Regulatory Guide 5.7: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13350A204
| number = ML003739976
| issue date = 06/30/1973
| issue date = 05/30/1980
| title = Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas
| title = (Task SG 909-4), Revision 1, Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Access Areas
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
Line 10: Line 10:
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = RG-5.007
| document report number = RG-5.007, Rev 1
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 10
| page count = 11
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:i U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
{{#Wiki_filter:Revision 1" May 1980 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
REGULATORY
COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE
REGULATORY  
OF REGULATORY
GUIDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS
STANDARDS Juno 1973 GuIDE REGULATORY  
DEVELOPMENT
GUIDE 5.7 CONTROL OF PERSONNEL
REGULATORY  
ACCESS TO PROTECTED  
GUIDE 57 (Task SG 909-4) ENTRY/EXIT
CONTROL FOR PROTECTED  
AREAS, VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS  
AREAS, VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS  


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Proposed amendments to the Commission regulations of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities." 10 CFR Part 70. "Special Nuclear Material," and 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material," would, if adopted. require nuc..ures (I) for the protection against industrial sabotage of fuel reprocessing plants and certain facilities subject to tic provisions of 10 CFR Part 70 and (2) for tile protection of special nuclear mtaterial (SNM) against theft or diversion from certain licensed lacilities.
Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, specifies perform ance requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear materials and associated facilities.


One element of this protection is proper control of access of personnel to and from protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas. Searching persons and packages for tirearms.
Section 73.20, "General Performance Requirements," describes the general performance objective and requirements that must be met through the establishment of a physical protection system.  Performance capabilities necessary to meet the requirements of § 73.20 are described in § 73.45,"Performance Capabilities for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems." While detec tion and control requirements are specified throughout the capability statements, specific entry/exit control techniques are required under three capabilities.


explosives, and other devices which could aid in sabotage or theft of SNM is another element of physical protection.
Paragraph
73.45(b) specifies preventing "unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital areas." A physical protection system must achieve this by using entry controls, among other thing


This guide describes acceptable methods of searching personnel prior to entry into a protected area and upon exit from a material access area, and of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas.
====s. Paragraph ====
73.45(e) "removal of only authorized and confirmed forms and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from mate rial access areas." The system must achieve this capability by providing detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess, and communicate attempts at unauthorized removal.
 
Paragraph
73.45(f) provides for ensuring only authorized access to the protected area and requires, in part, the use of entry controls to meet the capability.
 
Finally, § 73.46,"Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, Components, and Procedures," outlines typical specific safe guards measures that will often be included in an overall system that meets the requirements of Sections 73.20 and 73.45.  A significant element of the physical protection system is the control of the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, and material.
 
This control includes personnel identification The substantial number of changes In this revision has made It Impractical to Indicate the changes with lines In the margi
 
====n. USNRC REGULATORY ====
GUIDES Regulatory Guide s are Issued to describe and make available to the public methods acceptable to* the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu'led accidents or to provide guidance to applicants.
 
Regulator uldes, are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliance wIth Am Is not required.
 
Methods and solutions different from those set __,Jut in the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
 
Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or experience.
 
This guide was revised as a result of substantive com ments received from the public and additional staff review.and entry/exit control systems and procedures for searching individuals, vehicles, and materials.
 
Entry and exit control procedures are used to provide assurance that only authorized individuals are allowed access to protected areas (PAs), vital areas (VAs), and material access areas (MAAs). Entry search procedures, in conjunction with other protection elements, are used to provide assurance that firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices are not introduced into the subject areas.  Exit search procedures from material access areas are used to provide assurance that strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) is not being covertly removed.
 
This guide describes measures the NRC staff considers acceptable for implementing entry/exit control requirements at facilities subject to the above regulatory requirements.


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that (I) only persons authorized access to a protected area are permilled within that area and (2) that only individuals authorized access to vital equipment or special nuclear material will be allowed within vital areas or material access areas.The objective of searching individuals prior tc permitting entry into a protected area is to prevent illicit passage into tile protected area of objects such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices which could aid in industrial sabotage to the facility or in tile theft of special nuclear material.
The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that only authorized persons with legitimate need be allowed access to such areas. The objective of searching vehicles, personnel, or packages prior to entry into protected or material access areas is to prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices that could be used to commit radio logical sabotage or aid in the theft of SSNM. The objective of searching all personnel and material exiting material access areas is to provide a means of detecting attempted theft or diversion of concealed SSNM.  Entry control involves the following functions:
I. Identification and authorization check, 2. Entry to control point, 3. Weapons search, 4. Explosive/incendiary device search, 5. Badge exchange, if used, and 6. Admittance to area or denial and notification to security force of a problem.Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.  The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions:
1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2. Research and Test Reactors
 
===7. Transportation ===
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities a. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe CHfIc divisions is available through the Government Printing Office.  Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Publications Sales Manager.I I[
The identity of an individual can be verified by determin ing something about an individual, such as facial features;
by determining something possessed by an individual, such as a coded badge; or by determining something known to an individual, such as a numerical code. By using combina tions of the above three identity verification processes, more reliable identity verification can be obtained.
 
Such identification procedures can be accomplished by attendant security personnel or by the use of identification equipment such as video comparator systems.
 
Searching of incoming personnel or material can be accomplished by a hands-on "pat-down" search, by-the use of devices that detect unauthorized materials, by the use of a "strip" search, or by a combination of all three. Entry searches that use equipment to perform the search function, such as metal or explosives detectors, are preferred as they minimize the imposition of a hands-on or strip search.  Exit searches, which are conducted to ensure that concealed SSNM is not removed from material access areas, should use both special nuclear material (SNM) detection equipment and metal detection equipment to provide greater confidence that either shielded or unshielded material could be detected.
 
All materials leaving the material access area should undergo such a search.  Direct responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, and materials normally resides with members of the security organization.


Searching individuals and packages for conce:;Ied special nuclear material at exit points from material access areas provides a means of detecting attempted theft or diversion of special nuclear material.Some meanis by which control of access can be accomplished include a key and lock system. a magnetic or electronic key-card system. an attendant guard or watchman, or a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) in conjunction with keys or key-cards.
They should be adequately trained in operation of entry/exit control and search equipment and procedures in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to 10 CFR Part 73.  Extensive discussions and descriptions of various alterna tive equipment and procedures for use in controlling entry and exit and for conducting searches of personnel, vehicles, and materials can be found in NUREG-0509, "Bibliography of Technical Guidance for the Physical Protection Upgrade Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites."'1 For the purpose of this guide the following definitions are provided:  
i. Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special nuclear material against theft and the protection of a plant against radiological sabotage.


Of these means. the magnetic or electronic key-card system in conjunction with closed.circuit TV offers the greatest security with a ininimurn of personnel.
2. Watchman means an individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the course of performing other duties. 1 NUREG-0509 is available for public inspection or copying for a fee at the NRC's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased directly from the NRe by writing to the Publications Sales Manager, Distribution Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.  20555 or the National Technical Information Service, Springfield.


The key-cards are mutch more difficult to duplicate tian keys and the locks cannot be "picked." Further, the control system can "read" the key-card and record the identity of the card (to whom it was issued)and the time of entry. A closed-cilcuit
Virginia 22161.3. Escort means a member of the security organization or other designated individual responsible for accompanying those personnel not allowed unescorted access within a protected area. An escort is not required to possess technica;
1V system would allow visual observation of the access point without requiring an attendant guard or watchman.
knowledge of processes or equipment as is required by the". two-man concept.


In fact, by use of closed-circuit TV several such access points can be maintained under observation by a single guard or watchman.
C. REGULATORY
POSITION


Such a system would be especially useful at access points to remote or normally unoccupied vital areas or material access areas. In any case, visual observation, either directly or via CCTV, provides a positive neans of assuring that only individuals authorized access to an area pass through the access point into the area.Searching of individuals can be carried out by means of a hands-on search ("frisking").
===1. PROTECTED ===
or by means of devices which will detect the presence of weapons and explosives or SNM concealed on the individual, or by a combination of both. The search should be conducted in a manner which (I) provides as.surance that firearms, explosives, and other such contraband are not being carried into the protected area and that SNM is not USAEC REGULATORY
AREAS a. Entry. Identification and Authorization At each entry/exit control point (EECP) into a protected area, a means of establishing the identity and access autho rization of incoming individuals should be provided.
GUIDES Copies ol published guides may be obtained by request Indicating the divisions desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commisston.


Wathinglon, D.C 240645, Regulatory Guides are issued to denoribe and rrake available to the public Attention:
Accept able means of identity verification are facial recognition and positive comparison to an authorized picture badge.  Such identity verification can be performed by attendant security personnel or by the use of remotely viewed closed circuit television (CCTV) systems that display an acceptable image of the individual's face and compare it to an image of a picture badge or a stored image of that individual's face.  The identification/verification procedure and confirmation of entry authorization should be performed prior to any search function.
Director of Regulatory Standerds.


Comments and suggestions for methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of Implementing specific parts of Improvements In theta guides are encouraged end should be sent to the Secretary the Commisson';
To facilitate both identification and search functions, entry and exit traffic should be separated by physical barriers, and employee and visitor traffic should be processed separately.
regulations, to delineate techniques used by the stafl In of the Commission.


US. Atomic Energy CommIsslon, Washington.
b. Personnel Search A search of entering personnel for firearms, exploK.. 
sives, or incendiary devices should be conducted by use of both a firearms detector and an explosives detector.


DC. 20545, evaluating probtems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to Attention:
All incoming individuals not possessing a Department of Energy (DOE) material access authorization should undergo such a search. DOE couriers engaged in the transport of SSNM are exempt from such searches.
Chief. Public Proceedinmt Staff.applicants.


Regulatory Guidet are not substitutla for regulations and complIance with thenm is not reouired.
A sample of all individuals possessing DOE material access authorizations should be searched.


Methods and solutions different from those set out In The guides are Issued In the following lan broad divisions:
The sample rate should be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly from all entering personnel who possess the necessary authorizations.
the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.


2. Poewerds and Teas Reactors 7. Traneportotlon I. Fuels and Matatials Facilities
In the event that search equipment indicates the presence of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the following actions should be taken: 1. The security personnel should request that the individual empty his or her pockets and again be tested by the search equipment.
8. Occupt.lional Health Published guides will he revised periodically, at appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitruitt Review comments and to reflect new information or experience.


5. Materials and Plant Protection
If the individual complies and after the equipment no longer indicates the presence of firearms or explosives and the contents of the pockets have been verified as not including firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area.  2. If, however, the equipment continues to indica! the presence of firearms or explosives, a physical searck.., should be made by one unarmed security person, while at 5.7-2 least one guard observes the search. An acceptable alterna tive to a hands-on search is a "'strip search," which could be completed in the privacy of a separate searchroom and which should include the individual disrobing (except for underclothing)  
10. Geonwal I.I being transportcd out of a material access area and (2)nminimizcs inconvenience to the individuals being searched.
and submitting his or her clothing for inspection.


The use of equipment capable of detecting weapons, explosives, or SNM is usually the preferable form of searching, since the use of detection devices avoids the personal imposition of a hands-on search.An "airport type" weapon (me tal) detector located in a passageway arranged so that all individuals entering the protected area pass through the detector provides a convenient and effective means ofsearching for firearms.Devices capable of detecting dynanmite.
3. If an individual refuses to comply with either a hands-on or strip search or if a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device is found, entry should be denied.  4. If material of a suspicious and unknown nature is found, entry should be delayed until responsible security personnel are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature.  When the initial search uses hand-held detectors or is a hands-on search, firearms should be searched for first, as it is presumed that a concealed firearm is a more immediate danger to the searcher than concealed explosives or incen diary devices.


TNT, and other explosives can be used to search individuals for concealed explosives.
Entry into the protected area should be granted to individuals only after they have satisfactorily met the identification, authorization, and search requirements of 10 CFR Part 73. The opening to the last barrier to the PA should be controlled by an individual isolated within a bullet-resisting structure.


Most explosive detectors commercialiy available at present are of the hand-held"sniffer" variety- hence an attendant guard or watchman must pass the detector over the individual being searched.
Acceptable means to accomplish this are to provide a builet-resisting booth meeting UL Level IV standards at the last barrier of the EECP for the individual who controls the opening to the PA or to have this opening controlled by the central alarm station (CAS) or secondary alarm station (SAS) operator or both.  c. Package or Material Identification and Search At PA EECPs, all hand-carried packages should be searched by direct observation, by the use of firearms detectors or explosives detectors, or by the use of X-ray equipment for concealed firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other items that could be used for theft or sabotage purposes.


However, it is possible to locate an explosive detector in a passageway and to use the detector in the sanre manner that a fixed weapon detector is used.If a hand-held explosive detector is used, tIle explosive check is best made after the weapon detector has indicated that no weapon is concealed upon the individual.
Packages carried by individuals who possess a DOE material access authorization may be excepted unless that person is one of the sample selected randomly to'undergo an entry search, in which case any hand-carried packages should also be searched.


This procedure affords greater protection to the attendant guard or watchman on the presumption that concealed explosives offer less of an immediate danger to the guard or watchman than a concealed firearm.One alternative approach to the hand-held explosive detector would be tile location of an explosive detector within a revolving-door frame. The rather small volume of air trapped in a section of the revolving door would be sampled by tile explosive detector and, as the isý)lation of the air volume by a revolving door section provides some concentration of vapors emitted by any explosives within that section, the 41fectiveness of the detector would be increased.
Hand-carried packages or materials that cannot be readily opened or otherwise cannot be effectively searched by direct observation should be submitted to suitable detec tion equipment, which may include X-ray devices. If the nature of the packaging interferes with effective operation of firearm or explosives detection equipment, X-ray should be used. Any item or material determined to be of a ques tionable nature by search personnel should not be allowed into the protected area until responsible security personnel are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature.  d. Vehicle and Cargo Entry and Search All vehicles except DOE vehicles engaged in the transport of SNM and emergency vehicles responding to emergency conditions are required to be searched for unauthorized personnel, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area. The search should include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. (Refer to NUREG/CR-0485, "Vehicle Access and Search Training Manual," 2 for details. A level I search should be conducted as a minimum.)
The use of vehicle sally ports (secure access passageways)
is an acceptable way to facilitate identification, control, and search functions.


To further increase efficiency of thie explosive detector, the air in the door section might be flushed through the detector.Searching individuals for concealed SNM upon exit from material access areas can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For example, at facilities processing plutonium or uranium-233 the search for concealed SNM can be made in an attended air lock between change rooms. At areas where only highly enriched uranium is processed.
All material or packages to be delivered into the PA are required to be identified and verified as an authorized delivery prior to entry. A sample of all such delivered packages or materials should be searched for firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with samples selected randomly from all such deliveries.


the search can be carried nut by use of a doorway SNM monitor and a metal detector in conjunction with a clused-circiit TV (C"CTV) system.hence a guard om watchman need notl be alleirdattl, However, whether or not the access voint is Attended.the use of both an SNM .-ot;iitor ain ,I itetal de tIotl would seemn iiecessary to asstirr that eni iched rIrailrl.shielded or Li1lshieldcd, is niot tnecorlcealcd.
Where size, weight, packaging, or other characteristics prohibit an effective search by direct observa tion, detection equipment, or X-ray, entry may be granted so long as: 1. The material is escorted to its destination by a member of the security organization, 2. The material is not initially offloaded or unpack aged adjacent to a vital or material access area, and 3. Offloading and unpackaging is observed by at least two authorized individuals, one of whom is a member of the security organization, for the purpose of ensuring that only authorized material has been delivered and that there are no concealed firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices.


It addition, exit from any imaterial access area sNhould bu controlled to assure that all individuals and packages exiting from a material access area pass through the SNM check system.It is the facility guards and watchmen who are charged with the responsibility of assuring that firearms, explosives, and other similar items or devices are not transported into the protected area and that SNM is not removed from a material access area without authorization.
e. Entry and Search Aids The use of pedestrian and vehicle sally ports can provide an effective means of isolating, identifying, and searching individuals in a controlled area prior to allowing entry into the PA. By interlocking the first and second openings in the sally port so they cannot be opened simultaneously and by providing observation of entry, a positive means of prevent ing "piggybacking" is available.


Hence, they should search any packages being carried into thc protected area or out of a material access area. No individual should be allowed to directly hand carry any package, valise, tool box, or similar hand-carriable item into the protected area or out ot" a material access area. Such objects should be handed to an attendant guard or watchman who will check them and pass them into the protectcd area or out of the material access area. To further reduce the possibility of concealment, where feasible, bulky outer clothing such as overcoats, raincoats, greatcodits, and ski jackets should be left in a cloak room provided outside the protected area and in any case should never be taken into a material access area. The licensee may wish to use several members of the security force to check packages, coats, etc.. during shift change to minimize tile delay encountered in gaining access. Unattended access points into the protected area can be used. provided observation of such points is maintained by CCTV to assure that packages are not being hand carried into the protected area at that point.Posting of a sign in a conspicuous location will inform individuals requesting access into the protected area that they will be searched, and that any packages, etc., they wish to take into the protected area will also be searched.Although the Commission regulations do not require searching of individuals entering a material access area, observation of access points provides a convenient method of ensuring that personnel do not carry weapons, explosives, and other similar items or devices into the material access area.In emergency situations, such as those which may require the evacuation of a material access area, the objectives of access control and search should not be allowed to compromise health and safety. Hence, the licensee should develop plans of action and provide areas and equipment for searching and controlling access under emergency conditions compatible with the objectives of both safety and security.
Firearms detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least an 85% effective detection rate one of the following located any where on an individual:
(1) Colt .25 automatic, (2) Titan .25 automatic, (3) General Precision Model 20-.22 caliber, (4) CDM .22 short, or (5) the calibration source specified in NILECJ-STD-0601.00, "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Use in Weapons Detection." 3 The false alarm rate should 2 NUREGXCR-0495 is available for public inspection or copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased for $4.75 directly from NRC by sending check or money order, payable to Superintendent of Documents, to the Director, Division of Technical Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 205SS. GPO Deposit Account holders may charge their order by calling (301) 492-9530.


