ML17334B364: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 04/11/1990 | | issue date = 04/11/1990 | ||
| title = Responds to NRC 900301 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-315/89-31 & 50-316/89-31.Corrective Actions:Reliability Centered Maint Program Initiated | | title = Responds to NRC 900301 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-315/89-31 & 50-316/89-31.Corrective Actions:Reliability Centered Maint Program Initiated | ||
| author name = | | author name = Alexich M | ||
| author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG | | author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = Davis A | ||
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) | | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) | ||
| docket = 05000315, 05000316 | | docket = 05000315, 05000316 |
Revision as of 13:31, 18 June 2019
ML17334B364 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Cook ![]() |
Issue date: | 04/11/1990 |
From: | Alexich M INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
To: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
AEP:NRC:1125A, NUDOCS 9004200632 | |
Download: ML17334B364 (38) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1989031
Text
\r Indiana'Achrga~Power Company~~0 80 c'.663'Nl7lAMA
NTCHIGAN POWER AEP:NRC:1125A
Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos.50-315 and 50-316 License Nos.DPR-58 and DPR-74 NRC INSPECTION
NOS.50-315/89031
AND 50-316/89031:
RESPONSE TO VIOLATION U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Attn: A.B.Davi.s April ll, 1990 Dear Mr.Davis: This letter is in response to Mr.H.J.Miller's letter dated March 1, 1990, which forwarded the report on the special maintenance
team inspection
conducted by Mr.Z.Falevits and others of your staff.This inspection
was conducted from December 4 through 8, and December 18 through 22, 1989, on activities
at the Cook Nuclear Plant associated
with the support and implementation
of maintenance
to ensure that plant structures, systems and components
reliably perform on demand.The Notice of Violation attached to Mr.Miller's letter identified
six weaknesses
and four Severity Level IV violations
relating to our maintenance
program.The weaknesses
are addressed in Attachment
1 to this letter.The violations
are addressed in Attachment
2 to this letter.A 14-day extension for our response was granted on March 15, 1990'his document has been prepared following Corporate procedures
that incorporate
a reasonable
set of controls to ensure its accuracy and completeness
prior to signature by the undersigned.
Sincerely, M.P.Al ich Vice President ldp Attachments
~)g4QOCk&2
90041 1 pgg ADQcK o>oog+~~~I pp 1/00
Mr.A.B.Davis AEP:NRC:1125A
cc: D.H.Williams, Jr.A.A.Blind-Bridgman R.C.Callen G.Charnoff NRC Resident Inspector-Bridgman NFEM Section Chief
ATTACHMENT
1 TO AEP:NRC:1125A
RESPONSE TO NRC-IDENTIFIED
WEAKNESSES
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 1 NRC-Identified
Weakness (1)"Lack of or ineffective
action to correct numerous self identified
maintenance
problems identified
in February 1988, many of which were identified
by the team during this inspection." Response to Weakness (1)Corrective
Actions Taken As a result of the 1988 Maintenance
Self-Assessment
Report, AEPSC contracted
IMPELL to assist in identifying
and formulating
appropriate
corrective
actions to address the self-identified
deficiencies.
The results of thi,s effort are in a document entitled, D.C.Cook Plant PM Pro ram U rade Strate Document, dated November 1988.This study contained a strategy for AEP to accomplish
a planned upgrade of the Preventive
Maintenance (PM)Program at the Cook Nuclear Plant.It identified
reasonable
goals and achievable
objectives
for the PM Upgrade Program based on AEPSC/Cook
Nuclear Plant philosophy, resources and capabilities.
The specific implementation
tasks and strategic considerations
were presented for obtaining the desired upgrade results.This effort'ot only addressed improvements
in the PM Program itself, but also examined related organization
and automation
requirements
to support the improved PM Program.Based on the results of this study, numerous corrective
actions were initiated in January 1989.The first was the initiation
of a reliability-centered
maintenance (RCM)program.This major task has two phases: analysis and implementation.
AEPSC has been working closely with General Physics on the analysis portion that will form the foundation
of the RCM program.This work includes: defining system boundaries
and functions identifying
dominant failure modes determining
criti.cal failure modes and criti.cal components
identifying
applicable
and effective preventive
maintenance
tasks to prevent failures completing
analysis of selected plant systems
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 2 Implementation
of the RCM Program began in August 1989 with the development
of plant procedures, identification
of system boundaries, and establishment
of an RCM database.The first syst: em analysis was completed in February 1990 on the feedwater system.Analysis of 22 additional
plant systems/functional
areas will take place over the next three years.Another outgrowth of the Maintenance
Self-Assessment
Report and the AEPSC/IMPELL
study was the development
of the System Engineer Program.The goal of the System Engineer Program is to provide training to enable individuals
to provide the engineering
expertise required for safe, efficient and reliable operation of systems for which they are responsible.
The System Engineer discharges
this responsibility
by performing
assigned tasks, and maintaining
cognizance
of all work associated
with the assigned system(s).
In addition, AEPSC contracted
TENERA Systems and Software to provide a computerized
maintenance
management
information
system.This system, referred to as the Nuclear Plant Maintenance
Module (NPM)System, discussed in more detail in our response to weakness (3), will allow plant staff to initiate, issue, prioritize
and track all maintenance
work at the plant.This same software is currently being used at Pacific Gas and Electric's
Diablo Canyon, and Public Service Electric and Gas's Salem and Hope Creek Generating
Stations.In addition, it was recently chosen by Electricite
de France for use in all fifty of its nuclear plants.These three programs, RCM, System Engineer and NPM, are just part of the actions that are being taken to respond to the Self-Assessment.
The November 1989 reorganization
of Cook Nuclear Plant's management
is another important element in the upgrade of our maintenance
program.The intent of the new organization
is to place emphasis on maintenance, outages, and human'resources, Other actions, which have or are being taken are as follows: o An AEP and Cook Nuclear Plant policy on maintenance
was developed and approved in December 1989 by AEP senior management.
An additional
plant-specific
maintenance
policy established
in accordance
with INPO guidelines
is being developed to clarify maintenance
philosophies
and responsibilities
for all maintenance
groups
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 3 o Corporate reviews have been conducted, which have resulted in improvements
being made to shop areas used by the maintenance
groups o Staffing studies are being performed, which have already resulted in an increase in the number of engineers and radiation protection
technicians
on site.o Other programs of note that address maintenance
self-assessment
findings include the maintenance
procedure rewrite (See Weakness (6)), the long-range
plan and the outage guideline development
plan.(2)Benefits To Be Derived From Corrective
Actions RCM, the System Engineer Program and NPM were initiated to address many of the Maintenance
Self-Assessment's
identified
deficiencies.
When all of our efforts have been completely
implemented, each of the major findings of the self assessment
will have been addressed.,As a result of these corrective
actions.we anticipate
having a state of the art maintenance
program which will result in improved plant safety, reliability
and accountability.
(3)Date When Benefits Vill Be Realized As previously
stated, we started the RCM Program in August 1989.However, we anticipate
that the program will not be completely
implemented
for all the critical plant systems until the end of 1992.As each system is analyzed, benefits will be realized so that when this program is completed we will have a fully integrated
preventive
maintenance
program.The System Engineer Program, like RCM, is still in the early stages of implementation.
A document which clearly delineates
the responsibilities
of the engineers is currently in the final stages of review and approval.AEPSC's acquisition
of TENERA's NPM system was approved in December 1989.However, it will not be in place and operational
until August 1990, when data will be entered.Ve will be conducting
QA audits or surveillances
to access the status and effectiveness
of some of our corrective
actions as they develop.In addition, the Maintenance
Improvement
Plan will review and resolve, as appropriate, the Maintenance
Self-Assessment
items'he Improvement
Plan includes milestones
and a built-in mechanism that requires regular re-evaluation.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 4 While we are already realizing benefits from our efforts, we do not anticipate
the full benefit for several years.In order to effectively
implement programs as encompassing
and comprehensive
as these, significant
analysis, planning and coordination
are needed.As a result, their benefits will not be fully realized until mid 1993.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 5 NRC-Identified
Weakness (2)"An ineffective
preventive
maintenance
program that resulted, for example, in failures of 4KV circuit breakers" Response to Weakness We concur that the Preventive
Maintenance
Program can be improved and, as previously
discussed, we are taking steps to do so.However, Cook Nuclear Plant's availability
in 1989 is evidence that the present preventive
maintenance
program is effective.
During 1989, Cook Nuclear Plant generated 12 million net MWHRS, the most since 1984.The 69.3%availability
for Unit 1 in 1989 contributed
to an average availability
of 79.4%since 1985'lthough Unit 2 overall availability
has not been as high due to steam generator tube degradatidn, its 74.4%availability
in 1989 was the highest since 1983.On December 8, the 111-day record for the longest run with both units operating was broken.This record was extended to 140 days when Unit 2 was brought off-line for a surveillance
outage on January 6, 1990.Unit 1 ended 1989 with its longest run of 175 days and continued operating until March 17, 1990 (a Cook Nuclear Plant record run of 251 days)when the unit was brought off line for a planned surveillance
outage.As discussed in our response to NRC violation (2)of the inspection
report, the 4KV circuit breakers failure was detected during preventive
maintenance
testing.As a result, appropriate
corrective
action was.subsequently
taken which resulted in improvements
to our 4KV breakers.Also, we notified the industry of the problem via a Part 21 report.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 6 NRC-Identified
Veakness (3)"An extensive backlog of non-outage
corrective
maintenance
job orders partly caused by lack of integrated
planning and scheduling
methodology." Response to Weakness"Maintaining
the Cook Nuclear Plant involves the completion
of approximately
20,000 Job Orders annually.The relative priorities
of jobs change frequently
due to a number of factors, the primary reason being plant conditions.
Managing the information
contained within the backlog of yet-to-be completed Job Orders can be critical to plant availability
and reliability.
These efforts are presently hampered by the logistics of paper filing systems and computer tracking systems that lack needed flexibility
in hardware and software.(1)Corrective
Actions Taken The Cook Nuclear Plant Information
Management
System (IMS)plan, approved for development
in February of 1989 identified
nine computer system modules that, when completed, will form a single, integrated
information
management
system.This automated information
system will be used by both plant site and corporate personnel to support plant operation and maintenance.
It will provide for the scheduling
and initiation
of maintenance
tasks and support the assignment
of responsibilities
and accountabilities
for these tasks.Specifically, for maintenance, the Nuclear Plant Maintenance
Module (NPM)of the Cook Nuclear Plant's IMS plan will allow plant staff to initiate, issue, prioritize, and track all maintenance
work at the plant.The NPM module of the IMS plan will also maintain a history of maintenance
work.The primary objectives
of the NPM module are to improve plant availability
and to optimize the use of plant resources with the overall goal of reducing plant maintenance.
The NPM system is designed to allow any NPM user to initiate a structured
request that the user believes should be reviewed and, if warranted, acted upon.This action request feature provides a process for screening those actions requiring work, and will serve as a focal point for initiating
and tracking Job Orders.Plant personnel will enter data into the NPM system defining the component that needs work and briefly describing
that work.The system is designed to eliminate all paper in this process except the actual Job Order itself.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 7 The reviews that take place in the Job Order system are performed on-line.This on-line capability
allows for pending Job Orders to be sorted in various ways and the reviewing individuals
have'mmediate
access to this information.
Once reviews are performed the actual Job Orders can be printed for the work to be performed.
Once a Job Order has been initiated, starting from the very first entry into the system and not just from the time it gets printed, the Job Order processing
system can track the status of the Job Order.This is accomplished
through the use of status code fields.Some of the codes represent situations
such as waiting for materials, or waiting for approval of the reviews, or other types of conditions.
This feature is very helpful for planning and scheduling
the many Job Orders in the system.The NPM system will permit the plant staff to assign specific Job Orders, at the activity level, to a scheduled date, crew and supervisor.
Upon completion'f
the crew assignments
and confirmation
of permit requirements, the system produces a supervisory
assignment
report and prints the Job Order.The completed work package includes the Job Order, equipment descriptions, parts list, and testing forms along with other needed documents.
Once the work related to a Job Order has been completed and tested, the Job Order is reviewed and closed out, on-line.The NPM system maintains a complete history of all completed and closed-out
Job Orders.This feature allows for rapid access to all history on Job Orders.The NPM system prevents a Job Order from being closed-out
until all reviews and tests have been completed.
Zn addition, the NPM system will be a repository
for previous repetitive
tasks.This function eliminates
the need for individuals
to recreate Job Orders that are repetitive
in nature, The NPM system will automatically
generate the Job Orders,, according to the appropriate
due dates, or as directed by a planner.The NPM system will also provide for continuous
monitoring
of surveillance
tests and preventive
maintenance
work to meet regulatory
or plant requirements.
Once the repetitive
or preventive
maintenance
Job Orders are created, they are available for reviews and executions
in the same manner as any of the other Job Orders.This system will also be used to develop Job Orders for planned outages such as refueling outages.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 8 (2)Benefits To Be Derived From Corrective
Actions The data entered into the NPM system, and the processing
that the system does with this data, will eliminate the multiple manual data entry steps of our present process.Eliminating
redundant manual systems is of significance
itself.However, more importantly
are the anticipated
improvements
in plant availability
and labor productivity.
Along with improved ability to plan and schedule work comes an increased amount of time available for more careful consideration
of other aspects of the work to be performed, for example, personnel safety.Improvements
can be expected and will certainly be strived for.The NPM system will also identify and coordinate
maintenance
on related equipment and systems, thus decreasing
down time on components
removed from service.Quick access to the information
in the NPM data bases makes the supervisors
in both the operations
and maintenance
areas more aware of Job Order progress.It is anticipated
that the NPM system w'ill help us realize our goal of a non-outage
corrective
maintenance
job order backlog not in excess of 90 days.(3)Date When Benefits Will Be Achieved We currently anticipate
having the computerized
automated maintenance
system in place and operational
by August 1990.At that time, data validation
and loading, procedure changes and training of personnel will begin.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 9 NRC-Identified
Weakness (4)"Poor material condition especially
as evidenced by the high number of oil, steam and water leaks." Response to Weakness (1)Corrective
Actions Taken While it is AEPSC's policy to keep all of its facilities, in good material condition, we recognize the need for improvement
in this area.As a result, the management
of the Cook Nuclear Plant has launched a concerted effort to improve plant material condition.
This is evidenced by the allocation
of funds to support the following physical improvements
that are currently taking place: o Auxiliary building painting o Contaminated
equipment storage area expansion I o Decontamination
area redesign o Improved lighting o Installation
of 18 personnel whole body contamination
monitors It is Cook Nuclear Plant policy that no leak is considered
acceptable.
Consequently, during the 1988/1989 refueling outages we refurbished
about 1,780 valves and packed them with Chesterton
packing.A breakdown of this effort is as follows: Unit 1 Unit 2 Total Auxiliary Building Containment
Turbine Hall Miscellaneous
254 130 225 21 150 280 700 925 50 71 250 504 Nevertheless, a substantial
number of leaks still exist in the auxiliary building, ranging from small traces of dried boric acid to dripping.These leaks have been entered into a computer data base, have been chalked down, and job orders have been written.The leaks are currently being prioritized
and efforts will be made to repair them during the next refueling outage, if not before.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 10 The plant manager has reaffirmed
his commitment
to good plant material condition and personal accountability
by sending a memorandum
to each employee.This commitment
has been supported by continued radiation worker awareness training, and operator training on venting and draining.In addition, decontamination
efforts continue, which have already reduced the contaminated
area from approximately
45,000 feet in 1986 to the current 25,000 feet (excluding
laydown areas).Our goal is to reduce these contaminated
areas to 20,000 square feet in 1990 and 10,000 square feet prior to the outage in 1991.(2)Benefits To Be Derived from Corrective
Actions There are numerous benefits gained from having the plant in good physical condition, the most important of these being increased plant safety and reliability.
