ML101870567
| ML101870567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/21/1999 |
| From: | Collins S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Colvin J Nuclear Energy Institute |
| References | |
| EGM 98-002, Rev 1 NUDOCS 9907270125 | |
| Download: ML101870567 (22) | |
Text
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4H UNITEDsttES NUCLEAR, REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. ="-m&Oi July 2 . 1.99.9 MrJoseph 4.....Ivln
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I am aespondirgto the, letter ..... . iebran, . ,ntirect*o,
'(OE);,fh, 1on Setehmer1,4 .1.998,,coneihgAheUS:uc~(Rib~~y~imsin's ffice.of Enf
_:Enforcbmen Guidance,, n,"~g ~ .S NDeaiespi (NRC's)
Secton~ll. ,Meoraidun, (GM)987Q02' pipo~t6nfuyViolations. Cm:~
.. "he Ill. .Regarding Citc~it Failures., 'Y6..sugjestd 6f Appedndix R, abeyance enforcerment ,action~s per~tain~ing 'that t NR:old in induce circuit failure vulnerabilities until the to vioI~tibnr'o 6fAppendix R stemtTiinig from fire-NRC revises the regulatory requirements or iC..accep~ts .. Ranom I~ndustry Fre. .approach. You, further.
r'2Eno~eae.vaemen, . dl~e . s'esth~..
... th.stated ~thatB.rui ifýenforcement. action is deemed necessary; te N t~udance+deo Ush exerciseasndu(Gl) o 98-002,c~ *i .... e.... wit ntil a: h~sotshUon of
. ....... moor permiSsiesignal.G gui anc,+is establis.hed'andythat and I.LZega~rdated u' ula~esut +p-e in o aspuenous ; ' '+
a th-eJan'cutarJMJCsho' 14lu99.7*Yyou.asued 6 Ld us b risk IN 921
- .ya~nd, cca' I iit. exrsedf* a, infeomtirn tec hnica lafin-,0+fnftorcement isses NRha1dlng contaceirns'pthatithestaf rview1aindinsf p*ection of the~ Mequrepontse technica aird d
- .++ acrcepts an997,ein teaprat he ustaoti that thepren foreetieionu requ"remntso.In thre,, aeMthicenseets circt fues to
'frrotec iosary, glhe lo sC Th~olexetrcmeasrtionncude stthat-the ECMrlO'soultedbeth n the a eneclosreso ton oothelter aprovidesthe' certains tor-i Isuda Ea8-0 -.onJnep3199ss.vs setbsed Marha2198 nd asy toeRC ioauknowrshoude i respoy6unetrtaisedefforts
,ue nsformenttuidnc o t aconcearnig INa2-18 and safety Issues addressedexpressed concefrs in-iN,92-18"may that theconstitutea uclregardlngyi inspctiont :'
staff reviewanderic p~ant-ispe..f lepedin. flc*:ba the.echnican
`,ý," - soonse
. +,MAirdh,1,!11," f997,. . reiterated aodfhs ated'
. the staff" ... o ition,.. that. th6,.. ,*+,, tnll.f h:,+.*
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rnui the acApbiility. trtoachieve and aintain pproprtein'ulatr safe shutcown was withinte st e ons, The Information rco of e theeistlng geneic6m lette w'asI no .yncluded n I th nclosure Th.gerstdvaff rgRC SII .issued statf iss esu.*wen991,s"Prblemsd postoreqirtemardengtr ete' ed.
EGM 98'-002 0n March heglardgtheprosetonffire-indused ja Asocasnle,*iat to the letterprovides the 2;, 1998j"oipi6V~de uedWtPost-Fcirto enforcement SfeSutdownCiruitinasuos,':
oire guidance sfailuppre. Spbsequently,OE
+'......+'+**++:++ drrispertaining to the inability to achieve concerning inspection :
and maintaih safe shutdown conditions due to..... .i+
shutdntia
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nformation, cieitye cinthe byaintrm notice followed a generic Itn the letter EGiMp the staffquestions to address stated itsabout intentions
- . requ.1remerts. In the EGM, the. to issue antote the regulatory staff also stated..that the EGM would ,++
- "generic letter was not issued. be reconsidered if the -i.*li A
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.. . n++June 99-1_7, 6... 3-ý 1999. "Problems Associated With Post-Fire As you know, In response to the Safe Shutdown Circuit,
. ii+i!,Imttut:(E!'a~dthe Boiling Water efforts of the Nuclear Energy"!
Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) ii~i*: . jsssue, Is, " the sataf! deferred its plan to issue to address'the circuit!,*li a generic letter pending completion of these I'*L
'*iindustry actlvties.. After these Industry activities ,.
- iappropriate
',i; regulatory response, If any, needed.*toare completed, the staff will determine the' ' i ensure that, licensee~s comply with,
+regulato*ryreuirements regarding the the *I
- .,+ **.,*sl!ut protection.of, circuits needed to suppod
............ *p*i'y..*
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,............... In.the intedm,,,it post-fireae , **'
Is importan~t-that:ficenseps continuea to pay a'ttentio'n to the t 97 9 7 0 2 '"99 0 7 2 1 :;* ,.** ' ii:* * '
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issue of circuIt failures,, given the potentially i,-rinadequately analyzed or proteed circuits. significant conseq.uences that "can rstultfr*o.
For example, "if crcut analyss iapproprately
,excludes x :circuits from. rece6ivng the,*re qu!recdfe 'protection vulnerable to'1*ir6:damage which. could adversely'c or separationj . the circusit could be maintain safe shutdown. fect the abilit of aplt tooachieve and Werecognize that some licensees disagree.
with the NRC's interpetation of the requirements this area anrd that the diffegrin.gews, need in to be. resolved. .Ao preyously noted. to,,'chieve resolution,.thestaff.has agreed to..cops!deOrendorsi':gpositiOns.proposed;.bý',takeholders. this t.he staff's knowledge; NEI ndtheBWIOG are jtieonly stakeolde' ',A," pi gpositlins To to Tresolve this.issue." "To allowVYE and the, 61 endore, the NRC willltemPoranly ef err BW,, tmeto evelop. po'siionis that the, NRC can nonconforrnancesin:this area. I he deferral aIl eformement acions perafr)rg to,.';
eo ll a1pl 0for 180 da"!from the'date of this
- tter. Johrn 'HHannon, Chle fof .the l Sys.ems Branch, NRR,'discussed this time frame with DAVid MDdeen of your staff/n dttey ageed that S.'should all0, sufficient-time for the "NEI tO each agreement on acceptable staff.and a....achforresoln the issbei-'The staff discussed progress and scheduling with also tai of theBWROGfr The,180-day deferral period is consistent with the,BWROG's will,' on the basis of ,thecurrent staff position schedule. Durng the 180-day deferral period, remy lette"o March11, 1997, dodument the NRC
,i"nonconformances as .apparerit violatdonss' The'staff will defer enforcement'actons for disputed apparent violations provided the affected hcenseesimplemeut reasonable compensatory
... atonsfor the Identified vulnerabilities.
For fire-induced circuit failure nonconformances are not disputed, the staff will take enforcement that EGM 98-002, which has been modified action consistent with the guidance provided as described herein.. If we have not reached in
...onan.acceptable-approach for resolving agreement this issue within the 180-day deferral period, will resume application of the, modified EGM the staff 98-002 guidance and of the NRC's Enforcement Policy ,* -. " ,,; ..l. le 1 pd3/4.. ,d ' "5 . " -. 9 .... ."" .' * .
erring
~~J formal
~.def dons 'pe~taihndng ttb-c~lcu ac~t'
%'indIcatcte that:, IscretiohdWillbe exercised noifcon orrnance and to
-nl'l to not cite violations of the applicable requirements
-regardless of who. identifies the -condition, actions.and:commit to.6perf**many necessaranalyses provided;,kicensees take approprate compensatory
- ..*... .. frame.h*, and modificatio-ns in a.reasonable' time f,rame...., s.i,ap~p proach-..w. I'ch.dfffers. rom the curren EGM guidance that vola violations ios.,..ebe cited if
. '*':'i*dentified
' by'th-
- was NRC* i applied in the recent St. Lucie and'River and 98-460, rýpecti'vely). This discretion Bend cases ( EAs98-513 will be exercised until proper generic notification the industry occ6rs and licensees have sufficient to time to respond to the notification. The does not Intend to revisit past cases in which staff If li e s e s a i e ..h. , i . t . .. . enforcement actions have been dispositioned.
, d i~i' If licensees, after~eintenr~n~180-day I',,' bound by thetaE ,cable.re.quirementsantd period, continue to maintain that their facilities choose not to perform necessary analysesare not and
. modifications, *the NC wllapply the.
normal Enforcement Policy, including warranted.,', , sanctions., as
'Each case will have to be evaluated on its own merits. The reasonableness of the corrective"actiohs*schedule is expected e to lbe based on thejsafety significance of the "
- !!*:"!;':*"-"nonconf0oranc;, the established qutageo gtcedule, and :,
4*iirlc Compensatory, measures will normally the scope of modifications necessary.
i!.iii..4',4,vulneraboiesrmust be resolved. be acceptable as an interim measure, but the circuit 14' 9 ' 4e
Mr. Joseph CoMn 3
The staffagrees that both the licensees and the staff should use risk information the safety significance of violations of to help assess the regulatory requirements regarding Although the use of risk information is circuit failures.
not specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, risk information to help assess the significance the staff uses of violations and will continue to do so.
Sincerely, nsue rector Office of Nuclea~r Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
EGM 98-002, Rev. I 0
.~A iF F' F'
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Mr Joseph Colvin 3
!.The 1staff agrees that both the licensees `arid the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significance of violationsi'of!fthe regiuatory requirements A.th6 gh t.e use of risk Information'l's not spedf regarding Circuit failures.
ically addressed In EGM 98-002, the staff uses risk Information to help assessJhe significance of yiolations and will continue to do so.
`-, l*: SinSncerely, fli;* N-~
-Samuel J. Collinirector t f, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation EnhcosUre: EGM 98-002, R ev. S
-.DISTRIBUTION:
Public JHannon TCins GHolahan RZlmmerman SCollins BSheron OPA PQualls OGC P Madden DOudinot KSWest WRuland, RI KLandis, RII RGardner, Rill DPowers, RIV DOCUMENT NAME: A:NEIIEGM see Previous concurrence SPLB:DSSA SPLB:DSSA.
DOudinot:Jk° SPLB:DSSA; DSSA:NRR KSWest* JNHannon*ý 06/30/99 GMHolahan.
06/30/99 07/01/99 07/08/99 TECH EDfTOR* . :OE ADiPT:DONR9/99 D:DONR
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- 07/14M99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 4
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- Mr. Joseph Colvin 3
- Tehb"sta-ff -agrees that both the licensees t" ,,heft Ad the staff should use risk information of violations f, thler*guilatory
'isignificance requirements regarding to help assess
.Althoughftheuse of risk information is&n6t'-ecii'cally circuit failures.
risk information to help assss t!he significance addressed in EGM 98-002, ihe staff uses of violations and will continue to do so.
Sinc erely, C>
uel J. Collins, !Dire'ctor offK;e of Nuclear. Reactor '. '. ,Regulation)n, .
- Attabhrfent
- EGiM 98-002, Rev 1 DISTRIBUTION:
.Central" H~e Public SPLBl R/F JHannon GHolahan RZimmerman SCollins BSheron OPA Qualls OGC P dden DOudinot KS st WRuland, RI KLan RIl/
RGardner, Rill DPow #IV DOCUMENT NAkME: A:NEIIEGM
- see previous concurrence SPLB:DSSAI- SPLB:DSSA, DOudinot:lk* KSWest" " SP :DSSA " DSS,A:NRR JNHa on, GM:
06/30/99 -1 aan*
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'07/14/99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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('Mi. Joseph Colvin . ' 3
ýtaff agrees that both the licensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess T'.%f~he
,.th:t diefetylignificance (l violations 16f the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.
Altho gh the'use of risk information 'ils not specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, the staff uses A
risk information to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.
Sincerely.
.A. . , 'A SamuelJ. eoihns, Director,.
S j*'S.~-'.5 Ii) Office:0oUNucIear
-*;,* r -' "* Reactor RgulatWion
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DISTRIBUTION.
Central File Public I SPLBR/F,... JHannon 'S
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TColhins GHolahan RZimmmerinan SCollins BSheron WKane OPA PQualls OGC PMadden DOudinot KSWest WRuland, RI KLandis, RII RGardner, Rill DPowers, RIV DOCUMENT NAME: A:NEI!EGM *see previous concurrence SPLB:DSSA, SPLB:DSSA SPt.B:D SSA DOudinot:lk* KSWest' JNHannon*
06/30/99 06/30/99 07/Oj.i 1
- TECH: A N :,D;,ON R EDITOR WCollins 07/1'1/99 '07/ /99 71/,. /99 P,;: M , ,.. . . .' "
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-Mr.Joseph Colvin jTh staff agrees that both the licensees and the staff should use risk Information to he assess i'the safety significance of violationsdf the'regulatory requirements Although
. the use of risk information'nsnot specifically addressed regarding circuit f ures.
!sk nsformatlon to help assess the signifidance in EGM 98-002, , e staff uses of violations and will continue to o so.
Sincerely, C Samuel Office." r Regulationi.
.DISTRIBUTION: "
C-ntral File .Public * ..
WTravers
ýPNorr / / EDO R/F I. ,~'*~j T\CollIns Ri*lrRmerman GHolahan
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concurrenc/
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.,b- epM. Golvin
,Jobpn 3 ne sta r ag'r~ee~s that.both th, e 'lcensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significance of violations of the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.
theusi risk hfdrmatn'is~nt specifically addressed in EGM 98-002, the staff uses risk information to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.
. . .S,- Si e l
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Sincer-ely,.. .......
/ I':: ** \ *O".
Wilia D. Trav, Executive for Operationhs
'DISTRIBUTION ON NEXT PAGE DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SPLB\SECTIONB\OUDINO-TNEI 2 .REV.WPD SSPJBDSSA PLB:DSSA SPLB:DSSA DSSANRR' DOudinot:lk KSWest JNHannon GMHolahan
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.Mr. Joseph Colvin 3
T"heestaff agrees that bath the licensees and the staff should use risk information to help assess the safety significanceof violations of the regulatory requirements regarding circuit failures.
IN,,
Although the use if risk inf: 6tion is not specifically addressed in EGMV 98-002, the staff uses risk informat n to help assess the significance of violations and will continue to do so.
Sincere'y, ,
William D. Trvers I .... :. ..... Exe 9Otive Dir'ectbý fr Operations DISTRIBUTION ON NEXT PAGE
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DOCUMENT NAME: G:\SPLB\SECT ONB\OUD OT\NEI2. REV.WPD iSPLB!,bSSA S PBDSSA .SPLB SSA' D DOudinot lk SWest JNHannMHolahan 1/99 //99, 991
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COPY:ý.
ENCLOSURE
'UNITED`STATES'
ý,,NU,CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 WASHINGTON. D.C. 2014114M I
'Jt*""y 21, 1999 EGM 98-002, Rev 1 MEMORANDUM TO. Hubeqrt.J. Miller', RegFionalAdmniistrator 9 Region I .
,Region.~-
-"James ,ED.er,R.Regiona[iAdministrator.,:".; . ,
egion Ill Ellis W.'Merschoff, Regional Administrator Region IV William Kane, Associate Director for Inspection and Programs, . ..
. ...... .. * , Bnan~,W. She on, A* .ociate&Directo dr..o , .; .. , .
...*,....,,*.,:k.,: " '.Prolect 'Lice !sin' .. and 'Teclrimcaa "... Analysis, "' DONRI ** *"..': " - "
IElzabeth 0. Ten Eyck,Dbi'riior; visiton6o Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Donald A. Cool, Director,. Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS
.ohin'T..~reeves,-,Diredtor, Divisi'6-of Waste. oi,* " . .,
Man enei;NMSS~
EWiam Brach, Director .
i.:*,.*:,..,.
. * , .* :. SporntFuel Projec Officed. , . .
,*-,FRO '*-."* ?* -*.v,:James~e em~an',,Pirector!,,* Y*-Z-,**.:,**.? -*,-:?,*i.'*,.*,,.
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cirFROM i~z ... ,00er.~&.~~*.
Office, of Enforcement.. F,
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT GUIDA MEMORANDUM EGM 98-002, REVISION I DISPOSITION.OF VIOLATIONS OF SECTIONS Ill.G AND III.L. OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50 INVOLVING CIRCUIT
- .FAILURES.
.~ ~_.yrppse.of this revision is to change the guidance pertaining to the disposition of potential.
noncomphiances lnvoving fre-iduced circuit failure vulnerabilities that have the potential to affect the safe shutdown of a facility. The initial guidance was published in March 1998.
NRR staff and regional inspectors have found a number of plant-specific problems related to potential fire-induced electrical circuit failures that could prevent operation or cause malfunctioning of equipment needed to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown. Fire protection inspections conducted in each region have found that licensees may not have complied with thelregulations that require that facilities be designed such that fire-induced circuit failures (e.g.,.hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) do not adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve.and maintain a safe-shutdown condition.
, . ;! i*, .
- ,-.,,,,............ ~~~~~~..
9907270131 -990721 PD4R REVOP.;1ERQNLMC i PDR
"Multiple Addressees - . 2 - . . .
.. exampleof' the consequences of this type of 92-1.8,, Potenti4I for Loss of Remote, ShuJtdo.wn problem is reported in Information Notice (IN)
'.alerted licenseesthat the circuit *,pabilit During a Control Room Fire qgic associated with certain motor-*rat which
- subjecte to. a,singlejfireýi'nduc'ed ,ot,,sbp,6rt, cq6u!,d result edvalves, When
ýspnur os~signhaI.could ca~use'the,'valveý,1 i spý#666s,.p'erim si v sgnal. The
- rsulingin.r~chai~a vave amgp~.Suh, ir-induced. ~Qtv 11-0, 0p"~t.bpy aii ty ,oi sh~ut ,d * "the plant arid maintain diti6 damaige,66uId, ipajr he licensee s
'..;v ui~nerability e~xtends be~yond 3t e scop .eiof ic 'a isafe"-shu'tdo n.c dditibh., How vqe,.',
.nltrol,r~o m*tires alon~e.o.*.* I,.9 .
