U-600995, Informs of Results of Monitored Evolutions Started on 870705.Evolutions Suspended After Reactor Scram Caused by Equipment Failure Occurred.Evolutions Resumed on 870719 & Formally Concluded on 870722.QA Performed Program Oversight
| ML20236L235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1987 |
| From: | Hall D ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| U-600995, NUDOCS 8708100182 | |
| Download: ML20236L235 (5) | |
Text
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U-600995 L30- 87(07-29)-L 1A.120
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/LL/NOIS POWER OOMPANY IP
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CLINTON POWER STATION, P.O. BOX 678 CLINTON, ILLINOIS 61727 9 pd#
g July 29, 1987 i
h,Wg Docket No. 50-461
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Mr. A. B. Davis M
e Regional Administrator ggt M Region'III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Subject:
Results of Monitored Evolutions i
Dear Mr. Davis:
As discussed in Illinois Power Company (IP) letter l
(U-600958) to Mr. A. B. Davis dated June 18, 1987, and.as l
reviewed with you and your staff at our July 13, 1987 Monthly Management Meeting, IP began an 11-day period of monitored operator evolutions on July 5, 1987.
The evolutions were suspended on July 13, 1987, after a reactor scram caused by equipment failure occurred.
Tha evolutions were resumed on July 19, 1987 and were formally concluded on July 22, 1987.
During this time frame, the Radiation Protection and Maintenance Departments also were assessed for a two-day period.
Additionally, Quality Assurance performed an oversight of each of these evaluation programs.
OPERATIONS MONITORED EVOLUTIONS For the operators, 75 monitored evolutions were completed.
The monitor reports provided evaluation of 150 safety standards and 225 operational standards.
In all j
cases, safety and operational standards were met, and the evolutions were evaluated as satisfactory.
These evolutions were also evaluated for 225 excellence standards.
The excellence standards were categorized as follows:
45 Above Average J
134 Average 16 Needing Improvement M; 3 1 1997
-30 Not Observed / Applicable I
t 8708100182 870729 fDR ADOCK 05000461 j b[,
U-600995 L3 0- 87 (07-29 )-L 1A.120 Additionally, monitors identified 196 strengths, 63 minor errors and nine significant errors.
Four of the significant errors were related to problems during shifting between single-element and three-element control (three procedure problems and one operator command and control problem).
This was the first time that operators had performed this evolution.
Two significant errors occurred during a power maneuver when four control rods were mispositioned by one notch.
The other three significant errors dealt with a procedure problem, a procedure implementation problem and a problem with unauthorized operator aides.
The areas needing improvement were classified in the following major areas:
l One deviation from procedure - The procedure was unclear; one operator " figured out" how to proceed without contacting supervision.
The operator was immediately counselled.
Procedure and operator inexperience problems concerning shifting between single-element and three-element Feedwater Control - The procedure, while usable now, is too specific in this area.
A revision has been initiated to correct this problem.
The Plant Manager required this evolution to be repeated additional times until operators were comfortable with the evolution.
Operator control problems resulting in the rod disposition incident - All shifts will be briefed on the errors which occurred during this event.
Additionally, both the plant and simulator Rod Control Information System (RCIS) display will be reviewed for required corrections.
One operator control problem - One operator did not check redundant indication.
All crews have been cautioned to check redundant indication.
One procedure problem - Procedure caused confusion on responsibility for completion of a plant status report.
A revision for this procedure has been initiated to require completion of the status report by a single shift.
One procedure implementation problem An operator did not promptly reference an integrated rocedure as required after the steps had correct 1 been completed via operator response to a forced power reduction.
A1.1 crews will be cautioned to ensure timely implementation of integrated procedures. _
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U-600995 l
L30-87(07-29)-L l
1A.120 l
Overall evaluation of the monitored evolutions indicates satisfactory operator performance with strengths in many areas.
The operators demonstrated that they are well trained, and that their operational practices are good.
The evaluation concluded that the operators are ready to conduct plant operations at full power.
MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENT 1
A two-day assessment of maintenance activities was conducted July 7-8, 1987.
The assessment focused on
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evaluating " normal" maintenance tasks as they occurred in the field.
A total of 18 maintenance tasks were evaluated against safety,. operational and excellence standards.
All of the 18 tasks were evaluated as satisfactorily meeting the safety and operational standards.
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72 excellence standards were categorized as follows:
12 Above Average 36 Average i
13 Needing Improvement
.l 11 Not Observed / Applicable l
Additionally, the monitors identified 38 strengths, 42
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weaknesses (minor errors) and three significant errors.
