Semantic search
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 55940 | 14 June 2022 01:09:00 | The following information was received by the Iowa Department of Public Health via e-mail: At 0229 CDT on 06-14-22, the Assistant RSO (ARSO) received a phone call from one of the radiographers involved stating that he was working at a temporary jobsite and was unable to fully expose the source into the guide tube/collimator (Device Model: QSA 880D, Source Model: QSA A424-9, Source Activity: 80.8 Ci). Upon noticing the resistance, the radiographer extended his Restricted Area boundaries, notified the on-site personnel to maintain clearance of the area and proceeded to contact the ARSO. During the phone conversation, the ARSO was able to guide the radiographer through disassembly of the crank body to the point that he could manually pull the drive cable and retract the source into a fully shielded position within the exposure device. Once the source was successfully locked into the exposure device and the appropriate surveys were completed, the ARSO instructed the radiographer to perform an inspection of the drive cables and guide tube to look for the presence of any bends, kinks or dents that could have contributed to the binding of the drive cable. It was at this point that the radiographer noted an area on the drive cable sheathing that appeared to be melted on the `retract' side of the drive cable assembly. At this point (approximately 0254 CDT), The ARSO contacted the PROtect, LLC RSO and informed him of the details of the incident. A follow-up Corrective Action Report and additional detail regarding the cause of the event will be submitted to the State of Iowa within 30 days. Reporting requirements: 30.50(b)(2)(ii) - The 24 hour report of an event where required equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when the equipment is required to be available and operable when it is disabled or fails to function. IAC 40.96(2)'c'(2). |
| ENS 55417 | 19 August 2021 07:19:00 | The following information was obtained from the state of Iowa via email: On August 18, 2021, at approximately 1000 CDT, the DAV-015 #4 shutter was reported to be stuck in the open position. A survey meter measured a background level of 0.02 mR/hr outside of the gauge house, and 0.05 mR/hr inside the gauge house at that time. Locks were changed to the gauge house to prevent entry. The service company, SenTek, was notified and requested to provide service. They are expected to arrive on August 19, 2021, to provide service and repairs. This event will be updated after the service company determines the cause of the failure and the licensee provides a corrective action plan. The gauge was manufactured by Isotope Measuring Systems, Inc., model number 5221-02, serial number 2332-2336L, and contains 5 Curies of Am-241. NMED Number: IA210003
The following information was obtained from the state of Iowa via email: The SenTek service technician arrived onsite late afternoon on August 18, 2021 and determined that the bolts holding the shutter had sheared and needed to be replaced. All other shutter bolts were inspected and found to be satisfactory. As a corrective action, the licensee is implementing an annual preventative maintenance check to inspect and replace the bolts on all shutters. The licensee's intent is to replace these fixed gauging devices with x-ray tube devices. The State considers this event closed. Notified: R3DO (Riemer) and NMSS Events Notification via e-mail. |
| ENS 55015 | 1 December 2020 09:55:00 | The following information was obtained from the State of Iowa via email: A maintenance technician at the 3M facility in Knoxville, Iowa discovered that a Thermo Fisher Scientific model SULP-77A fixed gauging device containing 661 milliCuries of Krypton-85 had a shutter that was stuck open and would not close. This discovery occurred when the production line was shutdown for routine maintenance. The RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) and backup RSO were notified and the gauge was isolated with caution tape to prevent personnel from getting close to the device. 3M maintenance personnel are authorized to perform shutter repair under the supervision of the RSO or backup RSO by Iowa radioactive materials license number 0042-1-63-FG. The licensee will provide a written follow-up report once repairs have been completed and the cause of the failure identified. The licensee had a service provider operating under reciprocity with Iowa onsite November 17, 2020 to troubleshoot and repair the gauge. The root cause of the stuck shutter was a broken shutter return spring. A new shutter operating cylinder with a new return spring was installed and the gauge shutter was tested and found to be operating correctly. To minimize the chance of future shutter closure failures, the shutter operating cylinders will be replaced for all beta gauges of the same model that are currently in use at the site. Cylinder replacement will occur during future planned maintenance activities. These failures are exceedingly rare. This is the first occurrence in more than 20 years of using these gauges. The site is considering implementing a preventative maintenance replacement of these cylinders every 10 years. Iowa report number: IA200004 |
