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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 50588 | 2 November 2014 12:26:00 | On November 2, 2014 EST, the bus providing power to the Health Physics emergency HVAC system for climate control tripped unexpectedly and has been out of service for greater than 30 minutes. The Health Physics emergency HVAC system for climate control is required for functionality of the Operations Support Center (OSC), which is a required emergency response facility (ERF). Actions to determine the cause of loss of 1R24-S030 Load Center and to return ERF to functional status are in progress with high priority. In the interim, the backup OSC remains fully functional and capable of providing the required support as defined in the Hatch Emergency Plan and emergency implementing procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with the plant's Technical Requirements Manual Specifications to make the notification within 8 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the unplanned loss of an emergency response facility. An update will be provided once the OSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power was restored to the 1R24-S030 Load Center at 1955 EST. At 2038 EST, power to the Health Physics emergency HVAC system was restored. The OSC was returned to service at 2120 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).
In accordance with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, the NRC endorsed NEI 13-01, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities,' such that 'if a licensee has a 'backup ERF' that is capable of performing the functions of the primary facility, the licensee's emergency assessment capability is not significantly impaired if the primary facility is not available.' Based on this information this condition is not reportable. Although NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 did not require an event notification report to be made, an initial notification was generated based on requirements within licensee control documents. These documents have been updated to reflect the guidance provided in the supplement to NUREG 1022. This report is therefore being retracted in accordance with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 since a backup ERF remained fully functional and capable of providing the required support during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper). |
| ENS 51091 | 26 May 2015 17:45:00 |
During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147(foot) elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Gaps were identified around cables in the foam cable tray penetration seal for penetration 1Z43H006F in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (separating Fire Areas 0024A and 1104). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10074859 The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL. - An issue was identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Station Battery Room 1B, FA 1005. - An issue was identified with the wall separating the Station Battery Room 2A, Fire Area (FA) 2004 from the Station Battery Room 2B, FA 2005, on el. 112 (foot). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10077573 & 10077574. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO(O'Donohue).
During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL: - Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, FA 1008. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078011. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).
During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL: - Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building U2 Water Analysis Room, Fire Area (FA) 2006 from the Control Building East Corridor, FA 0007 The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078561. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose). |
| ENS 46211 | 28 August 2010 21:09:00 | During the performance of procedure 34S0-Z41-006-0 section 7.3.1.8, which tests the operability of the HP/CHEM area emergency HVAC, the system failed to indicate proper flow of the system. On panel 1Z41-N030, the system flow gauge failed upscale high and could not be lowered. The decision was made to halt the procedure at 1700 (EDT) on step 7.3.1.8 and restore the normal HP/CHEM HVAC lineup. The HP/CHEM area emergency HVAC is required for functionality of the Operations Support Center (OSC), as this area may be used during declared emergencies. Alternate OSC facilities have been verified to be available. All efforts and resources have been made available to restore the HP/CHEM emergency HVAC to functional status. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and TRM 3.10.1.B.2 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44658 | 13 November 2008 21:43:00 | At approximately 2031 Eastern time, Jacksonville National Weather service has notified Plant Hatch that the capability to broadcast prompt notification messages is not available at this time due to problems with the phone service. Emergency Preparedness personnel have been contacted to ensure proper notifications have been made. Security has notified state and local agencies along with Information Technology (IT) group of the problem. The licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector.
At 2315 on 11/13/08, the National Weather Service notified the licensee that the notification network is available. However, the National Weather Service cannot guarantee that the system will remain operational due to on-going maintenance activities on the system. The licensee is monitoring the notification network and will provide an update once the maintenance is complete and system reliability is fully restored. Notified R2DO(Bonser)
Troubleshooting the system has been completed. Although the system was restored at 2315 EST on 11/13/08, the verification that the system would maintain operability was not completed until 1440 EST on 11/14/08. The licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser). |
| ENS 44654 | 13 November 2008 03:04:00 | At approximately 0102 eastern time, Jacksonville National Weather service has notified Plant Hatch that the capability to broadcast prompt notification messages is NOT available at this time due to problems with the phone service. Emergency Preparedness personnel (DELETED) have been contacted to ensure proper notifications have been made. Security has notified state and local agencies along with Information Technology (IT) group of the problem. At 0145, Jacksonville National Weather service has reported that the problem with the phone service has been resolved and that the broadcast system has been restored. All agencies have been made aware of the NWS system return to service. The licensee notified Georgia EMA, Appling County, Jeff Davis County, Tattnall County, and Toombs County. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43221 | 8 March 2007 01:07:00 | While Performing HPCI ATTS Panel, 1H11-P927, Functional Test & Calibration Surveillance (57SV-SUV-013-1S) For Ambient Torus Temperature High, The HPCI System Isolated. The Functional Test & Calibration Was Complete. The Isolation Was Reset. Following Return Of The Test Switch To Normal, HPCI Isolation Trip Logic 'A' Initiated & Closed 1E41-F002. HPCI Isolation Valve F002/F003 Alarm Annunciated When The Isolation Valve Started Closing & The HPCI Turbine Trip Solenoid Energized. I&C Investigating Time Delay Relay For Possible Cause. HPCI has been declared inoperable placing Unit 1 in TS LCO A/S 3.5.1.c - 14 days to restore. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |