Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56523 | 18 May 2023 14:50:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 0940 EDT on May 18th, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified that the fire door of the dry conversion process (DCP) elevator shaft malfunctioned and was in the open position. The DCP elevator is located on the south wall of the DCP which is a credited fire barrier. A fire watch was initiated and maintained until the elevator door was closed at approximately 1030 EDT. The elevator was restored to full operation at approximately 1330 EDT on May 18th. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The NRC region will be notified. |
| ENS 56159 | 13 October 2022 10:39:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1311 (EDT) on October 12th, 2022, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired. During a flow test, the backup diesel fire pump experienced an overheating condition. As a result, the diesel fire pump was placed in the manual 'Off' position. The electric fire pump remained fully operational and available to perform its safety function. The diesel pump was repaired and returned to operation at approximately 1000 (EDT) on Thursday, October 13th. The New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified of restoration at 1020 (EDT). Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify the State and NRC Region II. |
| ENS 55853 | 22 April 2022 13:35:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1300 EDT on April 21st, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified that a roll up fire door located between a boiler room and the rad waste system malfunctioned in the open position. The door was approximately 3/4 closed. Compensatory measures were discussed with the Deputy Fire Marshall and then implemented. The door was repaired at approximately 1045 EDT on April 22nd. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify the State and NRC Region II. |
| ENS 55786 | 13 March 2022 09:34:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1045 EST on March 12th, 2022, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired. High winds had caused a tree to fall on a power line. As a result, the electric fire pump was without power. The backup diesel fire pump remained fully operational and available to perform its safety function. Power was restored at approximately 1600 EST on March 12th, 2022, and the Deputy Fire Marshall was notified of system restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify the State and NRC Region II. |
| ENS 55623 | 3 December 2021 13:58:00 | At approximately 1826 EST on December 2, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified that a roll up fire door located between a boiler room and the radioactive waste system malfunctioned in the open position. Compensatory measures were discussed with the Deputy Fire Marshall and then implemented. The door was manually closed at approximately 1350, December 3. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify the State and NRC Region II. |
| ENS 55364 | 20 July 2021 11:11:00 | At approximately 1310 EDT on July 19, 2021, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired. The electric fire pump was without power as the result of a failure of an electrical feed from Duke Energy. The backup diesel fire pump remained fully operational and available to perform its safety function. Power was restored at approximately 1400 EDT on July 19, and the Deputy Fire Marshall was notified of system restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c)." The licensee will notify the North Carolina Radiation Protection Branch and NRC Region II. |
| ENS 55349 | 10 July 2021 14:58:00 | At approximately 1730 (EDT) on July 9, 2021, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired. The backup diesel fire pump experienced a cooling system failure. As a result, the diesel fire pump was placed in the manual 'Off' position. The diesel fire pump could still be operated manually in an emergency for a short time. The electric fire pump remains fully operational and available to perform its safety function. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). From the discussion between the licensee and the Headquarters Operations Officer, the vendor plans to be onsite Monday July 12, 2021 to conduct repairs. |
| ENS 55096 | 7 February 2021 14:48:00 | At approximately 2135 (EST) on February 6th, 2021, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired due to the failure of the diesel fire pump controller. The diesel fire pump can be activated manually but not automatically. The electric fire pump remains fully operational and available to perform its safety function. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). NRC Region 2 and the State of North Carolina will be notified by the licensee. |
| ENS 54890 | 9 September 2020 09:09:00 | At approximately 1015 (EDT) on September 8th, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing a part of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired due to planned piping replacement. Additional compensatory measures were enacted. The system was restored at approximately 1750 (EDT) yesterday (9/8/2020) and the Deputy Fire Marshal informed of restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). NRC Region 2 and the State of North Carolina will be notified by the licensee. |
| ENS 54889 | 8 September 2020 14:16:00 | At approximately 2045 EDT on September 7th, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing a part of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired due the discovery of a water leak in the sprinkler system. Additional compensatory measures were enacted. The system was restored at approximately 0930 today (9/8/2020) and the Deputy Fire Marshal informed of restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshal was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The NRC Region 2 and the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Office will be notified of this event. |
| ENS 54875 | 2 September 2020 16:52:00 | At approximately 1027 EDT on September 2, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing a part of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired due to planned sprinkler head modifications. Additional compensatory measures were enacted. The system was restored at approximately 1300 EDT today (9/2/2020) and the Deputy Fire Marshall informed of restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify Region 2. |
| ENS 54797 | 22 July 2020 10:04:00 | The following was received from Global Nuclear Fuels, America: At 1030 (EDT) on July 21st, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system for the Fuel Manufacturing Operation Sandblast Building was impaired. An underground pipe that feeds water to the sprinkler system had developed a leak. The building is normally unoccupied and no other buildings are affected. Compensatory measures were enacted and communicated to the Deputy Fire Marshall. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify Region 2. |
| ENS 54700 | 10 May 2020 09:47:00 | On May 8th, GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuels - America) underwent an unplanned local power outage due to failed equipment at a substation. The facility shutdown safely. While critical systems are on generators, the fire alarm systems are on batteries which will be depleted before power can be restored. Compensatory measures were enacted. At approximately 1215 (EDT) on May 9th, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire alarm systems would not function. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). |
| ENS 54699 | 8 May 2020 14:23:00 | The following was received via email from Global Nuclear Fuel - America: On May 7, 2020, Global Nuclear Fuel America initiated maintenance activities on fire alarm systems that affect the Waste Treatment facility and the Process Lagoons. Compensatory measures were enacted. Upon system restoration, it was determined that a communication line between the initiating devices of fire alarm systems and the Emergency Control Center (ECC) was not functioning. Per State code requirements, fire alarm systems must report back to a continuously monitored station. Compensatory measures remained in place. At approximately 1625 (EDT) on May 7, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that communications between the initiating devices of fire alarm systems and the ECC were not functioning. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (c). The licensee will notify NRC Region 2. |
| ENS 54640 | 4 April 2020 18:43:00 | At approximately 0930 EDT on April 4, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per state code requirements that the fire alarm system and accompanying fire pumps encompassing the fuel manufacturing operation (FMO) were placed on backup power due to a planned power outage. Additional compensatory measures were enacted. Power was restored at approximately 1800 EDT on April 4, 2020. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). |
| ENS 54538 | 24 February 2020 14:41:00 | At 2100 (EST) on February 23rd, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that a fire door for Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Dry Conversion Process (DCP) Line 1 conversion area remained open and unattended for an extended time. DCP Line 1 was shut down for maintenance at the time and all Special Nuclear Material (SNM) had been removed prior to work beginning. Compensatory measures have been enacted. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify NRC Region 2. |
| ENS 54422 | 5 December 2019 13:20:00 | The following was received via email from Global Nuclear Fuels - Americas, LLC: At 1430 EST, on December 4, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified that a section of fire sprinkler line supporting the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was unable to perform its intended function. The sprinkler line supported a small section of office area. No areas supporting fuel manufacturing were affected. The fire sprinkler pipeline was returned to operation at approximately 1920 EST on December 4, 2019. The New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was informed of system restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Region. Notified R2DO (Blamey) and NMSS (email). |
| ENS 54319 | 9 October 2019 15:55:00 | At 1300 (EDT) on October 9th, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the electric fire pump supporting the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was being taken offline for maintenance. An electrical disconnect was being replaced. Compensatory measures were enacted. The pump was restored to operation at 1348 (EDT). Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services Radiation Protection Branch. |
| ENS 54313 | 6 October 2019 16:16:00 | At 0700 (EDT) on October 6, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per state code requirements that the fire pump supporting the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was being taken offline for NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) required testing. Compensatory measures were enacted. The fire pump was returned to operation at 1215 (EDT) on 10/6/2019. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The NRC Region II office will be notified. |
| ENS 54279 | 13 September 2019 14:47:00 | At 1640 (EDT) on September 12, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, per State code requirements, that the fire alarm system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) will be taken offline for planned maintenance. The system was taken offline at approximately 0800 on September 13, 2019. Compensatory measures were enacted. The system was returned to service at approximately 1335 on September 13, 2019. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The NRC Region, as well as the North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch, will be notified. |