Such emergency procedures will minimize the effectiveness of an emergency situation deliberately perpetrated to conceal theft of SNMN Admiinisirtaive controls, as well as physical barriers where applicable.
Copies are also available for purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.  3 National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Standard 0601.00, Stock Number GPO-2700-002S6,Is for sale for 65 cents per copy by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.  Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.5.7-3 II{
not exceed 10% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. The devices should be adjusted to discriminate between typical firearm and non-firearm masses of metal. One example of a testing method for demonstrating compliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC.  Explosives detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least a 90% effective detection rate dynamite, TNT, and similar nitrogen-containing compounds in a minimum amount of 200 grams. One example of a testing method for demon strating compliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix.


may be employed to gather evacuating individuals within a holding area. Such controls would serve both ro vetif' that to one has remained in 1he evacuated area and to ensure that an emergency 57.2
Other testing methods may be used if the methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. If the search for explosives is to be performed directly by security personnel, it should be performed only after a search for firearms has been made.  A search dog may be capable of providing a satisfac tory detection capability for firearms and explosives.
(0 situation will not successfully conceal an attempted theft of SNM.C. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose uf this guide (he following dve illilions
;lLe provided: I ."Guard'" incan.i in armed arid uniforiied individual whose primary ditty is thie protection of materials and property to the ,txlcnit that theft of SNM or sabotage of thie facility curl Id pose a threat to tile common defense arid security or result in a r:adiological hazard to public health and sal'ct y.2. "Walchilnlul" Illealls all tin arnd individual.


nto nieces.iarily uinifornied, who provides protection for nialerials and property in tile course of performing oilier duties.3. -Patrol watrman'" means an ainis-qualified individual whose primary duty, at lcast during threat or enmergency situations, is the protection
If dogs are used, they should be individually tested to ensure their continued capability and reliability.
.,f material and property, arid hvlio is normally unarmed but who may be armed during emergency or threat situations.


A patrol watchman may or may not be uniformed.
As an animal may present unpredictable problems and weaknesses, a set of trained and tested backup individuals or other detection devices or equipment should be immediately available to serve as a substitute in the event of a dog's illness or other sign of abnormal behavior.


D. REGULATORY
A dog should be used only if it can be shown to detect firearms or explosives with equal or greater confidence than existing alternatives.
POSITION I. Protected Areas I. Identity and Authorization At each access point into a protected area, an identlity and access authorization check should be made ini conjunction willi a search for firearms and explosives'
Si.!,:], idenlitv and access authorization checks should be performied by an attendant guard or watchman or by nmeans of an electronic or magnetic key-card system and a closed-circuit TV systenm. Packages should be taken into the protected area only at access points attended by a guard or watchman.


If the access point is unattended, the individual monitoring.
A dog may be particularly useful in the search of vehicles or oversize packages.


the access point via closed-circuit TV should carefully observe any individual requesting access at that point to ensure that no packages arc being carried into the protected area.b. Personnel Search If tile search of individuals is to be carried out by mezuis of detection equipment, a weapon (metal)detector anl(] an explosive detector should be used. An acceptable arrangement for the use of detection equipnmenI
As the duration of a dog's effectiveness for performing search functions may be limited, it should be used only as a secondary aid. Annunciation of metal and explosives detection equip ment should be both aural and visual. The EECP should be provided with one or more duress alarms that annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. Such alarms should be placed in a concealed location that can generally be reached by attendant security personnel and activated in an unobtrusive manner. An acceptable alterna tive to duress alarms that annunciate in the alarm stations is the use of duress alarms that are ,Worn or carried by atten dant security personnel and that can be activated unobtru sively. Such duress alarms should be worn or carried at all times when security personnel attend an EECP.  2. MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS a. Entry Identification and Authorization Individuals desiring entry to material access areas should be verified as being on appropriate authorization schedules and should be identified by comparison of facial features to an authorized picture badge. An acceptable method of verifying authorization is the use of a code intrinsic to the picture badge indicating that entry to MAAs is authorized.
in a secure access passageway is illustrated in Figure 1. The doors oil the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be sinniltaneously open, thus providing positive access control. An explicit enabling act should be required of a security individual, either attending the secure access passageway or in the central alarm station, to open the inner door.c. Metal Detector The metal detector located within (tie secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 200 grams of non-forrous metal placed anywhere on the body at a )0% conifidence limit. The false alarm rate should be a niaxi mnum of' I d. Explosive Detector The explosive detector, as a miliniumn.


hould be capable of' detecting dynaimite.
At no time should a lone individual be allowed entry to an MAA or a vault. As a minimum, entry to an unoccupied MAA requires at least two individuals to meet the intent of the two-man concept.


TNT. and similar nitrogen compounds in nminiimim amountsl of 200 gramis at a 90%-. confidence hinil, The false alarii rate should be a miaxinium of 1V,.. If deteclor is hand held rather than permanently fixed to a passageway or revolving door framle, lieice requiriing an attendanlt guard or watchlmaui, the search for explosives should be IerTornied after the search for firearms.
b. Package or Material Identification and Search All packages and materials entering a material access area should be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. Search procedures and equipment, as discussed previously, for use at protected area EECPs should be used. In the event that security search personnel are suspicious of the nature of any searched packages or material, entry should be delayed until the nature or identity of the package or material can be determined.


An acceptable arrangi.ent is illustrated in Figure 2.e. Alarm Ani. niciation The alarins of tile weapon detector arid tile explosive detector should annunciate at the location of tile detectors, if attended, as well as in a centrad alarm station. The alarm annunciation at the location of tile detectors need not be aural.f. Alarm System The alarms of the weaponi (metal) detector and tihe explosive detector should be interfaced with (lie inner door lock so ihal. with aln alarm triggered.
c. Entry and Search Aids Entry and search aids discussed in the section on pro tected areas are also applicable to EECPs at MAA boundaries.


Ihe inner door cannot be opened from either side without a specific action by the individual manning the central alarm station acknowledging the alarm and enabling the inner door to be opened.2. Material Access Areas Containing Pu or U-233 a. Change Room Exit Checking for c on cealed plutoniumn or uranirim-233 at all exit point from a material access area into a protected area should be performed in an attended secure access passageway located between change rooms. An acceptable arrangement is shown in Figure 3. Unless exit is into a contiguous material access area, all individuals should exit from a nmatcrial access area, other than a vault, only via tie change rooms arid should be required to deposit all work clothing in tile inner change room. walk through tihe passageway, and dress in street clothing in (lie outer change room. The licensee should generally not allow packages to be transported out of the miaterial access area via tire change rooms. Showers, except those used exclusively for health plhysic.s, should be located in thie outer change room. A guard or watchman need not be altendant except when personnel are exiting from the material access area.b. SNM Detector An SNM detector should be located within the passageway.
In addition, unmanned EECP doors should be alarmed and annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. d. Exit Search for SSNM Prior to exit from an MAA, all individuals, vehicles, packages, and other materials are required to be searched for concealed SSNM. This search should be conducted using both metal detection and SNM detection equipment.


T1he detector should be capable of detecting 0.5 gram of plutonium or I gram of uraniun-233 shielded by 3 min of brass concealed anywhere on an individual at a 9Oi confidence limit. The false alarm rate on the detector should be less than 0.1%.5.7-3
The metal detection system used to search for concealed shielded SSNM should be capable of detecting with at least a 90% effective detection rate a minimum of 100 grams of nonfer rous metal (shielding)
0 c. Door Interlock The doors of tile attended secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. The doors should also be alarmed.so that an explicit action must be taken by either the attendant security individual or the individual manning the central alarm station to enable either door to open without triggering the alarm.d. Packages All packages.
concealed anywhere on an individual.


including waste barrels and work clothes hampers, being transported out of a material access area should be checked by an attendani guard or watchman for concealed SNM, preferably at an exit point expressly provided for packages.
One example of a testing method for demonstratinig com pliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC.  The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% for that level of detection.


SNM packages should be checked for proper seals, identification, and transfer documentation.
SNM detection equipment should be capable of detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched to 90% in the uranium-235 isotope in accordance with the testing and operational requirements of Regulatory Guide 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitor." Individuals should undergo two separate searches prior to exiting an MAA. An acceptable method of conduc ting these searches is to require individuals to pass through two separate sets of metal and SNM detection equipment, each set monitored by a different member of the security organization.


e. Change Room Access Access by personnel into a material access area should he permitted only through the change rooms.Control of access should be accomplished either by a guard or watchman attending the secure access passageway between the change rooms, or by a combination of key-card and CCTV when the passageway is unattended.
For individuals exiting an area that contains only encapsulated or alloyed SSNM, the second search may be made of a sampling of all individuals exiting the area, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly to undergo the search.  If an SNM or metal detector is triggered by an individual attempting to exit an MAA EECP, the individual should be asked to remove all items from his or her pockets and again 3.74/'
pass through the detection equipment.


f. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the control of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone indihidual is allowed within a material access area without some means to observe that individual's activities.
If the detector still triggers, a hands-on or strip search should be conducted.


3. Material Access Areas Containing Highly Enriched Uranium, and Vaults Containing SNM a. Exit At material access area exit points, the check for concealed SNM should be carried out by means of an SNM doorway monitor and a metal detector.
In the event search personnel are unsure of the nature of an object or material uncovered during a search, the material or object should be confiscated and the individual's exit delayed until a determination can be made that the object or material is not SSNM or does not contain SSNM. Vehicles, materials, or packages, including trash, uncon taminated wastes, tools, and other equipment should be searched with SNM and metal detection equipment where appropriate.


A secure access passageway located at the exit point from the material access area should house the detection equipment.
This search should be conducted by a team of at least two authorized and designated individuals who are not normally allowed access to the material access area in question.