| ENS 55001 | 16 November 2020 14:28:00 | The following was received from the Iowa Bureau of Radiological Health via email: A maintenance technician at the 3M facility in Knoxville, Iowa discovered that a Thermo Fisher Scientific model SULP-77A fixed gauging device containing 661 milliCuries of krypton-85 had a shutter that was stuck open and would not close. This discovery occurred when the production line was shutdown for routine maintenance. The RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) and backup RSO were notified and the gauge was isolated with caution tape to prevent personnel from getting close to the device. 3M maintenance personnel are authorized to perform shutter repair under the supervision of the RSO or backup RSO by Iowa radioactive materials license number 0042-1-63-FG. The licensee will provide a written follow-up report once repairs have been completed and the cause of the failure identified. Iowa Event Number IA200004 |
| ENS 54764 | 6 July 2020 13:26:00 | EN Revision Imported Date : 8/17/2020 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT The following was received via email: On 6/30/20 microspheres were injected in the patient (intended target of Hepatic Segments 4 through 8) at the vessel branch point with the intention of targeting both the right hepatic artery (RHA) and the middle hepatic artery (MHA). However, post-therapy imaging demonstrates that radiotracer was preferentially deposited along the MHA distribution. This is attributed to unforeseeable clumping of microspheres at the origin of the RHA, such that a majority of the microspheres were preferentially injected into MHA. As such, microspheres were predominantly deposited in the extrahepatic lymph node as well as an unexpected pancreaticoduodenal lymph node. Deposition in this second node can be attributed to additional unintended reflux into a third branching vessel upstream from the RHA and MHA, and further supports the assertion flow into the RHA was hindered by the clumping of microsphere particles. Ultimately, SPECT-CT image analysis suggests no more than approximately 40 percent of the therapy dose was deposited within the liver (as detailed below). It is estimated the following activity distribution from post-treatment imaging: At most, approximately 40 percent of the administered activity appears to be within the liver, with the other 60 percent being in extrahepatic tissue (e.g. lymph nodes). This breakdown should be considered approximate, as these images are not scatter corrected. From pre-treatment macro aggregated albumin (MAA) imaging, it appears that 84 percent of the administered activity was expected to be delivered to the liver, and 16 percent was expected to shunted to the nodes. Overall, this indicates that approximately 53 percent less activity than what was intended reached the liver. There is uncertainty in this estimate. The dose to extrahepatic tissue (lymph nodes) differs from what was intended/expected by more than 50 Rem (0.5 Gy). A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following retraction was received from the state of Iowa via email: On July 6, 2020 Iowa reported a potential medical event at the University of Iowa (License number 0037-1-52-AAB) involving Yttrium-90 (Y-90) microspheres. This potential medical event occurred on June 30, 2020 and was discovered by the licensee on July 1, 2020 during analysis of post therapy SPECT/CT imaging. This event was reported to the state on July 2, 2020 after staff working hours. Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) Radioactive Materials Program (RAM) staff became aware of the potential medical event on July 6, 2020 after the holiday weekend. IDPH staff conducted a reactive inspection at the University of Iowa on July 8, 2020 to interview university staff involved in the procedure and the university radiation safety officer, review the written directive for the Y-90 procedure and review fluoroscopic images of placement of the catheter in the right hepatic artery. IDPH staff determined that the university used due diligence in following their policies and procedures for Y-90 administrations and manufacturer's instructions and no violations were noted. The university followed up with a written report on July 16, 2020 which determined that the unintended dose to the lymph nodes was due to shunting through a pathway or bypass due to patient vasculature. A review of the NRC licensing guidance for Y-90 microspheres dated March 20, 2020 Revision 10.1 revealed that unintended doses to tissue or organs during a Y-90 procedure due to shunting is not considered a reportable medical event. IDPH program staff had a meeting with NRC Region III staff on Wednesday, August 12, 2020 to discuss this potential medical event. Region III staff agreed with IDPH that this unintended dose was due to shunting and therefore not a reportable medical event. Therefore Iowa is retracting event number 54764. Notified R3DO (Pelke) and NMSS Events (email). |
| ENS 54576 | 9 March 2020 13:08:00 | The following information was received via email: The licensee reported a stuck open shutter on an IMS model 5221-02 fixed gauging device. The manufacturer arrived on site 2/26/2020 and determined the cause to be a faulty solenoid valve on the air supply to the shutter. The valve was replaced and shutter was then determined to be working properly. Iowa Item Number: IA200001 |
