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The following information was provided by North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services via email: Licensee reported a portable nuclear gauge (Troxler model 3400 containing Cs-137 and Am-241 sources) was damaged by a work truck at a construction site on 11/4/22. Inspector was dispatched to investigate immediately. The technician utilizing the gauge was able to cordon off the area to secure the gauge. Licensee was able to retrieve the gauge and verify the source rod was intact and retracted back into the gauge. Surveys confirmed the sources were intact and in the shielded position. The gauge sustained damage to its outer housing and is being transported to the manufacturer for repair. More information will be provided to close and complete this report. NC Event No: TBD

• * * UPDATE ON 11/16/2022 AT 1505 EST FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information is a summary of information received via email: After investigation, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services updated this report to state that the cause of the damaged gauge was due to a vehicular accident and the corrective actions are to provide gauge user retraining. The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services considers this event be closed and complete. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis) and NMSS Events Notification email group.

The following information was received from the state of North Carolina via email: A patient being treated for liver tumors was prescribed to receive 47.6 mCi of Y-90 microspheres, but instead received only 11.9 mCi (about 25 percent of prescribed). The remainder was in the vial as residual.

Because this under-dosing was not due to stasis or emergent patient conditions, and the delivered dose was less than 20 percent of that prescribed, this constitutes a reportable medical event according to the 2016 version (9) of the NRC guidance for Y-90 microspheres. Source: Microspheres Radionuclide: Y-90 Manufacturer: Sirtex Medical Model: Sir-Spheres S/N: Aggregate Investigation is pending for the Medical Event. North Carolina Tracking Number: 180039 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

The following information was received via email. North Carolina (NC) Radioactive Materials Branch (RMB) is submitting the following reportable event: Radiography Camera Source Unable to Retract.

  Reportable per: 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) & 10 CFR 34.101(a)(2)
  Event Date & Discovered Date:  6/25/18
  Date Reported to RMB:  6/26/18
  Location where event took place:  Stoneville, NC
  Reporting Licensee:  Applied Technical Services (ATS)
  NC License Number:  1510-1
  Radiography Camera Manufacturer:  QSA Global, Inc.
  Radiography Camera Model #:  Delta 880
  Radiography Camera S/N:  D5059
  Source:  Ir-192
  Source Activity:  71.4 Ci
  Source Manufacturer:  QSA Global, Inc.
  Source Model #:  A424-9
  Source S/N:  65909G

While conducting radiography shots at a water tank construction site, ATS radiography crew experienced a source hang up. Radiographers initially believed the cause to be a crimped guide tube due to source not moving in either direction. While maintaining a 2 mR/hr boundary, additional personnel were dispatched to the work site by ATS with additional shielding material and (the) RSO (radiation safety officer) who is responsible for source retrievals. Lead blankets were placed on the guide tube and the RSO determined that the guide tube was not compromised, kinked, crimped or otherwise damaged. Probable cause was determined to be in the control assembly. RSO unthreaded the guide from the outlet adapter and exercised the controls with no effect. Guide tube was reconnected and RSO began to troubleshoot the connection side of the camera by removing the housing from the connection to observe the cable while again exercising the controls. Cable would flex but was observed to be either wedged or pinned at the connector. During this process, it was observed that since the cable would not flex on the outlet side of the camera it was determined that extreme force on the controls side would not result in the cable being disconnected from the pig tail. The housing was reattached, and extreme force was used on the controls to break the cable free and the source was returned to its secured and shielded position. The RSO observed the control assembly crank did have more movement than usual, and root cause was determined to be debris from a damaged bearing that had moved down the control cable housing and locked up the controls. This equipment had quarterly maintenance and weekly inspections conducted on it. (The) controls were shipped to QSA for repair or disposal. All personnel involved in the source retrieval received doses well within annual limits for radiation workers.