"n r.mul.iple orrespondence, the Nuclear interpretation of the regqlzatory, requirements Energy Institute (NEI) has asserted that is, at a.minimum, inconsistent with many the staff's unde'standing -and different from past staff licensees' inteipretations. Inra letter to'NEI dated March 11, 1997, the Director of NRR reiterated ndudd te staff's psition that the tential for fire-faues, tompaatth.abiity,'art the apant t achieve anrd mAintain safe was ,ithiin-t1se s<60pe, of th, existing ire'protection shutdown NEI s questionsregarding IN 92-18. tThe regulati6ndris:The ,etter inforrmation in the enclosure to'the March focused on
- r -.
explaihed' the' NRC'staffs pObstions'germjane 11 letter, A copy'o the Ma'rch 11 etter is attached-and to the larger issue of fire-uedid circuit failures.
followup-lettersfrom NEI, including onel fully-explains theapplicatiof the received on September 14, .1998, that regulations. In guidance provided in the initial EGM 98-002 requested that current staff interpretations of the requirements be changed, NEI continued to assert that the and represent a change in previous NRC are beyond the licensing basis of many staff positions. facilities The NRC staff and the industry are currently about the"adequacy 6f,,thiexsting'btaff'gu~idance working to resolve questions raised by the industry SX.thenconsistency of-staff,.terpretations'ofbothhot'guidance onicemingi.rei-duced ,ircuitfailures and requirements. 'The staff exe'ts to reach 'and .the underlying regulator ;i for resolving this issue within 180:days agreement with industry on an acceptable of the. date of this EGM. To allow the industryapproach develop positions that the, NRC Cca"nendorse, time to actions pertaining .to noncOnfo rmances in the NRC will temporarily defer, formal enforcement issues constitute violations of. reagulatory-requirementsn.ti: this-area f or those %licenseesthat dispute that the T snhansar-n visionged ndthefrcement guidan '.is,as follows: . .
A. "" For,licensees that assert that a particular nonconformance associated with a fire-induced circuit failure vulnerability does not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements, theNRC~wi', on the-basis of-the staff position reflected in the attachment, document the nonconformance as an apparent enforcement actionsjfor. disputed apparent violation.' The NRC will defer reasonable compensatory, actions for the violations provided the licensee implements identified vuinerabilities.
'An apparent violation, as defined by Manual Chapter,0610, is merely "a potential,.
noncompliance with a regulatory requirement
.in,a Notice of Violaion orý,order.. that has not yet been formally cil-Ad as a violation.
1
." ' -.I, *:,-' "* /
f~~~ ~~~
'!:* j** .. Ij ts*i,':
Multipl'e ssees 3
.Inpectors shlcld include language Int cove ltter iilato the ollwig to Adocument the apparent violations:
".,.uring he insp.ection, ap*a*ni tiolationspof,[state
-wei'.,
e:e de'tifi'ed.ý These crcuir t.Vulnerabilities applicable requirement(s))
- ".,,scenarios, aderseyae tf e ab.ilit could, under certain postulated fire JIthe facdlity.,-It isthe NRC's unders t 'o.achg'eve and 'maintain, safe shutdown tanding that you do not..consider *thse of vulAnerabilities to be violations of NRC requirements. In order to allow the industryjtime to develop an.acceptable NRCcan approach to resolving this issue that the endorse, the NRC will defer any ehforcementactlon S....
- .... "matters, untilnuary 18" 2000) retativ to these proviwed you take 'adequate compensatory measures for theidentified vulnerabiItes.
resolving this issue is not reached If an acceptable approach for by (January .18, 2000), the issue subject to disposition in accordance will be with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
B. For licensees that assert that a particular noncorformance associated induced. circuit failure Vulnerability with a fire-does not constitute a violation requirements and refuse to take of regulatory compensatory measures during normal enforcement processes this interim period, will be followed and the licensees formal enforcement may be subject to action.
C. For those cases in which licensees
'requirements do not. dispute that a violation
- olow,
, . sctbdcUraedewith* "6*sect*.to:anohnhnfor~ance,ý of regulatory
?
. th`e6guidance 'is as
- Enforcement, discrbetioW*n i bebexercised'toprnotcite the vioations
- F 'F Q,icensees I'r
- , take,'prompt provided r.easonable time,,frame.,.compensatory 2 actions IThis'discretion will beand corrective actions within a exercised regardless of who
- identifies the nonconformance The enforcement discret~on provided for herein may be exercised even deferral period until such time.as after the 180-day ...
proper generic notification to the licensees have sufficient time to industry occurs and.
respond to the notification. After the 180-day intenm period,
" ' i !""* !'i' *> '* F
- ,
- ' *' '*'* " " * * ' * ."" F"
i, Each case will have to beevaluated corrective actions .schedule on its own merits., The reasonableness is expected to be based on the of safety significance.of the.,. the:.,-
nn.conformance,,the established ,
outage :schiedule, and-the sqope necessary'. Compensatory measures of. the, modif ications will normally be acceptable as an the circuit vulnerabilities must be interim measure, but resolved.
1-~,
Multiple Addressees
- 4 -
OE will review this EGM and revise it, as appropriate, to reflect any agreement reached between the staff and the industry on the disposition of these issues.
Attachment:
As stated cc: The Chairman Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield W. Travers, EDO F. Miraglia, DEDR M. Knapp, DEDE D. Dambly, OGC S. Collins, DONR J. Zwolinski, NRR L. Chandler, OGC J. Hannon, NRR SECY Ii i~;7~.
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- tip e Addressees .OE will review this EGM and revise*f, as.app*roriate, to refiect any agreement reached cbet~en the staff and the Industryon the dispositiOi of theso issues.
,Attachment. As stated
!, *"".!!*:The 4 4 Chairman
UCormmissioner Diaz.
'Commissioner McGaffigan Gommlssioner Merrifield WTravers, EDO FMlragia, DEDR
.. MKnapp, DEDE DDambty, OGC.
4.d1.4SColI1nsjDONR'4,,-~~~
JiZio4inski, DONR`.;ý ,`.,
JHannoW, DONR ..
J. ebermnahn~l,OE ~ J OE Staff Enforcement -Coordinators RI, RII,, RIII',..RI -NRR,;NMSS (Also by E-Mail)
EGM File Day File WEB (2 weeks after issuance) .4 PUBLIC (2 weeks after: issuance)
SPLB R/F G3Holahan BSherion DOudinot
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DOCUMENT; NAME: A:\EGM98002REV1.WPD *see previous concurrence NU SOE S
NU:bC I NRR D D:C F0 44 YE TReis* SWest /an ,
N /99 7L 1/L9I 7 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY j!