| ENS 53163 | 10 January 2018 15:19:00 | The following information was received via E-mail: The licensee reported that a shutter on a fixed gauge (Isotope Measuring Systems, Inc. model 5221-02) containing five (5) five curies of Americium-241 sealed sources had one of the five shutters on the device fail to close during device calibration on January 9, 2018. This failure was reported to the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) on January 10, 2018. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer and a service representative will arrive on site Thursday, January 11, 2018 to assess the cause of the shutter failure. IDPH will provide additional information to the NRC after receiving the manufacturer service representatives field report. |
| ENS 51997 | 9 June 2016 15:56:00 | The following was received from Iowa via email: The licensee (Quad City Testing Lab) reported a source disconnect on a QSA Global 880 Delta radiography camera containing 66.3 curies of lr-192. The RSO was able to retrieve the source and return it to the shielded position. The time from disconnect to retrieval was less than two hours. During the RSO investigation, it was determined that the radiographer trainee did not properly connect the source pigtail to the drive cable and this action was not noticed by the radiographer trainer. Total doses during the event as indicated by pocket dosimeters were: RSO 130 mRem, radiographer trainer 55 mRem, and radiographer trainee 30 mRem. No member of the public received any dose from this event. Incident Number IA160001 |
| ENS 47680 | 21 February 2012 09:13:00 | The following information was received from the State of Iowa via email: Agri-Industrial Plastics Company, a general license registrant, reported the loss of one static eliminator, NRD model P-2021-8201, serial number A2HL930, containing 10 millicuries of Polonium-210. The device was used to eliminate static on plastic particles from the trimming of plastic parts. The device was last used on November 30, 2011. The registrant has spent several hours looking for the device. The registrant will be eliminating all remaining static eliminators and returning them to the manufacturer. Source/Radioactive Material: Sealed source ionizing Manufacturer: NRD, INC. Model Number: P-2021-8201 Serial Number: A2HL930 Radionuclide: PO-210, .010 Ci, 0.37 GBq Device Name: Static elimination device Manufacturer: NRD, INC. Model Number: P-2021-8201 Serial Number: A2HL930 The state indicated the cause of the loss was due to inattention to detail. Iowa Event Number IA120002 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 47420 | 7 November 2011 13:16:00 | The following report was received via e-mail: Curwood, Inc. reported an incident involving a NDC Infrared Engineering, Inc. thickness gauge, model 103, serial number 13457, containing 150 mCi's of Americium-241 that occurred on November 2, 2011. A sample of film was cut from the web on a production line and as the sample passed the device, the tail snagged the gauge and dislodged it from the mounting bracket. The gauge fell approximately 40 inches to the treater deck platform. The fall caused the shutter to become dislodged from the device and the crystal lens was cracked. Curwood contacted NDC and was instructed to perform a survey and wipe test of the device. The survey and wipe test indicated that the source was intact and no removable contamination was present. The device is currently packaged and in storage awaiting shipment to NDC for repair. The cause of this incident was the fact that the sample was taken prior to the device and that one of the two screws mounting the device was missing. Corrective actions include now taking the samples at a location on the production line after the device, replacing and securing the missing screw, (performing) a daily spot check of the mounting screws, and a weekly check of the screws to ensure that they are secure. Iowa Event: IA110006 |
| ENS 46993 | 27 June 2011 09:18:00 | The following information was received from the State of Iowa via email: The Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) was conducting a field inspection of Midwest Industrial X-Ray on Friday, June 24, 2011. The licensee was conducting 1 minute, 15 second shots on 12" diameter gas pipeline in a 10 foot deep trench. They were using a SPEC model 150 camera with a 49 Curie Iridium-192 source and SPEC control cables. After completion of the third shot, the licensee was unable to retract the source. The lead radiographer disassembled the control cable crank mechanism and manually pulled the source back into the shielded position. The licensee then reassembled the crank mechanism and attempted a third shot. Once again, they could not retract the source. The radiographer disassembled the crank mechanism, pulled the source into the shielded position and secured from any additional radiography that day. The licensee indicated that they had similar problems with SPEC control cables in the past. The radiographer and assistant radiographer's pocket dosimeters both indicated less than 5 milliRem. The licensee will submit a written report within 30 days. The radiography was being performed in the Redfield Gas Storage facility in Redfield, IA. The event was reported by Midwest Industrial X-ray of Fargo, ND. Iowa Report No.: IA110004 |