| ENS 54166 | 16 July 2019 14:42:00 | At 1133 EDT on July 16, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system for the Fuel Manufacturing Operation Shop Support Areas was taken offline for planned maintenance to modify sprinkler piping. Compensatory measures were enacted. The system was taken offline at approximately 0800 EDT and was returned to service at approximately 1400. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina Emergency Management Agency and NRC Region 2. |
| ENS 54142 | 3 July 2019 10:29:00 | At 0915 EST on July 3, 2019, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system for the Fuel Manufacturing Operation Shop Support Areas was taken offline for planned maintenance to modify sprinkler piping. Compensatory measures were enacted. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will be notifying the state of North Carolina and the NRC Regional Office. |
| ENS 53735 | 12 November 2018 14:06:00 | At 0930 (EST) on November 12th, 2018, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system (Fire Riser 617) for the FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operations) oil storage warehouse will be taken offline to replace sprinkler heads and conduct the required 5 year inspection. This impairment will begin Tuesday, November 13th. This building is normally unoccupied. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c). The system will be offline for approximately 8 hours and the NRC will be notified once work is complete. The licensee will notify the NRC Region and the State of North Carolina
Fire Riser 617 and the supporting system was restored to service at approximately 1300 EST, 11/14/18. The NHC Deputy Fire Marshall was notified via telephone of the return to service. Notified R2DO (Sandal) and NMSS Events Notification (by email). |
| ENS 53295 | 28 March 2018 14:07:00 | At approximately 1330 EDT, 3/28/2018, a report was sent to the State of North Carolina Department of Radiation Protection. The report is below: 'Pursuant to 10A NCAC 15.0309, Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC (GNF-A) is providing this report for discovery of a damaged self illuminated exit sign in the Fuel Manufacturing Operations (FMO) building. On February 26, 2018, it was discovered that one tube out of the twelve originally installed tubes in a generally licensed exit sign was damaged. The sign was in storage and not being used at the time and there was no significant exposure as a result of the event. The sign is believed to be a model number 101 or 201, originally containing a maximum of 25 Ci of tritium manufactured and distributed by: Evenlite, Inc., 220 VFW Avenue.,Grasonville, MD 21638. Arrangements were made to properly dispose of the sign. It was shipped offsite for recovery or disposal on March 23, 2018 to SRB Technologies (NC Radioactive Material License 034-0534-2).' This report to NRC is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (c) - Concurrent Reports (... notifications to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification.) The Licensee has notified NRC Region 2. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 52811 | 16 June 2017 18:20:00 | At 1700 EDT on June 16, 2017 it was determined that an unanalyzed condition was identified that failed to meet performance criteria. This report is conservatively being made in accordance with 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1). In the powder process, a non-radioactive additive is added to a can of uranium in a hood. A previous process hazard analysis (PHA) determined that a criticality in the associated HEPA filters was not credible during this step. A recent update to a criticality analysis identified a potential condition where small amounts of uranium could build up in the HEPA filter over decades. The ISA (Integrated Safety Analysis) team met and decided that current safety controls will need to be implemented as IROFS (items relied on for safety) to assure that performance criteria are met. The operation is currently shut down and no unsafe condition existed. Safety Significance of Events: At no time was an unsafe condition present. Safety Equipment Status: The operation was shutdown. Status of Corrective Actions: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. |
| ENS 50276 | 13 July 2014 16:10:00 | It was determined at 1200 (EDT) on 7/13/14, that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle operation failed to meet performance requirements. At approximately 1730 (EDT) on July 12, 2014, a potable water line (1/2 inch poly) failed and resulted in a release of approximately 10 gallons of water into the area. The leak was contained and cleaned up. However, this water release is a failure of IROFS 900-03 for Moderation Restriction. Although the second IROFS (Process Equipment Barriers IROFS 301) prevented moderation intrusion into equipment and containers, it alone was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. The affected equipment has been shut down. At no time was an unsafe condition present. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was not impacted by the leak. No water escaped the area or travelled to non-contaminated areas. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and the cause of the failure are being determined. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management. |
| ENS 49878 | 6 March 2014 11:22:00 | Feed tube level sensor was found to be in a state such that it has failed as an IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) for a fire accident sequence leading to the loss of a criticality control. Another IROFS is in place and the accident sequence continues to meet performance requirements. Less than a safe mass was always maintained. This event is being reported because only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Safety Analysis summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than eight hours. Portion of the plant affected: FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operation) Press. The licensee notified the North Carolina State Radiation Protection Branch, New Hanover County Emergency Management, and NRC Region II.
