92OGC /18/ /92 I//ID:DSTAThadani8/ /92):ADTIRusse 13/ /9C: DOBAGMarcus8/ /92I/
Timothy E. Collins,
}}
                            (301) 504-2897 SRXB: DS1b            ig    DST  SI3            D:DST      C: DOBA
TCollins:Bah        J6nes        SN    rry      AThadani  GMarcus
8/17/92          8/1    /92    Sr1 /92        8/ /92   8/ /92 D:DOEA      A D: PNRR                       ):ADT
ERossi      3]?artlow           OGC        IRusse 1
                                            /1
8/ /92      8 / /92              8/ /92   I/ 3/ /9 DISTRIBUTION
SRXB R/F
AThadani
                                  /I
JPartlow Collins Collins R/F
RJones I
                        /}}


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Latest revision as of 03:01, 24 November 2019

NRC Generic Letter 1992-004 - Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F)
ML031130402
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Washington Public Power Supply System, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Clinch River  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/19/1992
From: Partlow J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
GL-92-004, NUDOCS 9208190057
Download: ML031130402 (11)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 19, 1992 TO: ALL BOILING WATER REACTOR (BWR) LICENSEES OF

OPERATING REACTORS

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RELATED TO REACTOR VESSEL

WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IN BWRs PURSUANT TO

10 CFR 50.54(F) (GENERIC LETTER NO. 92-04)

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to request information regarding the adequacy of and corrective actions for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) water level instrumentation with respect to the effects of noncondensible gases on system operation.

Background and Safety Considerations As discussed in NRC Information Notice No. 92-54 "Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Caused by Rapid Depressurization,"

the staff is concerned that noncondensible gases may become dissolved in the reference leg of BWR water level instrumentation and can lead to a false high level indication after a rapid depressurization event. The dissolved gases which accumulate over time during normal operation can rapidly come out of solution during depressurization and displace water from the reference leg. A reduced reference leg level will result in a false high level indication. This is important to safety because water level signals are used for actuating automatic safety systems and for guidance to operators during and after an event.

On July 29, 1992, the NRC staff held a public meeting with the Regulatory Response Group (RRG) of the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) to discuss the effect of inaccuracies in the reactor vessel level instrumentation system in BWRs. During the meeting, theBWROG and its consultant, General Electric Company (GE), presented the results of analyses assessing the safety implications of the postulated error in level indication. The analyses consisted of two basic parts: (1) an assessment of the mechanism and potential magnitude of errors in the level instruments and (2) a review of the relevant licensing basis transients and accidents to determine the effect of this error on plant response, including post-accident operator actions.

The BWROG analyses indicated that significant errors in level indication can occur as a result of degassing the instrument reference leg if noncondensible gas is dissolved in the reference leg and if the reactor abruptly depressurizes below 450 psig.

p

(9208190057 Z4r li-4 t /-

Generic Letter 92-04 - 2 - August 19, 1992 The NRC staff reviewed the BWROG analyses basis accident scenarios which lead to a and selected design vessel water level and has concluded that lowering of the reactor systems will be actuated at pressures well automatic safety for postulated worst-case noncondensible above 450 psig, even the reference legs. Therefore, the NRC is gas concentrations in emergency cooling systems will initiate as confident that all do. In addition, the BWROG discussed diverse they were designed to also initiate ECCS for reactor water level signals which would NRC staff reviewed the backup systems and lowering events. The would be initiated by diverse signals as concluded that the ECCS

analyzed by the BWROG.

After ECCS actuation, reactor water level the operators for long term actions (i.e., indication is used by reactor water level and ensuring adequate maintaining adequate Operators would not utilize only reactor core cooling).

to determine accident mitigation actions vessel level indications but would also utilize other indications such as containment pressure, humidity to determine accident mitigation temperature, and Additionally, events characterized by gradualstrategies.

would lead to a reduced error in the indicated depressurization two or four reference leg columns in each level. There are plant design. The amount of noncondensible plant, depending on each depends primarily upon system leakage gases dissolved in of this, a common mode, common magnitude and geometry. Because is unlikely. Operators would therefore see level indication error indicated level alerting them to a level a mismatch in indication problem.

Finally, emergency procedure guidelines (EPGs)

reactor vessel water level is indeterminate, state that when flood the reactor vessel using at least one operators should unaffected diverse instrumentation (i.e., pump guided by the pressure indication). Reactor operators high containment these situations should they occur. are trained to deal with Upon reviewing the information provided by staff's assessment, the staff concluded that the BWROG and the operation is acceptable. The bases for the interim plant are as follows: 1) the level instrumentationstaff's conclusion initiate safety systems prior to a significant is expected to of the reactor; 2) emergency procedures which depressurization place in conjunction with operator training are currently in result in adequate operator actions; and are expected to

3)

depressurization event resulting in a common an abrupt magnitude level indication error is unlikely. mode, common For longer term operation however, the staff water level instrumentation inaccuracies considers potential an because level indication has safety and controlimportant issue functions in all

Generic Letter 92-04 - 3 - August 19, 1992 modes of BWR operation. Furthermore, since the analyses provided are of a generic nature and the magnitude of possible errors depends strongly upon plant-specific factors such as system leakage and geometry, it is important that the analyses be reviewed promptly by all individual licensees.

