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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 51057 | 8 May 2015 11:02:00 | On May 7, 2015, at 1515 hours, B&W NOG-L Security management determined alcohol had been inadvertently introduced into the Protected Area through the shipping and receiving process. 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) requires that the licensee report to the Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery, the use, sale distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area. The item in question was a six pack of bottled beer which was part of a box of promotional items personally delivered by a sales representative from Graybar Electric. The B&W employee addressee first became aware of the package through an email and voicemail left by the salesman advising of a package delivery and indicating the presence of alcohol in the package. The B&W employee immediately contacted Shipping and Receiving management at approximately 1300 hrs. in an effort to intercept the package before delivery; however the package had already been processed into the Protected Area. Shipping and Receiving Management contacted the delivery driver via radio and instructed the driver not to deliver the package. The delivery driver separated the package from the delivery items. The package was removed from the Protected Area and returned to the Shipping and Receiving Manager located in the Owner Controlled Area at approximately 1500 hrs. The package was returned unopened. B&W Security Management was notified of the incident at approximately 1515 hrs. All items processed through Shipping and Receiving undergo security x-ray inspection. Containers of liquid are commonly processed items and therefore did not create an elevated level of suspicion which would have led to the officers conducting a visual inspection. B&W NOG-L Management will conduct an evaluation of the incident to include root cause analysis and corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| ENS 50970 | 9 April 2015 14:25:00 | On April 9, 2015, a NOG-L (Nuclear Operations Group - Lynchburg) employee passed away shortly after arriving to work. The employee arrived to work at 0534 (EST). He proceeded to his work center and collapsed at 0540 while clocking in. CPR was administered to the employee by a co-worker who was at the scene and the site Emergency Team was called. The Emergency Team arrived in three minutes and used an AED to attempt to resuscitate the employee. At 0555, the Emergency Team transported the employee in our onsite Advanced Life Support ambulance to Lynchburg General Hospital (arrived 0623). CPR was maintained in transit to the hospital. The employee was pronounced dead at the hospital from an apparent heart attack. NOG-L reported this event to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at 1110 on April 9, 2015. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the NRC Regional Office. |
| ENS 50425 | 4 September 2014 16:49:00 | I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: On September 4, 2014 at approximately 1100 (EDT), a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer identified a safety concern. While working to consolidate information in the safety basis for the safe geometry storage and transport carts, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed that did not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Tipping or impact of a cart during transport had not been considered as a credible upset condition. II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: At B&W's NOG-L (Nuclear Operations Group) facilities, safe geometry storage and transport carts are used to transfer uranium bearing materials between radiologically controlled areas. The carts are typically used to transfer scrap and waste materials in favorable volumes less than or equal to 2.5 liter containers to the Drum Count Area for 235U assay. Because the 235U content of such containers is not known until they have been assayed, they are referred to as 'unknowns' and are subject to a net weight limit. These containers are limited to a maximum of 7,000 grams net weight (approximately 15 pounds) of uranium bearing material in any form. There are forty storage locations on a cart, twenty per side. The locations on each side are arranged in an array of 4 columns, each column contains 5 storage locations. During transport each column of storage locations is protected by closure of a door. The four column doors on each side of the cart are secured by a common locked bar. The NCS evaluation of the safe geometry storage and transport carts did not address possible tipping during transit. Although unlikely, it is believed at this point the event is credible. If a cart were to tip, no controls were identified to retain the containers on the cart. Although the doors on the cart are secured by a robust locking bar, this action is taken for security purposes and is not credited as an IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety). Assuming the containers on the cart were fully loaded (7 kg net weight) with a U-metal water mixture at optimum H/X and the cart tipped over, and more than three containers fell out of the cart, a configuration could result that would exceed the keff safety limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency. The requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '... the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.' Therefore the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) would not be maintained during this credible abnormal condition. The as-found condition had no actual safety significance. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of the workers, the public, or the environment as a result of this condition. The safe geometry storage and transport carts did not contain any uranium bearing materials. There was no actual tipping event. The carts were immediately removed from service. Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1)--Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61. IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The carts have been removed from service. An investigation of the root causes of this condition is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the facility NMSS Project Manager (Baker).
The initially identified abnormal condition was not analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis. A conservative approach was taken in evaluating the condition in order to ensure compliance with the specified time period established in the regulations for reporting. Further analysis has determined the condition is not credible. Although unlikely, should more than three containers fall from the cart, it is not credible that a configuration could occur that would exceed the keff limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42 for a single contingency. The performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 would be maintained. Following the guidance of FCSS ISG-12, Rev 0, '10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A- Reportable Safety Events', B&W is correcting Event Notification #50425 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a)(4) and withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) notification. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Gonzalez) and Fuels OUO Group via email. |
| ENS 48091 | 11 July 2012 12:19:00 | The following is a redacted summary of the event report provided by the licensee: EVENT DESCRIPTION: Metallurgical samples at B&Ws NOG-L facility are contained in 'bread pans'. The bread pans are used to transport and store samples. Each bread pan has U235 quantity limits as well as spacing and volume limits for maintaining criticality controls. The volume of the bread pan is an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). On July 10, 2012, at approximately 1230 EDT, a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer identified during a routine quarterly audit that the bread pans in use exceeded the volume liter limit. At the time of discovery, the mass controls for the bread pans were not exceeded. Neither was there excess moderation between storage locations. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: Although an IROFS was lost (the bread pan volume), other IROFS (operator control of mass, operator control of interspersed moderation) were available at the time of discovery of this condition to ensure the risk of a criticality remained highly unlikely. However, 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '...the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.' Further evaluation of the as-found condition of the bread pans indicated the licensed keff limit may have been exceeded. Therefore, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were not maintained. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. However, the bread pan storage area is being shutdown. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following is a redacted summary of the event report provided by the licensee: The event was reported in 24 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 70. Appendix A. (b)(1): 'any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61'. Upon further evaluation it was determined that keff limit in the NRC License was not exceeded. Therefore, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. This is the basis for correcting Event Notification #48091 and withdrawing the report. A conservative approach was initially taken in evaluating the event in order to ensure compliance with the specified time periods established in the regulations. A reanalysis calculated keff less than the keff safety limit in NRC License SNM-42. Although the facility was in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. In accordance with 10 CFR 70.61 (b) and FCSS Interim Staff Guidance-12, although an IROFS was lost, the situation did not pose a safety concern that is significant enough to report to NRC. Other IROFS were available at the time of discovery of the condition to ensure the risk of a criticality remained highly unlikely. In addition, the calculated keff using an approved approach described in Section 5.2.2 of NRC License SNM-42 demonstrates compliance with 10 CFR 70.61 (d). The system remained subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety, during a credible abnormal condition. Therefore, in accordance with the guidance of FCSS ISG-12, Rev 0, '10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A - Reportable Safety Events,' B&W is correcting Event Notification #48091 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a)(4) and withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b )(1) notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Stablein), and the Fuels Group OUO (via e-mail). Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details on this event. |