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The following information was provided by … The following information was provided by the licensee via email:</br>During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing lncore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.</br>This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to an unplanned valid actuation of a system pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(2). Additionally, this is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.</br>Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration.</br>The NRC resident was notified by the licensee.</br>* * * UPDATE FROM SIMEON MORALES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1547 EDT ON 6/16/2022 * * *</br>The following information was received via email:</br>This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) only for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. </br>The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation.</br>Updated ENS Text:</br>During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing Incore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.</br>This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. </br>Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration.</br>The plant is stable, and all effected systems have been restored. </br>There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.</br>The NRC resident has been notified.</br>Notified R4DO (Azua).</br>* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY HOWARD TO ERNEST WEST AT 1853 EDT ON 8/10/2022 * * *</br>The following information was received via email:</br>At 0923 (PDT) on June 13, 2022, a partial loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' occurred due to the inadvertent opening of circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B during thermography of RPS-PP-C72/P001. The partial loss of RPS 'B' resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in multiple systems. No plant parameters existed which would cause the opening of RPS-CB-7B or actuation of the primary containment isolation; therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(iv)(B). </br>The closure of PCIVs were expected responses to the partial loss of RPS 'B'. </br>Circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B was closed lo restore energy lo RPS 'B' at 1008 (PDT), containment isolation valves were opened, and the affected systems were returned to normal operating conditions for the current configuration per plant procedures. </br>As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification lo the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for invalid actuations reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). This actuation was invalid since it was caused by maintenance activities and not the result of actual plant conditions warranting containment isolation.</br>The following additional information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:</br>The following inboard containment isolation valves were actuated when personnel inadvertently bumped into RPS-CB-7B during the removal of a panel</br>� RWCU-V-1 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� EDR-V-19 Drywell Equipment Drain Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� FDR-V-3 Drywell Floor Drain Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� RRC-V-19 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� TIP-V-15 Traversing In-Core Probe Purge Isolation Valve </br>All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power. </br>There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event since all affected equipment responded as designed.</br>The NRG Residents have been notified.</br>Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).ve been notified.
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).
16:23:00, 13 June 2022 +
18:21:00, 13 June 2022 +
16:23:00, 13 June 2022 +
The following information was provided by … The following information was provided by the licensee via email:</br>During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing lncore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.</br>This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to an unplanned valid actuation of a system pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(2). Additionally, this is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.</br>Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration.</br>The NRC resident was notified by the licensee.</br>* * * UPDATE FROM SIMEON MORALES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1547 EDT ON 6/16/2022 * * *</br>The following information was received via email:</br>This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) only for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. </br>The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation.</br>Updated ENS Text:</br>During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing Incore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.</br>This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. </br>Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration.</br>The plant is stable, and all effected systems have been restored. </br>There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.</br>The NRC resident has been notified.</br>Notified R4DO (Azua).</br>* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY HOWARD TO ERNEST WEST AT 1853 EDT ON 8/10/2022 * * *</br>The following information was received via email:</br>At 0923 (PDT) on June 13, 2022, a partial loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' occurred due to the inadvertent opening of circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B during thermography of RPS-PP-C72/P001. The partial loss of RPS 'B' resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in multiple systems. No plant parameters existed which would cause the opening of RPS-CB-7B or actuation of the primary containment isolation; therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(iv)(B). </br>The closure of PCIVs were expected responses to the partial loss of RPS 'B'. </br>Circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B was closed lo restore energy lo RPS 'B' at 1008 (PDT), containment isolation valves were opened, and the affected systems were returned to normal operating conditions for the current configuration per plant procedures. </br>As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification lo the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for invalid actuations reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). This actuation was invalid since it was caused by maintenance activities and not the result of actual plant conditions warranting containment isolation.</br>The following additional information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:</br>The following inboard containment isolation valves were actuated when personnel inadvertently bumped into RPS-CB-7B during the removal of a panel</br>� RWCU-V-1 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� EDR-V-19 Drywell Equipment Drain Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� FDR-V-3 Drywell Floor Drain Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� RRC-V-19 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve </br>� TIP-V-15 Traversing In-Core Probe Purge Isolation Valve </br>All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power. </br>There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event since all affected equipment responded as designed.</br>The NRG Residents have been notified.</br>Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).ve been notified.
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).
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