W3P88-0160, Application for Amend to License NPF-38,changing Tech Specs to Clarify Testing of Log Power Level Trip & to Allow Reduction of Shutdown Flow in Mode 6 to Minimize Potential for Loss of Shutdown Due to Vortexing.Fee Paid
| ML20149M821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1988 |
| From: | Dewease J LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149M822 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-87-12, W3P88-0160, W3P88-160, NUDOCS 8802290103 | |
| Download: ML20149M821 (5) | |
Text
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LOUISIANA 317 BARONNE STREET e
P. O. BOX 60340 (504) 595-2781 POWE R & LIGHT NEW ORLEANS, LOUI5 LANA 70160 e
$lU IN IYS U
January 28, 1988 J. G. DEWE AS E stwon wct ressegur.
NUCtlAR o9tRA TOWS W3P88-0160 A4.05 QA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Technical Specification Change Requests NPF-38-73 and NPF-38-74
Dear Sir:
Louisiana Power & Light hereby files an application for an amendment to the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications regarding the Reactor Protective Instru-mentation and Shutdown Cooling Flow.
In NPF-38-73, testing of the log power level trip is clarified as discussed 5it.h the Waterford 3 Resident Inspector. The amendment requested in NPF-38-74 would allow reduction of shutdown cooling flow in Mode 6 to minimize the potential for a loss of shutdown cooling due to vortexing. This change is consistent with the guidance of (and Waterford 3 commitments in response to) Generic Letter 87-12.
Waterford 3 will enter Mode 6 early in the second refueling outage currently scheduled for the beginning of April, 1988.
Your timely review of NPF-38-74 is requested to support this schedule.
The enclosed amendments do not involve an unreviewed safety question nor a significant hazards consideration.
Should you have any questions or require additional information concerning the proposed changes, please contact Larry Laughlin at (504) 595-2845.
Yours very truly, 8802290103 880128 6
ewease P
Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations JGD/LWL/pim
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Enclosures:
NPF-38-73 NPF-38-74 j
Filing Fee - LP&L check for $150.00 cci E.L. Blake, W.H. Stevenson, J.A. Calvo, J.H. Wilson, R.D. Martin, NRC Resident Inspector's Office (W3)
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o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of-
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Louisiana Power & Light Company
) Docket No. 50-382 Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station
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AFFIDAVIT J.G. Dewease, being. duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations of Louisiana Power & Light Company; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached Technical Specification Change Requests; that he is familiar l
with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true l
and correct to the beat of his knowledge, information and belief, i
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(;. Mwease
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yhnior Vice President j uclear Operations N
STATE OF LOUISIANA) i
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PARISH OF ORLEANS )
l Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public-n and for the Parish and State above named this e1 P M day of m
1988.
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e NPF-38-73 1
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DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-73 This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3/4.3.1, Reactor Protection Instrumentation.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Prcposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description The proposed change would revise a portion of the operabililty and surveillance requirements associated with Technical Specification 3/4.3.1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation.
Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 currently, among other things, requires the Logarithmic Power (Log Power) Level - High Channels to be operable in modes 1 and 2.
The proposed change would remove the operability as well as surveillsnce requirements for Log Power Channels when reactor thermal power is above 1.0E-4% of rated thermal power.
The bases for the Log Power Level - High trip is to protect the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary in the event of an unplanned criticality from a shutdown condition. In order to operate above 1.0E-4% reactor thermal power, plant operators must bypass the Log Power Level -
High trip.
Therefore, the requirement for the channels to be operable above 1.0E-4% reactor thermal power is inappropriate.
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
1.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
NS41376
The intent of the Logarithmic Power trip is to protect the integrity of the fuel cladding and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary in the event of an unplanned criticality from a shutdown condition. When increasing reactor power following a shutdown, plant operators must bypass the Log Power Trip in order to increase reactor power above 1.0E-4%.
By doing this, the Log Power Channels will be removed from the reactor trip logic.
The proposed change will remove the operability requirements for the instru-mentation when the trip is bypassed (above 1.0E-4% reactor power).
The proposed change will not, however, affect the operability and surveillance requirements when reactor power is below 1.0E-4%.
Therefore, removing the operability and surveillance requirements above 1.0E-4% reactor thermal power does not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
2.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
The operability and surveillance requirements will remain in effect below 1.0E-4% reactor thermal power; therefore, the design basis of the instru-mentation will not be affected.
There has been no physical change to plant structures, systems or components.
Thus, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response
No.
The intent of the Log Power trip is to prevent a power excursion during shutdown conditions as a result of an unplanned criticality.
The proposed change will not affect the ability of the instrumentation to perform its intended function.
Therefore, the proposed change will not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination l
Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that:
(1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92(c); (2) there is a reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
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NS41376 I
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