-ATTACH-MENT1 V
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1.
uclear Regulatory to youffieerW Of Ja uary 14, 1997, conceing U.S.N r es d
- of Remote, Shutdown tial For Lor wI a
- Ni ( 9n oty Commiss (N.Rg,I)!nstrt CapabMIiy Dug a*Control Roodm Ftrrq, F6&092)A~~aaelN21 reor Mon A-'a e IN, adresd conitnsI and ees, tat couJld hav 'resuhed In the o'U* ,Af relicensra Win Vit6M'evnt of a ~65trof 4 ++.'
' w;en'.
jacieVe an~d ma%
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lPl* i~r bft ,idi*Or-<)perat~tve.va Spciicll tec~rcjt oss ýoffire.apbdftyto, room' ,
hot shfedhapiodipenmsvesignal.
4 uojcte to a s*ngle fie staff*dUpo d*amaP c6,6Mhaveiimpaireýn the in1 mh u -, laN,'dma mag)Su fbfor and resu.'ng byrassdingI 9-1(the ~rtciv featre, T" i spurouIgasslnblcudits e thase'thtide safety Isse a myO':.
myisser noftute(NEs ) the ssfiosvand Iasues -rasedir*
ofath Niha it agreedrwithesyourp tnae Itr'Arx STher Durithe m o Ae* s. taff e nwndes i no. i esshouldde nbs*ton s hot shorts and ,
staff presented Its positins regarding fire-ndcerd potential for positions 0r guidance. The that the saety isue a ,stutdo 92-18 (themsn in IN,codiio.m* +4 signals SpuriIxA to shtown the*p<an theand' tI position ,
andcapabiltyto 'enot nki* achieve and maintain safe shutdown) Is within cpablmo fire-induced hot.shorts to*Impair saf als explainled how the, reguilation th sop o te xiPig fire protecion regul~atin.Th, posiio and why its revew and andpubstd saffpoitinsand, guianc spporthis tnite a plant-sfey issues addressed IN 8o X"ioof the technlcaI ind withto your positi that enforcement F saff that it also Stated a licensee for failure against agreed 'comply with. Information notices.
actins Durin the ýmOOtl-Vgft souldno(t4b taken the staff were not discussed during the meeting, in response to 4i Althugh specific enforcemnent actions notices of violation to several licensees adonowledgedl that Ithad recently issued kvOMng ho shorts. In each csthe against findings of post-fie safe shutdown deficienies taken dependent on fthcircumstances of fthcase and were enfo*mrcprentc*irwwere appicable regulatorY requirements, consistentwih4 a cerwe"s for,faiur to comply with the an information notice.
1roguia", posto~ns, and not for failure to compl with After j treated your concerns In accordance with its procedures for managing backfits. licensee The staW and in your letter, the discussions with NEI protection consldertn§ th 1 m rMatlon You submitted 7,199, ad r-evaluating the fire
~rtg te metin ofFebuar reprsenaties and guidanice, the staff concuded that its position (fthat oJ, :Idteaultl 4 and, apicable staff po, tfions Og
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. ENCLOSURE
... ASSESSMENT OF NEI COCEN RG DIG
.<,, . , :..0:..,i.:,.*..*..."*:
- - " * ~Ji NRC INFORMA7ION NQTICE 92-18... *,
- " ~........... ':, :" DRN . A CONTRL.. ROMFIE.*
On"FebLuar* 28,"1992, the1 U.*S. Ni.clea'r Regul tory:pmmiss'n '(NRC) issud Information. .
Nio. 3 eIN)92* ,,.otentil 3 or Loss of Remote hu Cap.dtDuna.CtolRo Fr.ThINaddreS*O the po*_tential .for a corntrol rg0oom fire ,to: ause'electncal short circuits I*.w#.no.rm..aly energi.zed conuctorsand conductor~s asscited-.ih thecontr.ol circutry of.
conditions: *Such ap.event could cause' certairn valves tosp~unou, sy actuate. In addition,;
b:*.ue.of the, ocation of the circujit'fau.it' the MOV torque an~d limit switches wo~uld be o*-
ineffective to, stop valv'e operation. Moreover, because thermal overload protection had been bypassed at some facilities, the potential existed iorfjlre-inducd .spuriousvalve actuations to resuhltn i,c1m6nt m'e'chanical damage'toprevent the react(or~prato~s from'Tmanually operating the aff'ected valves. .This,*uld result in a loss df capabelity to ahiev~e or' mfn~t'ai .safe..
- 2. APPLICAB'LE .REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE '
Th1e 10 of ithe..Code of ,Federal :Reaulation~s, iPart..50, .Appe.ndix..R, Secion lIl.G, 'Fre, protetio of safe, shutdow..capabI'ity, par~agraph1.a, l.require8.sthatone.tramn*
3 iof...ystems*ncesry to achkeve and. m.a.ntan: ho.t* shutdqwn./conditios .from: .ei~therthe..controelroom or, emergency*M'j,*
con.trolsttion (s) be: free of*,fire;damage., *.,.In addition., Section. lI!.G~ paragraph 2,* requires!that
- where-cables~or.euipment,.including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent.
operation or cause maloprationdue to hot shorts, open circuits, or. shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to. achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditio*: ..are located within the same fire :area," a m~eans be provided for .ensuring one train of the redundant safe shutdown trains will be free of fire damage*.1 : For .those plants licensed after*
January1.," 1979, the applicable regulatory requiremenet is 10 CFR Part 50, Appndix A*,....
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(SRP 9.5.1 ), 'Fire Protection Pr..gram,' ReviSion' 3, ;dated July 1'981,' was used by the: staff, as..."
review guidance. This guidance is the same as that specified by the technical requirements of Appendix R, Section IIl.G.
In Genernis Letter (GL) 86-10, ;implementatio ofFire Protection .Requirements," dated.............
April24,r198, thestaff interpreted the term..free of fire damage." In Enclosure 1, "lnterretaion of-Appndix R," Interpretatio.nl 3, "Fire Damage,' the staff stated, in part, that j33~{
"the lm has provided methods acceptable for assuring that necessary structures,
.!The ,safety concerns associated with fire-induced hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts'to ground In safe shutdown and associated circuits, which could prevent operation cause maloperation of.. .
redundlant.shutdow trains, were predicated on the numerous adverse conditions that oc:curred during ..
..ieB..wns Fer tire..of_ March 25, 19756'Reeec . :i'; NRC05,
... Rcmenain Related... to 33.:343 n Fer .~o F.ire.; . Feb.ruary., 19,76.,;¢.**.. :** ;:.',....:. :.. : . .. .: .. . . . .
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t tehnicl ue addre lh IN 92-188 within the scope 61 te existng fire Protect.Kn rebulation) Ws justified.t On this basis, the staf hasi,1o--conclde tatit~c~ntinued review and spcioffre protecoissues, icludiig.suh tn nicaaand safety issues, as those addrissed In IN 92-'18, is app'ropiate. In addifi*;ntIc staff is"considenng the need to take further action to ensure that licensees understapd and comply with the applicable regulatory requirements.
With respect to enforcement actions, the staff thentinue toenforce te-Commission's requirements in accordance with the guidance 'fiNUREG1 600;'Generai Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions0, and the 'NC. Enforcement Manual.' As you are aware, licensees that question enforcemeint, actio'n' inqypqotest'thm inacrdance with the procedures In 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B. Furthermore; iceieyseesthattbeliee a staff V poston Is a backf.t with regard to its facilities may raise such claim in accordance with establisihed NRC polices and procedures. This includes submitting the claim in writing to either the Director of DONR or the.Regional Administrator supervising the NRC employee who issued 2 the staff position In question, with a copy to the NRC Executive Director for Operations.
The staff's response to the technical issues you raised in your letter are enclosed. Because you alleged in your letter that the staff was inappropriately backfitting new positions or interpretations regarding fire-induced hot shorts and spurious signals, I have referred your letter to the NRC Office of the Inspector General. If you have questions about the staff positions or IN 92-18, please have your staff contact the NRC point of. contact for fire protection matters, Steven West, Chief, Fire Protection Engineering Section. Mr., West can be reached at r 301-415-1220;. If youdisagree with the NRC staff positions, or you wish to further your backfitting claim, you can appeal to the NRC Executive Director for Operations.
Sincerely, Original signed by S. J. Collins Samuel J. Collins, Director. A
.Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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12 syes... at . .andI co onant. aree id offire da6mageothat lit, the-st**dUr- .ysts o.Ircompo*n."ent uner consderation is capable of performing*rits inte'ndW funcfich duringiad after the ppsultefre~aspeed .',
W.he'er redundant sfeoshut.*down,,tral.ns arýe"sL*.* `sdPtibI to fire damage, Apendix:R -
ctiot,1:.r3 s at pbi tyand t sibifddcati.eshutdow asscir)ated)dcircuts indepet nrof cabl6s,.yirt 7.i ooa oneatint in odhuetarea omn, zono thder a ratlon shaibe prov Frtconsld ad.Section IlI.L Ale"7atlveC5,or S 9.5.1shut ca ability, paragraph 1, spetfies th. the sautdwata~b6i dedica'f edoshutdei h craeab e.. "r, prode"" o a4sp~lf ir'e iiishal be able, t6 (a) bhieve and-Miaintairi'brtie reacivity on&ilutions r--re in in tra .
maM Deonemntqne II. -o.
- ntor
. , ( . . maintain downS* hot Ina tlbyo.r atPWRa(ressuedS teaterr tatarhutdownfprsaBW,1&, water', .ing reactor])*'; (d)tachivecldhe 7aren(mitnosutdown conditions thereafter.',,For plant seater aua-ry 9. was used the'itaff -s reviewygui ts thisgfie. dAric&U te;ame* " sithaV` I he t chnical
ý*7ed requirementsh o atndi R, Setslion' er.t llept U
"*.tionll.L. paragraphte ,~tiatsh. ft-he shut,*wn belitcly f specific'-f r iretAreas maydbre, unique cuc if n- recognized aocbination p IAhotss to grond,,horipoen airrhtsi.i.es tha't'-her' ranlt ' orderfoetm shralltbown alerative cridapeeiiy tof thefor ntirena*di-e( ic eshuti .7 nt7tes, '(tihe stfe ashutdpow pei I ntndd tis16it~h tsbi kfire areao tedfr ofe
-. M 16W .U 6pmn.
In nclosre*..r*tl 3 to soL8te'Fire-dProtetion R.cir ',dated Feriousuary 20, 8 taff stated.
morhe T) ealuatingdaternativenshutdown me6tsodssh assownci ents atrecircutthae couldprevent t asocated neg.
theotera ontroft Or.cause tio n aroot an the'filesre~a dinaso'th)a.hotishirt, the mr.Clsoderationom t us ts'-
.hhe c.rc"."
op. or"shor."lo.
ed,'[tahve andmag masnsaue thot
--::groun8*..:i. .the safeishutdown conditions due t asoiatf'*Sedclicits willnotpevent r~oegarding e faireidced rot shorts;d of open ciut reguatdOryrequirements sorooo.rtsI '
ground.0 the gusidan ofnGLy811i2 [tce recognizdmothat afire capable of inducing multiple hot shosshortsto e groundum,oraopenscsrcurit. Therefore, In order for the alternai shutdown capability to perform. its Intended function, tosohutdownt equipml etho Itree les on must be capable of performing i ncrtionso after ithaffs bense y iaed from the tire area of.
concern (e.g., control room and tecbesraigro) 1 1.cn in.GL.8-1.,te staff, issued additional guidance regardingth.e regulatory requirements re-4gairding the* need tqJoisoate fire-dmage.qdjb cic mitigate spuiu acUatsk Ls (oeta ne, and retain .functionality.of the safe shutdownt components after-their transfer. In its repns o Oues~tioni 3.8.4, 'Control Room, Fire Considerations, *the stalffstaited, 'ti~he damage
-othe systems in the control room cannot be predicted. A bounding analyss should be made to
.assure that safe shutdown conditions can be maintained f rom outside the control room.' in a4iddition; -thestaf -stated, *[tlheanalyi should dem~onstrate that the -capability exists to anAllyacieve safe shutdown conditions from outside thel control ,roomý by re'stonrg"'ac".c po:0wer to designated pumps, assu ring that valve lineups are correct, an assuming ftht any' malfunctions of valves that permit, the loss of reactor coolant can be' corrected before' unrttorbleconitins an ocur'. he taf's esponse to this question recog-nized thati a fire
',can. induqce1 signals, that cause operational changes-(e.g., valves changing position) to the plant.
So ha actual reported coditions related to
'the desgn of post-firesafe shutdown omponents and" the potential, for ertain cpom*-ent to be. daifiagdbyireIdcdfut to uesobecndtnsbefore the lcicens~e~e' could transfer
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t a cotr tons otutsie the controdl, transfer and slte irequred equie e r Bdntied staff that fire'*
uthe or component una*abiltes and sppuus qte, actuation .
.,andem n.a: mitigating uns
,actultiosa~nd.t ! fotr, stpnogngheede se dtiiff ncaabtiis~hilti fire nma-go shoul be tatOO In,',proceo""S'6duile's. ý-The -ts , al . nghford.o mamum,!Jývl of ahemateFt'eshutdOwn t*
,rtet of te c1annot b* predicted, it"'
lab-iles,s ruous~njiait6i )i Si
(:;iyst.em( ,ur or res te iratbrs from ull system seems prudent to have thepostfire shcapability.
availalty to the minimum shutdown t4 tf*-1ur C iifalSd 1 *"-~it addres the -crcutttaiure AT
- Cirtud.adre.Modes,/,9'ept~ff In its resp se to Question55.3.1
'on ln-"ýe by 's~rIlusa6tuation; The In Kientif*yngciuts Ra .ss..ted circt fiilure iomesias hot modes that must, bconisidered ApP'*i*x "frthe staff' stated . Secti.ns IIl.G.2'an 'I.I'.7*of alt,. ,-
and hrtsto grouind..o,. Fc si'ratid* 'of spurio(s'-actuations, circu.,s.
d66p be6 energized sho-rt, be':evluati that jkthe cbumq encould p, pIossible fu*onal faiure+*tAtesnust f i . ,vThefvfer f vies could ,fail open onebri by:oe theabvellre or de-energiz. breakers could fail
(:dlaifa running or not.runnirn;.eieiticai'distnbution
- or closed; pumpi requirement that multiple open or closed. In this response, the staff, reiteratedthe,regulatory ropen c6iictits, mustor h) e tt ;
6r','htito ,
grou ["
lbyifire-) component could be energized spurk:lusacitusýcad "Wtb(* ite 'The` staff also indicated that a circuits wich could result In valves failing be cons i nd~
de-esergizedbyhot s horts to ground, or open purpose.o this opno lsd ld uningF'o wn'rvi,,ý 6tc.6The princpaiispe anddepth to 4faipsdo I aia**yisofi1 guidance was toe*sureitht "tlicenseesperformed:an shorts to ground, and and mitigate the potential adverse consequences of hot shorts, logic. These could
- identify control circuits and their,associated open circuits onsafe shutdown-related ethoInl* minimum
- a
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flowpathand,q, inOclude, for exampli spmstart' w I features.
or closinrg of MOVs by signals that bypasses the-vavesi' protective to cause spurious opening hot shoras licensees to the potential for fire-induced Later, inIN 92-18,r the staff alerted features of the byas he protection
- valves ofll opno lsdadta o hr-coul valve motors of plant eqipmen needed to mee thFeactor peprformnce goalo T,ýo. limit,the scpeofthe to GL .86-1O, Question 5.,.30,,.
Design Section,,,,! 6.Lbf AppendixR, theixstff,inIt4 response that licensees should consider to 4
qas:,: s Pant Tran ropts, specified the plant transient system.
and ca pNt of -the alternativ or dedicated ioutdown deter.ine..the design..capacity inventory losfW esbse h eIgn, input0lmits, tor thoerector coolant . '
~ hsgudac to p.eorm the,reactor c ntmaknkeupfUnc*tio6nsie systems neede e d'* eis.onaf18,cbng specified by h tf powr qen Inlogic,;,etc. Tades~ig ciita afire In, any fire,aea@.n. fet with Loss.Of offsite power shall. c.assumedforý :;,,-
4wthfollowinqgassumnptions:
not be acversely affected by. any
- a. Th af hudwncpabifity-should resuting from a fire in ,any plant area,'
one spurious actuat**o or. sigrial and adverselyaffectedb:afirein heThsafe Ohnapblity~should~not be
(
ti any fire area whichrresults inttie losst of all aUtomatic function'(sgnals-roin the circUtslocated in th area conlunctir Iloc) en a h
" Cas* trus~a~tiorýlii*,ýres ring fohthe firei .andlth o. worst cse spunious ac A. , J,
,c he,safe W s6hutdown capability should not be acerselyaf t*dbf a fire V
,i:','c* y~n area a planta 7;Wf*, '*:,tany, 'hif ~wtchlb sreurein results spunouQs'actuaiWenof inte l Ii,.. the'redunddAnffate V Thei staf, ex ed licseesto apply this 0uinctoestabljsh"theap ia6nd capabilit ~I (a g size the !q PUmpp.and su rt systems need6,do naint eactornt Innory. define the scope of 'sro"u,
' "e " n" oe'*'-i.no-ei. 0Mb'ish'6an*",ritional S.., S
, ... 1mý,,id set of pln~t c'onditbons that woud define 'the scope of n iActionh baeIn '1,646h to reseitore se syistms necessary to-accomp i rtflerequr~9 reactor' ormanc ,~ ,
1g11) physically sociattd 'circuits so-that hot shorts, shortsto dround, and open-circuits n these circuits will -not-prevent the.,r operation o..f "safeshutdwn',equipment or components:,
- 3. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES AND,NEI CONCERNS" St eltr January 1, 997,te N iEnar**Energy Institute (NE 4stae,.
