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On March 7, 2015, at 9:40 p.m., while the On March 7, 2015, at 9:40 p.m., while the plant was in cold shutdown, power from the reserve station service line no. 2 to the Division 2 onsite electrical distribution system was lost. The Division 2 diesel generator (EDG) received an automatic start signal due the under-voltage condition on the 4160v bus, but did not start since it was out of service for scheduled maintenance. The Division 2 standby service water pumps were operating at the time for scheduled testing, and subsequently shut down when power was lost. The cabinet on the reserve station service transformer "D". The apparent cause of this event was inadequate work practices on the part of the electricians, in that they did not take all available precautions prior to performing the voltage check. The workers recognized the adverse conditions, but did not recognize the need to put into place any robust barriers. The electricians' successful past performance of this type of task likely led to overconfidence. Reviewers of the work package didn't challenge the potential risks or identify a most error-likely task. The EDG start logic responded as designed to the loss of power on the Division 2 electrical systems. This event did not involve any interruption of the shutdown cooling function. This event was, thus, of minimal safety significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the EDG starting logic.valid actuation of the EDG starting logic.  +
April 16, 2015  +
February 18, 2015  +
On March 7, 2015, at 9:40 p.m., while the On March 7, 2015, at 9:40 p.m., while the plant was in cold shutdown, power from the reserve station service line no. 2 to the Division 2 onsite electrical distribution system was lost. The Division 2 diesel generator (EDG) received an automatic start signal due the under-voltage condition on the 4160v bus, but did not start since it was out of service for scheduled maintenance. The Division 2 standby service water pumps were operating at the time for scheduled testing, and subsequently shut down when power was lost. The cabinet on the reserve station service transformer "D". The apparent cause of this event was inadequate work practices on the part of the electricians, in that they did not take all available precautions prior to performing the voltage check. The workers recognized the adverse conditions, but did not recognize the need to put into place any robust barriers. The electricians' successful past performance of this type of task likely led to overconfidence. Reviewers of the work package didn't challenge the potential risks or identify a most error-likely task. The EDG start logic responded as designed to the loss of power on the Division 2 electrical systems. This event did not involve any interruption of the shutdown cooling function. This event was, thus, of minimal safety significance with respect to the health and safety of the public. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the EDG starting logic.valid actuation of the EDG starting logic.  +
2,015  +
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17:51:31, 19 March 2017  +
April 16, 2015  +
February 18, 2015  +
Operations Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Deficient Local Leak Rate Test Procedures Containing Erroneous Valve Alignments  +
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