Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 57115 | 9 May 2024 11:48:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0800 EDT on May 9, 2024, it was identified during leak rate testing that through-wall flaws existed on reactor plant river water piping inside the containment building. This determination resulted in a containment bypass condition such that a gaseous release could have occurred at a location not analyzed for a release in the loss of coolant accident dose consequence analysis. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents. Evaluation of the condition of the piping is ongoing to support repair prior to startup. With the plant currently in cold shutdown, the containment, as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1, is not required to be operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56527 | 19 May 2023 12:33:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0852 (EDT) on May 19, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, an actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred. The reason for the AFW auto-start was a failed start attempt of the 'B' main feedwater pump. The 'A' and 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 54337 | 18 October 2019 02:28:00 | At 1951 (EDT) on October 17, 2019, fretting indications on the reactor coolant system pressure boundary piping (pressurizer spray line) were identified. This condition does not appear to meet original construction code, ANSI B31.1, 1967 Edition thru summer 1971 Addenda. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This condition will be corrected prior to the plant entering Mode 4.
An engineering evaluation has determined that the subject fretting is not considered a flaw, but instead is considered wear. Appendix F of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was applied and it was determined that the pressurizer spray line piping maintained its required design safety functions in the as-found condition. The wear has been repaired during the current refueling outage in accordance with the original construction code (ANSI B3l.l, 1967 Edition through summer 1971 Addenda) as well as Owner's Requirements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Young). |
| ENS 51479 | 17 October 2015 19:30:00 | At 1230 EDT, it was discovered that sodium hypochlorite had leaked into the ground soil at the bottom of a leak sensing pit, which is located near the BVPS-1 Cooling Tower Pump House, at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 1 (BVPS-1). The source of the sodium hypochlorite, is suspected to be from a piping leak, and has been terminated. The cause of the leak has not yet been conclusively determined, and there is no evidence that the sodium hypochlorite reached the surface water of the Ohio River. At 1613 EDT on October 17, 2015, it was determined that there was CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation & Liability Act) reportable leak of a minimum 294 gallons of sodium hypochlorite to ground soil, and the following offsite notifications were made starting at 1625 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report #1131084); Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection; Beaver County Emergency Management; PA Emergency Management Agency. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49716 | 11 January 2014 22:25:00 | At 1605 EST on January 11, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) had a communication loop failure resulting in a loss of control room radiation monitor indication and alarm capability. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared nonfunctional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were established. At 2040 EST on January 11, 2014, BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was returned to service and declared functional. The failure of the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS communication loop resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio emergency management agencies as well as local authorities of this notification. |