RMB has concluded its investigation and consider this event Closed & Complete. No other agencies were informed of this event and no other generic issues identified. NMED Event ID: 180329 NC Tracking ID: 180029

The following report was received from the State of North Carolina via email: On 2/15/2017 Duke University reported to the NC Radiation Protection Section (NCRPS) a leaking source:

U-235 3 microCuries 1.5 grams S/N: D16156

This source was loaned to Duke University through Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for experimentation, research, education and calibration purposes. NCRPS personnel were dispatched to conduct a reactive inspection on 2/15/2017. Through interviews with Duke personnel it was determined that during an experiment the source integrity was compromised and assumed to be leaking. No direct wipe of the source was taken. The source was packaged to prevent contamination and then isolated for pending disposal. It was also determined that the actual breach of the source occurred on 2/11/2017. Given the lapse of when the source was compromised and when Duke Radiation Safety Office was notified it is apparent that established Duke SOPs were not followed. Duke personnel and researchers believed to have been exposed to the leaking source had lung scans performed on 2/15/2017, in which all came back indicating no exposure. Duke personnel accompanied by NCRPS staff began testing for contamination of the affected area and surrounding areas due to the compromised source.

On 2/16/2017, Duke personnel again notified NCRPS that contamination was discovered outside of the anticipated areas where contamination was suspected. On 2/16/2017, NCRPS personnel continued the reactive inspection. The scope to the surveys was expanded to now cover high traffic areas, vehicles of the individuals involved, bathrooms and other areas where potential contamination from the leaking source may have been in. Testing of these areas for contamination is ongoing at the time of this report. For the identified personnel directly associated with the leaking source, surveys and wipes were expanded to their residences. One residence, that of a Duke Physicist Researcher, presented contamination on a toilet seat which was decontaminated and re-surveyed and re-wiped and the results confirmed the decontamination. Other areas of the residence were surveyed and at the time of this report all results indicate no further contamination. Additional researchers identified on 2/16/17 to have been involved with the leaking source, were also scheduled to have lung scans on 2/17/2017. Additionally, Duke University decided to compound testing to include urinalysis and possibly bloodwork at the advice of REACTS. At this time, it is believed that contamination due to the leaking source has been contained and no members of the public have received radiation exposures. To date, the highest reading in proximity to the source on Duke University's property was 7000 CPM and 4280 DPM.

On 2/17/2017, NCRPS in conjunction with Duke personnel reconvened to continue to complete the expanded surveys and wipes of all possible suspected areas and to conduct additional interviews with Duke personnel to rule out any chances of additional affected persons. Currently, this is an ongoing investigation and this event will be updated as additional details are received. North Carolina Event Report 2/17/2017.

• * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL 1436 EST ON 3/3/17 * * *

