W3P83-2273, Forwards Response to NRC Requesting Review of ESF Actuation Sys Testing Commitments Against Provisions of IEEE-338 & Reg Guide 1.22.List of ESF Subgroup Relays Not Testable During Operation Encl
| ML20077D358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1983 |
| From: | Drummond F LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| W3P83-2273, NUDOCS 8307260489 | |
| Download: ML20077D358 (15) | |
Text
.
LOUISIANA P O W E R & L I G H T ! New OALeANE LOUSANA 44a oe-O~Oe emee
. m eOxe=e 70174-0o08 9 (504] 368-a345 MIDDLE SOUTH UTIUTIES SYSTEM July 21, 1983 W3P83-2273 3-A1.01.04 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit 3 Docket No. 50-382 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
Surveillance Requirements
Reference:
Letter dated Eay 10, 1983, from G. W. Knighton to L. V. Maurin
Enclosure:
(1) ESF subgroup Relays not testable during reactor operation (2) ESF subgroup Relays testable during reactor operation
Dear Sir:
In your referenced letter you requested LP&L to review the Waterford 3 ESFAS testing commitments against the provisions.of IEEE-338 and Regulatory Guide 1.22.
Specifically, you asked that we provide a list of any ESFAS actuation devices, and actuated equipment associated with each, that cannot be tested during plant operation.
The ESFAS at Waterford 3 is essentially the same as that used at Sar Onofre Units 2 and 3, however, the assignment and grouping of actuated equipment to specific subgroup relays varies. The system complies with General Design Criterion 21 in that the protection system as defined by IEEE Standard 279-1971 and Regulatory Guide 1.22 is designed to permit testing (up to the input to the actuation devices) with the reactor in operation. A few subgroup re-lays (actuation devices per Regulatory Guide 1.22) howcVer, cannot be tested without adverse consequences for plant safety and/or operability, and there-fore do not fully comply with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and 1EEE Standard 338.
Sections 7.3.1.1.1.9 and 7.3.2.1.2 (item 4.10) of the Waterford FSAR will be revised to indicate the extent of compliance with the standards.
FSAR section 7.3.2.13 currently specifies that these standards provide testing guidance and that actuated devices which are not tested during reactor operation will be tested during reactor shutdown.
8307260489 830721 0
DR ADOCK 05000382 hO PDR I
.m Enclosed pleasel find'two tables: 1) a listing of' those ESF subgroup relays that are not testable during reactor operation, and 2) a listing of ESF subgroup re-lays which are testable during reactor operation.
The actuated equipment listed in Enclosure (1) cannot be operated during reactor operation without adverse and unwarranted impact on plant safety-and/or operability. However, the equipment can be tested when,the reactor.is shut down and, in this respect, is in compliance
- with Regulatory Guide 1.22 and IEEE Standard 338. _ Appropriate justification for inclusion of-each actuation device (subgroup' relay) in this listing is contained
'in Enclosure'(1).
FSAR section' 7.3.1.1.1.9.6 describes the normal method for subgroup relay testing during_ reactor operation. During shutdown, alternate methods of relay testing may be used in order to combine relay-testing with other required testing such as system / component functional testing, manual ESF Trips, Response Time Testing, and-Integrated Diesel Generator Testing.
During at power Channel Functional Tests required by Technical Specification Table 4.3-2 (subgroup relay. test, note (2)], the subgroup relays listed in Enclo-sure (2) are tested. The actuated equipment associated with each-relay is in accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.22 definition of Actuated Equipment, i.e.
"A component or assembly of components that performs or directly contributes to the performance of a protective function...".
The operability of the' subgroup relays is normally deoonstrated by verifying that the actuated equipment performs its intended function when the relay is de-energized (ESF signal present). How-ever.in a few instances, placing the actuated equipment in either the post ac-cident condition or the opposite condition in order to verify its change of state poses adverse safety and/or operational impact on the plant. For these cases, the actuated equipment is either prevented from operating or remains in its post accident condition in order to support normal plant operation, while the subgroup
' relay is tested.- This is permissible under the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and the remarks.in Enclosure (2) indicate the actuated equipment to which this applies.
We request that the actuation devices listed in-Enclosure (1) be exempted from
-testing at power as required by Regulatory Guide'1.22.
Should you have any questions or comments in this matter please contact Dennis Buschbaum at (504) 464-3395 or Mike Meisner at (504) 363-8938.
- Very truly yours,
,,+u.*-, m F. J. Drummond-Project Support Manager - Nuclear FJD/ DEB /MJM/ch cc:
W. M. Stevenson, E. L. Blake, J. Wilson (NRC), R. Stevens (NRC)
G. L. Constable (Resident Inspector)
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Enclosure (1)
Page 1 of 5-ESF SUBGROUP RELAYS NOT TESTABLE DURING REACTOR OPERATION
. RELAY NO.
~ ACTUATED EQUIPMENT' REMARKS
-Train A K 109 Trip 3A32 Station This feature was provided SIAS Service Transformer to implement NUREG 0737 item feeder Breaker II.E.3.], Emergency Power Supply for pressurizer heaters.
The feature sheds and locks out the heater bus on SIAS.
The shedding feature is redun-dant to the under voltage trip of the breaker, and the lock out is an aid to the' op-erator to avoid overloading the Diesel Generator by man-ually reloading the heaters on the Diesel Bus post LOCA.
The 3A32 bus supplies the CEA Drive Motor Generator set in addition to the pres-suricer heaters, and shut -
down/ restart of the MG re-quires realignment and syn-chronization of the redund-ant MG set.
Operation with a single MG and the realign-ment unnecessarily increases
+
the exposure to a reactor trip and subsequent transient.
K 202 (a) Letdown Cont-(a) Relay dropout causes CIAS tainment Isolation isolation or securing of Valve 2CH-1518 A B charging and letdown flow.
This is considered an off-normal event due to the re-sulting thermal transient and stresses caused in the system piping, heat exchangers etc.
... =
e Enclosure (1)
Page 2 of 5 Each stress cycle increases I-the probability of a letdown line break (analyzed'LOCA) and also interrupts normal plant operation. Without charging and letdown, bora-tion / dilution ~for reactivitu control is not available; pressurizer level control to ensure proper plant pressure control is temporarily unavail-able in the event of transients; chemistry control.via the ion exchangers or chemical addi-tion is unavailable; and the boronometer and process radi-tion monitor are inoperable.
(b) RCP Bleedoff (b) Relay dropout produces Containment Isolation detrimental affects to the Valve 2CH-F1512 A B RCP seals. Both CCW and bleed-and Component Cooling off are necessary for proper Water from RCP's Cont-seal cooling.
In addition, ainment Isolation Valve bleedoff flow is necessary to 2CC-F243 A B ensure proper seal seating and staging to ensure the in-tegrity of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundry.
Ir.dustry experience iniicates numerous seal failure or degradation problems; they should not be unnecessarily exposed to po-tentially damaging t.ransients which raise the probability l
radioactivity. release to con-tainment then to the atmosphere and plant shutdowns.
(c) Instrument Air (c) Relay dropout causer lost Containment Isolation of instrument air inside con-Valve 21A-F601'A B tainment which impacts the nor-mal operation of numerous sys-tems. Examples of systems im-pacted are the pressurizer spray valve, CCW cooling to the con-tainment fan coolers, letdown
Enclosure (1)
Page 3 of 5 and charging valves [see' dis-cussion in part (a)], and some containment isolation valves (fail shut on loss of air).
Although many safety related applications are backed.up by accumulators inside containment in the event of loss of instru-ment air, others necassary for-normal plant operation are not and therefore cause'a reduction.
in plant safety on loss of air.
(d) Fire Water Con-(d) Relay dropout causes un-tainment Valve 2FP-necessary isolation of the fire F127
. water supply inside containment.
This removes the protection of the sprinkler systems and hose stations inside containment.
K 305 SG #1 Feedwater Is6la-Relay dropout causes all valves MSIS.
tion Valve 2FW-V823A to isolate and plant operation cannot continue.
Severe plant SG #1-Main Steam Isola-trcasients and reactor trip ^
tion Valve 2MS-V602A would occur if these valves SG #1 Feedwater Control were isolated during power Valve-5FW-FM833 operation.
- Bypass Valve 5FW-FM835
-K 308 LLetdown Stop Valve Same as K 202 (a)
-K 313 SG #2 Feedwater Isola-Same as K 305 MSIS^
tion Valve 2FW-V824 3 SG #2 Main Steam Isola-tion Valve 2MS-V604 B
.SG #2 Feedwater Control Valve SFW-FM834 SG #2 Feedwater Control Bypass Valve 5FW-FM836 p -
..7
, - ~
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Enclosure (1)
Page i of 5 ESF SUBGROUP RELAYS NOT TESTABLE DURING REACTOR OPERATION 4
RELAY NO.
ACTUATED EQUPIPMENT REMARKS Train B K 109 Trip 3B32 Station ~
Same as K 109 Train A for 3B32 SIAS Service Transformer Bus.
Feeder Breaker K 202 Letdown Containment Same as K 202 Train A except'
'CIAS Isolation Valve ICH-item (c) does not apply.
F2501 A B RCP Bleedoff Containment Isolation Valve 2CH-F1513 AB Component Cooling Water to RCP's containment Iso-lation Valve 2CC-F146 A B Component Cooling' Water from RCP's' Containment Isolation Valve 2CC-F146 AB Fire Water Containment Isolation Valve'2FP-F129 K 301 Boric Acid Tank A Gravity Relay dropout isolates the SIAS Feed valve 3CH-V106 A normal supply to the chareing (opens) pumps (VCT) and aligns pump suction directly to the Boric Boric Acid Tank B Gravity Acid tanks. This would cause Feed valve 3CH-V107 B addition of concentrated boric.
p, 3) acid to the Reactor Coolant Volume Control Tank Dis-System with severe reactor
~
charge Valve 2CH-123 A B power trarsients resulting.
(shuts)
The alternative is to secure charging and letdown but this also causes severe transients-see discussion for K 202 (a)
Train A.
_. ~. _.. _,
4 Enclosure (1) j Page 5 of 5
- K 305 Same as K 305 Train A Same as K 305 Train A MSIS'
(..
K'308 Letdown Containment Same as K 202 (a) Train
'I>
SIAS Isolation Valve ICH--
A F2501 A B
- K 313 Same as K 213 Train A Same as K 313 Train A
- MSIS.
i e
l' l*
I
-1 i.
I
-l
t Enclosure (2)
Page 1 of 8 A TRAIN SUBGROUP RELAYS TESTABLE DURING REACTOR OPERATION [B TRAIN)
RELAY NO.
ACTUATED EQUIPMENT REMARKS K 101 [K 101]
Containmcnt Fan Cooler SIAS AH-1 (3A-SA) (3B-SB)
Containment Fan Cooler AH-1 (3C-SA) [3D-SD)
' Containment Fan Cooler CCW Valves 2CC-F155A2 2CC-F159A2, 2CC-F154A1 2CC-F158A1, 3CC-TM148A
[2CC-F157B2,2CC-F161B2 2CC-F156Bl. 2CC-F160B1 3CC-TM149B]
Containment Fan Cooler Discharge Damper D-69(SA)
[D-70(SB)]
K 102 [K 102]
HVAC Equipment Room Sup-SIAS ply Fan AH-13(3A-SA)
[3B-SB]
'SBVS Fan E-17(3A-SA)
[3B-SB]
CVAS Exhaust Fan E-23(3A-SA)
[3B-SB)
CVAS Isolation Valve 3HV-B210A, 3HV-B216A 3HV-B218A, 3HV-B224A 3HV-B226A, [3HV-B215B 3HV-B217B, 3HV-B223B 3HV-B225B, 3HV-B227B]
-K.103 [K,103]
Control. Room (CR) Emer-SIAS gency Filtration Fan S-8(3A-SA)'[3B-SB]
Control Rocm Supply Fan AH-12(3A-SA).[3B-SB]
CR Toilet Exhaust Fan E-34(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
CR Toilet Exhaust Fan Isolation Valve 3HV-B177A [3HV-B178B]-
Enclosure (2)
Page 2 of 8 RELAY NO.
ACTUATED EQUIPMENT REMARKS CR Toilet Exhaust Fan Bypass Damper D-18(SA)
[SB]-
~
CR Conference RM &
Kitchen Exhaust Fan Isolation Valve 3HV-B171A [3HV-B172B]
CR Conference RM & Kitchen Exhaust Fan Bypass Damper D-19(SA) [SB]
CR Supply Fan Outside Intake Valve 3HV-B169A [3HV-B170B]
K 104 [K 104]
-LPSI Pump A [B] (stops)
'K 105 [K 105]
Not Used MSIS K 106 [K 106]
Main Steam Sample Valve MSIS 2MS-F714 (2MS-F715]
K 107 [K 1C7]'
Not Used CCAS K 108 [K 108]
. Charging Pump A [B]
SIAS K 110 [K 110]
LPSI Pump A [B]
2SI-L103A [2SI-L104B] will remain open, A.[
wi rema n shut,
^
RWSP Outlet Valve in rder to avoid removing water supply 2SI-L103A [2SI-L104B]
for HPSI, LPSI and containment Spray SIS Sump Isol Valve Pumps and risk possible introduction 2SI-L101A [2SI-L102B]
of air into the system with potential 1 ss of pump' suction when the LPSI DG A Breaker [B]
Pump starts. These valves are normally HPSI Pump A [B]
aligned in the required accident position and checked periodically as required.
by Technical Specification Surveillance Charging Pump AB [Both]
requirement.
Only one HPSI Pump will start depending on system alignment. -Since the subgroup relay' actuates either pump through common circuitry, starting of either pump verifies subgroup relay operation.
=
Enclosure (2)
Page 3 of 8
-RELAY NO.
ACTUATED EQUIPbENT REMARKS
.K 111 [K 111]
Containment. Spray g*
CSAS Pump A [B]
K 112 [K 112].
EFW Pump A [B]
EFAS-2 K 113 [K 113)
EFW Pump A [B]
EFAS-1 K 114 [K 114]
Not Used CSAS K 201 [K 201]
Rx Drain Tk Cont Isol CIAS 2BM-F109AS [2BM-F108AB]
Waste Gas Cont Isol 2WM-F158AB [2WM-F157AB)
K 203 [K 203]
Hydrogen Analyzer Cont'Isol
.CIAS 2HA-E608A, 2HA-E609A 2HA-E610A,[2HA-E628B 2HA-E629B,2HA-E630B]
Cont Atm RAD Monitor Cont.
[2CA-E604B]
K 204 [K 204]
RCS Sample Cont Isol CIAS 2SL-F1504AB [2SL-F1501AB]
Surge Line Sample Cont Isol 2SL-1505AB [2SL-1502AB]
Pzr Steam Sample Cont Isol 2SL-1506AB [2SL-1503AB]
SG Blowdown Cont Isol
-2BD-F604, 2BD-F606 (2BD-F603, 2BD-F605]
Steam Line Drain 2MS-V670,-2MS-V671
[2MS-V663, 2MS-V664]
K 205 [K 205]
Not Used CIAS
.K 206 [K 206]
SG Sample Cont Isol CIAS-2SL-F602, 2SL-F604
[2SL-F601, 2SL-F603]
SIS Sump Sample Cont Isol 2SI-E655 [2SI-E654]
.K 207 [K 207]
No Relay t-
Enclosure (2)
Page 4 of 8 RELAY NO.
-ACTUATED EQUIPMENT REMARKS K 208 [K 208]
Not Used CIAS
' K 209 [K 209]
Cont Sunp Pump Cont Isol CIAS 2WM-F105AB [2WM-F104AB]
SIT Drain to RWSP Cont Isol 2SI-F1561AB
[ Nitrogen Cont Isol 2NG-F604]
K 210 [K'210]
CARS Eupply Fan Relay dropout trips S3 and E18; CIAS S3(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
-however, these fans are not run during plant operation and are CARS Exhaust Fan interl cked with normally locked E18(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
closed manual containment isolation Cont Purge Valves valves.
