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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 55129 | 9 March 2021 11:22:00 | At 1027 CST on 3/8/21, while the reactor was at 900 kW at steady state, a sample was pulled before the planned down power was executed. As a result, the reactor may have exceeded the 1000 kW limit for one second by 1 kW per Tech Spec 3.1. The duration was recorded on the strip chart recorder. The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Patrick Boyle).
After reviewing the power instrument channels, the licensee determined that they had not exceeded the 1000 kW limit per their license condition. The licensee noted that the channel used for the strip chart recorder is not normally used for operations, but information only. The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager (Patrick Boyle) Notified NRR PM (Boyle) and NRR ENC (Takacs). |
| ENS 51508 | 30 October 2015 13:53:00 | At 1250 CDT, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared at the Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center due to a tornado warning on the Texas A&M Campus. The reactor was secured and Science Center staff were evacuated to their designated tornado shelter in the facility. There is no risk to public health and safety. The tornado warning is in effect until 1345 CDT.
At 1342 CDT, the tornado warning was terminated. The licensee conducted a facility walkdown and did not observe any damage to the facility. At 1400 CDT, the Notification of Unusual Event was terminated. The licensee notified their NRC Project Manager (Hardesty). Notified NRR (Reed), NRR EO (Howe), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email) and FEMA Watch Center (email). |
| ENS 50309 | 25 July 2014 13:24:00 | This morning around 9:45 a.m. (CDT), a reportable occurrence under Section 1.28.f of the NSC (Nuclear Science Center) Technical Specifications was documented at the Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center (NRC License No. R-83). The incident involved leaving the control room unstaffed by a licensed operator (Section 6.1.3.a.2 of the NSC Technical Specifications) for approximately 2.5 minutes while the 1 MW TRlGA reactor was operating at full power. The text below presents a brief description of the event: On the morning of July 25, 2014, during steady state operation at 1 MW (full power), Reactor Operator (RO) trainee (Deleted) was in the control room, along with a Senior Reactor Operator on Duty (SRO) (Deleted) and electronic technician (Deleted). Senior Reactor Operator (Deleted) and Reactor Operator (RO) (Deleted) were signed in as the operators on duty during the duration of the incident. Duty SRO and RO were elsewhere in the facility performing Operations tasks, and RO (Licensed) (Deleted) had remained in the Control Room to fulfill the requirement set forth in TS (Staffing) 6.1.3.a.2. At approximately 0948, NSC Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) (Deleted) entered the control room and requested the use of RO (Deleted) key to access a building on site. RO offered to open the building and left (control room) leaving RO trainee and electronic technician alone in the control room. At 0950, RO trainee noted that there was no licensed reactor operator in the control room. RO Trainee paged RO over the intercom and shutdown the reactor via manual SCRAM. Manager of Reactor Operations (also SRO) heard the reactor SCRAM from his office above the control room and went to the control room to investigate. (Duty) SRO was notified and immediately returned to the control room. It was determined by SROs that during the 2.5 minutes that RO was absent from the control room, the requirements outlined in Technical Specification 6.1.3.a.2 were not fulfilled. NSC Director was informed of the incident and NSC Form 590 (Unscheduled Scram Recovery Form) was filled out after the unscheduled shutdown. Manager of Reactor Operations authorized the restart of the reactor. NSC Director began implementation of Reportable Occurrence reporting procedures according to Technical Specification 1.28.f. Licensee is initiating an internal review to identify and correct any practices and/or procedures that may have systematically contributed to the environment that created this situation. Other corrective actions include the internal suspension of one reactor operator's license privileges pending satisfactory retraining. The unit response during and after the scram was normal. |