Basis for Compliance Determination The level errors that could result from the effects of noncondensible gas may prevent the level instrumentation systems in BWRs from satisfying the following regulations:

(1) General Design Criterion (GDC) 13, "Instrumentation and control," which requires that "Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety."

Existing instrumentation may not accurately monitor reactor vessel water level under accident conditions.

(2) GDC 21, "Protection system reliability and testability,"

which requires that "The protection system shall be designed for high functional reliability...commensurate with the safety function to be performed." The instrumentation may not be reliable under rapid depressurization conditions.

(3) GDC 22, "Protection system independence," which requires that "The protection system shall be designed to assure that the effects of natural phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions...do not result in loss of the protection function." The natural phenomena of degassi'ng may cause a loss of the reactor vessel water level indication function following a rapid depressurization.

(4) Section 50.55a(h) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.55a(h)), which requires that protection systems, for those plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, shall meet the requirements stated in editions of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" (IEEE-279). Section 4.20 of IEEE-279 requires that "The protection system shall be designed to provide the operator with accurate,

Generic Letter 92-04 - 4 - August 19, 1992 complete, and timely information pertinent to its own status and to generating station safety." The water level instrumentation for the reactor vessel may not be accurate after a rapid depressurization event.

Requested Actions

1. In light of potential errors resulting from the effects of noncondensible gas, each licensee should determine:

a. The impact of potential level indication errors on automatic safety system response during all licensing basis transients and accidents;

b. The impact of potential level indication errors on operator's short and long term actions during and after all licensing basis accidents and transients;

c. The impact of potential level indication errors on operator actions prescribed in emergency operating procedures or other affected procedures not covered in (b).

2. Based upon the results of (1), above, each licensee should

-notify the NRC of short term actions taken, such as:

a. Periodic monitoring of level instrumentation system leakage; and, b. Implementation of procedures and operator training to assure that potential level errors will not result in improper operator actions.

3. Each licensee should provide its plans and schedule for corrective actions, including any proposed hardware modifications necessary to ensure the level instrumentation system design is of high functional reliability for long term operation. Since this instrumentation plays an important role in plant safety and is required for both normal and accident conditions, the staff recommends that each utility implement its longer term actions to assure a level instrumentation system of high functional reliability at the first opportunity but prior to starting up after the next refueling outage commencing 3 months after the date of this letter.

Generic Letter 92-04 - 5. - August 19, 1992 Required Information - -

Because of the importance of plant-specific aspects of this issue and the potential magnitude of the-errors, the staff requires,- pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54.(f) and Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, that you provide a response to this letter by September 27,

1992.

Merely committing to evaluate the safety significance as part of the individual plant examination (IPE) program is not an -

acceptable alternative to the actions rdescribed herein; since the licensee should resolve this issue as a matter of compliance.

Backfit Discussion

In accordance with NRC procedures, the actions requested herein are considered a backfit to assure that facilities are in compliance with existing regulatory requirements discussed above.

Thus, a backfit analysis is not-required by 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i),

and the staff performed a-documented evaluation as discussed in

10 CFR 50.109(a) (6) . The-documented evaluation is provided in the preceding discussions.

Burden Information This request is covered by Office of Management and Budget Clearance Number 3150-0011, which expires May. 31, 1994. The estimated average number of burden hours is 200 person hours for each licensee response, including the time required to assess the questions, search data sources, gather and analyze the data, and prepare the required response. These estimated average burden hours pertain only to the identified response-related matters and do not include the time for actual implementation of the requested actions. Comments on the accuracy of this estimate and suggestions to reduce the burden may be directed to Ronald Minsk, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011), NEOB-

3019, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503 and to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information and Records Management Branch, Division of Information Support Services, Office of Information and Resources Management, Washington, D.C. 20555.

Although no specific request or requirement is intended, the following information would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating the cost of complying with this generic letter:

(1) the licensee staff time and costs to perform requested inspections, corrective actions, and associated testing;

(2) the licensee staff's time and costs to prepare the requested reports and documentation;

Generic Letter 92- 04 - 6 - August 19t 1992

(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the costs of the corrective actions or the costs of down time; and

(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will be incurred in the future as a result of implementing commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.

Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.

Nuclear Reguiatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(a) of the NRC's regulations.

Sincerely, James G. Partlow Adsociate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:

List of recently issued generic letters.

Technical Contact:

Timothy E. Collins, NRR

.. (301) 504-2897

ENCLOSURE I

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED GENERIC LETTERS

Generic Date of Subiect Issuance Issued To Letter No.

ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENTS 07/31/92 ALL LWR LICENSEES

90-02

1 FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN THE AND APPLICANTS

SUPPLEMENT

DESIGN FEATURES SECTION OF

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT 05/22/92 ALL USI A-46

87-02 NO. 2 ON SQUG GENERIC LICENSEES WHO

SUPPLEMENT 1 IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE, ARE SQUG MEMBERS

REVISION 2.

COMPILATION OF THE CURRENT 03/19/92 ALL NUCLEAR POWER

92-03 LICENSING BASIS: REQUEST PLANT APPLICANTS

FOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND LICENSEES

IN PILOT PROGRAM

REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL 3/06/92 ALL HOLDERS OF OP

92-01 LICENSES OR CONST.

REVISION 1 INTEGRITY, 10CFR50.54(f)

PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR

PWR PLANTS (EXCEPT

YANKEE ATOMIC FOR

YANKEE NUC PWR STA.)

RESOLUTION OF GENERIC 03/06/92 ALL HOLDERS OF OP

92-02 ISSUE 79, UNANALYZED REACTOR LICENSES OF CONST.

VESSEL (PWR) THERMAL STRESS PERMITS FOR PWRs DURING NATURAL CONVECTION

COOLDOWN

REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL NOT ISSUED ALL HOLDERS OF OP

92-01 INTEGRITY, 10CFR50.54(f) Revision LICENSES OR CONST.

Listed PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR

Above PWR PLANTS (EXCEPT

YANKEE ATOMIC FOR

YANKEE NUC PWR STA.)

CONSIDERATION OF VALVE 02/14/92 ALL LICENSEES OF OP

  • 89-10

MISPOSITIONING IN BWRs NUC PWR PLANTS AND

SUPPLEMENT 4 HOLDERS OF CONSTRUC.

PERMITS FOR PWR

PLANTS

  • NOTE: 89-10 Supp. 4 -

Accession No. 9202070037 has been changed to 9202250311.

Generic Letter 92- 04 - 6 - August l19, 1992

(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the costs of the corrective actions or the costs of down time; and

(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will be incurred in the future as a result of implementing commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.

Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.4(a) of the NRC's regulations.

Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:

List of recently issued generic letters.

Technical Contact:

Timothy E. Collins, NRR

(301) 504-2897 EDITED: J. MAIN

DATE: 8/13 /92 SRXB:DST* SRXB:DST* SICB/DST* D:DST* C:DOBA*

TCollins:Bah RJones SNewberry AThadani GMarcus

8/17/92 8/17/92 8/17/92 8/18/92 8/18/92 AD:PNR @ GC* D:ADT*

  • See previous concurrence JPartlo SILewis WRussell

8/\1%/92 8/ /92 8/1 /92 DISTRIBUTION

SRXB R/F SNewberry AThadani GMarcus JPartlow SLewis Collins WRussell Collins R/F RJones

Generic Letter 92- - 6 -

(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such as the costs of the corrective actions or the costs of down time

(4) an estimate of the additional long-term costs which will be incurred in the future as a result of implementing commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.

Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC's regulations.

Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:

List of recently issued generic letters.

Technical Contact:

Timothy E. Collins, NRR

(301) 504-2897 EDITED: J. MAIN

DATE: 8/13/92 SRXB:DST* SRXB:DST* SICB/DST* D:DST* C:DOBA*

TCollins:Bah RJones SNewberry AThadani GMarcus

8/17/92 8/17/92 8/17/92 8/18/92 8/18/92 AD:PNRR 0 GC

  • See previous concurrence JPartlow SILewis WRussell

8/ /92 8/ /92 8/Y / 92 DISTRIBUTION

SRXB R/F SNewberry AThadani GMarcus JPartlow SLewis Collins WRussell Collins R/F RJones

Generic Letter 92- - 6 -

Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC's regulations.

Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:

List of recently issued generic letters.

Technical Contact:

Timothy E. Collins, NRR

(301) 504-2897 EDITED: J. MAIN .

DATE: 8/13/92 a,

SRXB:DST* SRXB:DST* SICV/DST* D:DS'r C:DOBA

TCollins:Bah RJones SNewberry ATh7j lani GMarculom

8/17/92 8/17/92\ 8/17/92 8If /92 8/g7/92 AD:]PNRR \vD:ADT

ERAS~ JPar rtlow OGC C ,85. iRussell

--af /9`2 8/ /92 8/11/92 8/ /92 DISTRIBUTION

SRXB R/F

AThadani JPartlow N

Collins Collins R/F

RJones

Generic letter 92- - 6 -

Please address your response to this generic letter to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 of the NRC's regulations.

Sincerely, James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:

List of recently issued generic letters.

Technical Contact:

Timothy E. Collins,

(301) 504-2897 SRXB: DS1b ig DST SI3 D:DST C: DOBA

TCollins:Bah J6nes SN rry AThadani GMarcus

8/17/92 8/1 /92 Sr1 /92 8/ /92 8/ /92 D:DOEA A D: PNRR ):ADT

ERossi 3]?artlow OGC IRusse 1

/1

8/ /92 8 / /92 8/ /92 I/ 3/ /9 DISTRIBUTION

SRXB R/F

AThadani

/I

JPartlow Collins Collins R/F

RJones I

/

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