A related benefit is improved radiation protection
and worker safety.However, another important, but less quantifiable
benefit is the improvement
to worker morale.(3)Date When Benefits Will Be Realized While maintaining
the plant in good physical condition is an ongoing process, we anticipate
major improvements
within the next year.The refueling outage will facilitate
the refurbishment
of valises, as well as other repairs and modifications.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 11 NRC-Identified
Weakness (5)"Inadequate
trending, root cause analysis and action to correct, for example, numerous leaking safety relief valves." Response to Weakness (1)Corrective
Actions Taken This weakness is being addressed by three programs: the NPM system which is discussed in detail in our response to weaknesses
(1)and (3), the System Engineer Program, discussed in our response to weakness (1), and the RCM Program discussed in our response to weakness (1).(2)Benefits To Be Derived from Corrective
Actions The NPM system will provide for a complete component history.The component history will provide a chronological
listing of work, modifications
or inspections
that have been performed on a particular
component.
This process creates an indexed historical
record for components
or functional
equipment groups and catalogs completion
dates, failure codes, as-found and as-left conditions, parts replaced, test results, etc.The System Engineers are expected to identify and trend appropriate
system parameters, with the goal of obtaining pertinent data for system performance
and reliability
monitoring.
The parameters
trended shall be periodically
reviewed and approved to allow timely preventive
or corrective
actions to be implemented.
Based on the trended data, the System Engineer is expected to recognize significant
system/component
degradation
or abnormal operating conditions
from both a historical
basis, as well as current status.The System Engineer may require the support of technical experts to analyze specific areas of concern and will work closely with our Corporate Nuclear Engineering
Division engineers in this regard.The System Engineers are expected to perform root cause analyses on the systems assigned.Consequently, the System Engineers will be trained in root cause analysis.In addition, the System Engineer is expected to: Evaluate system/component
failure impact on plant safety and unit power operations
Prepare and perform special system/component
performance
tests.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 12 The RCM Program wt.ll contribute
to resolving this issue by identifying
dominant failure modes and critical components.
(3)Date When Benefits Will Be Realized As previously
stated, we expect the NPM system to be in place and operational
in August 1990.At that time, personnel training and data loading will begin.Several system engineers have been assigned at Cook Nuclear Plant and benefits have already been realized from this program.An effort is currently being made to recruit System Engineers.
However, we anticipate
it will take at least a year before the program is fully staffed.
Attachment
1 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 13 NRC-Identified
Weakness (6)"In several instances procedures
were not followed, were poor or did not exist especially
in the balance of plant area." Response to Weakness (1)Corrective
Actions Taken Key to the safe and efficient operation of any nuclear power plant is strict adherence to procedures.
As such, employees are shown during the Nuclear General Employee Training (NGET)classes, a videotape of David Williams, Jr., Senior Executive V.P., Engineering
and Construction, mandating the adherence to procedures.
It is AEPSC's long-standing
policy that failure to follow procedures
will result in disciplinary
action.In order for this policy to have any benefit, well-written
and accurate procedures
must be in place.Consequently, AEPSC is purchasing
PRONET and the services of consultant
procedure writers to upgrade or write 690 maintenance
procedures
(268 maintenance, 422 I&C).Critical balance of plant components
will be addressed as they arise in the RCM program.The Maintenance
Improvement
Plan provides guidance that clearly defines what procedure compliance
is.In addition, a procedure writer'/user's
guide will address the circumstances
for changing a procedure to ensure procedural
compliance.
(2)Benefits To Be Derived from Corrective
Actions PRONET is a state of the art computer system that integrates
writer's guidelines, word processing, graphics and data base functions into a centralized
procedure management
system.Development, commitment, scheduling
and reporting functions will be controlled
by this menu-driven
network.This integrated
approach will result in a program that reduces development
time and provides efficient long-term procedure maintenance
and commitment/reference
tracking.(3)Date When Benefits Will Be Realized Although a consultant
will train plant staff on the use of PRONET, the bulk of the procedure upgrade work will be performed by consultant
personnel.
By using contract workers we will not impact the plant staff.If the existing staff were used, it is anticipated
that the effort would take four to five years.This is considered
to be an unacceptable
time frame for this work.By using contract workers, we will obtain professionally
prepared procedures
in a reasonable
time frame.The effort is scheduled to be completed by December 1991.
ATTACHMENT
2 TO AEP:NRC:1125A
RESPONSE TO NRC-IDENTIFIED
VIOLATIONS
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 1 NRC Violation 1"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented
by Section 1.7.5 of the Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Operational
Quality Assurance Program requires that activities
related to quality be prescribed
by documented
instructions, procedures, and drawings, that those activities
be accomplished
in accordance
with those instructions, procedures
and drawings, and that instructions, procedures
or drawings include appropriate
quantitative
or qualitative
acceptance
criteria for determining
that important activt,ties
have been satisfactorily
accomplished.
a~Procedure PMI-2290,"Job Orders," Revision 8, required in Sections 4.4.8 and 4.4.8.3 that upon completion
of the physical work, the job order tags be removed and discarded.
Contrary to the abo~e, tags 15119, 029643, B012209, B016950, B016832, and B017240 were not removed although the job orders were cancelled or completed.
As a result, status of equipment condi.tion
remained indeterminate
(315/89031-01A;
316/89031-01A)
~b.Request For Change 12-2180 required installation
of 200%overload motor protection
and that the thermal overload be set at the low trip current rating.Contrary to the above, on December 19, 1989, the inspectors
observed that the thermal overload heater associated
with residual heat removal loop isolation motor-operated
valve ICM-111 was set at the high trip current rating.Numerous additional
thermal overloads in the diesel generator motor control center were also observed to be the wrong size or set at the wrong current rating, which will result in premature removal of operating voltage from the motors (315/89031-01B;
316/89031-01B)
~c~Procedure PMI-2030,"Document Control," Revision 10, failed to include requirements
for the Master Drawing Indexes to be reviewed by intended users for the latest as built drawings located in the plant master file.Consequently, drawings issued by the document control center for field verifications
were not the latest as built drawings or revisions (315/89031-01C;
316/89031/01C).
The"Pump Operator's
Data" manual and the vendor manual for'he Auxiliary Feedwater (AFV)pump required that the pump packing be adjusted while the pump is operating.
Contrary to the above, this requirement
was not incorporated
into the AFV maintenance
procdures[sic).Although no problems were noted, inadequate
attention to this requirement
could result in rotor seizure, scored shaft sleeves, or burned packing (315/89031-01D;
316/89031-01D).
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 2 Procedure 12 THP 6030 IMP.014"Protective
Relay Calibration", Revision 8, Step 8.1.2-2 specified that black electrical
tape be used when cleaning the disk and drag magnet mechanism on Time Overcurrent (IAC)relays.Contrary to the above, on December 5, 1989, a technician
was observed using an unused calibration
sticker to clean the 2AB EDG Time Overcurrent
test relay.As a result, cleanliness
of the contacts was questionable
(315/89031-01E;
316/89031-01E).
f.Procedure PMI-2010"Plant Manager and Department
Head Instructions, Procedures
and Index," Revision 17, Policy Statement 3.1, Section 3 required that"double asterisked" procedures
for plant activities
be"in-hand" when implementing
the procedure.
Contrary to the above, on December 6, 1989, the inspector observed an operator rack in"2A" Train Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker without having"in hand" double asterisked
procedure~12-OHP 4021.082.018"Racking In and Out Reactor Trip, Reactor Trip Bypass and MG Set Output Breakers," Revision 2.Even though no adverse affects were noted, in the past under similar circumstances, a reactor trip occurred (315/89031-01F;
316/89031-01F).
Procedure PMI-2010,"Plant Manager and Department
Head Instructions, Procedures
and Index," Revision 17, requires in Section 3.14.1 that all effective instructions
and procedures
be reviewed no less frequent than once every two years.Contrary to the above, maintenance
procedure MHI 2070, MHI 7090, PMI 4050, 12 THP 6030 IMP~071, and 12 THP IMP.062 were not reviewed in the last two years.As a result, the procedures
were not updated to reflect feedback and changes to preventive
maintenance
activities
(315/89031-01G;
316/89031-1G)." Response to Violation la Plant procedure PMI-2290 requires that tags placed at or near equipment needing repair be removed when the item is repaired or if the Job Order is cancelled.
As noted in the text, six Job Order tags were found in the plant for work that had been cancelled or completed which constitutes
failure to follow procedure.
The conclusion
made in Inspection
Report 89031 was that equipment status was"indeterminate." While the presence of Job Order tags was contrary to the requirements
of PMI-2290, the status of equipment/components
involved would not be affected.The information
placed on a tag identifies
to personnel 1)that a Job Order has been written for repair with number noted, 2)the nature of repairs/adjustments
required as determined
by the person initiating
the Job Order and 3)helps locate the specific component.
By itself, a Job Order tag has no impact on system or equipment operability, does
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC.:1125A
Page 3 not indicate that equipment has been tagged out, and does not direct any other activity involving the equipment.
Other systems such as the clearance permit system logs and the deficiency
logs indicate the equipment status.(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved Job Order tags identified
during the inspection
were subsequently
removed to achieve compliance
with applicable
sections of PMI-2290.(2)Corrective
Action Taken To Avoid Further Violation The Plant Manager will i.ssue a memo on procedural
compliance
to ensure that all personnel are fully aware of the meaning of compliance, consequences
of failure and what actions to take~when a procedure cannot be followed as written.The Maintenance
Improvement
Plan includes issuance of a department
policy on procedure compliance.
Included will be guidance on the monitoring
of the effectiveness
of procedure compliance.
Also a procedure writer'/user's
guide will address the circumstances
for changing a procedure to ensure procedural
compliance.
(3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved The final draft of the policy will be issued on July 15, 1990.Guidance on the effectiveness
monitoring
will be issued on August 15, 1990.The Plant Manager's memo will be issued on May 1, 1990.Response to Violation lb The Notice of Violation identified
that thermal overloads in the plant had been installed at an incorrect trip current rating.As a result of the inspection, plant personnel investigated
the problem and addressed it in Problem Report 90-81.(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved The improper positioning
and/or mis-sizing
of the overload heaters resulted from errors made during initial installations.
Twenty overloads were inspected and evaluated by plant and AEPSC engineers.
Eleven were found to b'e correct.One was found on a breaker for a resistive heater where overload protection
was not considered
critical as molded case circuit breakers protection
was provided.On four breakers (including
ICM-111)the as-found heater size agreed with the calculated, but arrow position did not agree.Full load amps was at the dividing point for selecting up or down posi.tion.
Slight changes in motor protection
resulted but did not affect the operability
of load.Four feeders on BOP were found to be mis-sized.
Of those four
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A-Page 4 one was mis-sized to a degree that replacement
was needed to ensure adequate protection.
Of the three other overload heaters, though improperly
set, would have provided thermal overload protection
for equipment.
Job Orders to correct these settings by October 30, 1990, have been written.(2)Corrective
Action Taken To Avoid Further Violation In the course of the plant's investigation
it was determined
that the mis-sizing
and/or mispositioning
of the thermal overloads had occurred during initial installation
in 1977 and 1978.Lacking vendor information, calculations
were most likely developed by plant personnel for positions/sizes
which in some of the cases, proved incorrect.
The design change process has evolved since that time to a level that reasonably
ensures that repetition
of a similar condition will not occur.Specifically, general procedures
now require that design calculations
be verified and documented
by qualified personnel.
(3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved Based on the engineering
evaluation
completed January 15,'990, the deficiencies
in the thermal overload heater settings would not have affected the operability
of the ICM-111 breaker.Other deficiencies
did not degrade the thermal overload protection
of the equipment breakers.Current procedures/practices
should prevent recurrence
of this problem.Response to Violation lc In the course of the inspection
it was found that a plant instruction
utilized for document control (drawings)
contained no provision mandating that the user of the index verify that it was the most recent update.We concur with the inspector's
conclusion
that an instruction
to users of the Master Drawing Index to ensure that it references
up-to-date
as-built drawings should be included in procedures.
(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved As a result of the inspection, PMI-2030,"Document Control," was revised to instruct a Master Data Index user to ensure that it reflects the latest as-built drawings located in the plant's master file.(2)Corrective
Action Taken To Avoid Further Violation Revision 11 to PMI-2030 is being routed for approval from plant management.
The revision addresses the inspector's
concern noted in the Notice of Violation.
I Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 5 (3)Date When Full Com lienee Will Be Achieved The revised version of PMI-2030 will be effective by May 1, 1990.Response to Violation ld Procedural
revision to incorporate
a direction to run a pump in order to properly adjust packing is not viewed as necessary.
Personnel performing
packing adjustments
meet the requirements
of ANSI Standard N18-1 (4.5.3).Consistent
with that standard, maintenance
personnel receive formal training in subjects associated
with their position.Included in the plant's training is a course on pumps that directly references
the correct methodology
for adjusting the packing on pumps.This teaches maintenance
personnel that adjustments
will only be made to packing when the pump is operating.
As required by ANSI Standard N18-7, Section 4.1 (2), plant procedures
are developed with the objective of providing adequate information
to personnel involved in a given task considering
the skill they are provided through the training program.(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved Those persons who would be involved in pump packing work are hired and trained consistent
with ANSI N18-1.(2)Corrective
Action Taken to Avoid Further Violation The hiring practices and training programs have proven adequate to prevent problems due to pump packing (3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved No violation occurred as practices are in accordance
with N18-1 and personnel are fully qualified.
Response to Violation le While the intent of Step 8.1.2-2 of maintenance
procedure 12 THP 6030.IMP.014
was to ensure that technicians
performing
cleaning would utilize tape or similar adhesive-backed
material.Black electrical
tape, was specified because it is a commonly available item.However, use of a calibration
sticker did-constitute
a violation of the procedure as written.(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved Maintenance
supervision
reviewed the net effect of utilizing the sticker in the course of cleaning and determined
that satisfactory
results were obtained.No re-cleaning
was deemed
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 6 necessary.
12 THP 6030.IMP.014
had been revised via a change sheet initiated April 2, 1990, to remove reference to black electrical
tape.(2)Corrective
Action Taken To Avoid Further Violation The Plant Manager will issue a memo on procedural
compliance
to ensure that all personnel are fully aware of the meaning of compliance, consequences
of failure and what actions to take when a procedure cannot be followed as written.The Maintenance
Improvement
Plan includes issuance of a department
policy on procedure compliance.
Included will be guidance on the monitoring
of the effectiveness
of procedure compliance.
Also a procedure writer'/user's
guide will address the circumstances
for changing a procedure to ensure procedural
compliance.
(3)Date When Full Com lienee Will Be Achieved The final draft of the policy will be issued on July 15, 1990.Guidance on the effectiveness
monitoring
will be issued on August 15, 1990.The Plant Manager's memo will be issued on May 1, 1990.Response to Violation lf (1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved The Auxiliary Equipment Operator (AEO)involved in this event had received training on the operation of reactor trip breakers and the existence of the procedure prior to this event.The AEO, however, overlooked
the reactor trip breaker procedure was required to be"in hand" whenever performing
racking operations.
Although the racking evolution was done in accordance
with the.procedure requirements, this event was a violation because the requirement
to have the procedure"in hand" was not satisfied.
A memorandum
was issued to Operations
personnel on January 19, 1990, to remind them of the"in hand" requirement
for the reactor trip breaker procedure.
(2)Corrective
Action To Be Taken To Avoid Further Violation The routine surveillance
procedures
for reactor trip breaker testing were revised on December 13, 1989, to reference the requirement
for having the reactor trip breaker racking procedure"in hand" for the racking evolutions.
The startup surveillance
procedures, which require racking of the reactor trip breakers, will be revised by June 4, 1990, to reference the requirement
for having the reactor trip breaker procedure"in hand."
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 7 During the concluded, procedures
Therefore, past two years, QA audits/surveillances
have except for a"few isolated cases," double asterisked
have in fact been"in hand" when required.no generic programmatic
problem exists.(3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved Full compliance
was achieved on December 6, 1989, when the'involved AEO was reinstructed
of the"in hand" procedural
requirement.
Response to Violation lg Five procedures/instructions
were cited in the Notice of Violation as not having been reviewed within the two-year limit established
in plant procedure PMI-2010.However, in each case the documents had been reviewed and documentation
to that effect was on file.Upon request one of the inspectors
was provided with biannual review documents for IMP.071 and IMP.062.The instruction
does not require an approved revision within two.years, only a review prior to such revision.This information
may not have been adequately
communicated.
(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved Further review of the Notice of Violation by the plant identified
that procedures/instructions
noted had received review as required by PMI-2010, Rev.17.(2)Corrective
Action Taken to Avoid Further Violation Tracking and review of procedures
is presently adequate.(3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved No violation occurred.
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 8 NRC Violation 2"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII, as implemented
by Section 1.7.8 of the Donald CD Cook Operational
Quality Assurance Program required that measures be established
for the identification
of materials, parts and components
such as by part number, serial number, or other appropriate
means on the item or records traceable to the item throughout
fabrication, installation
and use of the item.""Contrary to the above, identification
of materials and components
for traceability
was not accomplished
for cable extension portions and aluminum splicing sleeves for connections
to several safety-related
motor control centers installed under the Request For Change 1482 modification
(315/89031-02;
316/89031-02)." Response to Violation 2 RFC-1482 installed transition
pieces (sleeves)to splice copper to aluminum cables in various motor control centers.Per RFC instructions, the transition
pieces were to be installed in accordance
with Engineering
Design Specification (EDS)607 and EDS 608'he installation
took place between June of 1979 and September of 1981 when the final summary was issued.A search of the completed RFC package (including
installation
job orders)and of the microfilm of the completed job order packages revealed no documentation
of the parts (sleeves)used for the installation.
Individuals
who were involved with the Maintenance
Department
at that time stated that personnel would have installed the transition
pieces per the EDS as stated in the RFC.Inadequate
documentation
of material installed by a Job Order during the design change process was the root cause of this violation.
Additionally, there were inadequate
review of the completed job orders and the design change package upon completion.
(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved The installation
took place approximately
10 years ago and was performed in accordance
with EDS 608, which was referenced
in the RFC package.Actual application
for the past ten years has functionally
demonstrated
the adequacy of subject materials'
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 9 (2)Corrective
Action Taken To Avoid Further Violation Current procurement/dedication
practices ensure proper documentation
is developed to demonstrate
control over the suitability
of material, parts and components.
(3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved Current procedures/practice's
should prevent recurrence
of this problem and ensure future compliance.
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 10 NRC Violation 3"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, as implemented
by Section 1.7.11 of the Donald C.Cook Operational
Quality Assurance Program required that a test program be established
to assure testing to demonstrate
that systems and components
will perform satisfactorily
in service in accordance
with test procedures
which incorporate
requirements
and acceptance
limits contained in applicable
design documents, and that adequate test instrumentation
was available and used.""Contrary to the above, test instruments
were not sensitive or accurate enough to verify the calibration
of the undervoltage
relays that actuate the Emergency Diesel Generators.
Procedure 2 THP 6030 IMP.250,"4kV Diesel Start, 4kV ESS Bus Undervoltage
Relay Calibration," Revision 7, Section 3.0, required the use of a Westinghouse
type PA-161 AC anolog[sic]voltmeter or its equivalent
with equal or better accuracy and adequate range to measure the desired parameters.
However, the voltmeter had a tolerance of+1.5 volts that was not sufficiently
accurate to measure the desired parameter of 90.3 to 91.8 volts specified in Technical Specification 3.3.2.In addition, the voltmeter indicated to the nearest whole volt and did not have division markings between the numbers.Technicians
had to interpolate
results and record values to the nearest tenth of a volt while the voltmeter's
dial indicator was moving in the increasing
or decreasing
direction.
Furthermore, the technicians
used hand signals to communicate
the moment the under voltage relay operated.Based on the inaccuracy
and insensitivity
of the voltmeter, and poor testing technique, results of the undervoltage
test were not conclusive
(315/89031-03;
316/89031-03)." Response to Violation 3 The meter used was first specified in the original procedure developed before initial plant start-up.The specific reasons for using this meter could not be determined.