| ENS 46952 | 13 June 2011 13:01:00 | The following information was received via e-mail: The Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) received a telephone notification on May 19, 2011 from the licensee concerning the loss of two tritium exit signs. They stated that during a remodeling process that the signs were taken down and mistakenly placed with the construction trash and sent to a landfill in Pike County, Illinois. The licensee stated that the signs were not retrievable. At the time of the notification, the licensee was not aware of the manufacturer, model number or activity of the signs. IDPH notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency on May 20, 2011 regarding the exit signs in an Illinois landfill. IDPH was notified by the licensee on June 13, 2011 of the manufacturer, model number, serial number and activity of the sources. Manufacturer: EvenLite, Inc. Activity: 20 Ci each Model: LEX Series Serial Numbers: Z34957 and Z34946 Iowa event: IA110003 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 46648 | 28 February 2011 12:14:00 | The following report was received by the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) on February 23, 2011. On February 22, 2011, the University of Iowa Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) staff discovered evidence that a Nickel-63 foil in a custom made static eliminator had lost its seal integrity. The source in question consists of two 8.951 mCi Ni-63 foils that are housed in a custom built static eliminator (2 inch diameter steel pipe with the foils glued to the walls of the pipe). The static eliminator is attached to a chamber apparatus located in a fume hood within a principal investigator's lab. The results of the leak test indicated approximately 40,203 dpm (0.0181 uCi's) of activity on a wipe taken of several areas in the apparatus housing the Ni-63 foils. EHS personnel bagged the static eliminator and returned it to EHS for disposal. The two Ni-63 sources were purchased from DuPont/Merck in March of 1995. The Principle Investigator (PI) had been conducting research using these sources since that time. The University RSO reports that the PI does not have any more of these custom devices and will be pursuing other options for research. A previous leaking Ni-63 foil was reported as NMED Item Number 100592. Iowa Incident No. 110002 |
| ENS 46609 | 11 February 2011 13:39:00 | The State of Iowa reported the following via email: The licensee reported a potential medical event that had occurred on Thursday, February 10, 2011. A patient was under going breast cancer treatment using a Nucletron Corporation Micro Selection High Dose Rate Afterloader (HDR). The HDR contained a 5.2 curie Iridium-192 sealed source. The patient was scheduled to receive a total dose of 3400 cGy in ten (10) fractions of 340 cGy each over a five day period. The licensee performs a CT scan on the patient before each fraction to confirm the positioning of the balloon catheter. On the morning of Thursday, February 10, 2011 the patient arrived for the seventh fraction. The licensee's CT scanner was not operable at the time so the Authorized User (AU) (Radiation Oncologist) imaged the patient using ultrasound. The AU noticed at the time that the patient had some drainage from the surgical incision but the results of the ultrasound appeared (to show) that the balloon catheter was correctly placed. The patient then received the seventh fraction. When the patient returned for the eighth fraction in the afternoon of the 10th the licensee's CT scanner was operable. This scan showed that the balloon catheter had completely leaked out all of the fluid. The AU and Medical Physicist made the decision to not perform the eighth fraction due to the possibility that the patient may have received a double dose (680 cGy) during the previous fraction. The patient, referring physician and surgeon were then notified. The surgeon removed the leaking balloon catheter and replaced it with a new catheter. The patient completed fraction nine on the morning of Friday, February 11, 2011 and is scheduled for fraction ten and treatment completion in the afternoon of the 11th. The AU and Medical Physicist do not believe that this event will result in any adverse complications to the health of the patient. The licensee will continue to investigate this event and provide a written report to IDPH within 15 days of the occurrence. Iowa Item Number: IA110001 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 46458 | 6 December 2010 10:56:00 | The following report was received via e-mail: The following report was received by the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) on December 3, 2010. On November 29, 2010, the University of Iowa Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) staff discovered evidence that a Nickel-63 foil in a custom made static eliminator had lost its seal integrity. The source in question consists of two 10 mCi Ni-63 foils that are housed in a custom built static eliminator (2 inch diameter steel pipe with the foils glued to the walls of the pipe). The static eliminator is attached to a chamber apparatus located in a fume hood within a principal investigator's lab. The results of the leak test indicated approximately 11,500 dpm (0.0052 microCuries) of activity on a wipe taken of several areas in the apparatus housing the Ni-63 foils. EHS personnel bagged the static eliminator and returned it to EHS for disposal. Iowa Report Number: IA100008 |