An attendant guard or watchman or a closed-circuit TV connected to the central alarm station should also be provided.
An acceptable means of accomplishing such searches for items too large to be accommodated in pedes trian EECPs is to provide a holding area within the MAA that can be isolated from other MAA activities when search personnel are conducting authorized searches.


Administrative procedures should require the passage of packages only through attended exit points. The doors of the secure access passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be simultaneously open. A suggested layout is illustrated in Figure 4.b. SNM Detector The SNM doorway monitor in the secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 3 grams uranium enriched to 90t10 in the uranium-235 isotope in 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an individual at a 50,7 confidence limit. The false alarm rate should not exceed 0. 1%, c. Metal Detector The metal detector in the secure access passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum of 100 grams of non-ferrous metal (shielding)
e. Accounting for Individuals In MAAs Procedures should be employed at MAA EECPs to account for the number and identity of individuals within the MAA. Manual or automated accounting procedures are equally acceptable so long as the procedures can determine at any given time that no lone individual Is within the MAA. An attempted violation of the two-man concept should be detectable at the EECP, CAS, and SAS (e.g., if one of two individuals alone within an MAA attempts to exit without the other). I. Vaults .Entry to vaults should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules are accomplished prior to opening the vault door. The use of split-screen CCTV or CCTV and badge reader are accept able means of establishing identification and authorization.
at a 90%confidence limit concealed anywhere on an individual.


The false alarm rate should not exceed 0.1%.d. Alarms The doors of the se. :tre access passageway should be alarmed and interfaced with the doorway monitor such that an individual can be detained for a sufficient time for the doorway monitor to operate. If an individual passes through without waiting for the proper period of time (perhaps indicated by a light) the alarm should sound. The doorway monitor and metal detector alarms and the door alarms should annunciate in the central alarm station and may also annunciate at the passageway.
Entry control should ensure use of the two-man concept during entry and access to vaults and should ensure that the vault is monitored by CCTV in both alarm stations and at least one other continuously manned onsite location.


e. Access The exit points from the material access area should be used for access points as well. Control of access should be by either the attendant security individual or by a key-card CCTV system.f. Closed-Circuit TV Observation If observation of the passageway is accomplished by CCTV, the guard or watchman monitoring the passageway should carefully observe any individual widtin to ensure that no packages are being carried into or out of the access area.g. Observation of Individuals Procedures should be employed in the control of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone individual is allowed within a material access area without sonic means to observe that individual's activities.
3. VITAL AREAS Entry to vital areas should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules are accomplished prior to entry into the area. Use of the two-man concept for entry control is recommended.


h. Vaults A key-card CCTV system should be employed to control access to and from a vault if such access and exit points do not open to or from material access areas contiguous to the vault. In addition, all individuals who transport SNM between material access areas or to or from a vault, should be escorted by a member of the facility's security force during any period of the transport that the SNM is not within a material access area.4. Vital Areas Control of access into vital areas should be accompli fl ither by an attendant guard or watchman, or by meiýn , i nagnetic or electronic key-card access in conjunctint:
The use of attendant security personnel, authorized escorts, or remotely viewed CCTV systems that compare a facial image to an authorized picture badge are all acceptable means of providing such control.
with closed-circuit TV. The identification checi: .,tid include either direct observation by an.attendant guard or watchman or observation by CCTV of each individual passing into the vital area, or some alternate means (e.g.. an escort) which will provide 5.7-4 pisitive asstrance that only individuals authorized access to the vital area are permitted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an Alarm The guard:; and patrol watchmen should be trained and prepared to protect the facility from sabot::ge and tihe SNM within from theft.a. Protected Area Access Point SIlion anlnunciatiot, ot all alarni from explosive Or Lea rt detectir tl eqtuirnment loc:ated at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman.a gtr:-rd 'hould lc dispatched iCnIlediatelV
to the access point oripinating the "d:rni. If the ac,:ess point is unaltellded.


two .,r: should h%, sent to thie access pointi. At the a,ces, poittil th,: 0ti'rd or watchmlan should!eLicsi t tha 11,Cividluafl'.
===4. EMERGENCY ===
pockets be emptied and that the ilndividUal la.s arilin 1hioudi the detection cquiipmen'n.
PROCEDURES
Emergency procedures should be developed to deal with the possibility of failure of entry/exit detection and assessment equipment or emergency evacuation.


I1 the i: dividu.al complies and if the alarms do inot register.
a. Failure of Detection Equipment Provisions should be made to use alternative EECPs or backup detection equipment or security personnel and provide for rapid repair of malfunctioning detection equip ment. Failure of detection equipment should not be allowed to compromise the effectiveness of required search proce dures. b. Evacuation Procedures To the extent possible, and without compromising safety practices or considerations, procedures should be established to protect against the possibility of an emergency evacuation being used to remove SSNM from the facility or to gain unauthorized access to the facility.


tie individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area after the contents of the individual's pocketis have beet examnined verifying that nto atleruipt has been made to pass explosives or firearms into the proleeted area. If. however, all alarmi continues t) register.
Such procedures should be part of the facility's contingency plan.5.7-5 III
VALUE/IMPACT
STATEMENT A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared for the revision to this regulatory guide. The changes were made to make the guide consistent with the upgrade physical protection amendments to the regulations published in final form in the Federal Register of November 28, 1979 (44 FR 68184). A value/impact analysis prepared for the proposed amendments was made available in the Commis sion's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash ington, D.C., at the time the proposed amendments were published.


tie individual should be physically searched 1w a%,n tiarned security individual, while at least one gCaif or armcd pitrol watchnian observes.
This analysis is appropriate for the final amend ments as well as for the regulatory guide revisions appropri ate to those amendments.


to verify that no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the hndividtral.
5.7-6 APPENDIX


I!* tile individual relfuses to comply with the ren.ýuesl tI r furthher searching, or if a weapon or cexpiosives
===1. BACKGROUND ===
:tic ftound. tlie individual should be denied h. -Materil Access Area Exit Point If an SNM or metal delector alarii or a door.'ir~i is triggered at a miatcrial access area exit point ated bd hv a guard or watchman or at all unattended A.,lt point, security personnel, at least one of whom is armled (a guard or arnied patrol watchman).
The purpose of this appendix Is to provide an example of a testing method for determining the detection capabil ity of firearms, explosives, and nonferrous metal detectors.
should be dispatched to that exit point. The individual should be scatrhed bw emptying pockets and passing again through!O detection equipment or by a hands-on search 1.xrfortned by an unarmed security individual while at least ote guard or arnied patrol watchman observes.


Th, ca~(, of the alarm should be determined before the individual is ieleased.
This example should not be interpreted as a regulatory requirement.


If the cause of the alarti was an uhiect. metal or SNM, not concealed by the individual.
Other testing -methods for demonstrating compliance with the detection rates may be used if fully documented and approved by the NRC. The purpose of testing a detector is to ensure that the installed instru ment is operating according to one of the three performance criteria stated below.  I. Firearms Detectors
-Regulatory Position C. L.e of this guide' states, in part, that firearms detectors should be capable of detecting firearms with at least an 85% effective detection rate. 2. Explosives Detectors
-Regulatory Position C. I.e of this guide states, in part, that explosives detectors should be capable of detecting explosives with at least a 90% effective detection rate.  3. Nonferrous Metal Detect6rs
-Regulatory PositionC.2.d of this guide states, in part, that the metal detection system should be capable of detecting nonferrous metals with at least a 90% effective detection rate.  2. TESTING THE DETECTORS
There are at least two types of testing that should be conducted on the detectors:
detection rate testing and operational testing. Detection rate testing should be con ducted quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is designed to determine whether the detector is operating in compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.


thl. individual should be searched without the object to ensure that the object is not a decoy and that SNM is olt still tk:ing concealed by the individual.
Operational testing should be conducted daily or, preferably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detec tion rate has not decreased to below the performance criterion.


If the::cur 1ity personnel determine that attempted unauthtorized removal of SNM has been made with tile intent to .;teal SN.M, local police and the Federal Bureau Wf Investigation should be contacted.
Additionally, manufacturer's design specifi cation testing could be conducted quarterly.


and tile individual should be field by the security personnel until the local polio: arrive and arrest the individual.
If the detector does not meet the minimum performance levels for the detection rate testing and the operational testing given in the following two sections, then corrective actions should be taken. All tests, test results, and corrective actions should be documented.


c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas It1 unautllioried ent ry is made or atlempted into a vital area or material access arca. or if atn intrusiorn alarm protecting all unoccupied vital or material access area is triggered, two drnied xecuirity personnel should he dispatched immediately to the area of al:irn. If.however. the area of the alarm can be obsev.:ed by CCTV. tile guard or valchniman in the alrm :.iation whiere the TV mronitor is located should first verily tile existence of intrusiOn and assess tile extent of a tharc:. if any. before dispatching flie security persottnef.
The documentation will establish the performance history for each detector, and the test results should be available for inspection and analysis.


If ilie ,,i,.cti ce of all intrusion is verified, cither by CCTV or:;CCLMiy personnel in tile area, a law en 'oreeren juimi'ty should be nolified imnmediately.
2.1 Detection Rate Testing Detection rate testing should be conducted on each detector quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is designed to determine whether the detector is operating in compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.


It" pos,;ible.
The performance criterion for firearms detectors is at least an 85% effective detection rate. The performance criterion for explosives and nonferrous metal detectors is at least a 90% effective detection rate. One example of a method for detection rate testing Is outlined on the following pages.  The testing methods for showing at least 85% and at least 90% effective detection rates are similar, the only difference being that more successful tests are required to demonstrate the higher detection rate. The security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through the detector carrying the appropriate test material.


tli ifiatruder(s)
2.1.1 Firearm.s Detectors For firearms detectors, test each detector 30 times. 1. If 29 or 30 of the 30 tests result in successful detec tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a detection rate of at least 85%, with 95% confidence in this statement.
found by tile security persotnel shothd searched and detadned until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide proteduhres anrd equipmen t to maintain the level of access control and SNM and facility protection during condilions of emergency or equipment failure. E-mergency procedures should be developed and executed in a rimtiner consistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions which require evacuation of part or all of the facility.


lemporafry SNM checking stations should be established at the perinucler of tile protected area or at a personnel collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should he searched for concealed SNM before being released from the protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll of all individuals
2. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi tional tests should be conducted.
%,,ho had entered tile evacutated area should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated .alfely.If an evacuation or other emergency alarm souttids.guards and watchmen should take at prearranged surveillance points to ensure that: (I) Proper evacuation routes :ire being observed, (2) SNM is not being tossed over tile protected area perimeter harrier, and (3) No one atteinpts to gain trnatlhorized access to the protected area during tile emergency.


b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as possible.
If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 38 successful detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion.


Ill the interim, alternate access or exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed, Ili no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise tihe protection of the facility or the SNM within the facility.
However, Uf only 9 out of the 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.


S ip4sitive assurance that only individuals authorized access to the vital area are permit ted to pass into that area.5. Security Force Response to an Alarm The guard:, and patrol watchnmen should be trained and prepared to protect tlie l'acility firom sahotage and the SNNI within fromi thelt.a. Protected Area Access Point I Ilion1 annunciation of an alarin from explosive or weapon detctiiOn equipment located at a protected area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman, a guard should be dispatched inmediately to the access poii't originating tile alarm. If the aczess point is t1tlat tenrdell.
All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since. the cumulative number of successful detections must be at least 47 out of 50 tests in order to demonstrate at least an 85% detection rate, with 95% confidence.


two .should be sent to the access point. At the ajces; point the guard or watchman shouldthar dhc itlividual's pockets be emptied and that the individual pas again tlhr'ough Ltie detection equipment.
3. If 27 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 addi tional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, then the detec tion rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter.


If the individual complies and if tile alarms do not register.
4. If 26 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, compliance with the perform ance criterion is not demonstrated.


tile individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area after the contents of the individual's pockets have been examined verifying that no at lempt has been made to pass explosives or firearms init, the protected area. It1. however. an alarm continues fit register.
Table 1, given below, shows in summary form the minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and 50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on the detection rate is at least 85%. See the appendices to Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys tems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits.5.7-7 1_1 Table 1 SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE
DETECTION
RATE OF 85%Total No. Minimum No. of of ,ests Successful Detections
29 38 47 Statement:
The detection rate is at least _%, with 95% confidence
85.1 85.1 85.2 If the minimum number of successful detections given in Table I is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated.


thle individual should be physically searched 1wv all unarmed security individual.
The detector needs to be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), the testing procedure should be conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests.  A table similar to Table 2 of this Appendix can be used for recording the test results.


while at least one.Ciad or armed patrol watchman observes.
Table 2 DETECTION
RATE TESTING RESULTS Firearms Detector at (location)
Quarter 198 Date: 2. If 29 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi tional tests should be conducted.


to verify that nio firearms or explosives are yet concealed by tie individual.
If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 39 successful detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion.


If the individual rfiuses to comply with the request for further searching, or if a weapon or expiosives are found, the individual should be denied*kcces:ý.1). Material Access Area Exit Point If an SNM or nietal detector alarm or a door ,arran, is triggered at a material access area exit point t by a guard or watchman or at an unattended exit point. security personnel, at least one of whom is armied (a guard or armed patrol watchman).
However, if only 9 out of the 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.
should be dispatched to that exit point. Tile individual should be searched by emptying pockets and passing again through thi' detection equipment or by a hands-on search performed by an unarmed security individual while at least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes.


The caosc of the alarm should be determined before the individual is feleased.
All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since the cumulative number of successful detections must be at least 48 out of 50 tests in order to demonstrate at least a 90% detection rate, with 95% confidence.


If the cause of the alarm was an object, metal or SNM, riot concealed by the individual, tile individual should be searched without the object to ensure that tile object is not a decoy and that SNM is nrot still b-ing concealed by the individual.
"3. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 additional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter.


If the security personnel determine that attempted unauthorized removal of SNM has been made with the intent to .4tcal SNM, local police and the Federal Bureau of Invesligation should he contacted.
4. If 27 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, compliance with the per formance criterion is not demonstrated.


and the individual should be held by the security personnel until the local police arrive and arrest the individual.
Table 3, given below, shows in summary form the minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and 50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on the detection rate is approximately
90% (at least 88%). See the appendices of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits."Time: Total 40 No. of Successful Detections
-(if 29 or 30, testing complete)SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE
DETECTION
RATE OF ABOUT 90% Statement:
The detection rate Total No. Minimum No. of is at least J%, with of Tests Successful Detections
95% confidence
-(if 38, testing complete)10 Total 50-(if 47, testing complete)2.1.2 Explosives Detectors andNonferrour Metl Detectors For explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors, test each detector 30 times.  I. If 30 out of the 30 tests result in successful detec tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a detection rate of at least 90%, with 95% confidence in this statement.


c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access Areas It' unauthoried en ry is made or atternited into a vital area or material access area. or if an intrusion alarm protecting an unoccupied vilal or material access area is triggered.
If the minimum number of successful detections given in Table 3 is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated.


two arrmed security personnel should he dispatched imnediately to tihe area of alarm. It.however. tile area of' the alarmn can be obsc.'ed by CCTV, the guard or vatlchman in the alarm ,,atlihri where the TV monitor is located should first verify the existence of intrusion and assess the extent of 'tihrkal.
The detector needs to be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), then the testing procedure should be conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A table similar to Table 4 can be used for recording the test results.5.7-8 30 40 50 No. of Tests 30 10 Table 3 30 40 so 30 39 48 90.5 88.7 87.9 Table 4 DETECTION
RATE TESTING RESULTS Explosives (or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (ocation)
Quarter _, 198_ Date: Time: No. of Tests 30 No. of Successful Detections S(if 30, testing complete)10 Total 40-(if 39, testing complete)10 Total 50__ (if 48, testing complete)2.2 Operational Testing Operational testing should be conducted daily or, pref erably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detection rate has not decreased to below the perform ance criterion.


it l any. before dispatching thie security personnel.
One example of a method for operational testing is outlined on the following pages. The testing meth od for operational testing is the same for firearms detectors, explosives detectors, and nonferrous metal detectors.


i1 the exiStence of anl intrusion is verified, either by CCTV or sccuniny personnel in tlie area, a law enforcement aJltno ily should be nolified immediately.
The security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through the detector carrying the appropriate test material.


If' pts,.ihle.
The operational testing on each detector should result in 100% detections of the test material.


th,' nitnider(s)
The test results should be documented on a success/failure basis. If the detector fails to detect the test material on an operational test, corrective actions should be taken and documented.
found by the security personnel sh,0tm1d searched and detained until arrest by local police.6. Emergency Procedures The licensee should provide procedures
;nd equipment to maintain the level of access conitrol ;anld SNM and facility protection during conditions ot'emergency or equipment failure. Etmergency procedures should be developed and executtcd in a mn:arne consistent with safety.a. Evacuation Procedures During emergency conditions whicil reqinte evacuation of part or all of live facility.


lemporary SNM checking stations should be established at the peri neler of thie protected area or at a personnel collection area outside the protected area. All individuals should Le searched for concealed SNM before being released nrono tile protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll of' all individuals who had entered the evacu:ated area should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated .allly.if an evacuation or other emergency alarm souinds.guards and watchmen should take positio- at prearranged surveillance peints to ensure that: (i) Proper evacuation rouics are being observed, (2) SNM is not being tossed over tire protected area perimeter barrier, and (3) No one attempts to gain unarlhtorized access to the protected area during tIre emergency.
For example, if the test of the detector results in no alarm (no detection), the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting and retested 4 more times during the same shift if possible.


b. Failed Detection Equipment Failed detection equipment should be repaired as quickly as possible.
If all 4 of these tests result in alarms, the detector should be tested 5 more times during the same shift on the next day. If all these 5 tests result in alarms, the daily or once-per-shift testing schedule can be resumed, since the performance criterion
(85% detection rate for firearms detectors or 90% detection rate for explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors)
has been con firmed. If there were any failures to detect among the 9 additional tests, the detector should not be used until after it has been thoroughly checked, repaired If necessary, and retested according to the detection rate testing method to demonstrate that it is now detecting the test material at the rate specified by the appropriate performance criterion.


In the interim, allernlale access or exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on search procedures should be employed.
A table similar to Table 5 can be used for recording the test results.


In no case should the failure of equipment be allowed to compromise the protection of tlie facility or tire SNM within the facility.0 5.7-5 PROTECTED
5.7-9 II
AREA-J'CCTV CAMERA-N PERIMETER
Table S OPERATIONAL
FENCE-x_ X-xx-X-x--
TESTING RESULTS (Success -I, Failure = 0) Firearms (or Explosives or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (location)
EXPLOSIVES
Week beginning , 198, (in Quarter , 198_) Date Tune Result 4 Retests S Retests Monday -Shift I I oro ..,,., -Shift 2 .... ----Shift 3 ' -' Tuesday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Wednesday
DETECTOR-/
-Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Thursday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Friday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Saturday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Sunday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 5.7-10
1 KEY-CARD READER---'
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
INNER DOOR-WEAPON (METAL) DETECTOR KEY-CARD READER (FOR EXIT),-PERIMETER
COMMISSION
FENCE a ----ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
WASHINGTON.
OUTER DOOR Figure 1 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
INTO PROTECTED
AREA (UNATTENDED)
0.


t" PROTECTED
0. C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID U.SL NUCLEAR REGULATORY
AREA INNER DOOR WEAPON DETECTOR PERIMETER
CoMMISSION
FENCE co cn>0 0 m mCA I/GUARD STATION I PERIMETER f FENCE_kz __ lz %y _%Z-J OFFICES--- ~ I OUTEF DOOR RECEPTION AREA-I.Figure 2 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
K}}
AT ENTRANCE TO PROTECTED
AREA (ATTENDED)
PROTECTED
AREA ENTRANCE Figure 3 SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
BETWEEN CHANGE ROOMS
I PROTECTED
AREA--MATERIAL ACCESS AREA KEY-CARD Figure 4 READER~SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY
AT EXIT FROM MATERIAL ACCESS AREA}}


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(Task SG 909-4), Revision 1, Entry/Exit Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Access Areas
ML003739976
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Issue date: 05/30/1980
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Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
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RG-5.007, Rev 1
Download: ML003739976 (11)
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Revision 1" May 1980 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

REGULATORY

GUIDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS

DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY

GUIDE 57 (Task SG 909-4) ENTRY/EXIT

CONTROL FOR PROTECTED

AREAS, VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS

A. INTRODUCTION

Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, specifies perform ance requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear materials and associated facilities.

Section 73.20, "General Performance Requirements," describes the general performance objective and requirements that must be met through the establishment of a physical protection system. Performance capabilities necessary to meet the requirements of § 73.20 are described in § 73.45,"Performance Capabilities for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems." While detec tion and control requirements are specified throughout the capability statements, specific entry/exit control techniques are required under three capabilities.

Paragraph

73.45(b) specifies preventing "unauthorized access of persons, vehicles and materials into material access areas and vital areas." A physical protection system must achieve this by using entry controls, among other thing

s. Paragraph

73.45(e) "removal of only authorized and confirmed forms and amounts of strategic special nuclear material from mate rial access areas." The system must achieve this capability by providing detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess, and communicate attempts at unauthorized removal.

Paragraph

73.45(f) provides for ensuring only authorized access to the protected area and requires, in part, the use of entry controls to meet the capability.

Finally, § 73.46,"Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, Components, and Procedures," outlines typical specific safe guards measures that will often be included in an overall system that meets the requirements of Sections 73.20 and 73.45. A significant element of the physical protection system is the control of the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, and material.

This control includes personnel identification The substantial number of changes In this revision has made It Impractical to Indicate the changes with lines In the margi

n. USNRC REGULATORY

GUIDES Regulatory Guide s are Issued to describe and make available to the public methods acceptable to* the NRC staff of Implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, to delineate tech niques used by the staff In evaluating specific problems or postu'led accidents or to provide guidance to applicants.

Regulator uldes, are nof substitutes for regulations, and compliance wIth Am Is not required.

Methods and solutions different from those set __,Jut in the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or experience.

This guide was revised as a result of substantive com ments received from the public and additional staff review.and entry/exit control systems and procedures for searching individuals, vehicles, and materials.

Entry and exit control procedures are used to provide assurance that only authorized individuals are allowed access to protected areas (PAs), vital areas (VAs), and material access areas (MAAs). Entry search procedures, in conjunction with other protection elements, are used to provide assurance that firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices are not introduced into the subject areas. Exit search procedures from material access areas are used to provide assurance that strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) is not being covertly removed.

This guide describes measures the NRC staff considers acceptable for implementing entry/exit control requirements at facilities subject to the above regulatory requirements.

B. DISCUSSION

The objective of controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure that only authorized persons with legitimate need be allowed access to such areas. The objective of searching vehicles, personnel, or packages prior to entry into protected or material access areas is to prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices that could be used to commit radio logical sabotage or aid in the theft of SSNM. The objective of searching all personnel and material exiting material access areas is to provide a means of detecting attempted theft or diversion of concealed SSNM. Entry control involves the following functions:

I. Identification and authorization check, 2. Entry to control point, 3. Weapons search, 4. Explosive/incendiary device search, 5. Badge exchange, if used, and 6. Admittance to area or denial and notification to security force of a problem.Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:

Docketing and Service Branch. The guides are Issued In the following ten broad divisions:

1. Power Reactors 6. Products 2. Research and Test Reactors

7. Transportation

3. Fuels and Materials Facilities a. Occupational Health 4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust and Financial Review 5. Materials and Plant Protection

10. General Copies of Issued guides may be purchased at the current Government Printing Office price. A subscription service for future guides In spe CHfIc divisions is available through the Government Printing Office. Information on the subscription service and current GPO prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:

Publications Sales Manager.I I[

The identity of an individual can be verified by determin ing something about an individual, such as facial features;

by determining something possessed by an individual, such as a coded badge; or by determining something known to an individual, such as a numerical code. By using combina tions of the above three identity verification processes, more reliable identity verification can be obtained.

Such identification procedures can be accomplished by attendant security personnel or by the use of identification equipment such as video comparator systems.

Searching of incoming personnel or material can be accomplished by a hands-on "pat-down" search, by-the use of devices that detect unauthorized materials, by the use of a "strip" search, or by a combination of all three. Entry searches that use equipment to perform the search function, such as metal or explosives detectors, are preferred as they minimize the imposition of a hands-on or strip search. Exit searches, which are conducted to ensure that concealed SSNM is not removed from material access areas, should use both special nuclear material (SNM) detection equipment and metal detection equipment to provide greater confidence that either shielded or unshielded material could be detected.

All materials leaving the material access area should undergo such a search. Direct responsibility for controlling the entry and exit of personnel, vehicles, and materials normally resides with members of the security organization.

They should be adequately trained in operation of entry/exit control and search equipment and procedures in accordance with Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnel," to 10 CFR Part 73. Extensive discussions and descriptions of various alterna tive equipment and procedures for use in controlling entry and exit and for conducting searches of personnel, vehicles, and materials can be found in NUREG-0509, "Bibliography of Technical Guidance for the Physical Protection Upgrade Rule Requirements for Fixed Sites."'1 For the purpose of this guide the following definitions are provided:

i. Guard means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special nuclear material against theft and the protection of a plant against radiological sabotage.

2. Watchman means an individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the course of performing other duties. 1 NUREG-0509 is available for public inspection or copying for a fee at the NRC's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased directly from the NRe by writing to the Publications Sales Manager, Distribution Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 or the National Technical Information Service, Springfield.

Virginia 22161.3. Escort means a member of the security organization or other designated individual responsible for accompanying those personnel not allowed unescorted access within a protected area. An escort is not required to possess technica;

knowledge of processes or equipment as is required by the". two-man concept.

C. REGULATORY

POSITION

1. PROTECTED

AREAS a. Entry. Identification and Authorization At each entry/exit control point (EECP) into a protected area, a means of establishing the identity and access autho rization of incoming individuals should be provided.

Accept able means of identity verification are facial recognition and positive comparison to an authorized picture badge. Such identity verification can be performed by attendant security personnel or by the use of remotely viewed closed circuit television (CCTV) systems that display an acceptable image of the individual's face and compare it to an image of a picture badge or a stored image of that individual's face. The identification/verification procedure and confirmation of entry authorization should be performed prior to any search function.

To facilitate both identification and search functions, entry and exit traffic should be separated by physical barriers, and employee and visitor traffic should be processed separately.

b. Personnel Search A search of entering personnel for firearms, exploK..

sives, or incendiary devices should be conducted by use of both a firearms detector and an explosives detector.

All incoming individuals not possessing a Department of Energy (DOE) material access authorization should undergo such a search. DOE couriers engaged in the transport of SSNM are exempt from such searches.

A sample of all individuals possessing DOE material access authorizations should be searched.

The sample rate should be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly from all entering personnel who possess the necessary authorizations.

In the event that search equipment indicates the presence of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the following actions should be taken: 1. The security personnel should request that the individual empty his or her pockets and again be tested by the search equipment.

If the individual complies and after the equipment no longer indicates the presence of firearms or explosives and the contents of the pockets have been verified as not including firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the individual may be allowed to pass into the protected area. 2. If, however, the equipment continues to indica! the presence of firearms or explosives, a physical searck.., should be made by one unarmed security person, while at 5.7-2 least one guard observes the search. An acceptable alterna tive to a hands-on search is a "'strip search," which could be completed in the privacy of a separate searchroom and which should include the individual disrobing (except for underclothing)

and submitting his or her clothing for inspection.

