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On February 7, 2001, at 1828, Unit 2 was o … On February 7, 2001, at 1828, Unit 2 was operating at 10% power, escalating to 12-14% power, in preparation for closing the Main Generator Breaker when a Reactor Operator performing electrical plant bus transfer operations inadvertently de- energized the 2F Auxiliary and Standby 13.8 kV busses. As a result Reactor Coolant Pump 2A was de-energized, requiring the operating crew to initiate a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted. All actuated safety equipment operated as required. The root causes identified for this event include time pressure imposed by electrical alarms and interlocks that lead to a deviation from fundamental work practices, and less than adequate procedural direction. Corrective actions include revising procedural guidance for this activity, training Plant Operations personnel on the pitfalls for time pressure driven evolutions, and revisiting the time limit setpoints for parallel operations of 13.8 kV busses.</br></br>This event was reviewed for risk impact and found to be risk insignificant since the conditional core damage probability is less than 2x10-7.re damage probability is less than 2x10-7. +
February 7, 2001 +
On February 7, 2001, at 1828, Unit 2 was o … On February 7, 2001, at 1828, Unit 2 was operating at 10% power, escalating to 12-14% power, in preparation for closing the Main Generator Breaker when a Reactor Operator performing electrical plant bus transfer operations inadvertently de- energized the 2F Auxiliary and Standby 13.8 kV busses. As a result Reactor Coolant Pump 2A was de-energized, requiring the operating crew to initiate a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedures. All control rods fully inserted. All actuated safety equipment operated as required. The root causes identified for this event include time pressure imposed by electrical alarms and interlocks that lead to a deviation from fundamental work practices, and less than adequate procedural direction. Corrective actions include revising procedural guidance for this activity, training Plant Operations personnel on the pitfalls for time pressure driven evolutions, and revisiting the time limit setpoints for parallel operations of 13.8 kV busses.</br></br>This event was reviewed for risk impact and found to be risk insignificant since the conditional core damage probability is less than 2x10-7.re damage probability is less than 2x10-7. +
Has query"Has query" is a predefined property that represents meta information (in form of a <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.semantic-mediawiki.org/wiki/Subobject">subobject</a>) about individual queries and is provided by <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.semantic-mediawiki.org/wiki/Help:Special_properties">Semantic MediaWiki</a>.
1 +
Modification date"Modification date" is a predefined property that corresponds to the date of the last modification of a subject and is provided by <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.semantic-mediawiki.org/wiki/Help:Special_properties">Semantic MediaWiki</a>.
04:13:11, 1 December 2017 +
April 9, 2001 +
February 7, 2001 +
URL"URL" is a <a href="/Special:Types/URL" title="Special:Types/URL">type</a> and predefined property provided by <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.semantic-mediawiki.org/wiki/Help:Special_properties">Semantic MediaWiki</a> to represent URI/URL values.