On 3/6/14, GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuels - America) conservatively made a 1 hour event notification (EN 49878) due to a discovery that a feed tube level sensor had failed. After further review, it has been determined that a second control remained available, reliable, and the remaining IROFS was sufficient to meet performance requirements. As a result, the event notification is retracted. Notified R2DO (Vias) and NMSS EO (Lombard). |
| ENS 48100 | 12 July 2012 16:29:00 | At approximately 1740 EDT on 7/11/12, lightning strikes near the Wilmington Field Service Center (WFSC) rendered several alarm annunciators (horns) of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) inoperable. There are no active fissile material operations in WFSC, thus no unsafe condition existed. Until the system is repaired, personnel have either been removed from the affected area or other compensatory measures have been established. Longer term preventative actions are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50(b)(2). The licensee will notify NRC R2 (Thomas), and the State and Hanover County Emergency Management Agencies. |
| ENS 47325 | 6 October 2011 13:16:00 | During a review of the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) for a 3-gallon can elevator used in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area, it was determined that the ISA incorrectly describes the IROFS used to control movement of SNM. The system is composed of two sequential can elevators that are used to move SNM to different floors. A Fuel Business System (FBS) automated control and associated gate controls are designated as one of the Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS). In the ISA, this IROFS is incorrectly attributed to the 2nd can elevator instead of the 1st can elevator. Based on a review of this condition, determined at approximately 1400 on October 5, 2011, it was determined that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The FBS and associated gate control were in place at all times on the 1st can elevator, was operating correctly, and supported by management measures. No unsafe condition existed. The ISA and associated documentation are being updated to designate the correct can elevator and associated controls. Operation of the equipment has been suspended pending additional review and implementation of corrective actions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and State and local authorities. |
| ENS 47308 | 30 September 2011 11:00:00 | During a review of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and criticality evaluation assumptions for a floor cleaning scrubber used in the Dry Conversion Process facility, it was determined that an equipment configuration was different than that analyzed in the ISA. Field verification of the floor cleaning scrubber recovery tank determined that its capacity was greater than the safe volume limit referenced in the analysis. The tank volume is credited as an IROFS (Items Relied On For Safety) in the ISA summary. Based on a review of this as-found condition, discovered at approximately 1120 EDT on September 29, 2011, it was determined that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The tanks for the floor cleaning scrubbers were inspected and no unsafe condition existed. Operation of the equipment has been suspended pending additional review and implementation of corrective actions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency and New Hanover County Emergency Management. |
| ENS 47061 | 15 July 2011 16:15:00 | As part of the corrective actions for the event reported on 7/13/11 (EN #47047), GNF-A performed a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility test covering the Controlled Access Area (CAA) at approximately 1655 on 7/14/11. The subsequent test revealed that the installed CAAS system failed to immediately activate the horn signal generators as expected. Activation of the associated warning horns was delayed approximately 3 minutes. This response time to activate horns did not meet the design requirement. Additionally, a review determined an approximately 3 minute horn signal delay was noted in a previous test on 7/12/11. An investigation into these matters is ongoing. The FMO (Fuel Manufacturing Operations) complex fissile material process operations were suspended on 7/14/11 and personnel evacuated. The emergency organization was activated and efforts to troubleshoot the root cause in the horn signal activation circuit delay initiated. All production activities involving Special Nuclear Material are shut down. The installed CAAS is a safety-significant system and is maintained through routine response checks and scheduled functional tests conducted in accordance with internal procedures. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50(b)(2). The licensee notified NRC Region 2 personnel (Sykes), State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County EMA.
