Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 55497 | 28 September 2021 18:00:00 | The following is a synopsis of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email: On 9/3/2021, Paragon Energy Solutions determined that they did not have sufficient information to determine if the inverter assemblies would, or has, created a substantial safety hazard or would have created a technical specification safety limit violation as it relates to plant applications. Exelon (Limerick and Peach Bottom) were notified on 9/3/2021. Duke (Brunswick) was notified on 9/7/2021. On 9/28/2021, Exelon Peach Bottom provided information indicating the failure of the unit in service could cause a substantial safety hazard in their application. Quantity of Inverters: Brunswick (7), Limerick (6), Peach Bottom (4). Component Description: Inverter Assembly 1000VA (Model CSI-K-B-Q9573-1), Nuclear Logistics part number: NLI-072034-CSI-K-5-A. The failed component is the DC-DC converter output rectifiers. Nature of Defect: The deviation relates to failure of the installed Absopulse 1000VA inverter (Model CSI-K-B-Q9573-1). The extent of condition is currently limited to Absopulse inverters manufactured or repaired in 2015 and later. The root cause of the failure is currently under investigation. The failed component is the DC-DC converter output rectifiers. Advice Related to Defect: Paragon recommends the identified plants evaluate their specific application and determine whether the condition described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, please contact Paragon to determine appropriate corrective action. Tracy Bolt Chief Nuclear Officer, CNO 817-284-0077 Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 |
| ENS 55300 | 10 June 2021 15:56:00 | Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions is providing initial notification of the identification of a deviation. Condition that requires evaluation: NLI 280-ton Custom Chillers, Serial Numbers XHX-0001A / XHX-0001B / XHX-0001C. The Chillers were originally supplied by Nuclear Logistics under PO: NU-02SR726683 in 2010. The original seismic qualification was questioned by plant personnel related to the size of the bolting utilized for the diagonal cross braces on the two lower chiller frames. Paragon performed a review and additional analysis of the original qualification report. It was confirmed that the bolting which was utilized to install the pinned diagonal braces on the condenser and compressor frame sections does not have a sufficient load bearing capacity to support the application loading during a seismic event. The upset and emergency loading for the diagonal brace is 5.59 kip and 8.59 kip, respectively. Compared to the load capacity of 2.32 kip and 3.09 kip for upset and emergency, respectively, for the 3/8" bolt in single-shear configuration with threads included in the shear plane. This condition does not affect normal operation of the chiller. However, this deviation has the potential to impact the ability to maintain structural integrity during a seismic event. Date of Discovery: 6/8/2021 Formal notification will be submitted on or before 7/8/2021. Paragon contact: Tracy Bolt, Chief Nuclear Officer, Paragon Energy Solutions, 817-284-0077, tbolt@paragones.com. This equipment was supplied to V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.
The following information was recevied via E-mail: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing written notification of the identification of a deviation. On 6/24/2021, Paragon has determined that we do not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if the deviation, if left uncorrected, could create a substantial safety hazard. VC Summer has been notified within five working days of this determination so that they can evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a). Condition that requires evaluation: NLI 280-ton Custom Chillers, Serial Numbers XHX-0001A / XHX-0001B / XHX-0001C. The Chillers were originally supplied by NLI to VC Summer station under PO: NU-02SR726683 in 2010. Ref. P21-06102021-IN, Rev. 0 (ML21174A009) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Tracy Bolt, Chief Nuclear Officer. Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC, 7410 Pebble Drive, Ft. Worth, TX 76118. Notified R2DO (Miller), R4DO (Werner), and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group. |
| ENS 55162 | 30 March 2021 16:50:00 | The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions: North Anna Station has identified instances where Size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by NLI. The Mechanical Interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor to close when energized. The identified starters are utilized in an application of operating Motor Operated Valves. Date of Discovery: 3/29/2021 Formal notification will be submitted on or before 4/29/2021. Affected plants: North Anna Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact: Tracy Bolt Chief Nuclear Officer Paragon Energy Solutions 817-284-0077 tbolt@paragones.com |
| ENS 55223 | 29 April 2021 19:52:00 | The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions: On 3/29/2021, Dominion - North Anna Station has identified instances where size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by Nuclear Logistics LLC (NLI). The mechanical interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor from closing when energized. The identified failed starters are utilized in an application of operating Motor Operated Valves (MOV). This is an intermittent duty application. The issue was identified on Eaton Starter Model AN56DN*, AN56GN*, CN55DN*, CN55GN* style starters and contactors with supplied date codes T4514 (week 45 of year 2014) and T4215 (week 42 of year 2015). Paragon is in the process of identifying the date codes to provide the specific information to the identified plants. The following plants were supplied starters from September 2014 through October 2018: Beaver Valley, Columbia, Ergytech, Harris, Millstone, NEK KRSKO, North Anna, Prairie Island. The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (Eaton) in October 2018. There have been no reported failures of the interlock mechanism in vintages manufactured before September 2014 or after October 2018. These recommendations are based on the specific application: The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed. The motor control centers that contain the mechanical interlock should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation. The evaluation being performed by Paragon is expected to be completed by May 29, 2021. Tracy Bolt Chief Nuclear Officer, CNO 817-284-0077 Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118
The following revision was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email and corrects the identified date code and includes the size and serial number of the starter that failed: The issue was identified on supplied Size 1, 73262-025-00028 (Date Code: T4515 - 45th week of 2015) and Size 2, 73262-028-00001 (Date Code: T4215 - 42nd week of 2015). Notified R1DO (Young), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Orlikowski), R4DO (Deese), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.
The following update (Interim Report) was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email: Paragon is submitting this Interim Report since this condition is currently under evaluation but will not be completed within 60 days. Paragon is in communication with EATON, the OEM for the starters/contactors to determine the extent of condition. The evaluation is expected to be completed by June 30, 2021. It was determined that Dominion - Millstone should not be included in the list of affected plants. Millstone will be removed from the list in the final revision of P21-03302021. Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Gepford), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.
The following is a synopsis of an update (completion of the evaluation) received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email: Paragon has identified the date codes of the supplied starters and contactors to provide the specific information to the identified plants. This information has been provided directly to the specific plant." (Millstone was removed from the list of plants.) The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (EATON) in September of 2014. The failed units were from Date Codes T4215 and T4515 which are in the 42nd and 45th weeks of 2015. In September 2018 the drawing was revised again. In discussions with the OEM the revision of the drawing was due to a change in material type and was not a result of binding issues. This condition has not been identified on assemblies manufactured after September 2018. Due to the number of starters that have been installed and in service without issue, it is highly unlikely that there is a defect within all the supplied starters in the date range of September 2014 through September 2018. To date, Paragon has been unable to obtain any conclusive information from EATON regarding the potential cause of the binding issue. One of the failed starters along with samples of binding and non-binding interlocks have been provided to EATON for them to perform their own analysis on the potential causes of the binding issue. Until more information is gathered from the OEM (EATON) Paragon recommends the following: The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed at the plant's discretion. Replacement mechanical interlocks may be ordered to replace the existing interlocks from the affected date code range if the plant application will not allow for removal. The motor control center cubicles or starter assemblies with date codes within the September 2014 through September 2018 range should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation. It is possible that if the starter is found to bind during operation, the bound condition could be released by cycling the power to the starter. This action may release the bound condition and will allow the starter to operate. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Werner), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email. |
| ENS 54734 | 3 June 2020 11:31:00 | The following was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions is providing initial notification of the identification of a defect. Duke Energy Harris Plant has identified instances where Size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by NLI. The auxiliary contacts have degraded prematurely and have failed to change state when the starter was energized which has affected indication and other controlling actions within the circuit. The identified starters have been installed for 3-5 years, operating in a continuous duty application. Formal notification will be submitted on or before 6/30/2020. For any questions or comments, please contact: Tracy Bolt, Chief Nuclear Officer Paragon Energy Solutions 817-284-0077 tbolt@paragones.com |
| ENS 54760 | 30 June 2020 17:41:00 | EN Revision Imported Date : 7/22/2020 PART 21 - FAILURE OF SIZE 1 AND 2 FREEDOM SERIES AUXILIARY CONTACTS The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions: DUKE Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) has identified instances where Size 1 and 2 Eaton Freedom Series starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by NLI. The auxiliary contacts have degraded prematurely and have failed to change state when the starter was energized which has affected indication and other controlling actions within the circuit. The premature degradation of the auxiliary contacts with the old model NLI special coil, part number: 057018-COIL-1/2, has occurred on size 1 and 2 contactors that were continuously energized with significant run time after approximately 3 to 5 years of service time. HNP has provided information to manage the known degradation. The auxiliary contacts should be replaced at an increased frequency until new auxiliary contacts are installed along with the new design NLI special coil, part number: 057018-COIL-1/2-M. The nature of the defect is the pre-mature aging of the component within the auxiliary contact mechanism that is adjacent to the operating coil. The starter coil is potentially being subjected to voltages of a nature that elevates the temperature within the starter adjacent to the auxiliary contacts. It is recommended that the starters and coils be replaced in the applications where the units are being operated in a continuous duty application. It is also recommended that the control transformer be replaced with a true 4:1 ratio transformer. Paragon/NLI has developed a true 4:1 ratio transformer that will provide additional mitigation of this potential over-voltage condition. Replacing the transformer with a true 4:1 ratio reduces the control voltage that is being applied to the control circuit in a manner that will not prevent the unit from providing a sufficient voltage during a degraded voltage condition, and also will not subject the components to a voltage above the ratings when the supply voltage is operated above the nominal 480 VAC bus voltage. Paragon has no other recommendations as the accelerated aging of the components and the expected life based on the additional heat the units have been subjected to is unknown. Affected plants: Sharon Harris Oconee Turkey Point Columbia North Anna Waterford River Bend Beaver Valley Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact: Tracy Bolt Chief Nuclear Officer Paragon Energy Solutions 817-284-0077 tbolt@paragones.com
The following is the summary of an email received from Paragon Energy Solutions: The root cause of the degraded component is due to the increased voltage and the overall temperature of the starter coil at the elevated voltage. This elevated voltage and temperature has degraded the mechanism of the auxiliary contact operator to a point to which it has become separated from the parent component. Paragon/NLI has developed a new version of the special coil (part number: 057018-COIL-1/2-M) that operates at a lower temperature than the original special coil that is currently in use at HNP. When the new version of the special coil is subjected to the same voltages, the temperature is lower. The affected plants have been revised to: Sharon Harris Oconee Turkey Point Columbia North Anna Notified R1DO (Carfang), R2DO (Miller), R4DO (Drake), and Part 21 Reactors Group (email). |
| ENS 54311 | 4 October 2019 17:54:00 | The following is a summary from a part 21 report received via facsimile: Susquehanna identified a deviation with a phase to phase to ground short that was caused by misalignment of the cubicle stabs when racking in the cubicle. The cubicle was racked into the cell and 2 of the 3 phase stab fingers engaged properly with the bus. The A phase stab fingers missed the center of the bus, however an electrical connection was maintained. This condition was estimated to be present for 3 years before the failure occurred. The deviation was originally evaluated as an installation issue, however after further evaluation, the deviation has been determined to be a failure to comply with the specification requirements. The specification requirements were reviewed and it was determined that the design of the connection stabs did not fully comply with the requirements. The reported deviation will complete an electrical connection between the stab finger assembly and the bus, but at a possible reduced current carrying ability as only 1 side of the stab finger assembly is touching the bus. This causes less surface area contact between the stab finger and the bus, which causes less current carrying ability. The cubicle will likely function, however over time, if left uncorrected, it is possible that the connection could overheat, depending on the load of the cubicle, since the connection has a reduced surface area and/or has a higher resistance than what would be typical if the stab finger assembly was properly engaged. The issue could extend to all F10 series MCC cubicles supplied by NLI (Nuclear Logistics Inc.) with the current design of stab assembly P/N: 5600-SA3-1. This design has been provided to Susquehanna Station, Limerick Generating Station, and Perry Nuclear. Please contact me with any questions or comments: Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance AZZ Nuclear 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 |
| ENS 51944 | 19 May 2016 19:17:00 | The following was received via FAX: On May 18, 2016, Nuclear Logistics INC. (NLI) determined that a contactor failure that occurred at the Shearon Harris plant had failed due to an auxiliary contact chatter present on the seal-in circuit for the coil voltage. The auxiliary contact chatter was caused by the loss of the shading coils. NLI will be submitting a full report on the issue to the NRC within 60 days. The contactor that failed was a Size 4 Eaton Freedom Series with a special coil for degraded voltage condition. Reference Number: P21-05192016 NLI reported that the following plants have these types of contactor's: Region 2: Oconee, Turkey Point, Shearon Harris and North Anna Region 4: Columbia and Waterford
The following is excerpted from the licensee submission: The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect: The Contactor that failed in service is a Size 4 Eaton Freedom Series with an AZZ/NLI special coil for meeting specific degraded voltage conditions. Extent of condition: Size 3, 4 and size 5 Eaton Freedom Series contactors or starters with an NLI special degraded voltage coil that have been supplied by AZZ/NLI since December 2010. NLI procured the commercial grade contactors and installed the special coil that was required to achieve the specific degraded voltage condition. The units were qualified, dedicated and supplied for safety related applications. The contactors were commercially procured from Eaton, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). For contactors/starters utilized in continuous duty applications. the OEM shading coils on the contactor core ... have the potential to become loose and fall off. If the shading coils are not in the intended location on the core, there is the potential for excessive chatter to occur on the normally open auxiliary contacts that are closed when the contactor is energized. The safety function of the contactor is to reliably supply uninterrupted power (no contact chatter) to a load on demand. For special degraded voltage applications, the NLI supplied contactor is equipped with an NLI special coil that replaces the OEM coil. When the contactor/starters that have the special coil installed are utilized in a continuous duty operation (continuously energized greater than 60 minutes) the special coil reaches a higher temperature than the original manufacturer's coil. The increased heat is potentially causing degradation of the acrylic resin that is utilized by the manufacturer to hold the OEM shading coils onto the OEM core. After the acrylic resin is no longer providing a secure hold on the shading coils, the shading coils can then become loose from the iron core. Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 AZZ/NLI Part 21 Report No: P21-05192016, Rev. 0 Plants potentially impacted include Oconee, Shearon Harris, Columbia, Turkey Point, North Anna, and Waterford. Notified R4DO (Rollins), R2DO (Musser) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors group (via email). |
| ENS 51923 | 12 May 2016 19:23:00 | The following information was a licensee received facsimile; Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential defect or failure to comply. On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation. The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4): (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 (ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect. Masterpact NT and NW style circuit breakers. -The failure of the breaker being ready to electrically close after being subjected to an 'Anti-Pump condition'. Note: The specific application where the failures have occurred is when the breaker is being utilized as a starter for closing into an inductive load like a fan motor. (iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. AZZ/ Nuclear Logistics Fort Worth, Texas 76118 (iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. Possible 'failure to close' condition of Masterpact breakers NT and NW style, that are being used with specific logic schemes that are subjected to 'anti-pump' conditions during normal operation. These breakers have a higher susceptibility to not return to the ready to close position after the close signal has been removed. PSEG reported approximately 14 instances with different breakers in different cubicles where they initiated an electric close order, and the breakers failed to close. All of the 14 instances were in applications of being used to start an inductive load. NLI inspected three of the breakers (all NWs) that were returned by PSEG and could not fully replicate the problem as described by the plant. NLI was only able to repeat the failure to close when performing an 'anti-pump' test. The failure to close was intermittent, but could be duplicated. When the anti-pump condition was not present, NLI could not duplicate a failure to close. Visual inspections of the tested breakers did not reveal any visible damage to the breaker linkages, latches, shunt close or shunt trip assemblies. Schneider Electric (SE) performed testing of three Masterpact NW08 breakers (operated to beyond design life) and duplicated the fail to close condition as described by the plant. It was determined that a standing close signal with a trip/open signal applied is determined to be the root cause of the fail to close issue. The SE testing confirms that the presence of this condition can cause the breaker anti-pump latch to receive excessive forward pressure. When the nose of the latch impacts the close coil plunger, it will 'rock' up in the rear, catching on the top of the mechanism plate. Once the close voltage is removed, and the plunger retracts, the latch may or may not let go. If the latch does not release, then application of the close coil voltage will simply activate the close coil plunger and without the latch underneath the plunger, the breaker will not close. PSEG performed extensive troubleshooting at the Hope Creek plant and discovered that all of the affected breakers were in an anti-pump condition when the breakers failed to close. (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. This revised notification is being submitted based on the information gathered on 5/10/2016 after additional testing, at the request of River Bend, was performed. This additional testing was requested following the notification that was provided to the plants listed below, in the original issue of this letter in February 2016. The evaluation of the condition was originally completed in September of 2012. The issue was originally determined at that time to not be a reportable condition based on the breaker not containing a defect and the condition was believed to be attributed to the specific logic scheme at the plant. To date, this issue has only been reported to NLI from the following plants, PSEG Hope Creek and River Bend Station. No other plants have reported this specific fail to close condition. NLI was in direct communication with the plants when this issue was first being evaluated and the failure analysis were being conducted. The two affected plants were knowledgeable of the condition. (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations In this part. Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers. PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style River Bend - Issue identified for NT style Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. St. Lucie - This issue has not been identified however. the potential should be evaluated. Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Hatch -This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NU), This issue has not been identified. (vii) The corrective action which bas been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 will be revised, as the proposed solution will not reliably solve the problem for all postulated events. Upon completion of the revised technical bulletin, it will be re-submitted to the plants which have been supplied the Masterpact breakers from NLI. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. NLI is currently working with the OEM of the circuit breaker to determine the permanent solution to correct the possible failure to close event after the breaker is subjected to an Anti-Pump condition. Advice for plants with breakers currently installed: Evaluate the applications where the breakers may be potentially subjected to an Anti-Pump condition; where the close coil will be energized for an extended period of time. The circuit breaker will continue to operate if this condition is present however there may need to be human interaction with the circuit breaker by manually pressing the trip/open button on the front of the circuit breaker to free the mechanism. Please contact NLI with any questions or comments. Sincerely, Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance
Added 4 additional plants that were inadvertently left off the list. Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Wolf Creek - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Seabrook - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Campbell), and Part 21 Group via email.
The following information was received via facsimile: Additional information in attachment has been updated since the original report provided on 5/13/2016. Additional facility identified as impacted: St. Lucie - Issue identified For additional information contact: Tracy Bolt Director of Quality Assurance AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics 7410 Pebble Drive Fort Worth, Texas 76118 Notified the R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Rich), R3DO (Kunowski), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email).
On the basis of our evaluation, it has been determined that there is sufficient information to determine if the subject condition is left uncorrected could potentially create a Substantial Safety Hazard or could create a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The plants will need to evaluate their application to determine if the identified condition could have an impact to the plant operation. Plants which have been supplied the Masterpact circuit breakers: PSEG Hope Creek - Issue Identified for NW style River Bend - Issue identified for NT style Callaway - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. St. Lucie - This issue has been identified. Turkey Point - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Beaver Valley - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Davis Besse - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Three Mile Island - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Calvert Cliffs - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Hatch - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. STP - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. SONGS - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Ulchin - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. KHNP Kori - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke Oconee - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Duke McGuire - Non-safety (not supplied by NLI). This issue has not been identified. Browns Ferry - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Fort Calhoun - This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Wolf Creek This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. Seabrook This issue has not been identified however, the potential should be evaluated. NLI originally created a technical bulletin to address the issue and recommendations. However, since new information has been recently identified, NLI TB-12-007 has been revised. The solution for this potential problem is to replace the XF (shunt close assembly) with the XFCOM shunt close assembly. The part numbers are: 847323 (100-130VAC/DC) 847324 (200-240VAC/DC) Additional details regarding the replacement device are contained in the NLI technical bulletin TB-12-007. Notified the R1DO (Krohn), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Jeffers), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21 Reactor group (via email). |
| ENS 51743 | 18 February 2016 18:29:00 | The following was received via fax: Initial notification of a potential 10 CFR Part 21 condition. Pursuant to the rules of 10 CFR 21.21 this initial notification is being submitted to the NRC to identify a potential reportable condition that is currently under evaluation. FPL (Florida Power & Light) Turkey Point has identified a contactor that was making a considerable amount of noise that was not expected. The unit was continuing to functionally operate, however the source of the noise is cause for investigation. The contactors are a non-standard Size 3 and Size 4 Freedom Series Starter/Contactor. These units are currently under evaluation and review by NLI (Nuclear Logistics Inc.) to determine the root cause of the identified condition to determine if the contactor contains a defect. To date there have been no reported failures of this item to perform the intended safety function. These components were first supplied in September 2002 to Duke Oconee with no reported issues identified. The units reported by FPL Turkey point were supplied in May and December 2011. They have been installed into other facilities including the Duke Shearon Harris plant in December 2013. Although the increased noise is undesirable, it is not presenting a significant condition adverse to quality that could create a substantial safety hazard. Preliminary testing has confirmed that the safety related performance characteristics have not been degraded. However, due to the number of utilities which may have these components in service, this notification is being submitted to identify the condition to the industry. NLI plans to have the completed report submitted by 3/15/2016.
This retraction is a brief summary from a report received from Nuclear Logistics Inc. via email: This retraction is being submitted to the NRC to provide additional information for the initial notification provided on 2/18/2016. After evaluating the identified condition, it has determined that there is no defect within the contactor that if left uncorrected would create a substantial safety hazard. This issue is not considered reportable per the rules of 10 CFR Part 21. Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Whitten), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email. |
| ENS 51454 | 5 October 2015 17:47:00 | The following was excerpted from a fax received from the licensee: NLI manufactured the reverse engineered units to replace the existing obsolete electronic position controller NLI Model: NLI-10A-LM-P. The failed component within the controller was sized based on the original published ratings of the original components installed. The unit had an internal component that was subjected to a current value that was higher than the rating for the component. The actual applied current value was not originally provided to NLI when the units were being designed. NLI and the affected plant has been in communication regarding the component condition since the first reported failure. Three of units that initially failed in the plant have already been returned to NLI for failure analysis and design modifications. These units were modified by installing a larger bridge rectifier and wire wound resistor onto the revision 0 circuit board. The modified versions, quantity of three, S/N: NLI-10A-LM-P-1003- 0, NLI-10A-LM-P-1004-0 and NLI-10A-LM-P-1006-0 have been returned to Calloway under purchase orders 689233 SR and 694253 SR and have been accepted and installed into the plant and are working with no reported issues. The model number NLI-10A-LM-P, has been redesigned with a larger bridge rectifier of a higher rating and wire wound resistor that will withstand the applied current in the intended application. The parent circuit board has also been revised to revision 1 to accept the larger bridge rectifier without impacting other components on the board. The remaining unmodified revision 0 units that were originally supplied have not yet been returned to NLI for incorporation of the design modification. NLI recommends that at the plant's earliest convenience, the remaining units be returned to NLI to be retrofitted with the latest design configuration (revision 1 circuit board). The affected plant is Callaway. |
| ENS 53867 | 8 February 2019 18:31:00 | The following is a synopsis of the Part 21 received: Pursuant to l0CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ Nuclear is providing initial written notification of the identification of a deviation. PDMS material has been identified in the Eaton A200 series starters/contactors with date code T4115 (41st week of 2015) which is outside the range of May 2008 to December 2012 that were originally identified in NRC Event Number 51611 from 2015. This resulted in a few instances where the starter did not immediately open when the power was removed. Point of contact for additional information: Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance AZZ Nuclear 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 |
| ENS 51030 | 1 May 2015 13:32:00 | The following is an excerpt from a document received from the licensee via email: Report of potential 10 CFR Part 21, Allen Bradley Timing Relay Model 700RTC Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a potential failure to comply. On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZ/NLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect: As of 2009-2010, Allen Bradley relays base model 700RTC, contain an unevaluated CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device). This was an unpublished design change that was implemented to replace an obsolete integrated circuit chip. The undocumented design change did not result in a part number change from Allen-Bradley. There was no change to the appearance of the relay that would identify any design changes were made to the relay configuration. Therefore, NLI qualification/dedication of the relays after 2009 have not included additional testing for the new CPLD component. The timing relay model 700RTC has been dedicated/qualified for multiple applications for various plants. Between 2009-2010 Allen Bradley made a design change without changing the part number of the commercial relay or providing any documented evidence of a design change. The manufacturer specification data sheets maintain the classification that the relays are 'solid state', which would imply that there are no digital devices installed in the relay. However, after inspection of the internals of the timing relay (Figure 2), it has been identified that the unit does contain a CPLD which meets the definition of a digital device under the guidance of NEI 01-01. Potentially affected plants include Browns Ferry, Ginna, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, North Anna, Ft. Calhoun, Perry, River Bend, South Texas Project, and St. Lucie.