However, it is believed that this was the limit of the available technology
at that time.The only other meter available was a basic digital type, which could not be used due to the inherently
slow response and update time, causing a greater uncertainty
of specific setpoint value than the analog meter.
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 11 (1)Corrective
Actions and Results Achieved Z&C now uses the Fluke Model 45 digital meter during testing of the 4KV diesel start and 4KV ESS bus undervoltage
relays.Recent developments
in digital meters which include faster response times and update times and minimum/maximum
modifier features has made their use acceptable.
The digital meter currently being used has an accuracy of+0.3 percent.The previous test method provided acceptable
results, based on the as-found values on the first use of the digital meters being in specification
by comparable
percentages.'2)
Corrective
Actions Taken To Avoid Further Violation The calibration
procedures
which currently allow use of either analog or digital meters will be changed to specify the use of the Fluke Model 45 digital meter, or its equivalent, to ensure consistent
use of a digital meter.(3)Date When Full Com lienee Will Be Achieved The procedure changes will be completed before April 30, 1990.
~~
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 12 NRC.Violation 4"10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented
in Section 1.7.16 of the Donald C.Cook Operational
Quality Assurance Program required that measures be established
to assure that conditions
adverse to quality were promptly identified
and corrected.
In the case of significant
conditions
adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition was determined
and corrective
action taken to preclude repetition."Contrary to the above: The Plant Assessment
Group Committee's
review in March 1989 for Problem Report 89-245, concerned with the February 1989 failure of two safety-related
4kV breakers T-11D6 and T-1104 to close on demand during tests due to lubrication
hardening, failed to specify corrective
action to prevent recurrence.
Furthermore, no action was taken to inspect other 4kV breakers for common mode failure.Consequently, in March and April of 1989 seven additional
safety related and balance of plant breakers failed to close during testing, which was also caused by hardening of the lubricant on the breaker linkage (315/89031-04A;
316/89031-04A).
b.Corrective
action was neither prompt nor adequate to correct maintenance
related'roblems
identified
by the licensee in February 1988.In December 1989, 36 of these 71 self identified
findings and recommendations
were reopened.During this inspection
many of the same problems were identified
that reflect a significant
weakness in the corrective
action system (315/89031-04B;
316/89031-04B)." Response to Violation 4a Based on review of Problem Report 89-245, which was addressed in the Notice of Violation it is our position that no actual violation occurred.The February 27, 1989, condition was identified
during scheduled'preventive
maintenance
work and resulted in the problem report.That discovery, coupled with a similar condition also found during preventive
maintenance, resulted in a Part 21 report.The Part 21 investigation
revealed that vendor-specified
information
contained no instruction
for periodic lubrication
of the breakers.Similar breakers used in the plant had, until that time, passed test requirements'he
plant's actions which were taken promptly, included revision of the procedure based on new input from the manufacturer, initiation
of Job Orders to inspect all other similar breakers installed in both units, and establishment
of scheduled inspections
to identify possible repetition
of the
C.I 1
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 13 condition in the future.The Notice of Violation incorrectly
concluded that no action was taken to inspect additional
breakers or develop corrective
action.Two subsequent
problem reports were initiated as a result of deficiencies
found in the inspections
and tests covered by our expanded action for Problem Report 89-245 and the associated
Part 21 review.Those reports were initiated to document the similar conditions
on the noted breakers.Within two months of the March 1, 1989, Part 21 report to the NRC, the plant had completed the inspections, cleaned and relubricated
the breakers in both units as recommended
by the revised vendor information, and documented
each case when a similar condition was found.(1)Corrective
Action Taken and Results Achieved The result of Problem Report 89-245, which was reviewed by the Plant Assessment
Group on March 17, 1989, was to inspect, clean and lubricate similar breakers in both units and document the results.(2)Corrective
Action Taken to Avoid Further Violation Procedure changes and inspections
were scheduled as a result of addressing
the problem reported in Problem Report 89-245 on similar breakers.These actions generated additional
Job Orders and condition reports which were referenced
in the inspection
report.(3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved No violation occurred.Response to Violation 4b As discussed in our response to Weakness (1), AEP has taken numerous corrective
actions to address the problems identified
by the Maintenance
Self-Assessment.
These actions include: o the development
of a RCM Program o the acquisition
of the Nuclear Plant Maintenance (NPM)Module o the development
of a System Engineer Program o the acquisition
of NUS's PRONET and the servt.ces of NUS's procedure writers.
Attachment
2 to AEP:NRC:1125A
Page 14 In order to effectively
implement programs as encompassing
and comprehensive
as these, significant
analysis, planning and coordination
are needed.As such, it will take several years to completely
implement some of the corrective
actions we have initiated.
(1)Corrective
Actions and Results Achieved Maintenance-related
problems identified
in the Maintenance
Self-Assessment
will be reviewed and resolved as appropriate, with implementation
of the Maintenance
Improvement
Plan.(2)Corrective
Actions Taken to Avoid Further Violation The Improvement
Plan includes milestones
and a built-in mechanism that requires regular re-evaluation
of the plan and monitoring
of its effectiveness
to ensure that it is providing the desired results and that there is continuing
improvement
in all maintenance-related
areas'3)Date When Full Com liance Will Be Achieved Resolution
and documentation
of the identified
items will be completed by June 1, 1991.