The cause of the inoperable Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has been identified as a hardware failure - specifically a capacitor on a circuit board. The CAAS has been repaired and a comprehensive testing plan is under development. The licensee continues to withhold personnel from the Controlled Access Area and all production activities remain shut down. A root cause analysis and recovery plan are underway. The licensee has contacted R2 (Sykes) and will be notifying state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman notified). See related Events #47047 and #47066. |
| ENS 47047 | 13 July 2011 17:12:00 | At approximately 1730 on 7/12/2011, a regularly scheduled test of the inside Criticality Warning System (CWS) covering the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was conducted. It was discovered that a CWS warning horn in the ChemMet lab was determined to be inaudible. Compensatory measures were immediately implemented. All other horns of the inside CWS in all other areas were functional and clearly audible. The affected area will remain shut down pending an investigation and implementation of additional corrective actions. The event is being reported within 24�hours pursuant to 10CFR70.50(b)(2) as a safety equipment failure. A CWS warning horn in the ChemMet lab was determined to be inaudible. All other CWS warning horns operating correctly. Investigation results pending. Affected area access was restricted. The faulty CWS horn has been replaced and tested. The licensee notified Region 2(Coovert) and will notify the state radiation protection agency and New Hanover Emergency Management. |
| ENS 47066 | 17 July 2011 18:26:00 | As part of the corrective actions for the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) events reported on 7/13/11 (EN #47047) and 7/15/11 (EN #47061), GNF-A is performing an investigation into the cause of the delayed audible alarm actuation. The investigation has determined that this delay existed at the time of the May and June 2011 functional tests and was not adequately identified and thus not reported. The response time to activate the horns did not meet the design requirement for CAAS. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee states that the delay in the alarm actuation existed during surveillance testing in May and June of 2011 but the delay was not recognized at the time. This condition rendered the system inoperable since May 2011. The licensee has notified R2 (Sykes) and will notify state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman) notified. |
| ENS 46749 | 13 April 2011 09:29:00 | A maintenance employee was involved in a pipe replacement project in the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) Building. The employee was leaning on a pipe and received a HF exposure through his PPE (personal protective equipment and clothing) onto his abdomen. The employee was immediately placed under a safety shower and an on-site emergency response was initiated. EMT's applied calcium gluconate and the employee was transported to on-site medical clinic. The employee was not contaminated with any radioactive material. The employee was later transferred to off-site medical. The employee's abdomen was reddened and had some blistering, but exposure is not considered life threatening. AII work in the HF building has been stopped pending the completion of an investigation. The licensee stated that the pipe had been flushed with water and steam prior to starting the maintenance evolution. The amount of fluid in the pipe was described as residual. There was no ongoing release of HF and no other employees were involved. The licensee is providing this as a notification under 10CFR70 App A (a) and 10CFR70.61(b)(4). The licensee plans to notify the NRC Regional Staff (Thomas).
