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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 48154 | 2 August 2012 16:16:00 | This is a non-emergency 4 hour informational notification to the NRC in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At approximately 0900 on 8/02/12, a contract employee suffered a non-work related personal medical event and was transported offsite. The contract employee was pronounced deceased at a local hospital. A courtesy notification was made to OSHA at 1304. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 46265 | 21 September 2010 22:28:00 | At 2017 (EDT) on 9/21/10, Turkey Point Unit 4 spuriously tripped. The cause of the reactor trip is currently under investigation. At the time of the trip, reactor power was 100%. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was automatically initiated when steam generator levels lowered below the actuation setpoint. Steam generator levels are now stable at their normal Mode 3 band and auxiliary feedwater is secured. Unit 4 has been stabilized in Mode 3 on normal off-site power. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - actuation of the reactor protection system with the reactor critical and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - valid actuation of an ESF system (AFW). All control rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed through the steam dumps to atmosphere. There was no activation of PORVs or SRVs. The reactor is at shutdown NOP and NOT. The reactor trip response was uncomplicated and there was no impact on Unit 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45791 | 25 March 2010 20:18:00 | At 1540 on 3/25/2010, engineering identified a gas void in the Unit 4 B Cold Leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pipe which exceeded the station's allowable gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg injection flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1540. The void was immediately vented and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1750. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: At 2018 on 3/25/2010, an event notification (#45791) was reported to the NRCOC as follows: 'At 1540 on 3/25/2010, engineering identified a gas void in the Unit 4 B Cold Leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pipe which exceeded the station's allowable gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg injection flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1540. The void was immediately vented and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1750 (on 3/25/2010).' The decision to enter TS 3.0.3 was based on the plant procedural guidance and the results of ultrasonic testing. Following the discovery of the void, the failure investigation process required that an engineering evaluation be performed. The evaluation performed calculations to determine if, during a hypothetical HHSI pump start with the measured gas void present, the resulting water hammer conditions would cause the Unit 4 HHSI piping design pressure or Unit 4 HHSI piping supports design loading to be exceeded, thereby challenging the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS). The engineering evaluation determined that under the specific conditions in the Unit 4 HHSI piping on 3/25/2010: (1) Unit 4 HHSI piping design pressure would not have been exceeded should the HHSI pumps have started. (2) Unit 4 HHSI piping support design loading would not have been exceeded should the HHSI pumps have started. Therefore, the analysis of the void concluded that both the pipe and the support structural integrity would have withstood the pressure and axial loads due to the gas void and the HHSI system would have continued to perform its safety related function. The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flowpath to the RCS remained operable at all times. Technical Specification 3/4.5.2, ECCS SUBSYSTEMS: Tavg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350 degrees F, Limiting Condition for Operation was satisfied at all times. Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 was not required at any time before or after the void discovery. The Unit 4 HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the design safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4, and an immediate notification to the NRCOC, discussed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), was not required. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayres). |
| ENS 45522 | 27 November 2009 05:00:00 | With Unit 4 borated to a cold shutdown condition following the Unit 4 Cycle 25 refueling outage, post-modification acceptance testing was being performed on the Rod Position Indication System prior to reactor startup. While performing this test, two shutdown bank rods showed indication of being fully inserted from a fully withdrawn position. Off-normal procedures were entered and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was subsequently manually actuated. All remaining rods were fully inserted in accordance with plant procedures. Investigations are in progress to determine and repair the cause of the dropped rods. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |