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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 49970 | 28 March 2014 17:21:00 | At 1358 (CDT) on March 28, 2014, the Control Room was notified that two Secondary Containment doors (DOOR-62 and DOOR-63) were open at the same lime. This occurred while two employees were entering and exiting the Reactor Building at the exact same time. The time that both doors were open was approximately one (1) second. Secondary Containment differential pressure was maintained throughout the event. With both doors open, technical specification surveillance requirement SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. Secondary Containment was declared operable after independently verifying at least one Secondary Containment access door was closed. The health and safety of the public was maintained as the plant was in a normal condition with no initiating event in progress or signs or elevated radiation levels within Secondary Containment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49580 | 26 November 2013 05:08:00 | Planned preventative maintenance on the discharge canal piping will remove the discharge canal radiation monitor from service. This represents a loss of emergency assessment capability under NUREG-1022, revision 3, specific to RU1.1, RU1.2, RA1.1, and RA1.2. The planned maintenance is expected to last 13 hours. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified (by the licensee) prior to removing the discharge canal radiation monitor from service. |
| ENS 48616 | 21 December 2012 00:06:00 | During a walkdown on December 20, 2012 at 1600 CST, two degraded Appendix R fire barriers (walls) were identified. These barriers separate the Torus Room (Fire Area IV)/ 'A' RHR Room (Fire Area I) and the Torus Room (Fire Area IV)/ 'B' RHR Room (Fire Area II). The walls separate Appendix R fire safe shutdown divisional equipment. A fire watch was established as a compensatory measure immediately following identification of the issue on December 20, 2012. The barrier affecting the 'B' RHR Room has been repaired on both sides. The barrier affecting the 'A' RHR Room has been repaired on the Torus Room side. The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The fire watch remains in place until verification of the completed repair is performed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on December 21, 2012 for degraded fire barriers between the Torus Room (Fire Area IV) and 'A' RHR Room (Fire Area I), and the Torus Room (Fire Area IV) and 'B' RHR Room (Fire Area II). Subsequent engineering analysis determined that the degraded fire barriers maintained the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and plant safety was not significantly degraded. The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) report is retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kunowski). |