ML101870567

NRC Response to Nuclear Energy Institute on September 14, 1998, Concerning NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 98-008, Disposition of Violations of Appendix R, Sections Iii.G and Iii.L, Regarding Circuit Failures.

ML101870567
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/21/1999
From:	Collins S J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Colvin J Nuclear Energy Institute
References
EGM 98-002, Rev 1 NUDOCS 9907270125
Download: ML101870567 (22)

Text

4H (4 ! i, ; ,- , "::; ,:, )UNITEDsttES NUCLEAR, REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. ="-m&Oi July 2 .1.99.9 MrJoseph Ivln 4......, I

• r , .-I ' l .. .7,. + + ., .., .-, : < + + .+ .; , + + , -+ .r + ' .P resdentýandCEO

,........The Nguclear y EneryInstitute,.

17761 .t ret, NW, SuiteAQ .-, +.£erM.Colvin*:, .3 ,r 0 I am aespondirgto the, letter .....iebran, ffice.of Enf ..,nt'(OE);,fh, 1 on Setehmer1,4

.1.998,,coneihg AheUS:uc~(Rib~~y~imsin's (NRC's)_:Enforcbmen Guidance,, n,"~g ~ .S NDeaiespi uy Cm:~Secton~ll. , ,Meoraidun (GM)987Q02' pipo~t6nf Violations.

6f Appedndix R,..Ill. .Regarding Citc~it Failures., 'Y6..sugjestd

'that "he t NR:old in abeyance enforcerment ,action~s per~tain~ing to vioI~tibnr'o 6fAppendix R stemtTiinig from fire-induce circuit failure vulnerabilities until the NRC revises the regulatory requirements or accep~ts an I~ndustry approach.

You, further. stated ~that if ýenforcement.

action is deemed necessary; te N Ush exercise o ntil a: +p-e u' ; ' '+gui anc,+ is establis.hed'andythat th-e JMJCsho'6Ld b us a, risk infeomtirn lafin-,0+fnftorcement iC .. ..R om Fre. ......dl~e s'esth~..

th. B.rui *i .... ....e wit ........ moor r'2Eno~eae.vaemen, t~u dance+deo asndu(Gl)98-002,c~

h~sotshUon of ula~esut in as o puenous permiSsiesignal.G and a I.LZega~rdated Jan'cutar tec hnica isses NRha1dlng IN 921 :.ya~nd, contaceirns' pthatithestaf rview1aindinsf of the~ technica aird cca' iit. I Mequrepontse d*.++ acrcepts an997,ein teaprat he u staoti that thepren foreet ieionu circt fues t o'frrotec iosary, glhe lo sC Th~olexet rcmeasrtionncude n the a eneclosreso ton oothelter aprovidesthe' Isuda -.setbsed Ea8-0 nd Marha2198 toeRC shoude ue nsformenttuidnc concearnig inspctiont

'requ"remntso.In thre,, aeMthicenseets st that-the ECMrlO 'soultedbeth certains i tor-geneic6m lette w'asI no ete' iss ed. ja Th.gerstdvaff uedWt Post-F oire SfeSutdownCiruitinasuos,':

onJnep3199ss.vs as y ioauknowr i , respoy6unetrtaisedefforts a o t uclregardlngyi IN a2-18 and expressed concefrs that the staff reviewanderic lepedin. the.echnican aodfhs safety Issues addressed in-iN,92-18"may constitutea p~ant-ispe..f `,ý, " -soonse ated'.+,MAirdh,1,!

11," f997,. ..reiterated the staff" ... o ition, that. th6, tnll.f rfr'd c dcic i alr s..., .. .... I, .,',".+ ,,+ ..+,,'rnui the acApbiility.

tr toachieve and aintain safe shutcown was withinte st e rco e of the eistlng pproprtein'ulatr ons, The Information .yncluded I n th nclosure to the letter provides the rgRC statf postoreqirtemardengtr heglardgtheprosetonffire-indused cirto sfailuppre.

Spbsequently,OE S II .issued EGM 98'-002 0n March 2;, 1998j"oipi6V~de enforcement guidance concerning inspection

drrispertaining to the inability to achieve and maintaih safe shutdown conditions due to..... .i+p. o shutdntia cieitye cinthe aintrm Itn the EGiMp the staff stated its intentions to issue an tote i..,+, nformation, notice followed by a generic letter to address questions about the regulatory

,++-.requ.1remerts.

In the EGM, the. staff also stated..that the EGM would be reconsidered if the : "generic letter was not issued. A............,...............

_:_h.__sa__:__ssu_

_N 99-1_7, "Problems Associated With Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit,+ ',,+ ... Ana!ys~es*,`,:

.. .6... n++June 3-ý 1999. As you know, In response to the efforts of the Nuclear Energy"!

.ii+i!,Imttut:(E!'a~dthe Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) to address'the Is, ." jsssue, the sataf! deferred its plan to issue a generic letter pending completion of these ,.

actlvties..

After these Industry activities are completed, the staff will determine the' ' i',i; :iappropriate regulatory response, If any, needed.*to ensure that, licensee~s comply with, the reuirements regarding the protection.of, circuits needed to suppod post-fireae , : .,+

In.the intedm,,,it Is importan~t-that:ficenseps continuea to pay a'ttentio'n to the t 9 9 7 7 0 2 '"99 0 7 2 1 ' ' " +'! !' * "' L ! ' ' '..... +,+HUM*R+

C,: ,,, +,,, L -,rOJ I II#

issue of circuIt failures,, given the potentially significant conseq.uences that "can i,-rinadequately analyzed or proteed circuits.

For example, if " crcut analyss iapproprately x ,excludes

circuits from. rece6ivng the,*re qu!recdfe

'protection or separationj

.the circusit could be vulnerable ir6:damage which. could adversely'c fect the abilit of aplt to oachieve and maintain safe shutdown.We recognize that some licensees disagree.

with the NRC's interpetation of the requirements in this area anrd that the diffegrin.gews, need to be. resolved. .Ao preyously noted. to,,'chieve this resolution,.thestaff.has agreed to..cops!deOrendorsi':gpositiOns.proposed;.bý',takeholders.

To t.he staff's knowledge; NEI ndtheBWIOG are jtieonly stakeolde'

',A," pi gpositlins to Tresolve this.issue." "To allowV YE and the, BW,, tmeto 61 evelop. po'siionis that the, NRC can endore, the NRC willltemPoranly ef err aIl eformement acions perafr)rg to,.';nonconforrnancesin:this area. I he deferral eo ll a1pl 0for 180 da"!from the'date of this* tter. Johrn Hannon, 'H Chle fof .the l Sys.ems Branch, NRR,'discussed this time frame with DAVid MDdeen of your staff/n dttey ageed that S.'should all0, sufficient-time for the staff.and"NEI tO each agreement on acceptable a....achforresoln the issbei-'The staff also discussed progress and scheduling with tai of theBWROGfr The,180-day deferral period is consistent with the, BWROG's schedule.

Durng the 180-day deferral period, the NRC will,' on the basis of ,thecurrent staff position remy lette"o March11, 1997, dodument ,i"nonconformances as .apparerit violatdonss' The'staff will defer enforcement'actons for disputed apparent violations provided the affected hcenseesimplemeut reasonable compensatory

...atonsfor the Identified vulnerabilities.

For fire-induced circuit failure nonconformances that are not disputed, the staff will take enforcement action consistent with the guidance provided in EGM 98-002, which has been modified as described herein.. If we have not reached agreement...onan.acceptable-approach for resolving this issue within the 180-day deferral period, the staff will resume application of the, modified EGM 98-002 guidance and of the NRC's Enforcement Policy -. " ,* ,,; l. le 1 ..pd3/4.. ,d 5 ' " ." -. 9 .... ."" .' * .~~J ~.def erring formal ac~t' dons 'pe~taihndng t tb-c~lcu -nl'l noifcon orrnance and to%'indIcatcte that:, IscretiohdWillbe exercised to not cite violations of the applicable requirements-regardless of who. identifies the -condition, provided;,kicensees take approprate compensatory actions.and:commit necessaranalyses and modificatio-ns in a.reasonable' timeproach-..w.

ch.dfffers.

rom the curren EGM guidance that violations be cited iff, ..rame...., s.i,ap~p I' vola ios.,..e i.

by ' 'th- applied in the recent St. Lucie and'River Bend cases ( EAs98-513 and 98-460, rýpecti'vely).

This discretion will be exercised until proper generic notification to the industry occ6rs and licensees have sufficient time to respond to the notification.

The staff does not Intend to revisit past cases in which enforcement actions have been dispositioned.

If li e s e s a i e h. i t .. , .... ., d i~i' If licensees, after~eintenr~n~180-day period, continue to maintain that their facilities are not I',,' bound by thetaE ,cable.re.quirementsantd choose not to perform necessary analyses and.modifications, NC wllapply the. normal Enforcement Policy, including sanctions., as warranted.,', , .'Each case will have to be evaluated on its own merits. The reasonableness of the "

is expected e to lbe based on thejsafety significance of the :,the established qutageo gtcedule, and the scope of modifications necessary.c Compensatory, measures will normally be acceptable as an interim measure, but the circuit i!.iii..4',4, vulneraboiesrmust be resolved.14' 9 ' 4e Mr. Joseph CoMn 3 The staffagrees that both the licensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significance of violations of the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.Although the use of risk information is not specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, the staff uses risk information to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.Sincerely, nsue rector Office of Nuclea~r Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

EGM 98-002, Rev. I 0.~A iF F' F'* F 'F' FF'F" ~ *F F' Mr Joseph Colvin 3!.The 1staff agrees that both the licensees

`arid the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significance of violationsi'of!fthe regiuatory requirements regarding Circuit failures.A.th6 gh t.e use of risk Information'l's not spedf ically addressed In EGM 98-002, the staff uses risk Information to help assessJhe significance of yiolations and will continue to do so.fli;* N-~`-, SinSncerely,-Samuel J. Collinirector f, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ev. S t EnhcosUre:

EGM 98-002, R-. DISTRIBUTION:

TCins RZlmmerman BSheron OPA OGC DOudinot WRuland, RI RGardner, Rill DOCUMENT NAME: A:NEIIEGM Public JHannon GHolahan SCollins PQualls P Madden KSWest KLandis, RII DPowers, RIV see Previous concurrence SPLB:DSSA DOudinot:Jk° 06/30/99 TECH EDfTOR*C.IIPB:DI.PM Wean *,!i 07/14M99 SPLB:DSSA.

KSWest*06/30/99.:OEýJL eberma&07/07/99 SPLB:DSSA; JNHannon*ý 07/01/99 ADiPT:DONR9/99 07/09/99 DSSA:NRR GMHolahan.

07/08/99 D:DONR SColllns*07/2/99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 3 4 k;0" .i U

Mr. Joseph Colvin 3-agrees that both the licensees Ad the staff should use risk information to help assess t" ,,he ft 'isignificance of violations f,

requirements regarding circuit failures..Althoughftheuse of risk information is&n6t'-ecii'cally addressed in EGM 98-002, ihe staff uses risk information to help assss t!he significance of violations and will continue to do so.C>Sinc offK M 98-002, Rev 1 erely, uel J. Collins, !Dire'ctor

e of Nuclear. Reactor ,Regulation)n, '. '. .;Attabhrfent

EGi DISTRIBUTION:.Central" H~e SPLBl R/F RZimmerman BSheron OPA OGC DOudinot WRuland, RI RGardner, Rill DOCUMENT NA SPLB:DSSAI-DOudinot:lk*

06/30/99 TECH I EDITOR*',6/29/99 C:IIPB:DIPM 0W7Dean*'07/14/99 Public JHannon GHolahan SCollins Qualls P dden KS st KLan RIl/DPow #IV kME: A:NEIIEGM

• see previous concurrence SPLB:DSSA, " SP :DSSA " DSS, KSWest" JNHa on, GM: 063099/07/01/99 O D:OE* ADPT:DONR,.

M 0/"" 07JLiebe an.' BSheron'07/Q9/99 , 07.C A:NRR-1 aan*~1 99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY* 1q..... .'-.-.....

.... .............." , .C.~:"5l.

V 4,'4, ('Mi. Joseph Colvin .' 3 T'.%f~he ýtaff agrees that both the licensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess ,.th:t diefetylignificance (l violations 16f the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.A Altho gh the'use of risk information

'ils not specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, the staff uses risk information to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.Sincerely.

.A. .,\ .~'DISTRIBUTION.

Central File SPLBR/F,...

TColhins RZimmmerinan BSheron OPA OGC DOudinot WRuland, RI RGardner, Rill S j*'S.~-'.5

Ii)/SamuelJ. eoihns, Director,.

Office:0oUNucIear Reactor RgulatWionr -' ,? ," " Public I JHannon GHolahan SCollins WKane PQualls PMadden KSWest KLandis, RII DPowers, RIV'S DOCUMENT NAME: A:NEI!EGM*see previous concurrence SPLB:DSSA, DOudinot:lk*

06/30/99 SPLB:DSSA KSWest'06/30/99'A SPt.B:D SSA JNHannon*07/Oj.i 1 A N 07/1'1/99*TECH: EDITOR:,D;,ON R WCollins'07/ /99 71/,. /99 P,;: M , ,.. ...' "~j7),,La,* vt:. /1 ,V .: .5. a~- 5. .4.4.aV a-Mr.Joseph Colvin jTh staff agrees that both the licensees and the staff should use risk Information to he assess i'the safety significance of violationsdf the'regulatory requirements regarding circuit f ures..Although the use of risk information'nsnot specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, , e staff uses!sk nsformatlon to help assess the signifidance of violations and will continue to o so.Sincerely,.DISTRIBUTION:

" C-ntral FileýPNorr T\CollIns SECYýOGC.,CFO DOudinot JHannon SBums C Samuel Office." r Regulationi..Public WTravers/ / EDO R/F GHolahan" SCollins , OPA OCA CIO KS West J/ aha* ..I. ,~'*~j t/DOCUMENT NAME: A:NEI!Et.*see previous concurrenc/

SP, SA. " .:,.SPLB:DSSA B S inot:lk- KSWest NHannon" 1 9 " " "'..": LX"/..i/99 0 /" "*TECH / -" " z. " ADPT:DONR D:DONR EDITOR ...BSheron. SColiris ...3/29/99 / /69 / /99 DSSA:NRR* GMHolahan/ /99 1 q'

.,b- epM. ,Jobpn Golvin 3 ne sta r ag'r~ee~s that.both , th e 'lcensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significance of violations of the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.theusi risk hfdrmatn'is~nt specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, the staff uses risk information to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.S i e l ...S,-lI, .,...-: -Sincer-ely,..

......./ I':: \ 'DISTRIBUTION ON NEXT PAGE Wilia D. Trav, Executive for Operationhs DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SPLB\SECTIONB\OUDINO-TNEI 2.REV.WPD SSPJBDSSA PLB:DSSA SPLB:DSSA DSSANRR'DOudinot:lk KSWest JNHannon GMHolahan/ /99 / /99./.99 / /99!TECH D P.T' 2 ADPT ONR D:DONR-------

BSheron SCollins 6/-9/ /99 /,./99 ADM, 1.EDO* " ' W~V Travers. '-:"!; ' ... ../9 9 ... .../I 9 9 , ., .., / 1 9 ., .O F/ / /99 /'/99 OFFICIAL RECORD.COP' ~~~~~. ....i; : .. ... , :, fl OR.Cp Ai "la",

IP.Mr. Joseph Colvin 3 T"he estaff agrees that bath the licensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significanceof violations of the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.Although the use if risk inf: 6tion is not specifically addressed in EGMV 98-002, the staff uses risk informat n to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.Sincere'y, , William D. Trvers I ....:. ..... Exe 9 Otive Dir'ectbýfr Operations DISTRIBUTION ON NEXT PAGE !//DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SPLB\SECT ONB\OUD OT\NEI2. REV.WPD iSPLB!,bSSA S PBDSSA .SPLB SSA' D DOudinot lk SWest JNHannMHolahan 1/99 //99, -19 991*TECH ADPT:DONR D:DONR EDITOR BSheron SCollins/' IN,,~A A:~Nf~~.s *1.j 6 ~'799/ /99/ /99 ADM OGC EDO WTravers/ ' ~ --. " ~ ... I /9ýIAN ,OFFICIAL RECORD COPY:ý.i* ' .L ' ' ' "A." -" ,, " " " .,

ENCLOSURE'UNITED`STATES'

ý,,NU, CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 WASHINGTON.

D.C. 2014114M21, 1999 EGM 98-002, Rev 1 MEMORANDUM TO. Hubeqrt.J.

Miller', RegFionalAdmniistrator 9 Region I .,Region.~-

-"James ,E D.er,R.Regiona[iAdministrator.,:".;

., egion Ill Ellis W.'Merschoff, Regional Administrator Region IV William Kane, Associate Director for Inspection and Programs, .......... .. , Bnan~,W. She on, .ociate&Directo dr..o , .; .. , .... .." "' " '.Prolect

'Lice !sin' .. and 'Teclrimcaa

"... Analysis, "' DONRI : " -" IElzabeth

0. Ten Eyck,Dbi'r iior; visiton6o Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Donald A. Cool, Director,.

Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS.ohin'T..~reeves,-,Diredtor, Divis i'6-of Waste. " .., Man enei;NMSS~

EWiam Brach, Director .i ., :. SporntFuel Projec Officed ., ..

........., .'..... ....... .;,,..

cirFROM i~z ...,00er.~&.~~*.

Off ice, of Enforcement..

F,

SUBJECT:

ENFORCEMENT GUIDA MEMORANDUM EGM 98-002, REVISION I -DISPOSITION.OF VIOLATIONS OF SECTIONS Ill.G AND III.L. OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50 INVOLVING CIRCUIT-.FAILURES.

I.~ ~_.yr ppse.of this revision is to change the guidance pertaining to the disposition of potential.

noncomphiances lnvoving fre-iduced circuit failure vulnerabilities that have the potential to affect the safe shutdown of a facility.

The initial guidance was published in March 1998.NRR staff and regional inspectors have found a number of plant-specific problems related to potential fire-induced electrical circuit failures that could prevent operation or cause malfunctioning of equipment needed to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown.

Fire protection inspections conducted in each region have found that licensees may not have complied with thelregulations that require that facilities be designed such that fire-induced circuit failures (e.g.,.hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) do not adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve.and maintain a safe-shutdown condition.

..... ............

~~~~~~.. ....,-.,,,, .: ..:' :....... ... , " , " 9907270131

-990721 PD4R REVOP.;1ERQNLMC i PDR.: ...:.. ......, .".....~, .;!

" Multiple Addressees

-.2 -..... exampleof' the consequences of this type of problem is reported in Information Notice (IN)92-1.8,, Potenti4I for Loss of Remote, ShuJtdo.wn During a Control Room Fire which'.alerted licenseesthat the circuit qgic associated with certain edvalves, When*subjecte to. a, singlej fireýi'nduc'ed ,ot,,sbp,6rt, cq6u!,d result i spý#666s,.p'erim si v sgnal. Theýspnur os~signhaI.could ca~use'the,'valveý,1 11-0, 0p"~t.bpy

~Qtv* rsulingin.r~chai~a vave amgp~.Suh, ir-induced.

damaige,66uId, ipajr he licensee s aii ty ,oi sh~ut ,d " the plant arid maintain diti6 'a isafe"-shu'tdo n.c dditibh., How vqe,.', I,.9 .'..; v ui~nerability e~xtends be~yond 3t e scop .e iof ic .nltrol, r~o tires

,,,,, -, ., .."n r.mul.iple orrespondence, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has asserted that the staff's interpretation of the regqlzatory, requirements is, at a.minimum, inconsistent with many licensees' unde'standing -and different from past staff inteipretations.

Inra letter to'NEI dated March 11, 1997, the Director of NRR reiterated te staff's psition that the tential for fire-ndudd atth.abiity,'art faues, tompa the apant t achieve anrd mAintain safe shutdown was ,ithiin-t1se s<60pe, of th, existing ire'protection regulati6ndris:The

• r -.,etter focused on NEI s questionsregarding IN 92-18. tThe inforrmation in the enclosure to'the March 11 letter, explaihed' the' NRC'staffs pObstions'germjane to the larger issue of fire-uedid circuit failures.A copy'o the Ma'rch 11 etter is attached-and fully-explains theapplicatiof the regulations.

In followup-lettersfrom NEI, including onel received on September 14, .1998, that requested that guidance provided in the initial EGM 98-002 be changed, NEI continued to assert that the current staff interpretations of the requirements are beyond the licensing basis of many facilities and represent a change in previous NRC staff positions.

The NRC staff and the industry are currently working to resolve questions raised by the industry about the"adequacy 6f,,thiexsting'btaff'gu~idance oniceming i.rei-duced ,ircuitfailures and SX.thenconsistency of-staff,.terpretations'ofbothhot'guidance

'and .the underlying regulator

i requirements.

'The staff exe'ts to reach agreement with industry on an acceptable approach for resolving this issue within 180:days of the. date of this EGM. To allow the industry time to develop positions that the, NRC Cca"nendorse, the NRC will temporarily defer, formal enforcement actions pertaining .to noncOnfo rmances in this-area f or those %licensees that dispute that the issues constitute violations of. reagulatory-requirementsn.ti:

T snhansar-n visionged ndthefrcement guidan '.is ,as follows: ..A. "" For,licensees that assert that a particular nonconformance associated with a fire-induced circuit failure vulnerability does not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements, theNRC~wi', on the-basis of-the staff position reflected in the attachment, document the nonconformance as an apparent violation.'

The NRC will defer enforcement actionsjfor.

disputed apparent violations provided the licensee implements reasonable compensatory, actions for the identified vuinerabilities.

'An apparent violation, as defined by Manual Chapter,0610, is merely "a potential,.

noncompliance with a regulatory requirement that has not yet been formally cil-Ad 1 as a violation..in,a Notice of Violaion orý,order..

." , ' -.I*:,-' /

f~~~ ~~~ Ij i,': ..Multipl'e ssees 3.Inpectors shlcld include language Int cove ltter iilato the ollwig to Adocument the apparent violations:

".,.uring he insp.ection, tiolationspof,[state applicable requirement(s))

e: e -wei'., de'tifi'ed.ý These crcuir t.Vulnerabilities could, under certain postulated fire;".,,scenarios, aderseyae tf e ab.ilit t 'o.achg'eve and 'maintain, safe shutdown of JIthe facdlity.,-It isthe NRC's unders tanding that you do not..consider

• thse vulAnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements.

In order to allow the industryjtime to develop an.acceptable approach to resolving this issue that the" " NRCcan endorse, the NRC will defer any ehforcementactlon retativ to these S.... : ...."matters, untilnuary 1 8" 2000) proviwed you take 'adequate compensatory measures for theidentified vulnerabiItes.

If an acceptable approach for resolving this issue is not reached by (January .18, 2000), the issue will be subject to disposition in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.B. For licensees that assert that a particular noncorformance associated with a fire-induced. circuit failure Vulnerability does not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements and refuse to take compensatory measures during this interim period, normal enforcement processes will be followed and the licensees may be subject to formal enforcement action.C. For those cases in which licensees do not. dispute that a violation of regulatory

'requirements th`e6guidance

'is as*olow, , ? ... .-Enforcement, i bebexercised'toprnotcite the vioations provided I'r:, ; F 'F Q ,icensees take,'prompt .compensatory actions and corrective actions within a r .easonable time,,frame., 2 IThis'discretion will be exercised regardless of who*:identifies the nonconformance The enforcement discret~on provided for herein may be exercised even after the 180-day ...deferral period until such time.as proper generic notification to the industry occurs and.licensees have sufficient time to respond to the notification.

After the 180-day intenm period," ' i !'i' '* ;,: ' F " " ' ."" F" i, Each case will have to beevaluated on its own merits., The reasonableness of the:.,-corrective actions .schedule is expected to be based on the safety significance.of the.,. , nn.conformance,,the established outage :schiedule, and-the sqope of. the, modif ications necessary'.

Compensatory measures will normally be acceptable as an interim measure, but the circuit vulnerabilities must be resolved.1- ~,

Multiple Addressees OE will review this EGM and revise it, as appropriate, to reflect any agreement reached between the staff and the industry on the disposition of these issues.

Attachment:

As stated cc: The Chairman Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield W. Travers, EDO F. Miraglia, DEDR M. Knapp, DEDE D. Dambly, OGC S. Collins, DONR J. Zwolinski, NRR L. Chandler, OGC J. Hannon, NRR SECY PJ ,.Ii i~;7~.,, 7,'I,-I 'U,'U, ~ 7, 7,a 7 ¶~~i'~4, ~ ~ ~ K) p~kJK~f' .1

• tip e Addressees .OE will review this EGM and to refiect any agreement reached cbet~en the staff and the Industryon the dispositiOi of theso issues.,Attachment.

As stated!, 4 4 Chairman

UCormmissioner Diaz.'Commissioner McGaffigan Gommlssioner Merrifield WTravers, EDO FMlragia, DEDR..MKnapp, DEDE DDambty, OGC.4.d1.4SColI1nsjDONR'4,,-~~~

JiZio4inski, DONR`.;ý ,`., JHannoW, DONR ..J. ebermnahn~l,OE

~ J OE Staff Enforcement -Coordinators RI, RII,, RIII',..RI -NRR,;NMSS (Also by E-Mail)EGM File Day File WEB (2 weeks after issuance)PUBLIC (2 weeks after: issuance)SPLB R/F G3Holahan BSherion DOudinot PMadden.... .... .. ... ...L W h it e y .: : .. ... ..... .. ... ..... ... ... ..... ... ..4 F0 44 DOCUMENT; NAME: A:\EGM98002REV1.WPD

• see previous concurrence NU:bC S NRR D:C D NU SOE I YE TReis* SWest , /an N /99 L I 7 7 1/L9 j! 'OFFICIAL RECORD COPY r J 4-ATTACH-MENT1 4;- .-it 4. V: "' '" " ' 0' 0.. ....'.. ......r "' " ...*).. .F ..'Chnorief deredntn1) wI r es d to youffieerW Of Ja uary 14, 1997, conceing U.S.N uclear Regulatory 1.Commiss (N.Rg ,I*)!nstrt a

• Ni ( 9 n oty tial For Lor of Remote, Shutdown CapabMIiy Dug a* Control Roodm Ftrrq, F6&092)A~~aaelN21 adresd conitnsI Mon and reor A-'a e IN,, f A relicensra ees, tat couJld hav 'resuhed In the oss ýof apbdftyto, jacieVe an~d ma% ~ i~r bft Win Vit6M'evnt of a ~65trof 4 room' fire. Spciicll , tec~rcjt b*

'w;en'. ++.'uojcte to a fie hot shfedhapiodipenmsvesignal.

T" i spurou Igas slnblcudits e thase'thtide safety Isse a byrassdingI 9-1(the ~rtciv featre, and resu.'ng in1 mh u -, laN,'dma mag)Su fbfor c6,6M haveiimpaireýn the cpablmo to shtown , and 'e not a ,stutdo ,

msn +of ath Niha myisser noftute(NEs ) the ssfiosvand Iasues -rased myO' :.STher Durithe m o .staff Itr'Arx it agreedrwithes yourp tnae no. i esshouldde nbs*ton s e nwndes i positions 0r guidance.

The staff presented Its positins regarding fire-ndcerd hot shorts and , SpuriIxA signals and' tI position that the saety isue in IN 92-18 (the potential for 4 fire-induced hot. shorts to* Impair the capabiltyto achieve and maintain safe shutdown)

Is within th sop o te xiPig fire protecion regul~atin.Th, saf als explainled how the, reguilation andpubstd saffpoitinsand, guianc spporthis p osiio and why its revew and X"ioof the technlcaI ind sfey issues addressed IN 8o tnite a plant-Durin the ýmOOtl-Vgft saff Stated that it also agreed with your positi that enforcement actins souldno(t4b taken against a licensee for failure to 'comply with. Information notices. F Althugh specific enforcemnent actions were not discussed during the meeting, the staff ado nowledgedl that It had recently issued notices of violation to several licensees in response to 4i findings of post-fie safe shutdown deficienies kvOMng ho shorts. In each csthe enfo*mrcprentc*irwwere dependent on fth circumstances of fth case and were taken against a cerwe"s for, faiur to comply with the appicable regulatorY requirements, consistentwih4 1 roguia", posto~ns, and not for failure to compl with an information notice.The staW treated your concerns In accordance with its procedures for managing backfits.

After j consldertn§ th 1 m rMatlon You submitted in your letter, the discussions with NEI and licensee reprsenaties

~rtg te metin ofFebuar 7,199, ad r-evaluating the fire protection 4 oJ, :Idteaultl and, apicable staff po, tfions and guidanice, the staff concuded that its position (fthat Og 3; 43.3 ,<3,,,..3 ... ..;: .: 3 '3 .": " .' ENCLOSURE.<,, .,

...ASSESSMENT OF NEI COCEN RG DIG* -" ~Ji NRC INFORMA7ION NQTICE 92-18... : " ~...........

':, :" .DRN A CONTRL.. ROMFIE.*

28,"1992, the 1 Ni.clea'r Regul tory:pmmiss'n

'(NRC) issud Information.

.Nio. 3 eIN) ,,.otentil 3 or Loss of Remote hu Cap.dtDuna.CtolRo the .for a corntrol rg0oom fire ,to: ause'electncal short circuits energi.zed conuctorsand conductor~s asscited-.ih thecontr.ol circutry of.conditions:

• Such ap.event could cause' certairn valves tosp~unou, sy actuate. In addition,;

the, ocation of the circujit'fau.it' the MOV torque an~d limit switches wo~uld be o*-ineffective to, stop valv'e operation.

Moreover, because thermal overload protection had been bypassed at some facilities, the potential existed iorfjlre-inducd .spurious valve actuations to resuhltn i,c1m6nt m'e'chanical damage'toprevent the react(or~prato~s from'Tmanually operating the aff'ected valves.

result in a loss df capabelity to ahiev~e or' mfn~t'ai .safe..2. APPLICAB'LE .REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE 'Th1e 10 of ithe..Code of ,Federal :Reaulation~s, iPart..50, .Appe.ndix..R, Secion lIl.G, 'Fre, protetio of safe, shutdow..

capabI'ity, par~agraph1.a, 3 to achkeve and. m.a.ntan: shutdqwn./conditios .from: .ei~ther the..controelroom or, con.trolsttion (s) be: free addition., Section. lI!.G~ paragraph requires!

that*where-cables~or.euipment,.including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent.operation or cause maloprationdue to hot shorts, open circuits, or. shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to. achieve and maintain hot shutdown

..are located within the same fire :area," a m~eans be provided for .ensuring one train of the redundant safe shutdown trains will be free of fire 1: For .those plants licensed after*January1.," 1979, the applicable regulatory requiremenet is 10 CFR Part 50, Appndix Crtro 3, " 'F e '" " ?"P.:. " e5:,ot; : ;, (SRP 9.5.1 ), 'Fire Protection Pr..gram,'

ReviSion' 3, ;dated July 1'981,' was used by the: staff, as..." review guidance.

This guidance is the same as that specified by the technical requirements of Appendix R, Section IIl.G.In Genernis Letter (GL) 86-10, ;implementatio ofFire Protection .Requirements," dated.............

April24,r198, thestaff interpreted the term..free of fire damage." In Enclosure 1,"lnterretaion of-Appndix R," Interpretatio.nl 3, "Fire Damage,' the staff stated, in part, that"the lm has provided methods acceptable for assuring that necessary structures,' .!The ,safety concerns associated with fire-induced hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts'to ground In safe shutdown and associated circuits, which could prevent operation cause maloperation of.. .redundlant.shutdow trains, were predicated on the numerous adverse conditions that oc:curred during ....ieB..wns Fer tire.. of_ March 25, 19756' .:i'; ... Reeec NRG05, Rcmenain Related...

to.~o n Fer .F.ire.; Feb.ruary., ;:.',....:.

.. : ... .: .. ....j33 ~{33. :343 3$33 t tehnicl ue addre lh IN 92-188 within the scope 61 te existng fire Protect.Kn rebulation)

Ws justified.t On this basis, the staf hasi,1o--conclde tatit~c~ntinued review and spcioffre protecoissues, icludiig.suh tn nicaa and safety issues, as those addrissed In IN 92-'18, is app'ropiate.

In staff is"considenng the need to take further action to ensure that licensees understapd and comply with the applicable regulatory requirements.

With respect to enforcement actions, the staff thentinue toenforce te-Commission's requirements in accordance with the guidance 'fiNUREG1 600;'Generai Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions0, and the 'NC. Enforcement Manual.' As you are aware, licensees that question enforcemeint, actio'n' in qypq otest'thm inacrdance with the procedures In 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B. Furthermore; iceieyseesthattbeliee a staff V poston Is a backf.t with regard to its facilities may raise such claim in accordance with establisihed NRC polices and procedures.

This includes submitting the claim in writing to either the Director of DONR or the.Regional Administrator supervising the NRC employee who issued 2 the staff position In question, with a copy to the NRC Executive Director for Operations.

The staff's response to the technical issues you raised in your letter are enclosed.

Because you alleged in your letter that the staff was inappropriately backfitting new positions or interpretations regarding fire-induced hot shorts and spurious signals, I have referred your letter to the NRC Office of the Inspector General. If you have questions about the staff positions or IN 92-18, please have your staff contact the NRC point of. contact for fire protection matters, Steven West, Chief, Fire Protection Engineering Section. Mr., West can be reached at r 301-415-1220;.

If youdisagree with the NRC staff positions, or you wish to further your backfitting claim, you can appeal to the NRC Executive Director for Operations.

Sincerely, Original signed by S. J. Collins Samuel J. Collins, Director.

A.Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-F-.. , }? ..:i : ." .: ..... ' .1* o* ..r ~ .V Ji 7-7 12 syes at ... ..andI co onan t. id aree offire da6mageothat lit, the .ysts o. Ir uner consderation is capable of performing*rits inte'ndW funcfich duringiad after the ppsultefre~aspeed

.', W.he'er redundant arý `sdPtibI to fire damage, Apendix: R -ctiot, 1:.r3 s at sibifddcati.eshutdow pbi tyand t asscir)ated)dcircuts indepet nrof cabl6s,.yirt 7.i ooa oneatint in odhuetarea omn, zono thder a Frtconsld ratlon shaibe prov ad. Section IlI.L Ale"7atlve C5,or S 9.5.1 shut r--re in .II. -o. * ., ..ca ability, paragraph 1, spetfies th. the sautdwata~b6i dedica'f edo shutdei h craeab e.. "r, prode"" o a4 sp~lf ir'e iii shal be able, t6 (a) bhieve and-Miaintairi'brtie reacivity on&ilutions in tra maM Deonemntqne ntor ( maintain hot Ina tlbyo.r at PWRa (ressuedS teaterr tatarhutdownfprsaBW,1&, .ing water', reactor])*'; (d)tachivecldhe 7aren(mitnosutdown conditions thereafter.',, For plant seater aua-ry 9. was used the'itaff -s review ygui ts thisgfie. " dAric&U si thaV` I he t chnical requirementsh o atndi R, Setslion' llept er.t U paragraphte

,~tiat sh. ft-he belitcly f r specific'-f iretAreas d may bre, unique cuc if n- recognized aocbination p IAhotss to grond,,horipoen airrhtsi.i.es tha't'-her' ranlt ' orderfoetm alerative shralltbown cridapeeiiy tof thefor ic eshuti .7 nt7tes, '(tihe st fe ashutdpow pei ntnd tis16it~h fire area ofe I k o d tsbi tedfr asocated neg. ontroft aroot an the'filesre~a dinaso'th)a.hotishirt, op. .c.rc"." ts'- or"shor." lo.--::groun .the ed clicits will notpevent r~oegarding of reguatdOryrequirements

'M -. 16W .U 6pmn.In 3 to soL8 te'Fire-dProtetion R.cir ',dated Feriousuary 20, 8 morhe taff stated.T) ealuatingd aternativenshutdown me6tsodssh assownci ents atrecircut thae t couldprevent theotera tio n Or.cause the mr.Clsoderationom t hhe us ed,'[tahve andmag masnsaue thot safeishutdown conditions due t e faireidced rot shorts;d open ciut soro oo.rtsI ground.0 the gusidan [tce ofnGLy811i2 recognizdmothat afire capable of inducing multiple hot shosshortsto e groundum, oraopenscsrcurit.

Therefore, In order for the alternai shutdown capability to perform. its Intended function, toso hutdownt equipml eth It ree o les on must be capable of performing i ncrtionso after ithaffs bense y iaed from the tire area of.concern (e.g., control room and tecbesraigro) 1 1.cn in.GL.8-1.,te staff, issued additional guidance regardingth.e regulatory requirements re-4gairding the* need tqJoisoate fire-dmage.qdjb cic Ls mitigate spuiu acUatsk (oeta ne, and retain .functionality.of the safe shutdownt components after-their transfer.