| ENS 46200 | 23 August 2010 16:21:00 | The following was received from the State of Iowa via e-mail: The licensee reported (to the IDPH (Iowa Department of Public Health)) on Saturday, August 21, 2010 of an event that occurred the previous day. A Troxler, model 3411B moisture/density gauge was run over at a temporary job site in Camanche, Iowa by a large dump truck. The construction vehicle was backing up and the driver did not see the gauge or the gauge user. The licensee's RSO reported the following to IDPH on August 23, 2010. The source rod was severed from the handle at the upper weld. The index rod was bent, and two of the faceplate screws were bent. The source rod was lifted up by hand and brought back into the gauge (safe position, with the exception that the source rod could pull completely out the top of the gauge). The bottom shutter closed as usual. No physical damage to the source rod was evident on the bottom half of the source rod. A leak test was completed on the gauge and the swabs were overnighted to Qal-Tek Associates (3998 Commerce Cr. Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401) on Friday night. Once the results are known, delivery of the gauge will be made to Qal-Tek to repair the gauge or dispose of as required. Direction will be given to us (IDPH) from Qal-Tek based on the leak test results. They are a certified disposal site. A survey was conducted on the soil surrounding the site of the accident. Based on a background radiation check 200' away from the site, no change in reading was observed at the actual accident site. The survey meter was also used to check the gauge itself compared to another gauge with a current leak test that had passed, and no change in reading was observed. The gauge is stored in a metal storage container on the jobsite in Camanche, Iowa. The windows are barred shut. The gauge is locked in its case to the inside of the storage container, and the container is locked shut at all times. Only the authorized user has access to this container. The gauge's source rod is duct taped to the index rod, and will have a ubolt binding the source rod to the index rod to prevent movement of the source rod from the gauge. The Troxler gauge contained .009 Curies Cs-137 and .044 Curies Am-241/Be. Item Number: IA100003 |
| ENS 44734 | 19 December 2008 10:23:00 | The Agency (Iowa Department of Public Health) was notified by the General License Registrant of a missing NRD Static Eliminator, model P-2021-8201, serial number A2FY911. The discovery was made during the annual renewal of the registration. The RSO for the company stated that the device was used to eliminate static on a part they were molding. The operators had the device hanging over a barrel and apparently the device became unscrewed from the gun and was disposed of in the trash. The registrant has developed a sleeve to assist in holding the device on the guns. In addition, the RSO instructed the shift foremen to check the devices to ensure they are properly secured to the guns. The Agency (Iowa Department of Public Health) called NRD. Inc. to verify that the device was not returned to the manufacturer. NRD Inc. stated they did not receive the device. Corrective Action: (1) Sleeve used to help hold the device on the gun, and (2) Additional oversight to ensure devices are properly secured to guns. The Po-210 source activity is 10 milliCuries. The state considers the material to be lost not recoverable, and the event is closed. Iowa Report: IA080003. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 43638 | 13 September 2007 13:41:00 | The State provided the following information via email: The licensee reported the inability to retract an Ir-192 radiography source (model G-60, serial #OA2910) that contained an activity of 1.45 TBq (39.12 Ci) into a SPEC exposure device (model 150, serial #456). The radiographers had attached the guide tube to a ladder within a tank at the Absolute Energy Ethanol Plant located on the Iowa/Minnesota border. Halfway through a shot, a gust of wind blew the ladder over, which crimped the guide tube such that the source could not be retracted. The radiographers located the source in the guide tube and covered it with sandbags. The crimped guide tube was then reformed using a hammer and the source was successfully retracted. A new guide tube was shipped to the jobsite and the damaged guide tube was destroyed. The two radiographers received exposures of 1.1 and 1 mSv (110 and 100 mrem) from the incident. The licensee submitted a written report to the Iowa Department of Public Health on 6/13/2007, but failed to provide the required 24-hour notification. The State of Minnesota performed an audit of the licensee on 7/12/2007 and it was determined that the incident occurred in Iowa. The root cause of the incident is the failure to properly secure the ladder per company policy. Corrective actions taken by the licensee included terminating the lead radiographer involved and providing additional instruction to all radiographers on the policy to secure ladders used as guide tube stands. Iowa report number: IA070002 |
| ENS 43639 | 13 September 2007 15:04:00 | The State provided the following information via email: A teletherapy patient received a dose greater than 50% of the prescribed fractionated dose due to an improperly calculated dose delivery time. The medical physicist used a fractionated dose of 200 cGy instead of the prescribed dose of 100 cGy. This overexposure occurred during the first fraction to the patient. Before the second scheduled treatment, a different therapist questioned the long treatment time and brought the matter to the medical physicist. The physicist checked the calculations, discovered the error and cancelled the treatment for the day. The radiation oncologist anticipates no unusual acute or late effects from the delivered dose. The University of Iowa no longer is in possession of this device. It was de-sourced on November 16, 2005. The device was a sealed Co-60 teletherapy source. The therapy was targeting the bone marrow. Iowa report number: IA070003 |