The state of North Carolina submitted their final report for the Duke incident via email: Radiation Protection Section - Duke Incident Report March 3, 2017 Friday 2/10/2017: U-235 Source was removed by RES (researcher) D from storage located at Triangle Universities Nuclear Laboratory (TUNL) and taken to the Upstream Target Room (UTR) at the High Intensity Gamma-ray Source (HIGS) facility. Saturday 2/11/2017: RES A utilizing the U-235 sealed source for research compromised the integrity of the source by bending the corners of the source to fit in a target holder resulting in the contamination of a researcher's hand (RES A) and work surface. The sealed source of a water insoluble form of U-235 with an activity of 3 micro curies containing a total of 1.5 grams of powdered U-235 with the majority still inside. This took place in the UTR located in HIGS and at no time was the source exposed to the accelerator beam. RES A informed RES D of the compromised source where it was confiscated by RES D. Both the RES A & RES D decontaminated their hands and work surfaces suspected to be contaminated. RES A expressed their concern over the leaking source to RES D, this concern was dismissed by RES D who did not report the status of the source or the possibility of contamination as dictated in Duke University established procedures. No contamination surveys were reported as performed for the compromised source or work surface areas at the location of UTR in HIGS. The compromised source was contained (bagged), sealed and moved back to storage located at TUNL by RES D following transport to Physics where an attempt was made to repair the source also by RES D. Surveys at Physics on the contained source indicated no contamination by RES D after resealing the source. At no time were gloves or any Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) reported to be utilized by either RES A or RES D before and after the source was compromised. Researchers and Duke personnel failed to follow established procedures which dictate that any damage to a radioactive source or suspected contamination be immediately reported to Duke Radiation Safety, RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) or RSM (Radiation Safety Manager) 1 or RSM 2. Monday 2/13/2017: RES D notified RSM 1 of the possibility of leaking compromised source and requested the source be detected for possible leakage. Again, the possible incident was not immediately reported. Tuesday 2/14/2017: RSO was notified by RSM 2 (who overheard the discussion between RES D & RSM 1 on 2/13/2017) about the possible incident that occurred on Saturday 2/11/2017. This notification should have come from any of the researchers involved (RES A, B, C & D or RSM 1). Wednesday 2/15/2017: Radiation Protection Section (RPS) was called by RSO Wednesday morning and informed of a possible incident at Duke University. SC (North Carolina Radiation Protection Section Chief) and HP (North Carolina Radiation Protection Section Health Physicist) 1 were dispatched to conduct a reactive inspection. RPS led a fact finding discussion with Duke personnel (Res D, RSO, RSM 1, RSM 2, LW (Laboratory Worker) 2 & LW 3) and international researchers (RES A, RES B & RES C) to establish the chain of events from 2/10/2017 to present. Following these discussions, RPS determined: 1. The investigation will remain open pending a follow up report from Duke University regarding the compromised source and; 2. That any contamination had been contained at UTR in HIGS by Duke personnel the verification of which; to be included in the follow up report. Duke Environmental Safety Office then began surveys of the affected areas of UTR at HIGS due to the compromised source and also to verify no further contamination. RES A, RES D & RSM1 were identified as being in contact with the source and were evaluated for contamination exposures by lung scans at TE (Technical Experts) 1. Results indicated no inhalation occurred. Because of the insoluble nature of the isotope, it was advised by TE 1 that no further bioassays (urine or fecal) were necessary. SC notified the Division of Public Health (DPH) of the Duke University incident. Roles and collaboration efforts were discussed during this time. The incident was also discussed with Division of Emergency Management (DEM). Thursday 2/16/2017: RPS was notified at Thursday morning that Duke personnel were discovering contamination found outside of UTR at HIGS. RPS (SC, HP1, HP 2, HP 3 & HP 4) was dispatched again to Duke. Additional areas at Duke were found to be contaminated at Free-Electron Laser Laboratory (FELL). RPS requested that Duke personnel immediately expand surveys for possible contamination well beyond original surveyed areas to include: bathrooms, stairwells, hallways and other high traffic areas at FELL. This was necessary to establish a high confidence that contamination was contained to Duke property/facilities. HP 1, HP 2, HP 3 & HP 4 observed all surveys conducted by Duke for his incident investigation. It was during these observations that many common radiation safety practices were not adhered to including: a. Several chances for cross contamination of the samples could take place due to the technique employed (crossing of one hand for samples taken and the other hand for sample collections), witnessed by HP 1. b. While licensee personnel were taking surveys of personal items and surveys of hands and shoes, it was observed that the detector surface was held at an angle which could allow contaminant particles to contaminate the survey window of the detector, potentially compromising the detector to make accurate survey determinations, witnessed by HP 1 & HP 2. c. Through observations, it was discovered that researchers consumed beverages in a radiation use area which lead RPS to the possibility that ingestion was now a possible exposure pathway, witnessed by HP 2. An additional 2 researchers (RES B & C) and a laboratory worker (LW 1) were identified as possibly having contact with the source on the 2/11/2017 (total of 6 people). RES B & C were also scheduled for lung scans on Friday 2/17/2017 at TE 1. All individuals that may have come into contact with the source (RES A, RES B, RES C, RES D, & RSM 1) were interviewed to map their routes from Saturday 2/11/2017 to present, with the exception of LW 1 who was not available for interview due to being unreachable via phone, email or page. LW 1 was finally contacted on Friday 2/17/2017. Based on those interviews, high risk areas were surveyed utilizing an alpha detector to include: initial laboratory areas, immediately surrounding areas, personal items (cell phones, wallets & shoes of RES A, B, C, D & RSM 1) and the vehicle of 1 RES D were completed and indicated no contamination. Duke personnel performed wipe surveys of these items and at the time indicated no contamination. RPS requested that Duke extend surveys to include the residences of those identified to have come into contact with the source to include: hotel rooms of 3 researchers (RES A, B, & C) who are visiting international researchers, and the residences of RES D & RSM 1 (LW 1 still unavailable at this time). All surveys indicated no contamination with the exception of the residence of RES D. That contamination was found on a toilet seat of the residence, remediated by Duke personnel and resurveyed and indicated no contamination. All other areas of RES D residence surveyed indicated no further contamination. Public Health Preparedness and Response (PHP&R) supported RPS on site for the investigation. Occupational and Environmental Epidemiology Branch (OEEB) was consulted for additional recommendations for bioassays and Duke personnel was made aware. Durham County Health Director and DPH leadership were informed and through conference call, determined a plan of action for public health. Conference call with Duke VP of Communications, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Communications Office, RPS and PHP&R was held to draft public and employee messaging. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) was consulted by RPS on the details of this incident to this point. Friday 2/17/2017: RPS continued its investigation with Duke Friday morning. Lung scans for RES B & C were conducted at the location of TE 1 and indicated negative results. LW 1 was interviewed and was eliminated from the list of possible contaminated personnel, as they did not have any contact with the source from when the incident took place (final total of 5 potentially exposed people). Surveys were expanded to areas known to be frequented by the researcher (RES D) whose residence was found to be contaminated on Thursday 2/16/2017. A keyboard in the researcher's office was found to be contaminated, contained by Duke personnel and removed for isolation. All other areas frequented by this researcher were surveyed and indicated no further contamination. An additional 10 personnel (ancillary, housekeeping, students, faculty, engineers) were identified as having frequented the affected areas involved with this incident. These individuals were interviewed and were found to not have had contact with any of the contaminated areas or any involvement with the compromised source. At this time, RPS generated a report to the USNRC under the assumption that a 24-hour report was to be required. This was necessary in assuming a reporting requirement for unplanned contamination and assuming a worst case scenario as the investigation was still ongoing. Additional consultation was provided to RPS from TE 3 & TE 4 with regards to the compromised source to add perspective, that, should one individual were to consume the entire U-235 source, that person would receive 2 years of natural background radiation upon ingestion. Additionally, given that the source contained an activity of 3 microCuries, it would not have exceeded the threshold for Allowable Limits for Intake (ALI). Training for those involved with this incident was also reviewed. During this review, it was confirmed that all individuals involved in this incident received Radiation Safety Training. This training specifically indicates that any damage to radioactive sources, suspected contamination and unexpected radiation exposures be reported immediately. The fact that this was not reported on 2/11/2017 appears to be in violation of Duke University Procedures. Other Procedures were reviewed with regards to the compromised source. Specifically, Duke's own customized procedures tailored for this source, indicated that the source was to be tested for leakage every six months. Duke could not provide documentation that these leak tests took place and freely admitted that they were not conducting these tests for this source. As surveys were continued to be expanded it was discovered that equipment used to reseal the compromised source on 2/11/2017 was found to be contaminated at the location in Physics. This equipment was remediated and removed. Additional surveys expanded out of Physics (door leading to Physics & hallways leading to Physics room) were conducted to confirm containment of any contamination and the area cordoned off pending results. Additional surveys and observations made where the source was stored at TUNL and no further contamination was detected at this location. Through interviews by HP 1 & HP 2 with Duke personnel conducting the wipe surveys for areas suspected to contain contamination, it was discovered that techniques utilized were suspected as inadequate (samples exposed to ESD (electrostatic discharge), improper lighting, temperature control) to provide reliable results and further put into question the capabilities of the detector equipment via Liquid Scintillation Counter (LSC) to provide reliable results. RPS requested that Duke personnel utilize another reliable LSC and re-run all samples up to this point for this incident and any future samples taken in this investigation. The results of which are pending. Duke personnel decided to conduct Whole Body (WB) scans for RES A, B & C to compound the Lung Scans previously performed for these individuals. The results for the WB scans were negative. This was necessary as these individuals were scheduled to depart to their home countries on Saturday 2/17/2017 and this was the most reliable additional testing that could be conducted in the time available. Urine samples were also taken for bioassays from RES A, B & C. RSO has reached out to the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency Radiation Safety Officer to inform him of events and discussed testing and results of the researchers from Japan. Additionally, Duke personnel committed to conducting 24-hour urine bioassays and possible blood analysis for Duke personnel involved in this incident. The results of which are pending. The decisions to conduct further tests were made in consultation with TE 1 & TE 2. An exit meeting was conducted by Radiation Protection Program with Duke University personnel in which preliminary items of Non-Compliance were discussed. A corrective action plan was presented which was acceptable to Radiation Protection Program as next steps: 1. Shut down the High Intensity Gamma Source (HIGS) operations within the Free Electron Laser Laboratory (FELL) until March 27, 2017. During this time DU (Duke University) will be modifying procedures and working toward needed improvements. On 2-18-17 this commitment had been upgraded by the new Director of FELL and Triangle Universities Nuclear Laboratories (TUNL), to an indefinite suspension of operations in HIGS using radioactive targets. HIGS is where the incident occurred using radioactive targets. 2. (A Duke Radiation Safety Program (DRSP) Health Physicist will temporarily manage the laboratory) until a permanent replacement may be found. DRSP will maintain a larger footprint and role in operations within the facility while improvements are being made. 3. DRSP is considering hiring a consultant to help with procedural improvements and restore safety culture beyond implementing their own resources. 4. Duke University has committed to begin leak testing all sealed sources prioritizing custom radioactive sources. 5. Duke University leadership has committed to providing DRSP with funding and resources needed to upgrade radiological analysis equipment and facilities. 6. DRSP has suspended online training practices and have committed to face-to-face training with all new researchers emphasizing safety practices and procedures. NOTE: This report was submitted March 3, 2017. RPS is continuing its investigation until all deficiencies identified in this report have been corrected to the satisfaction of RPS that Duke University is in compliance. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco), NMSS EO (Collins), and NMSS Events Notification (email).

