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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 531921 February 2018 14:23:00

At 1057 CST on February 1, 2018 with the unit in Mode 1 at approximately 27% power, a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was initiated due to an unexpected trip of the B Recirc Pump with A Recirc Pump in fast speed. B Recirc Pump tripped during transfer from slow to fast speed resulting in single loop operation. Operators were unable to reconcile differing indications of core flow. This resulted in a conservative decision to initiate a manual scram. The cause of the B Recirc Pump trip and the apparent issues with core flow indication are under investigation. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. The plant response to the scram was as expected. All control rods (fully) inserted as expected; the feedwater system is maintaining reactor vessel water level in the normal control band and reactor pressure is being maintained with steam line drains and main turbine bypass valves. The NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1015 EDT ON 03/22/2018 FROM DAVID DABADIE TO OSSY FONT * * *

This event was initially reported under 10 CFR 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a manual actuation of the RPS due to an unexpected trip of the B Reactor Recirculation Pump with the A Reactor Recirculation Pump running in fast speed (Single Loop Operations). Operations was unable to reconcile differing indications of core flow and made the conservative decision to perform a planned shutdown in accordance with normal operating procedures. Therefore, this event 'resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation' as specified in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and NUREG-1022 Section 3.2.6. Consequently, this event is not reportable as an actuation of RPS. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R4DO (Groom) has been notified.

ENS 5299527 September 2017 14:26:00Security personnel reported to the Main Control Room that at time 1000 CDT (on 9/27/2017), an alarm indicated that a secondary containment door was open beyond the normal delay time allowed for entry and exit. Security personnel responded and found the door open and unattended with the dogs extended meaning that the door was unable to be closed. Security personnel secured the door at time 1004 CDT. No deficiencies were found with the door. The fact the door was open and unattended beyond the time allowed for normal entry and exit results in Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 'Secondary Containment-Operating,' not being met because surveillance requirement SR 3.6.4.1.3 is not met. This surveillance requires that doors be closed except during normal entry and exit. By definition in NUREG-1022, when Secondary Containment is inoperable, it is not capable of performing its specified safety function which in turn makes this condition reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5282523 June 2017 23:58:00While performing a scheduled generator voltage regulator test, River Bend Station experienced an automatic scram when the main generator tripped. It is unknown at this time why the main generator tripped. There were no equipment issues that materially impacted post scram operator response. The intention at this time is to go to cold shutdown while the cause of the trip is investigated. All rods inserted during the scram. Reactor water level is being maintained via normal feedwater with decay heat being removed via turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant loads via the normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5229310 October 2016 14:07:00At 1032 (CDT) on October 10, 2016, it was determined that a spill of hydraulic oil that occurred earlier in the morning on the site was of sufficient quantity (approximately 60 gallons) to warrant a notification to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. This report will be made within 24 hours of the determination. The spill was the result of a hydraulic system failure on a truck that was on site to pick up non-radioactive trash. The truck was on company property but outside the Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA). There are no radiological or off-site impacts arising from this event. The spill did not reach surface water and is now contained. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a condition requiring the notification to State environmental authorities. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.