W3P87-1672, Forwards Responses to 870702 Questions Re 870616 Onsite Audit of Dcrdr.Response Sufficient to Close Out Dcrdr Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737
| ML20236F694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1987 |
| From: | Cook K LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 W3P87-1672, NUDOCS 8708040001 | |
| Download: ML20236F694 (14) | |
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- l. O UISI AN A / 317 BARONNE STREET P. O. BOX 60340
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P 3WER & LIGHT NEW ORLEANS, LOUISlANA 70160 + (504)S95-3100 IIA?00 lyss July 28, 1987 W3P87-1672 A4.05 l
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit 3
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Docket No. 50-382 Detailed Control Room Design Review Supplemental Information 4
Reference:
NRC letter from Wilson (NRC) to Dewease (LP&L) dated July 2, 1987 Gentlemen:
A a result of your June 16, 1987 on-site audit of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) yciu requested, in the referenced letter, addi-tional information to completa your review of the Waterford 3 DCRDR.
Enclosed please find our responses to the five questions you transmitted.
It is'our understanding that this response should be sufficient to close out the DCRDR requirements of NUREG 0737 Supplement 1 for Waterford 3.
Should you require any clarification of our responses please contact Mike Meisner at (504) 595-2832.
Your very truly, JE &
K.W. Cook Nuclear Safety &
Regulatory Affairs Manager KWC:MJM:ssf Enclosure ec:
E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, J.A. Calvo, J.H. Wilson, R.D. Martin, p
6fj G. West, E. Tomlinsen, NRC Resident Inspector's Office (W3) k\\
8708040001 870728 i
PDR ADOCK 050003B2
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p FDR "AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER" i
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l QUESTION:
j Have there bean any changes in the status of or corrections for human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) that were not mentioned in the Supplements to the Waterford Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Summary Report (SR) dated April 1986 and October 14, 1986? If so, any changes in HED status or justification for uncorrected HEDs should be provided to the NRC.
RESPONSE
The Waterford 3 HED Committee has recently reviewed the status of' corrective action for incomplete HEDs. As a result of the review, the following changes in status or corrective action have been initiated (revised HED pages are attached):
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l Revised Response - HEDs 126, 127, 277, LO2 These HEDs involve raising the sound level of various alarms in the control room in relation to ambient noise. Further review has determined that the alarm level is adequate and that the actual concern lies with the ambient noise. Accordingly, the responses have been changed to allow evaluation of control room noise levels and consideration of various alternatives for correction.
Invalid HEDs - HEDs 77, 310 For the reasons noted in the attachments, HEDs 77 and 310 are now considered to be invalid.
Completion Date Deferral - HED 356 HED 356 addresses display density for the SPDS. Since the SPDS design is presently being revised as a separate issue with the NRC, completion of HED 356 has been deferred consistent with the SPDS schedule.
Completion Date Uncertain - HED 281 The corrective action for HED 281 requires obtaining a new radio frequency from the FCC. One application has been denied and another is in preparation. The completion date for HED 281 may exceed the second refueling outage depending on the FCC approval process.
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:
0077 i
GUIDE NO.:... Val _idation CATEGORY: Invalid l
l EINDING:
Step 19 on LOCA Procedures sheuld include a subcooling requirement of 28 degrees F as well as a pressurizer level of 28%.
With pressurizer heaters, additional energy is given to containinenta l
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RESPONSE
During the validation process, the Subject Matter Expert'(SME) identified that at step 19 of the LOCA Procedures, a subcooling requirement of 28 degrees F as well as pressurizer ' level of 28% should be included.
With 1
pressurizer heaters, additional energy is given to containment.
- However, I
after careful evaluation with other SMEs, it was determined that by-I committing to this recommendation, the plant's emergency response j
capability would be lessened.
There' is no known technical reason to i
4 include this information in the Emergency Operating Procedures and should therefore be considered incorrect SME-cpinion and not a bona fide HED.
I IMPLEMENTATION.N:
Not applicable.
4331/1/85 l
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J CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l
llED NO.:
0126 GUIDE NO.: 2_ d _,1 t L L,_2.11a j,
- 3. ?ull CATEGORY:
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EJNDI1101 s
1 The auditory signals (annunciator horns) do not provide a value of at least 10dB(A) above average ambient noise.
In fact the speaker volume exceeds these annunciators.
EE.BEDHS11t The systematic evaluation of the sound levels within the control room will determine the interactive effects of the ambient noise levels and the auditory signals of the annunciators and emergency alarms.
The high background noise in the control room, its volume, amplitude, and j
frequencies significantly affect the signal-to-poise ratios of the auditory signals and thereby reduce their effectiveness.
A thorough review of the dynamics associated with these problems will diagnose the root causes and provide for design alternatives to mitigate these problems.
Recommendations will include considerations for ensuring i
sufficient volume levels and volume level deviations for the annunciators
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as wall as providing for the reduction of ambient noise levels.
1 J14PLEMENTATIDXt By the completion of the second refueling outage.
4338/1/29
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l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
HED NO.:
0127 GUIDE NO.:
3.2.12D CATEGORY:
X FINDING:
The average volume of annunciator horns is 71dB.