In its repns o Oues~tioni 3.8.4, 'Control Room, Fire Considerations, *the stalffstaited, 'ti~he damage-othe systems in the control room cannot be predicted.

A bounding analyss should be made to.assure that safe shutdown conditions can be maintained f rom outside the control room.' in a4iddition; -thestaf -stated, *[tlhe analyi should dem~onstrate that the -capability exists to anAllyacieve safe shutdown conditions from outside thel control ,roomý by re'stonrg"'ac".c po:0wer to designated pumps, assu ring that valve lineups are correct, an assuming ftht any'malfunctions of valves that permit, the loss of reactor coolant can be' corrected before'unrttorbleconitins an ocur'. he taf's esponse to this question recog-nized thati a fire',can. induqce1 signals, that cause operational changes-(e.g., valves changing position) to the plant.So ha actual reported coditions related to'the desgn of post-firesafe shutdown omponents and" the potential, for ertain to be. daifiagdby ireIdcdfut to uesobecndtnsbefore the lcicens~e~e' could transfer 4"' ,""L .

-£z V~ k I-tj'1 ,.. ....... ..... ...............'. ..- t--e r transfer and slte irequred equie t a cotr tons otutsie the controdl, uthe staff Bdntied that fire'*.,andem and sppuus qte, or component ,actultiosa~nd .t ! fotr, stpnog ngheede se n.a: mitigating uns actuation

.shoul be tatOO In,', proceo""S'6dui e's. ý-The dtiiff ncaabtiis~hilti ahemateFt'eshutdOwn l -ts , al .ngh ford.o mamum,!Jývl of fire nma- go (:;iyst.em( ,ur lab-iles,s ruous~njiait6i )i Si ,rtet of te c1 annot predicted, it"'seems prudent to have thepostfire sh or res te iratbrs from ull system availalty to the minimum shutdown capability.

AT ln-"ýe 'on C iifalSd t4 1 *"-~it tf*-1ur:!. In its resp se to Question5 5.3.1

• Cirtud.adre.Modes,/,9'ept~ff addres the -crcutttaiure modes that must, bconisidered In a .ss..ted by 's~rIlusa6tuation; The staff' stated .Secti.ns IIl.G.2'an R "frthe circt fiilure io mesias hot sho-rt, d66p circu.,s.

and hrtsto grouind..o,.

Fc si'ratid*

'of spurio(s'-actuations, alt,. ,-pIossible be':evluati that jkthe cbumq encould be6 energized or de-energiz.

by:oe onebri theabvellre f i .,vThe fvfer f vies could ,fail open p, or closed; pumpi (:dlaifa running or not.runnirn;.eieiticai'distnbution breakers could fail open or closed. In this response, the staff, reiteratedthe,regulatory requirement that multiple spurk:lusacitusýcad lbyifire-)

e tt ; 6r','htito , grou ropen c6iictits, must h)be cons i nd~ ite 'The` staff also indicated that a component could be energized or [" de-esergizedbyhot s horts to ground, or open circuits wich could result In valves failing opno lsd faipsdo ld 4 uningF'o wn'rvi,,ý 6tc.6The princpa purpose.o this guidance was "tlicenseesperformed:an ii spe anddepth to I identify and mitigate the potential adverse consequences of hot shorts, shorts to ground, and open circuits onsafe shutdown-related control circuits and their, associated logic. These could inOclude, for exampli spmstart' w I ,-#lo ;a minimum " flowpathand,q, spurious opening or closinrg of MOVs by signals that bypasses the-vavesi' protective features.Later, inIN 92-18,r the staff alerted licensees to the potential for fire-induced hot shoras to cause*valves ofll opno lsdadta o hr-coul byas he protection features of the valve motors T,ý o. limit, the scpeofthe plant eqipmen needed to mee thFeactor peprformnce goalo of 4 Section,,,,!

6.Lbf AppendixR, theix stff,inIt4 response to GL .86-1O, Question 5.,.30,,.

Design qas:,: s Pant Tran r opts, specified the plant transient that licensees should consider to deter.ine..the design..capacity and ca pNt of -the alternativ or dedicated ioutdown system.~ hsgudac esbse h eIgn, input0lmits, tor thoe rector coolant inventory losfWeis.onaf18,cbng systems neede to p.eorm the, reactor c

' .powr qen Inlogic,;,etc.

Tades~ig ciita specified by h tf e Loss. Of offsite power shall. c.assumedforý afire In, any fir e,aea@.n.

fet with 4wthfollowinqgassumnptions:

,,-a. Th af hudwncpabifity-should not be acversely aff ected by. any one spurious or. sigrial resuting from a fire in ,any plant area,'and heThsafe Ohnapblity~should~not be adverselyaffectedb

afirein ti any fire area whichrresults inttie losst of all aUtomatic function'(sgnals-Iloc) roin the circUtslocated in th area en conlunctir h a" trus~a~

ring fohthe firei .andlth o. worst cse spunious ac A. , J , ,c he ,safe W s6hutdown capability should not be acerselyaf a fire any, planta area ~wtch results in spunouQs'actuaiWenof the'redunddAnffatea y~n 'hif lb sre ure inte l Ii,..Thei staf, ex ed licseesto apply this 0uinctoestabljsh" theap ia6nd capabilit (a g !q size the PUmpp.and su rt systems need6,do naint eactornt Innory. define the scope of ' "e ' sro"u, " n" no-ei. ritional baeIn , ...1mý,,id set of pln~t c'onditbons that woud define 'the scope of n iActionh '1,646h to reseitore se syistms necessary to-accomp i rtflerequr~9 reactor' ormanc (V V~ I S.., S ,~ , 1g11) physically sociattd 'circuits so-that hot shorts, shortsto dround, and open-circuits n these circuits will -not-prevent the.,r operation o..f "safeshutdwn',equipment or components:, 3. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES AND,NEI CONCERNS" St eltr January 1, 997,te N Institute (NE 4stae,.tlhe postuilated Ifire is quife large <ah' results n'n.!cbntU r Jornevacuat..n AddItionally, the7Ios ofý remoteshd&icapability would require-a hota; sho thttoccurs duing, the,narrowtime wWndowbetweenm the evacuationof the control room. ad manningof the iemergency controi:!.,'

statios(s);such that MOVa are mechanically damaged and their.function cannottbe recovered, The poential; for this type' of tfire In! a continuously manned area coincident with the theoretical hotsho.s remote;,.. bhasis of the information, provded byNEI In ts. letter, it appears that t yere may be some' uncertaint aboutthe size and duration of theflre needed for spurious component.or equipment actuations to occur. As stated In the staff responses to Question 3.8.4 and Ques.tin 5.2.1 of GL 86-10, it Is the staffs psition -that it is not possible to predict the number of spurousa.'gnas, .thtw.ou.1d.occur orthe.changes.to the operational configuration of the plant that wouldboccur-in nt of a. fire. The staff has found that evacuation criteria for control room fires are plint speclfic.

The shift supervisor Is responsible for deciding when to evacuate.

In its interviews with control room operators, the staff has found that alternative shutdown (control room abandonment and shutdown from outside the control.room) would not be implemented until significant functional capability of the control room had.been lost. A small fire, even if it does not necessitate control room evacuation, could cause equipment maloperations.

due.to shorts to ground, hot shorts, and open circuits.

Such failures ,occurred.

dur.in the ..... s, Fey.. ... ,.. , .g ' ...;Froman operatiopal per e, most essential plant equLip ment is controlled ad -monitored from the.main.control board. Thetiming of.control room evacuation in.the event of,.a fire can be qracicfactorin preserving the operability of the safe shutdown functonsthatiare controlled jfrom ;Wde the control room by the alterativernv ,hutdowrn systemI Forexample,a small-fire in.te ...main control board may nIot result in :a, smoke or heat, envi.ronment th would necessitate,.immdiateevac1iationof the control room or the actuation of the alternative (or remote)s. ihutdown sys.te Hover, such a fire could, in a short time, adversely affect plant andchange

the plant configuration due to fire-Indce spuriousignals.i The staff i l~ ~ocemd hats~chfire-Iduced.

spurios. signlcod cauem10Maloperatipono OV IM tj.4 ~

requred bytthe pot-fir afternative safe shutdown system's.bef~e donitrol is -transeferrdfro~m'-;

thecotrl oo0t the,. remote shutdrow pl. In L"'urou OE"alW bps the MOV-4 prtectlvefeatures wich idbad t "MOVdrae T1hs cold adverselya a6dc theb, abilit to ahieve anmantalp~sfe, 4 shutdow cpirlds o- b"' 'ir6, h te eto Teptential-forbot shrt drig a triqq rom ieta ol desl tc O perato wasfondand,.repoqted by lidbnbs,,`

60shn~ PUt~id Powe S"pp-.y S~tem, Pennhsytvania' Power- and' "ht." Co9ay n orhr tts ýwrCmay -ain Ci~aedodt regardn fier teto'adteaityocheendri Ii" p t-fre saf e shto n. I,r-, ý.-.o. W " "< ý l, ; ý. : ., .. ....'ý,,ý, ;' ,; ,; V ..: , ) :, .: : : °view of the generc nature of the c e, its tentialsafe iglfanc&'af~l concerns about t th and scope ofanatýsbs performed by 'icensees of post-fire sofe shutdown assocated circuits,the staffIssued IN 92-18 to alert the industry to the reported conditions.

It was the staff's p'itint that time that this unanalyzed condition was within the scope of existing NRC fire protection regulations.

The staff expected that licensees would evaluate the information in theIN, and'ts safety segnifanc ith c Jn)tC pos t-fire sae' sftdown Implembrntation'ri tan 4 appr at wactions.

'In a letter to its.administratirve pointsof contact dated.'August

.1 3,.1992, ithe Nuclear .'M~nagement an Re'sources.

Concil (NU now NEl)'.a 6%is6d lhcenseesh that it" considered-i.n'resufting fro c. trolroom'fire~'aslidentfdirN to very unlikely .:-'InL .... ....ad t'.NU R advisa icensees to dive arefulconsiderat to anyoft asregarding plat esgnchnges ion response, toN9-8 NMRC base Wtdiconteaumin tht, firenc ho t s to' ground,.or openc ! tth can: prevnt operationr cau maperato of pnt equipment can only ocr as areut o a fire conditi that causes the conrolrom toLbe eacuted and only durin"ýg ýthe ttime It taes: to evcutetheconthAro room a 1d e-4,is cono of theequire safee sutdown ýequipmnlah repeteemrnc contr~stalons Th s oý'taff noe htNMRddnot*provldedinlcal jutfction or bases for this asup ion. ThdcdltJ& "o h esn ttdaoethehestf disagre ihti positon. It appears that theINUMARC guidance may have encouraged some licensees to dismiss IN 92-18 and to.forego

_ssessing the technical and safety issues. The staff also noted that NUMARC, in its letter of AUgust 29 1992, didnot quesnthe applicability.of the IN 92-18 issues to existing NRC regulatory requir ments-4. CONCLUSIONS I)As discussed.

above, the, regulatory rurements and supporting staff positions are well-documented.

NRC regulatbry-requireprots r ize that fires can induce multiple hot shorts, shorts to. ground. and open circuits.

The regulatory requirements also specify that such circuit faluessal ntpreen the ,operato orcuetemlproof.

required post-fire.safe

' 44 shutdown components.*, ',!I. IIN92-1, th saffdsre oniin related!4to the desgn, ofpstshu w c~omonnt a e pn n 'al for, certain c pe to bl damage by fire-Inducdfaults ef elrý a a er andIsolation could be acopls at lc cnrol sa oeii outside thebontrol roomr. This could result in u related e ent and c ponents icaable of pe their intended funcft ae they have been electrIcly isolted fromý the. fire area of concern Threfore, the staff concluded that such design .do nopt provide, reasonable asuanethattheminimum anrd limited'shu'tdo'w'n funlctionls controlld bty theý p onfigrations e'rniative shutdow~nsysem can beprformed as reqie by rgaty r equiement.

Thesffa c e th safetysu addre I IN 92-18 i ' s " s. ,d r s In.. IN88 18 9 -e apla_ _s"pecio fc onkftechFinaly h staffeha also coc8de thtdtontned rveandt Inpetono fiepoetm ue, K,,,,A s".c' techica and saet isue as those adroessW on IN 92-18, is needed to emphasize the Importancz of compliance with NRC fire protection requIrements and to verify licensee compliance with those requirements and the existing liensingbasis.

S I I