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided additional information regarding Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 1. Notified R1DO (Rogge), R2DO (Nease), R3DO(Skokowski), R4DO (Kellar), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided Revision 2 to Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015 to correct the referenced EPRI TR-102323 Rev. 3 to Rev. 4 and change 'timing' contacts to 'instantaneous' contacts as shown below: (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. The relays that are currently in stock at NLI have been placed on hold until after the units have been determined to be qualified for the specific application. NU has completed the EMC qualification testing per the requirements of EPRI TR-102323 Rev. 4 for the following tests, as applicable: CE101, CE102, RE101, RE102, RS101, RS103, CS101, CS114, CS115 and CS116. The results were satisfactory with exception of the following condition: During Conducted Susceptibility CS114 onto the power lines, with the timing circuit in operation, the instantaneous contacts exhibited chatter in the range of 2.6 MHz to 20.3 MHz. The unit requires a ferrite to be installed onto the input power lines of the relay with 3 turns through the ferrite core. In this modified configuration, the relay was not susceptible to Conducted Susceptibility and successfully passed the required test per CS114. Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Guthrie), R3DO(Kunowski), R4DO (Werner), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics provided additional information regarding Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 3, correcting the date the change occurred to October 2008. Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Proulx), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.
AZZ/NLI Nuclear Logistics is making a word correction in Part 21 Report No: P21-04302015, Rev. 4. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Michel), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar), and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email. |
| ENS 50726 | 8 January 2015 18:42:00 | The following is a summary of information that was provided by the reporting organization via facsimile: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (b), AZZ - NLI (AZZ - Nuclear Logistics Inc.) has provided written notification to the affected licensees of the potential failure of GEH SBM type switches manufactured (by GEH) (General Electric - Hitachi) in the period from January 2012 to December 2014. This condition has been reported in GEH document SC 14-19 (dated Dec. 11, 2014) in which GEH notified their affected licensees of the potential failure of SBM type switches, manufactured and shipped January 2012 through December 2014, due to incorrect installation of a conical spring. AZZ - NLI procured and dedicated commercial grade SBM type switches, manufactured during this time-frame, and subsequently provided to: Exelon - Peach Bottom; OPPD - Fort Calhoun; TVA- Watts Bar; KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power). On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZ - NLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications. Therefore, purchasers are being advised to perform a visual inspection of the switches at the earliest opportunity to determine if the condition exists. The following information is provided per 10 CFR 21.21(d) (4). Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance, AZZ - Nuclear Logistics Inc., 7410 Pebble Drive, Ft. Worth, TX 76118 |
| ENS 50272 | 11 July 2014 14:15:00 | The following is a summary of the information provided via facsimile: On March 27, 2014, at Exelon-Dresden Station, plant personnel identified that breaker UTC # 1185084 (3B CCSW Pump Breaker) was in the CLOSED condition, but did not indicate CHARGED. The breaker was last CLOSED successfully on March 19, 2014. The breaker charges the closing springs after a CLOSE operation. The breaker was OPENED and removed from service on 3/28/14, Dresden notified (Nuclear Logistic, Inc.) NLI on 3/28/14 of the issue and the breaker was returned to NLI on RMA 351022093. NLI performed a failure analysis on the breaker. The spring clamp cam 12mm nylon insert lock nut was not properly tightened on either side, resulting in insufficient clamping force of the cam on the jackshaft. In addition to the lock nuts not being sufficiently tightened, the closing springs were installed on the wrong side. There is a left and a right spring as identified by a red mark on the left spring. The left side spring is the shorter spring, and it was installed on the right side. Further evaluation by NLI determined that this may have been a contributing factor to the failure after the closing spring clamp started to move off the jackshaft. The presence of the under torque nuts resulted in insufficient clamping force, allowing the clamp to move off the jackshaft. The springs being on the wrong sides began to exert excessive force to the cam as it rotated, and after many operations, it had slipped enough to become partially dislodged from the jackshaft. This bent the spring guide arms, preventing the rotation of the jackshaft to the CHARGED position and did not allow the motor cutoff switch to activate. The result was the breaker did not CHARGE and the motor continued to run until it burned up. Several AHMG breakers (1200 and 2000A) for Dresden and Quad Cities were refurbished by Nuclear Logistics, Inc from 2008 to March 2014. At least one breaker was found with insufficient cam nut spring torque and had the two closing springs installed improperly. |
| ENS 49856 | 26 February 2014 17:19:00 | The following information was received via facsimile: Part 21 Report No: P21-01312014 Subject: Report of potential defect per 10CFR Part 21 primary disconnect assembly Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a defect. This letter is to notify you of a potential manufacturing defect concerning primary disconnect assemblies used on Masterpact replacement cradles. These assemblies are used in the replacement of the circuit breakers in low voltage switchgear. The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4), (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Aron Seiken, Vice President Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 (ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect. Facility: Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 7410 Pebble Drive Ft. Worth, TX 76118 The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect: Primary disconnect (p/n AHX30701) for Square D replacement low voltage switchgear breaker cradles (model LGSB4). (iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. The primary disconnect was manufactured by Square D Services (Schneider Electric) and supplied as a dedicated component by Nuclear Logistics, Inc. (iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. The cradle is an adaptor between the replacement circuit breaker and the existing switchgear cubicle. Part of the interfaces is the primary disconnects (fingers). The cradle primary disconnects connect to the bus stabs in the switchgear. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical flexibility (float) that maintains the finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical axis. The fabrication drawing for the primary disconnect fingers had an incorrect tolerance. If the fingers are made with a dimension at the low end of the specified tolerance, there will be interference with a mating part. This reduces or eliminates the vertical float for the fingers. If the cradle is installed in a switchgear cubicle with vertically misaligned bus stabs, the disconnect fingers may have inadequate contact pressure. This condition may result in a higher than normal contact resistance from the cubicle stab to the cradle primary disconnect. The higher contact resistance at any one finger contact could cause an unacceptable temperature rise at that connection point. At very high temperatures, the springs that maintain the finger contact pressure could relax, which would further increase the connection resistance and cause additional overheating. This would not be an issue if there was no vertical misalignment of the switchgear cubicle stabs. See the additional clarifications in section (vi) below. (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. The information that there is a defect was obtained on January 28, 2014. (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part. The issue is applicable to 1600amp cradles only. The same and similar disconnects are used in the different cradle designs identified below. A list of the cradle types, primary disconnect part numbers and affected facilities (plants) in Table 1 as follows: TABLE 1 Plant Name / Cradle-Breaker Type / Primary disconnect part number / Quantity / Original breaker type-Notes OPPD-Ft. Calhoun/LGSB4 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/18/Original breakers: GE AK-50. OPPD replaced all AHX30701 with narrower disconnect p/n R300112 TVA-Browns Ferry/LGSB4 and LGSB21 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/28/Original breakers: GE AK-50. Entergy-River Bend/LGSB9 Masterpact NW breaker/R300112/5/ Original breakers: AKR-50. Narrower disconnect. FENOC-Beaver Valley/LGSB4 Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/20/Original breakers: GE AK-50 FPL-St. Lucie/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/15/Original breakers: ABB K-1600 FPL-Turkey Point/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/12/Original breakers: ABB K-1600 SCE-SONGS/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/8/Original breakers: ABB K-1600 Nextera Energy-Seabrook/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/4/Original breakers: ABB K-1600 Additional details: - This issue does not affect all of the cradles identified above. Since the issue is a result of incorrect manufacturing tolerances, it will not be present on all cradles. - The overheating issue could be a problem with replacement circuit breakers for GE AK-50 circuit breakers. Due to the construction of the switchgear cubicles, there can be vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. If the primary disconnect float is not adequate, the overheating issue identified above could occur. - The overheating issue is expected to be much less prevalent or non-existent on the replacements for GE AKR and ABB K-line circuit breakers. The construction of the switchgear cubicles results in good vertical alignment of the stabs in the switchgear, so the amount of cradle finger vertical float is not as critical. (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. NLI has generated Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to direct the plants for inspections to determine if the manufacturing defect is present in the specific applications. The Technical Bulletin will be issued to the potentially impacted plants by March 4, 2014. NLl is in process of revising test plans to include verification of the proper operation of the primary disconnects during factory acceptance testing. The verification will be performed on 100% of supplied cradles. Square D Services is revising manufacturing drawings to eliminate any tolerance stack up issue that could limit the vertical movement of the finger contacts of the primary disconnect assemblies. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. NLI Will submit NLI Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to all facilities where the potentially impacted Masterpact breakers have been installed. The technical bulletin provides a summary of the issue and provides instructions for inspection and testing of the cradles. Please contact me with any questions or comments. |