All individual horns deviate from the average more tnan the
+/-2.5 dB recommended by NUREG-0700.
BESEDHSE1.
The systematic evaluation of the sound levels within the control room will determine the interactive effects of the ambient noise levels and the auditory signals of the annunciators and emergency alarms.
The high background noise in the control room, its volume, amplitude, and frequencies significantly affect the signal-to-noise ratios of the auditory signals and thereby reduce their effectiveness.
A thorough' review of the dynamics associated with these problents will diagnose the root causes and provide for design alternatives to mitigate these problems.
Recommendations will include considerations for ensuring sufficient volume levels and volume level deviations for the anrlunciators as : ell as providing for the reduction of ambient noise levels.
IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the second refueling outage.
4330/1/30
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1
HED NO.:
0277
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GUIDE NO.:
00 Survey A5.01. C1.01 l
l CATEGORY:
X FINDING:
Communication between the control desk and the protection panel area in 1
the back.i s impossible due to unnecessarily high bac.kground noise levels from CPC ventilation fans on CP21 and CP22.
This fan noise bleeds over
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into front panel area and creates background noise.
The RPS noise is a consistent high problem concerning normal verbal control room I
communication.
RESPONSE:.
The systematic evaluation of the sound levels within the control room will determine the interactive effects of the ambient noise levels and the 1
auditory signals of the annunciators and emergency alarms.
The high background noise in the control room, its volume, amplitude, and frequencies significantly affect the signal-to-noise ratios of the auditory signals and thereby reduce their effectiveness.
A thorough review of the dynamics associated with these problems will diagnose the root causes and provide for design alternatives to mitigate these problems.
Recommendations will include considerations for ensuring sufficient volume levels and volume level deviations for the annunciators as well as providing for the reduction of ambient noise levels.
IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the second' refueling outage.
4332/1/7
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:
0281 GU10E NO.:
Op Survey A5.06 CATEGORY:
X FINDING:
- here is need for a better comn.unication system, such as sound powered phones or another phone system with plug-ins, at all major components and throughout the plant.
There is also incompatibility between three wire female sockets and two wire male plugs which result in unreliable connections in remote locations.
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NESPONSE:
1 A solution for Radio Systen problems will be implemented to provide adequate communications.
Much of this hinges on FCC approval of a new radio frequency.
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IMPLEMENTATION:
1 By the completion of the second refueling outage.
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4332/1/8 A-17
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:
030J GUIDE NO.:
B6.02. C1.02 CATEGORY:
X F'INDING :
Emergency alarms, i.e.,
plant fire, plant emergency alarm, controls should be near plant operator console.
The low volume of the fire alarms makes I
them difficult to hear at a distance.
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BESPONSE:
l The systematic evaluation of the sound levels within the control room will i
determine the interactive effects of the ambient noise levels and the auditory signals of the annunciators and emergency alarms.
The high background noise in the control room, its volume, amplitude, and frequencies significantly affect the signal-to-noise ratios of the auditory signals and thereby reduce their effectiveness.
A thorough review of the dynamics associated with these problems will diagnose the root causes and provide for design alternatives to mitigate these problems.
Recommendations will include considerations for ensuring sufficient volume levels and volume level deviations for the annunciators as well as providing for the reduction of ambient noise levels.
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l IMPLEMENTATION:
By the completion of the second refueling outage.
4331/1/5 l-L
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HED NO.:
0310 GUIDE NO.:
B7.05 CATEGORY: Invalid FINDING:
The NMC process effluent rad monitors (on RAB +35),
which provide auto actuations are inaccessible to control room personnel.
There is a need for. emote control as on CP6 for NMC process monitors.
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RESPONSE
1 These controls cre acceptable at their present locations.
The NMC process l
effluent monitors are used infrequently to check the source during a
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discharge.
These monitors do not affect the safety and reliability of the l
plant.
Full monitoring capability is available in the control room and j
any control which must be exercised can be actuated locally.
This process l
is not time critical.
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l IMPLEMENTATION:
Not applicable.
4331/1/11
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l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l
l HED NO.:
0356 l
l GUIDE NO.:
7.2.5.H CATEGORY:
X FINDING:
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Some of the mimic displays on the SPDS ' have more than 25% of the total i
screen illuminated.
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RESPONSE
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The SPDS display requirements have been negotiated with the NRC. separately from the DCRDR process.
The final SPDS display (s) will receive NRC i
approval prior to implementation.
l IMPLEMENTATION:
Consistent with the SPDS implementation schedule.
4332/3/5'i l
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l QUESTION.
i How many of the 190 tasks identified during the DCRDR task analysis were evaluated to determine (a) the match' between task elements and availability of control room instrumentation, (b) the' identification of HEDs, and (c) the validity of the task analysis process that was employed?
RESPONSE
During the conduct of the Waterford 3 DCRDR, each of the 190 tasks identified during the task analysis was evaluated to determine the match between task elements and availability and suitability of control room i
I instrumentation. As a result of this review, 65 of the tasks identified 46 HEDs (some HEDs were identified from multiple tasks). Additionally, 23 total tasks were cited (cross-referenced) in 11 HEDs generated from the DCRDR Checklist or Operator Survey.
As indicated, the Task Analysis / Verification yielded a number of HEDs separately and in conjunction with other review processes. The approach utilized was consistent for all 190 tasks and correlated with the findings of the other activities in the DCRDR.
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Since each of the 190 tasks was evaluated producing findings cons 1 stent with the findings of other DCRDR processes, and because the Task Analysis /
Verification process paralleled the guidance of NUREG 0700 and followed the Task Analysis specifications identified in MIL-H-46855, we feel that the validity of the Task Analysis process has been demonstrated.
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QUESTION:
i Are DCRDR control room enhancements (e.g., painting, labeling and taping) based on any standard to ensure consistent changes?
RESPONSE
Yes.
An LP6L enhancement manual has been. developed and is being used for control room related modifications such as painting, labeling and taping.
The criteria used for the manual guidelines are the same ones employed for the HED modifications.
This ensures consistency between the completed modifications and future control room modifications.
One example of how a consistent standard is maintained can be found in I
Section 4 (labeling) of the enhancement manual which provides the guidance for labeling the control room. Table 4-1 sets the standard for the label plate sizes:
I Component Type Label Plate Size (in.)
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Vertical meter 1.60 x 0.65 Recorder 3.10 x 1.0 Selector Switch 2.25 x 0.50 Each label plate will conform to the guidance provided.
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QUESTION:
The staff requests clarification of the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 17 of the Supplement to the Waterford 3 DCRDR SR dated April 1986. With regard to the reflash capability of annunciators, do critical plant functions have independent alarms?
RESPONSE
The April, 1986 Supplement to the DCRDR Summary Report addressed, in part, the reflash capability of annunciators. For convenience, the appropriate section is reproduced below with the sentence in question underlined:
The visible and auditory operation of the annunciator system is as follows:
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(a) Annunciator tile is dark when no alarm is present.
(b) When an alarm setpoint is violated, the annunciator fast flashes.
The audible alarm sounds for three seconds and silences automati-cally.
(c) When the annunciator is acknowledged, the tile becomes a steady light.
(d) When the alarm setpoint clears, the tile slow flashes.
When the CLEAR button is pressed, the tile becomes dark.
(c) For multiple-input alarms when the tile is in a solidly lighted state, and a subsequent alarm setpoint is violated, the tile remains solidly lighted.
(f) When the tile is in slow flash and the alarm setpoint is again violated, the tile returns to fast flash with an audible alarm.
The policy of LP&L (refer to POM Operating Procedures, Section 10, Annunciator Response Procedures) is to dispatch an operator to the local panel for evaluation and corrective action at the first indica-tion of an alarm to a multiple-input window.
In general, the multiple-input windows require local action to address the malfunction. j[f the item is directly pertinent to control room activities, an indivi-dual alarm is used.
To clarify the above, two types of multiple-input annunciator windows exist in the Waterford 3 control room.
In the first type, the multiple inputs all concern the same component (i.e. function). For instance, a window may announce trouble with a diesel generator.
In this case, while further investigation would be necessary to determine the actual cause of the problem, the operator will clearly know that the function of the diesel generator may be impaired.
In the second type of multiple-input window the message is more general
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and the inputs come from different components (i.e. functions).
In this
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case, the operator will not know which function may be impaired without
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local investigation to determine which of several possible functions pro-duced the alarm.
Annunciator windows for critical plant functions have either single inputs
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or, if multiple inputs are employed, the windows are the first type des-i cribed above.
In other words, critical plant function annunciator windows do not receive multiple inputs from multiple components / functions.
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I QUESTION:
The Supplement to the Waterford DCRDR SR dated April 1986, indicates that HEDs involving control room lighting, control room noise, computer displayc, annunciator-system, suitability of control room displays, and radio communi-cations are still the subject of engineering evaluations. Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) should provide the NRC with information concernir.g the proposed corrective actions identified by the engineering studies and approved by LP&L management. LP&L should also confirm that resolutions selected do not introduce new HEDs.
RESPONSE
The DCRDR Summary Report Supplement of April,1986 reviewed the status of the following engineering evaluations:
(a) Lighting analysis (b) Computer review (c) Annunciator evaluation (d) Investigation into noise reduction (e) Analysis of instrumentation (f) Review of radio communications When the evaluations are completed, LP&L will provide updated copies of the HED corrective action pages which will indicate the evaluation results and corrective actions for the applicable HEDs.
It should be noted that updated and final information for some of the pertinent HEDs has previously been supplied in the April, 1986 report, or is contained in the response to Question 1 above (e.g. radio communication HED).
As noted in the original DCRDR Sunnary Report, HED corrective action must be reviewed by the HED Committee in accordance with established criteria.
The corrective action for the engineering evaluations has either already received, or will receive, appropriate review by the HED Committee including confirmation that the corrective action selected does not introduce new HEDs.
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