The following report was received from the State of Georgia via email: The following was reported to the State of Georgia on February 15, 2016. The patient was prepped for the delivery of doses of 18 and 21 Gy to 14 subcentimeter brain metastases with Gamma Knife stereotactic radiosurgery. The frame adapter was placed on the patient's stereotactic head frame by a Gamma Knife trained registered nurse, supervised by Authorized Medical Physicist (AMP), and Authorized User (AU). After five of the planned 14 lesions were treated, the patient was given a break in order to use the restroom and for additional medication. During this treatment break, the AU and AMP entered the room to release the patient from the restraining device and assist (the patient) to the rest room. It was at that point that it was discovered that the restraining device was locked, but not in the correct position. The displaced distance was measured and determined to be a maximum discrepancy of 2 cm in one plane. The AMP and AU applied the displacement to the treatment plan to determine which areas were treated and which were not. It was determined that a potential misadministration had occurred.

The RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) was notified to discuss the course of action. Following discussions with the AMP, AU, the medical director, the prescribing physician and radiation safety officer, it was decided that there was a potential medical event or misadministration as defined in 391-3-17-.05(115)(a)3 or 391-3-17-.05(115)(b). The cause of the event is uncertain at this time. The head restraining device should not have been able to be secured unless it was in the proper position. An investigation is ongoing and additional information is being sought. The patient received an unintended radiation dose to normal brain tissue, however, it was determined by the authorized user in consult with the medical physicist that little clinical effect will be demonstrated due to this inadvertent exposure. The patient, the patient's family and the patient's referring physician were informed of the event. After extensive discussions, it was agreed by all parties that the treatment would be completed to ensure that the correct dose is delivered to the remaining target areas. This is all the data available at the moment. A reactive inspection is currently underway and updates are soon to follow. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

The following Georgia Agreement State report was received via email. Event Description: Patient was scheduled for an I-131 prescribed dose of 100-150mCi for the treatment of Thyroid Carcinoma. The patient instead was administered a dose that deviated 20% lower than the prescribed dose. This incident was reported to the (Georgia) State per Rule 391-3-17.05(115)(a)1.(i): 'A dose that differs from the prescribed dose by more than 0.05 Sv (5 rem) effective dose equivalent, 0.5 Sv (50 rem) to an organ or tissue, or 0.5 Sv (50 rem) shallow dose equivalent to the skin; and either (i) The total dose delivered differs from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more.' The State will provide the corrective action information when provided by the licensee. GA State Report ID: CTS 71850 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

• * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL ON 8/20/13 AT 1240 EDT * * *

A sodium iodine I-131 thyroid ablation treatment was ordered as a NaI I-131 whole body scan resulting in a patient receiving a diagnostic dose of 5 mCi of NaI (I-131) instead of the therapeutic dose of 50 mCi of NaI (I-131).

Both the referring physician and the patient were also informed of the misadministration of the 5 mCi I-131 dose for the whole body scan on August 7, 2013 in light of the confirmed order for an I-131 thyroid ablation. The order verification process was reviewed with all involved staff members and an extensive review of the process was begun.