tlhe postuilated Ifire is quife large <ah' results n'n.!cbntU r Jornevacuat..n AddItionally, the7Ios ofý remoteshd&icapability would require-a hota;sho thttoccurs duing, the,narrowtime wWndowbetweenm the evacuationof the control room. ad manningof the iemergency controi:!.,' IM statios(s);such that MOVa are mechanically damaged and their.function cannottbe recovered, The poential; for this type' of tfire In! a continuously manned area coincident withthe theoretical hotsho.s remote;,.. *On~the bhasis of the information, provded byNEI In ts. letter, it appears that t mayyere be some' uncertaint aboutthe size and duration of theflre needed for spurious component.or equipment actuations to occur. As stated In the staff responses to tj Question 3.8.4 and Ques.tin 5.2.1 of GL 86-10, it Is the staffs psition -that it is not possible to predict the number of spurousa.'gnas, .thtw.ou.1d.occurorthe.changes.to the operational configuration of the plant that wouldboccur-in nt of a.fire. The staff has found that evacuation criteria for control room fires are plint speclfic. The shift supervisor Is responsible for deciding when to evacuate. In its interviews with control room operators, the staff has found that alternative shutdown (control room abandonment and shutdown from outside the control
.room) would not be implemented until significant functional capability of the control room had
.been lost. A small fire, even if it does not necessitate control room evacuation, could cause equipment maloperations. due.to shorts to ground, hot shorts, and open circuits. Such failures
,occurred. dur.ing the ..... s,Fey.. ... ,.. , . ' . . .
- Froman operatiopal per e, most essential plant equLip ment is controlled ad -monitored from the.main.control board. Thetiming of.control room evacuation in.the event of,.a fire can be qracicfactorin preserving the operability of the safe shutdown functonsthatiare controlled jfrom ;Wde the control room by the alterativernv ,hutdowrn systemI Forexample,a small-fire in.
te... main control board may nIot result in :a, smoke or heat,envi.ronment th would necessitate,
.immdiateevac1iationof the control room or the actuation of the alternative (or remote)
- s. ihutdown sys.te Hover, such a fire could, in a short time, adversely affect plant annunca*tors andchange :the plant configuration due to fire-Indce spuriousignals.i The staff i l~ ~ocemd hats~chfire-Iduced. spurios. signlcod cauem10Maloperatipono OV
.4 ~
shutdown system's.bef~e donitrol is-transeferrdfro~m'-;
requred bytthe pot-fir afternative safe pl. L"'urouIn OE"alW bps the the,. remote shutdrow adverselya a6dc theb, thecotrl oo0t t "MOVdrae T1hs cold
°
, ) :, . : : : **
MOV-4 prtectlvefeatures wich
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anmantalp~sfe, 4shutdow cpirlds j*.,_4 to ahieve abilit tc O perato te eto 'ir6, b"' h rom o-ieta ol desl Teptential- forbot shrt drig a triqq 60shn~PUt~id Powe S"pp-.y S~tem, Pennhsytvania' wasfondand,.repoqted by lidbnbs,,` -ain
ýwrCmay Ci~aedodt tts Power-and' "ht."Co9ay n orhr Ii" p t-fre safconcerns e shto n.I, regardn fier teto'adteaityocheendri about view of the generc nature of the c e, its tentialsafe iglfanc&'af~l assocated performed by 'icensees of post-fire sofe shutdown It was the tth and scope ofanatýsbs alert the industry to the reported conditions.
circuits,the staffIssued IN 92-18 to NRC that time that this unanalyzed condition was within the scope of existing in staff's p'itint the information protection regulations. The staff expected that licensees would evaluate Jn)tC pos t-fire fire c res0ectp4its'*tenia[
theIN, and'ts safety segnifanc 4 ith appr at wactions.
sae' sftdown Implembrntation'ri tan a letter to its.administratirve pointsof contact dated.'August .13,.1992,ithe Nuclear In that it"considered-*....
Concil (NU now WARC,* NEl)'.a 6%is6d lhcenseesh to very unlikely .:-'InL ....
M~nagement an Re'sources. c. trolroom'fire~'aslidentfdirN *,92-18 i.n'resufting fro asregarding to anyoft ad t'.NU R advisa icensees to dive arefulconsiderat NMRC base Wtdiconteaumin operationr response, toN9-8 to' ground,.or openc ! tth can: prevnt tht,plat esgnchnges firenc ho iont s that causes maperato of pnt equipment can only ocr as areut o a fire conditi room cau only durin"ýg ýthe ttime It taes:to evcutetheconthAro conrolrom toLbe eacuted and the repeteemrnc 1d cono of theequire safee sutdown ýequipmnlah jutfction or bases ae-4,is Th s oý'taff noe htNMRddnot*provldedinlcal ihti contr~stalons "oh esn ttdaoethehestf disagre forasup this ion.ThdcdltJ&
that theINUMARC guidance may have encouraged some licensees to positon. It appears The staff also noted dismiss IN 92-18 and to.forego _ssessing the technical and safety issues. the IN92-18 NUMARC, in its letter of AUgust 29 1992, didnot quesnthe applicability.of that issues to existing NRC regulatory requir ments-I)
- 4. CONCLUSIONS above, the, regulatory rurements and supporting staff positions are well-shorts, As discussed. r ize that fires can induce multiple hot regulatbry-requireprots requirements also specify that such circuit documented. NRC and open circuits. The regulatory shorts to.ground. required post-fire.safe ' 44 faluessal ntpreen the,operato orcuetemlproof. the desgn,ofpst components.*, ',!I. IIN92-1, th saffdsre oniinperelated!4to to bl damage by fire-shutdown a e pn n 'al for, certain c fir*ea shu w c~omonnt at lc cnrol ef elrý a a er andIsolation could be acopls ent and Inducdfaults result in u related e sa oeii outside thebontrol roomr. This couldtheir intended funcft ae they have been c ponents icaable of pe rforming* that such Threfore, the staff concluded electrIcly isolted fromý the. fire area of concern anrd limited'shu'tdo'w'n funlctionls design .do nopt provide, reasonable asuanethattheminimum shutdow~nsysem can beprformed as reqie by controlld bty theý p onfigrations e'rniative I IN 92-18 Thesffa c e th safetysu addre rgatyr equiement.
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18 s. r s In..IN889 - _e apla_
,d thtdtontned rveandt Inpetono s"peciofc onkftechFinaly h staffeha also coc8deand saet isue as those adroessW on fiepoetm ue, K,,,,A s".c' techica of compliance with NRC fire protection IN 92-18, is needed to emphasize the Importancz requIrements and to verify licensee compliance with those requirements and the existing liensingbasis.
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