The significant errors involved incorrect data aupplied to the l
l field for a calibration; inadequate planning to effectively implement a Field Alterations and unfamiliarity with Site Safety Standard #17, Electrical Safety.
Areas noted as needing improvement include timely and organized documentation and notification of tasks, and preventative i
maintenance of equipment.
Additionally, while monitoring a maintenance task in the vicinity of the "A" Circulating Water Pump, the evaluator observed poor work 7ractices on an adjacent work site.
A flow instrument had been removed from a bearing water supply line for calibration.
The appropriate isolation valve had not been tagged, and the protective (cleanliness) covers had not been installed on the open-ended pipe flanges.
This was brought to the attention of the Maintenance Department and a Condition Report was initiated.
In general, the technicians in the field demonstrated above average knowledge of systems and components and performed assigned maintenance tasks in a competent manner.
Some inefficiencies were noted in the planning effort and in day-to-day shop supervision.
Improvements in these areas should be effective in increasing maintenance productivity.
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i U-600995 L30- 87(07-29)-L 1A.120 RADIATION PROTECTION ASSESSMENT A two-day assessment of Radiation Protection (RP) activities was conducted July 7-8, 1987.
The assessment focused on RP activities, such as conduct of surveys and surveillance, adequacy of posted areas, adequacy of control access to radiological areas and controls to reduce personnel exposure in work areas.
Also evaluated were work-related functions, such as pre-job briefs, radiation work permits, job planning and radiological engineering controls to promote work efficiency.
A total of eight RP tasks were evaluated.
The monitor reports provided i
evaluation of 16 operational standards and eight safety standards.
Each of the evolutions was evaluated overall as satisfactory; however, one operational standard was not met in that a process radiation monitor was not placed in a tripped condition within one hour of a failed surveillance as required by Technical Specifications.
This incident was properly investigated, reported and critiqued.
A total of 32 excellence standards were categorized as follows:
11 Above Average 11 Average 8
Needing Improvement 2
Not Observed / Applicable Significant findings identified in the monitor reports are summarized below:
Several of the Radiation Protection Procedures are cumbersome and difficult to perform.
As a result, technicians will deviate from specific procedure requirements in order to complete job tasks, This lack of confidence in procedure viability has reselted in a lack of appreciation for procedural compliance.
Many of the difficulties noted (missing survey information, inadequate key control, failure to advise the Radiation Protection Shift Supervisor of procedural inadequacies) stem from a lack of concern for discipline towards procedural compliance and attention to detail.
Several radiation survey logs were incomplete.
Procedures for issuance of radiation protection equipment have not been followed in several instances.
Logs and records in general contained several inaccuracies which required correction prior to vaulting.
I U-600995 o
L30- 87(07-29)-L l
lA.120 In general, RP personnel were knowledgeable in the practical aspects of radiological controls.
Personnel were eager to assist in processing work-related items and made overt efforts to promote efficient, correct. radiological practices with field technicians.
Inefficiencies were found in some of the procedures used by technicians and in the verbatim compliance to these procedures.
QUALITY ASSURANCE OVERSIGHT Quality Assurance (QA) performed an oversight of each of the above evaluation programs in accordance.with approved Quality Verification Plans (QVP).
The QVP contained general Verification Points including program descriptions,.
evaluation critiques, and deficiency resolution processes.
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QA provided feedback to evaluators each shift'.
At the end of every three shifts, reports were reviewed by a QA coordinator for identification of trends with written i
results provided to CPS Management.
These reports include j
the identification of any observed weaknesses.
In general, the oversight found that evaluators were qualified; sufficient. data was collected to assess the effectiveness of each area; lessons learned were adequately l
identified; and evaluations provided meaningful feedback to management on the effectiveness of the activities evaluated.
QA has designated two weak areas identified in the i
evaluation that will be assessed to determine why CPS l
verification programs did not previously identify or prevent their occurrence.
These two areas concern procedural l
compliance in RP, and Operations activities associated with l
the rod disposition incident.
The assessment of these areas i
will be completed by the first week of August.
Illinois Power Company believes that the assessment results have demonstrated the high caliber of the CPS employees and have provided additional assurance of continued safe operation of Clinton Power Station, Please contact me if you have any questions.
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S,i_ncerely yours, 47) l D. 4FI dall Vice President KAB/krm B. L. Siegel, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager cc:
NRC Resident Inspector Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety NRC Document Control Desk