The employee was released from the hospital with no restrictions. As such, the event classification is being amended to 10 CFR 70.61(c)(4)." Notified NMSS (King Stablein), R2DO (Kathleen O'Donohue)
As a result of the root cause analysis, additional IROFS (Items Relied On For Safety) are needed and will be declared. Additional reporting for this event to include 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) as the GNF (Global Nuclear Fuels) ISA (Integrated Safety Analysis) did not consider HF as a high consequence event. Notified NMSS (Stablein) and R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| ENS 46650 | 2 March 2011 11:10:00 | At approximately 3:00 pm (EST) on Tuesday, March 1st, it was reported that 15.3kg of UO2 powder was removed from the UO2 Sinter Test Grinding Station (High Efficiency Particulate Air) HEPA filter housing transition. This clean-out was performed as a response to routine radiological surveys that indicated the presence of uranium. It was determined that this material was present during prior filter replacement in early February in which 30.9 kg of UO2 powder was removed. The total amount of UO2 powder present in the housing was therefore approximately 46 kg, which is greater than a safe mass. The Sinter Test Grinding Station and associated equipment was already shut down because of the HEPA filter housing clean-out and remained down pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions. Failure to maintain mass control resulted in a loss of double contingency for the filter housing. The double contingency controls required include (1) mass control and (2) moderation control. Moderation control, the 2nd leg of double contingency remained in place, was effective, and was not challenged. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. The UO2 in the HEPA housing was transferred into (a) favorable geometry (of) 3-gallon cans per procedure. An investigation is ongoing. At no time did an unsafe condition exist as the moderation control was in place, was effective, and was not challenged. Immediate corrective actions (are) complete (transfer of material into 3-gallons cans). Investigation of (the) event and implementation of long term corrective actions (are) pending. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Region II, State, and Local Authorities. |
| ENS 44161 | 23 April 2008 15:46:00 | |
| ENS 43439 | 21 June 2007 17:29:00 | During a review of the Integrated Safety Analysis for an additive addition step, it was determined that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS), as documented in the ISA Summary was not reliable. This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10CFR7O.50 Appendix A (a)(5). At no time did an unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective and was not challenged. The IROFS described for the additive sequence did not prevent incorrect type of additive from being added under all scenarios. All affected equipment is in the process of being shut down pending revision of the ISA IROFS for this additive addition process. Units will remain shutdown pending final investigation and implementation of additional preventive actions. Independent controls on moderation remained intact. The as found condition was previously analyzed and demonstrated to be safe. At no time did an unsafe condition exist. Licensee will notify NRC Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency, and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency. |
| ENS 43359 | 12 May 2007 12:07:00 | During the quarterly shutdown and clean-out of a rotary press used for pressing UO2-Gd203 powder in FMO, it was observed that approximately half of the schedule 80, one-inch diameter Chlorinated Poly Vinyl Chloride (CPVC) tubes placed in the lower shaft casing of the press did not extend the full length of the cavity as required by the nuclear safety analysis. These tubes are credited as a fixed neutron poison inside the casing and must extend the entire length of the cavity in order for the unit to be demonstrated safe geometry for (LEU) enriched UO2 under optimal moderation conditions. The independent control on mass remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe. The unit was in a shutdown condition and contained no Uranium at the time of the discovery. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 within 24 hours of discovery. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS The basis of criticality safety relies on geometry and mass as independent criticality safety controls. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS Mass control remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY TO RESTORE A SAFE SITUATION Control on geometry demonstrated by current analysis. No uranium present at time of discovery. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS Low Safety Significance - independent control on mass remained intact - additional failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe. SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS Unit was shutdown for maintenance and will remain Shutdown until CPVC tube error corrected. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Unit will remain shutdown pending final investigation results and implementation of additional preventive actions. The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency. |
| ENS 42979 | 9 November 2006 14:25:00 | At 0500 on 11/09/06, during a routine monthly test of the Criticality Warning System (CWS), a segment of the system covering the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was found to have no functioning evacuation horns. Appropriate personnel were notified, the DCP processes were shut down, DCP personnel evacuated, and the area cordoned off. The activation of the evacuation horns in the balance of the plant were fully functional. A follow-up test was immediately scheduled for 0900. The building was evacuated and the emergency organization assembled in accordance with normal procedures. During this test, the DCP horns again failed to function. The Emergency Director determined that the processes stay shut down and all personnel remain out of the area while investigations and testing were conducted. The problem was located in the interface between the Data Acquisition Modules (DAM's) and the Auto-Call system that initiates the alarm signals. After a repair was completed, a re-test was completed which confirmed functionality of the DCP process area horns. Current plans are to resume normal operations beginning with the 1500 (evening) shift. This event is being reported within 24-hours pursuant to 10CFR70.50(b)(2) as a safety equipment failure. The licensee will notify NRC Region II. |