In order to run the fans, 2HV-B151A, 2HV-B152A containment integrity would be 2HV-B155A,.[2HV-B150B breached. This is not warranted 2HV-B153B, 2HV-B154B since the fans are not run anyway.
Therefore, the relay is tested with Cont Vac Relief Instr.
the fans secured.
Line Cont Isol 2HV-E634, [2HV-F633B],
K 211 [K 211]
-SG #1 Blowdown Cont.
EFAS signal does not actuate EFW EFAS - 1 Isol 2BD-F604 [2BD-F603]-
valves without additional process 31 nal inputs from SG level and EFW 8
EFW Valve Logic fl w.
Placing multiple instrument 2-2FW-V848A [2FW-V847B]
tion in test during reactor operation reduces plant safety. The relay will be tested without operation of the EFW valves.
K 212 [K 212]
Not Used CIAS K 213 [K 213]
Not dsed CIAS K 301 Boric Acid Pump A
^
Boric Acid Pump B-HPSI Flow Valve 2SI-V1546A2 K 302 [K 401]
SIT Isol Valve Relay dropout causes the SIT Isolation SIAS ISI-V1505TKlA valve to open, however Technical Spec-
[lSI-V1506TKlB]
ification 3.5.1 requires the valve to be open with the power removed.
It is SIT Drain Valve verified at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to ISI-F1551TKlA
[lSI-F15521B]
be open. Shutting the valve (cont.)
' Om?
Enclosure (2)
Page 5 of 8 RELAY NO.
ACTUATED EQUIPMENT REMARKS LPSI Flow "s'ljie -
would decrease plant safety 2SI-V1543B2 for no reason. The valve there-
[2SI-V1539B1]
fore will be left open and not verified during reactor oper-HPSI Flow Valve ation, although the subgroup 2SI-V1548A4 relay is tested.
.[2SI-V1540B2]
. K 303~[K 303]
EFW Pump Steam Inlet EFAS - 2 2MS-V611A [2MS-V612B]
K 304 [K 304]-
Cont Spray Isol CSAS 2CS-F305A [2CS-F306B]
K 306 [K'306]
Not Used CCAS K 307 [K 307]
Nc Relay K 309 [K 309]
SI Min Flow Isol RAS 2SI-V809A, 2SI-V810A
[2SI-V801B, 2SI-V802B]
2SI-L101A [2SI-L102B]
K 310 [K 310]
SG Blowdown Cont. Isol Same as K 211 for EFW Logic.
EFW Valve Logic 2FW-V849A [2FW-V850B]
K 311 [K 311]
Computer RM Air Handler SIAS AH-31(3) [Both]
ANP Exhaust Fan E-19(SA), E-19(SB) [Both]
Cable Vault Exhaust Fan E-49(3) [Both]
RAB Exhaust Fan E-22(3A) [3B]
Switchgear Area Air Handler AH-25(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
AH-30(3A-SA) [3B-SB)
Battery RM Exhaust Fan E-29(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
E-30(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
E-31(3A-SA) [3B-SB]
L
r-Enclosure (2)
Page 6 of 8 RELAY-NO.
ACTUATED EQUIPMENT REMARKS Computer Battery RM Exh Fan E-46(3A-SA)
[3B-SB]
ANP Isol 3HV-175A
[3HV-176B]
Switchgear Area Intake Damper D-65(SA) [SB]
K 312 [K 312]
Not Used RAS
'K 401 Boric Acid Pump Recire SIAS 3CH-F170A, 3CH-F171B-Reactor Makeup Bypass 3CH-V112AB Reactor Makup Stop 3CH-Fil7AB'
~K 402 [K 402]
REFW Pump Steam Supply.
EFAS - 1 2MS-V611A [2MS-V612B]
K 403 [K 403]
HPSI Flow Valve SIAS 2SI-V1550A1 [2SI-V1547B3]
Hot Leg Injection Drain 1SI-V2504 [1SI-V2505]
K 404'[K 404]
Not Used MSIS K 405 [K 405]
Not Used RAS'
'K 406 [K.406]
Not Used MSIS' K 407 No Relay [Both)
.~
4 Enclosure (2)
Page 7 of 8 RELAY N01 ACTUATED EQUIPMENT REMARKS
~
K 408 [K 408]
. Water Chiller Compressor only one water chiller will-
. C-1(3A-SA).[3B-SB]
' start depending on system SIAS.
W alignment. Since the subgroup Water Chiller Compressor WC-1(3C-SAB) [Both]
relay actuates either chiller
. through common circuitry, start Chilled Water Header of either chiller varifies the Isolation Valves subgroup relay operation.
-3AC-F142A,.3AC-F149A 3AC-F144A, 3AC-F136A
[3AC-F143B, 3AC-F150B 3AC-F135B,~3AC-F151B]
I' K 409 [K 403]
SIT Isolation SIT Isolation same as K 302.
. SIAS ISI-V1507TK2A
[1SI-V1508TK2B]
SIT' Drain
'lSI-F1553TK2A
[lSI-F1554TK2B]
-LPSI Flow Valve 2SI-V1541A2
[2SI-V1549Al].
~
HPSI Flow Valve 2SI-V1542A3 i
[2SI-V15451B]
K 410 [K 410]
CCW Pump A-[B]
Under. normal conditions, CCW
^
supplies safety and non-safety.
loads and_the system is operated CCW Train Isolation with two pumps running and the Valves 3CC-F109AB.
trains cross connected to obtain
'3CC-F113AB, 3CC-F112AB sufficient' flow for all loads. On l
3CC-Fil6AB, [3CC-F110AB SIAS~two of the three pumps get 3CC-Fil4AB, 3CC-FlllAB start signals, the trains isolate 3CC-F115AB]
and the non-safety loads isolate.
To-test pump starting would re-ACCW Pump A [B]-
quire running the system with-CCW From SDC HX' only one pump which could lead 3CC-F130A=[3CC-F131B]
to inadequate flow for all loads, jeopardizing the operating status CCW NNS Isolation f safety as well an non-safety
'3CC-F122A, 3CC-F120A equipment. Therefore, the sub-3CC-F133AB [3CC-F123B
~
Sr up relays are tested without 3CC-F121B, 3CC-F132AB]
an actual pump start.
CCW HX Temp Control 3CC-TM290A [3CC-TM291B]
The operation of the CCW train isola-tion valves is dependent upon the
' Diesel Generator A [B]
assignment of-CCW pump AB.
If the pump is_ assigned to the A or B trains, the SIAS signal is blocked
?
-.....,_,,..-m...-.
^
q) is.
Enclosure (2).
'Page 8 of 8 RELAY NO.
ACTUATED EQUIPMENT' REFARKS to appropriate isolation valves to avoid isolating the pump from the assigned train piping. Also the AB pump starts in lieu of the
~
A or B pump. During subgroup re-lay testing, the valves associated with the CCW pump alignment at the time of test will be checked for proper isolation. since all the valves receive the. isolation sig-nal through common circuitry, sub-group relay operation is verified.
K 411 [K 411]-
Not Used MSIS K 412-[.K 412]
-Diesel Generator
.SIAS.
A [B)
Sequencer A [B)
K 413.[K 413]
Not Used CCAS K 623 [K 623]
SG #1 EFW MSIS 2FW-V848A [2FW-V847B]
.SG #2 EFW 2FW-V849A [2FW-V850B]
Trip Leg Dropout K 624.[K-624]
Trip Leg Dropout EFAS -'l K 625 [K.625]
Trip Leg Dropout EFAS
.2 K 723 [K 723]
SG #1 EFW Valve MSIS 2FW-V852A [2FW-V851B]
SG #2 EFW Valve 2FW-V853A [2FW-V854B]
Trip Leg Dropout K 724 [K 724]
SG'#1 EFW Valve Logic Same as K 211 for EFW Logic EFAS - 1 2FW-V852A [2FW-V851B]
Trip Leg Dropout K 725 [K 725]
SG #2 EFW. Valve Logic Same as K 211 for EFW Logic JEFAS - 2 2FW-V853A [2FW-V854B].
Trip. Leg Dropout i
i
)
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