Nuclear Medicine, like all diagnostic services, requires verification of the order for services. This verification must be in the form of a written order or an electronic authenticated order. On August 1, 2013 Piedmont Hospital Atlanta implemented EPIC, a new electronic medical record (EMR). The orders verification process changed a bit, because Piedmont Physician Groups could place an order within the EPIC environment (EPIC Physicians) and have them electronically authenticated, with e-signature and a time stamp. Physicians not in the EPIC environment (non-EPIC Physicians) could still schedule services through scheduling by providing a written order. Once scheduling had received a written order, the ancillary orders process would produce an order that looked just like the order produced by an EPIC physician, but the chart would have a paper clip to signify that it was a non-EPIC Physician order.

During the first week of the EPIC implementation, many of the orders that were transcribed by the scheduling services department did not have the attachment of the original written order. This information came to light during the first few days of go-live but not all end users were informed on the issue. In this particular case, the patient's order was requested by a non-EPIC physician, as an I-131 whole body scan. The order was transcribed by scheduling , and as of August 7, 2013, the original order was not scanned into the chart. The order in the chart appeared to be an EPIC Physician order. Based on the information known at the time, the order for an I-131 whole body scan was verified and the patient was dosed and instructed to return on Friday August 9, 2013 for imaging.

On August 8, 2013, a copy of the original order was scanned into the patient's record. The order contained more detailed information concerning the reason for the referral to nuclear medicine. This information would prove to be vital in determining the actual course of treatment requested by the referring physician.

On Friday August 9, 2013, the patient returned for the whole body scan, but due to a downed system at the hospital the patient was referred to the Piedmont West Imaging Center to complete their test. While preparing the report template in PACs (Name removed), noticed that the patients chart had a paper clip icon but the documentation that she had received from the hospital Nuclear Medicine department only had an EPIC Physician order. (Name removed) opened the original scanned order for an I-131 whole body scan and discovered that within the comments section of the note that the Authorized User was referring the patient for an I-131 thyroid ablation. The office was contacted, and the order for an I-131 thyroid ablation was confirmed. (Name Removed), contacted the RSO to inform him of the events leading up to this misadministration.

The actions taken to prevent a future reoccurrence of a similar event include: -Training on the orders verification process in EPIC for all Nuclear Medicine staff members -Defining the difference between an EPIC Physician order and a non-EPIC Physician order -All non-EPIC Physician orders must have an attached copy of the original order or a call must be placed to the provider's office requesting a copy of the order if the patient does not have an original copy. Notified R1DO (Schmidt) and FSME (via email).

The following information was provided by the State of Georgia via email: Licensee informed the Department (Georgia Radioactive Materials Program) via written correspondence dated 8/28/09 that a patient who underwent a nuclear cardiology treadmill stress test on 8/17/09 resulted in an embryo/fetus exposure greater than 500 mRem. Prior to treatment the patient declared to the licensee that she was not pregnant and the licensee followed in house protocols in which all female patients under the age of 55 are asked if they are currently pregnant or breastfeeding. In the event that a patient is unsure the licensee postpones testing until a negative pregnancy test can be obtained. The patient later informed the licensee of her pregnancy on 8/27/09. Isotopes and activity administered to the patient were as follows: Tc-99m 26.9 mCi & Tl-201 5.38 mCi with a Total Activity of 32.28 mCi. RSO for the licensee & consulting medical physicists conducted a dose determination and the conclusion was that the embryo/fetus did receive an effective dose equivalent in excess of 500 mRem. The results were forwarded to the patient's OBGYN. This was a diagnostic misadministration that did not involve contamination.

• * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS CARTOSKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/30/13 AT 0943 EST * * *

The following information was excerpted from a received facsimile: (The update is concerned with) the radiopharmaceutical dose administration that a female patient recently received at testing facility. It was subsequently determined that this patient was 9 weeks pregnant. The patient received two dose administrations, one dose of Tc-99m - Myoview for the Stress Myocardial Perfusion scan and one dose of TI-201 as Thallous Chloride for the Rest Myocardial Perfusion scan. The patient received 26.9 mCi of Tc-99m-Myoview and 5.38 mCi of TI-201. The dose to the conceptus was approximately 2.53 Rad. Determination of dose is limited by patient habitus and physiology. Notified the R1DO(Bellamy) and FSME Resources via email. Report: GA-2009-18i NMED# 090812