3. If an individual refuses to comply with either a hands-on or strip search or if a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device is found, entry should be denied. 4. If material of a suspicious and unknown nature is found, entry should be delayed until responsible security personnel are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. When the initial search uses hand-held detectors or is a hands-on search, firearms should be searched for first, as it is presumed that a concealed firearm is a more immediate danger to the searcher than concealed explosives or incen diary devices.

Entry into the protected area should be granted to individuals only after they have satisfactorily met the identification, authorization, and search requirements of 10 CFR Part 73. The opening to the last barrier to the PA should be controlled by an individual isolated within a bullet-resisting structure.

Acceptable means to accomplish this are to provide a builet-resisting booth meeting UL Level IV standards at the last barrier of the EECP for the individual who controls the opening to the PA or to have this opening controlled by the central alarm station (CAS) or secondary alarm station (SAS) operator or both. c. Package or Material Identification and Search At PA EECPs, all hand-carried packages should be searched by direct observation, by the use of firearms detectors or explosives detectors, or by the use of X-ray equipment for concealed firearms, explosives, incendiary devices or other items that could be used for theft or sabotage purposes.

Packages carried by individuals who possess a DOE material access authorization may be excepted unless that person is one of the sample selected randomly to'undergo an entry search, in which case any hand-carried packages should also be searched.

Hand-carried packages or materials that cannot be readily opened or otherwise cannot be effectively searched by direct observation should be submitted to suitable detec tion equipment, which may include X-ray devices. If the nature of the packaging interferes with effective operation of firearm or explosives detection equipment, X-ray should be used. Any item or material determined to be of a ques tionable nature by search personnel should not be allowed into the protected area until responsible security personnel are satisfied that the material is not of a threatening nature. d. Vehicle and Cargo Entry and Search All vehicles except DOE vehicles engaged in the transport of SNM and emergency vehicles responding to emergency conditions are required to be searched for unauthorized personnel, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area. The search should include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. (Refer to NUREG/CR-0485, "Vehicle Access and Search Training Manual," 2 for details. A level I search should be conducted as a minimum.)

The use of vehicle sally ports (secure access passageways)

is an acceptable way to facilitate identification, control, and search functions.

All material or packages to be delivered into the PA are required to be identified and verified as an authorized delivery prior to entry. A sample of all such delivered packages or materials should be searched for firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with samples selected randomly from all such deliveries.

Where size, weight, packaging, or other characteristics prohibit an effective search by direct observa tion, detection equipment, or X-ray, entry may be granted so long as: 1. The material is escorted to its destination by a member of the security organization, 2. The material is not initially offloaded or unpack aged adjacent to a vital or material access area, and 3. Offloading and unpackaging is observed by at least two authorized individuals, one of whom is a member of the security organization, for the purpose of ensuring that only authorized material has been delivered and that there are no concealed firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices.

e. Entry and Search Aids The use of pedestrian and vehicle sally ports can provide an effective means of isolating, identifying, and searching individuals in a controlled area prior to allowing entry into the PA. By interlocking the first and second openings in the sally port so they cannot be opened simultaneously and by providing observation of entry, a positive means of prevent ing "piggybacking" is available.

Firearms detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least an 85% effective detection rate one of the following located any where on an individual:

(1) Colt .25 automatic, (2) Titan .25 automatic, (3) General Precision Model 20-.22 caliber, (4) CDM .22 short, or (5) the calibration source specified in NILECJ-STD-0601.00, "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Use in Weapons Detection." 3 The false alarm rate should 2 NUREGXCR-0495 is available for public inspection or copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. Copies may be purchased for $4.75 directly from NRC by sending check or money order, payable to Superintendent of Documents, to the Director, Division of Technical Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 205SS. GPO Deposit Account holders may charge their order by calling (301) 492-9530.

Copies are also available for purchase through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. 3 National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Standard 0601.00, Stock Number GPO-2700-002S6,Is for sale for 65 cents per copy by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.5.7-3 II{

not exceed 10% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. The devices should be adjusted to discriminate between typical firearm and non-firearm masses of metal. One example of a testing method for demonstrating compliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. Explosives detectors, whether of the hand-held or portal variety, should be capable of detecting with at least a 90% effective detection rate dynamite, TNT, and similar nitrogen-containing compounds in a minimum amount of 200 grams. One example of a testing method for demon strating compliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix.

Other testing methods may be used if the methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% when the detector sensitivity is adjusted to this detection level. If the search for explosives is to be performed directly by security personnel, it should be performed only after a search for firearms has been made. A search dog may be capable of providing a satisfac tory detection capability for firearms and explosives.

If dogs are used, they should be individually tested to ensure their continued capability and reliability.

As an animal may present unpredictable problems and weaknesses, a set of trained and tested backup individuals or other detection devices or equipment should be immediately available to serve as a substitute in the event of a dog's illness or other sign of abnormal behavior.

A dog should be used only if it can be shown to detect firearms or explosives with equal or greater confidence than existing alternatives.

A dog may be particularly useful in the search of vehicles or oversize packages.

As the duration of a dog's effectiveness for performing search functions may be limited, it should be used only as a secondary aid. Annunciation of metal and explosives detection equip ment should be both aural and visual. The EECP should be provided with one or more duress alarms that annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. Such alarms should be placed in a concealed location that can generally be reached by attendant security personnel and activated in an unobtrusive manner. An acceptable alterna tive to duress alarms that annunciate in the alarm stations is the use of duress alarms that are ,Worn or carried by atten dant security personnel and that can be activated unobtru sively. Such duress alarms should be worn or carried at all times when security personnel attend an EECP. 2. MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS a. Entry Identification and Authorization Individuals desiring entry to material access areas should be verified as being on appropriate authorization schedules and should be identified by comparison of facial features to an authorized picture badge. An acceptable method of verifying authorization is the use of a code intrinsic to the picture badge indicating that entry to MAAs is authorized.

At no time should a lone individual be allowed entry to an MAA or a vault. As a minimum, entry to an unoccupied MAA requires at least two individuals to meet the intent of the two-man concept.

b. Package or Material Identification and Search All packages and materials entering a material access area should be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. Search procedures and equipment, as discussed previously, for use at protected area EECPs should be used. In the event that security search personnel are suspicious of the nature of any searched packages or material, entry should be delayed until the nature or identity of the package or material can be determined.

c. Entry and Search Aids Entry and search aids discussed in the section on pro tected areas are also applicable to EECPs at MAA boundaries.

In addition, unmanned EECP doors should be alarmed and annunciate in both the CAS and SAS. d. Exit Search for SSNM Prior to exit from an MAA, all individuals, vehicles, packages, and other materials are required to be searched for concealed SSNM. This search should be conducted using both metal detection and SNM detection equipment.

The metal detection system used to search for concealed shielded SSNM should be capable of detecting with at least a 90% effective detection rate a minimum of 100 grams of nonfer rous metal (shielding)

concealed anywhere on an individual.

One example of a testing method for demonstratinig com pliance with the detection rate is given in the Appendix to this guide. Other testing methods may be used if the methods are fully documented and approved by the NRC. The false alarm rate should not exceed 1% for that level of detection.

SNM detection equipment should be capable of detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched to 90% in the uranium-235 isotope in accordance with the testing and operational requirements of Regulatory Guide 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitor." Individuals should undergo two separate searches prior to exiting an MAA. An acceptable method of conduc ting these searches is to require individuals to pass through two separate sets of metal and SNM detection equipment, each set monitored by a different member of the security organization.

For individuals exiting an area that contains only encapsulated or alloyed SSNM, the second search may be made of a sampling of all individuals exiting the area, the sample rate to be a minimum of 10%, with individuals selected randomly to undergo the search. If an SNM or metal detector is triggered by an individual attempting to exit an MAA EECP, the individual should be asked to remove all items from his or her pockets and again 3.74/'

pass through the detection equipment.

If the detector still triggers, a hands-on or strip search should be conducted.

In the event search personnel are unsure of the nature of an object or material uncovered during a search, the material or object should be confiscated and the individual's exit delayed until a determination can be made that the object or material is not SSNM or does not contain SSNM. Vehicles, materials, or packages, including trash, uncon taminated wastes, tools, and other equipment should be searched with SNM and metal detection equipment where appropriate.

This search should be conducted by a team of at least two authorized and designated individuals who are not normally allowed access to the material access area in question.

An acceptable means of accomplishing such searches for items too large to be accommodated in pedes trian EECPs is to provide a holding area within the MAA that can be isolated from other MAA activities when search personnel are conducting authorized searches.

e. Accounting for Individuals In MAAs Procedures should be employed at MAA EECPs to account for the number and identity of individuals within the MAA. Manual or automated accounting procedures are equally acceptable so long as the procedures can determine at any given time that no lone individual Is within the MAA. An attempted violation of the two-man concept should be detectable at the EECP, CAS, and SAS (e.g., if one of two individuals alone within an MAA attempts to exit without the other). I. Vaults .Entry to vaults should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules are accomplished prior to opening the vault door. The use of split-screen CCTV or CCTV and badge reader are accept able means of establishing identification and authorization.

Entry control should ensure use of the two-man concept during entry and access to vaults and should ensure that the vault is monitored by CCTV in both alarm stations and at least one other continuously manned onsite location.

3. VITAL AREAS Entry to vital areas should be controlled so that individ ual identification and comparison to authorization schedules are accomplished prior to entry into the area. Use of the two-man concept for entry control is recommended.

The use of attendant security personnel, authorized escorts, or remotely viewed CCTV systems that compare a facial image to an authorized picture badge are all acceptable means of providing such control.

4. EMERGENCY

PROCEDURES

Emergency procedures should be developed to deal with the possibility of failure of entry/exit detection and assessment equipment or emergency evacuation.

a. Failure of Detection Equipment Provisions should be made to use alternative EECPs or backup detection equipment or security personnel and provide for rapid repair of malfunctioning detection equip ment. Failure of detection equipment should not be allowed to compromise the effectiveness of required search proce dures. b. Evacuation Procedures To the extent possible, and without compromising safety practices or considerations, procedures should be established to protect against the possibility of an emergency evacuation being used to remove SSNM from the facility or to gain unauthorized access to the facility.

Such procedures should be part of the facility's contingency plan.5.7-5 III

VALUE/IMPACT

STATEMENT A separate value/impact analysis has not been prepared for the revision to this regulatory guide. The changes were made to make the guide consistent with the upgrade physical protection amendments to the regulations published in final form in the Federal Register of November 28, 1979 (44 FR 68184). A value/impact analysis prepared for the proposed amendments was made available in the Commis sion's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Wash ington, D.C., at the time the proposed amendments were published.

This analysis is appropriate for the final amend ments as well as for the regulatory guide revisions appropri ate to those amendments.

5.7-6 APPENDIX

1. BACKGROUND

The purpose of this appendix Is to provide an example of a testing method for determining the detection capabil ity of firearms, explosives, and nonferrous metal detectors.

This example should not be interpreted as a regulatory requirement.

Other testing -methods for demonstrating compliance with the detection rates may be used if fully documented and approved by the NRC. The purpose of testing a detector is to ensure that the installed instru ment is operating according to one of the three performance criteria stated below. I. Firearms Detectors

-Regulatory Position C. L.e of this guide' states, in part, that firearms detectors should be capable of detecting firearms with at least an 85% effective detection rate. 2. Explosives Detectors

-Regulatory Position C. I.e of this guide states, in part, that explosives detectors should be capable of detecting explosives with at least a 90% effective detection rate. 3. Nonferrous Metal Detect6rs

-Regulatory PositionC.2.d of this guide states, in part, that the metal detection system should be capable of detecting nonferrous metals with at least a 90% effective detection rate. 2. TESTING THE DETECTORS

There are at least two types of testing that should be conducted on the detectors:

detection rate testing and operational testing. Detection rate testing should be con ducted quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is designed to determine whether the detector is operating in compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.

Operational testing should be conducted daily or, preferably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detec tion rate has not decreased to below the performance criterion.

Additionally, manufacturer's design specifi cation testing could be conducted quarterly.

If the detector does not meet the minimum performance levels for the detection rate testing and the operational testing given in the following two sections, then corrective actions should be taken. All tests, test results, and corrective actions should be documented.

The documentation will establish the performance history for each detector, and the test results should be available for inspection and analysis.

2.1 Detection Rate Testing Detection rate testing should be conducted on each detector quarterly (approximately every 90 days) and is designed to determine whether the detector is operating in compliance with the appropriate performance criterion.

The performance criterion for firearms detectors is at least an 85% effective detection rate. The performance criterion for explosives and nonferrous metal detectors is at least a 90% effective detection rate. One example of a method for detection rate testing Is outlined on the following pages. The testing methods for showing at least 85% and at least 90% effective detection rates are similar, the only difference being that more successful tests are required to demonstrate the higher detection rate. The security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through the detector carrying the appropriate test material.

2.1.1 Firearm.s Detectors For firearms detectors, test each detector 30 times. 1. If 29 or 30 of the 30 tests result in successful detec tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a detection rate of at least 85%, with 95% confidence in this statement.

2. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi tional tests should be conducted.

If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 38 successful detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion.

However, Uf only 9 out of the 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.

All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since. the cumulative number of successful detections must be at least 47 out of 50 tests in order to demonstrate at least an 85% detection rate, with 95% confidence.

3. If 27 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 addi tional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, then the detec tion rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter.

4. If 26 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, compliance with the perform ance criterion is not demonstrated.

Table 1, given below, shows in summary form the minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and 50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on the detection rate is at least 85%. See the appendices to Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys tems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits.5.7-7 1_1 Table 1 SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE

DETECTION

RATE OF 85%Total No. Minimum No. of of ,ests Successful Detections

29 38 47 Statement:

The detection rate is at least _%, with 95% confidence

85.1 85.1 85.2 If the minimum number of successful detections given in Table I is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated.

The detector needs to be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), the testing procedure should be conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A table similar to Table 2 of this Appendix can be used for recording the test results.

Table 2 DETECTION

RATE TESTING RESULTS Firearms Detector at (location)

Quarter 198 Date: 2. If 29 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 10 addi tional tests should be conducted.

If all 10 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter, since 39 successful detections out of 40 tests demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion.

However, if only 9 out of the 10 tests are successful, 10 more tests should be conducted.

All of these 10 tests must be successful detections to demonstrate compliance, since the cumulative number of successful detections must be at least 48 out of 50 tests in order to demonstrate at least a 90% detection rate, with 95% confidence.

"3. If 28 of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting, and 20 additional tests should be conducted (two sets of 10 tests). If all 20 tests result in successful detections, the detection rate testing can be ended for this detector for this quarter.

4. If 27 or fewer of the 30 tests result in successful detections of the test material, compliance with the per formance criterion is not demonstrated.

Table 3, given below, shows in summary form the minimum number of successful detections for 30, 40, and 50 tests for which the lower one-sided confidence limit on the detection rate is approximately

90% (at least 88%). See the appendices of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems," particularly Appendix B, for the details of deriving these confidence limits."Time: Total 40 No. of Successful Detections

-(if 29 or 30, testing complete)SUMMARY OF TESTS TO SHOW EFFECTIVE

DETECTION

RATE OF ABOUT 90% Statement:

The detection rate Total No. Minimum No. of is at least J%, with of Tests Successful Detections

95% confidence

-(if 38, testing complete)10 Total 50-(if 47, testing complete)2.1.2 Explosives Detectors andNonferrour Metl Detectors For explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors, test each detector 30 times. I. If 30 out of the 30 tests result in successful detec tions of the test material, the test results demonstrate a detection rate of at least 90%, with 95% confidence in this statement.

If the minimum number of successful detections given in Table 3 is not met, compliance with the performance criterion has not been demonstrated.

The detector needs to be upgraded to increase the detection rate to the required level. After the detector has been upgraded (repaired, adjusted, or replaced), then the testing procedure should be conducted again in order to demonstrate compliance with the performance criterion, beginning with the 30 tests. A table similar to Table 4 can be used for recording the test results.5.7-8 30 40 50 No. of Tests 30 10 Table 3 30 40 so 30 39 48 90.5 88.7 87.9 Table 4 DETECTION

RATE TESTING RESULTS Explosives (or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (ocation)

Quarter _, 198_ Date: Time: No. of Tests 30 No. of Successful Detections S(if 30, testing complete)10 Total 40-(if 39, testing complete)10 Total 50__ (if 48, testing complete)2.2 Operational Testing Operational testing should be conducted daily or, pref erably, at the beginning of each shift. Operational testing is designed to ensure that the detector is operating and that the detection rate has not decreased to below the perform ance criterion.

One example of a method for operational testing is outlined on the following pages. The testing meth od for operational testing is the same for firearms detectors, explosives detectors, and nonferrous metal detectors.

The security personnel should test each detector by having one of the members of the security organization walk through the detector carrying the appropriate test material.

The operational testing on each detector should result in 100% detections of the test material.

The test results should be documented on a success/failure basis. If the detector fails to detect the test material on an operational test, corrective actions should be taken and documented.

For example, if the test of the detector results in no alarm (no detection), the detector should be checked for an obvious problem such as an incorrect setting and retested 4 more times during the same shift if possible.

If all 4 of these tests result in alarms, the detector should be tested 5 more times during the same shift on the next day. If all these 5 tests result in alarms, the daily or once-per-shift testing schedule can be resumed, since the performance criterion

(85% detection rate for firearms detectors or 90% detection rate for explosives detectors and nonferrous metal detectors)

has been con firmed. If there were any failures to detect among the 9 additional tests, the detector should not be used until after it has been thoroughly checked, repaired If necessary, and retested according to the detection rate testing method to demonstrate that it is now detecting the test material at the rate specified by the appropriate performance criterion.

A table similar to Table 5 can be used for recording the test results.

5.7-9 II

Table S OPERATIONAL

TESTING RESULTS (Success -I, Failure = 0) Firearms (or Explosives or Nonferrous Metal) Detector at (location)

Week beginning , 198, (in Quarter , 198_) Date Tune Result 4 Retests S Retests Monday -Shift I I oro ..,,., -Shift 2 .... ----Shift 3 ' -' Tuesday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Wednesday

-Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Thursday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Friday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Saturday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 Sunday -Shift I -Shift 2 -Shift 3 5.7-10

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

WASHINGTON.

0. C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID U.SL NUCLEAR REGULATORY

CoMMISSION

K


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