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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 48717 | 5 February 2013 12:26:00 | Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was removed from service on 2/5/13 at 0545 EST to complete scheduled maintenance activities. Without proper ventilation, habitability of the TSC cannot be assured. Work duration is planned to complete today. In the event TSC activation is required, approved procedures are in place to establish an alternate location, if necessary. The licensee will make courtesy notifications to state and local agencies. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48213 | 20 August 2012 19:54:00 | The control room received a 4911 notification (emergency on-site 911 call) regarding an employee illness where the employee was unresponsive. Site Medical Emergency Response Team responded, and requested offsite assistance via ambulance. The employee was transported to Piedmont Medical Center via ambulance where he was pronounced deceased. A notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was made at 1645 EDT on 8/20/12 due to the on-site fatality. The employee had gone to a meeting and feeling ill went to the break room on-site. When the on-site medical team arrived at the break room they were unsuccessful in resuscitating the employee. The licensee will be notifying the state and local agencies. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41132 | 19 October 2004 08:50:00 | This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). During TSM 158 work associated with W/O 98686671 a SPOC Relief Supervisor inadvertently caused a ground when disconnecting test meter leads from an energized circuit. This ground resulted in an unplanned RN (Nuclear Service Water) swap to the SNSWP (Standby Nuclear Service Water System). At 0450 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937) The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2B started; 1A and 2A were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-53B and 1RN 54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B. Flow was manually initiated through all four NS Heat Exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for existing plant conditions. This event was entered into the site corrective action program for resolution (PIP C04-04056). At 1629 on 8/22/04, a lo-lo level signal was received for B Train RN Pit and this initiated a swap to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN had been aligned to the SNSWP on 8/16/04 for maintenance, and remained on the SNSWP due to 1RN-4B degraded condition (PIP C-04-3937). RN system response was as expected. The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all four RN Pumps (1B and 2A started; 1A and 2B were already operating). RN crossover valves 1RN-47A and 2RN-47A closed as expected, and return header isolation valves 1RN-53B and 1RN-54A closed as expected, separating RN trains A and B. Flow was manually initiated through all four NS heat exchangers to attempt to meet RN pump minimum flow demands. The reasons for the inadvertent actuation was a blown fuse. Performed Troubleshooting Plan to I/R Cause of Fuse HA-1 in 1EATC6 blowing under W/O #98686856-01 and 03. No cause for the fuse blowing on 2004-08-22 could be found. All data obtained under the plan were well within normal values. Thermography data indicate the fuse temperature was about 3 Deg F above ambient. The current through the fuse is 1.3 Amps. (Fuse HA-1 is a FLQ-3) Current alarm HF in 1EATC6 was calibrated, and was found in tolerance. No change in current through the fuse was noted during the calibration of the current alarm. The current alarm was cycled 5 times. This was a complete actuation for Train B and the system performed as designed for the existing plant conditions. This event has been entered into the site specific corrective action program for resolution. (C04-4060). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |