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At 1405 EDT on 3/20/14, Fermi Nuclear Station declared an Alert due to a fire in the lagging of an Emergency Diesel Generator Turbo Charger. The Alert notification was based on EAL HA02, fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. The fire in the EDG-11 turbocharger lagging occurred during testing. The fire was extinguished using handheld CO2 fire extinguishers and a reflash watch was set. EDG-11 has been removed from service and damage is minimal. The plant is shutdown in Mode 4 for Refueling Outage 16. All parameters associated with the reactor are stable. RHR Pump D remains in service in Shutdown Cooling and is unaffected by the EDG-11 fire. There has been no other impact on the plant electrical systems or shutdown cooling and Fermi Nuclear Station remains in an Alert pending further evaluation. The NRC remained in Normal Mode. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, and FDA. Notified NuclearSSA via email only.

• * * UPDATE FROM SAM HASSOUN TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1535 EDT ON 3/20/13 * * *

At 1359 (EDT on 3/20/14), with the plant in Mode 4, a fire was confirmed on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)-11 turbocharger. At 1402, the fire was extinguished with a CO2 extinguisher. An ALERT was declared at 1405 and Assembly and Accountability was ordered by the Emergency Director. The Assembly and Accountability was completed satisfactorily by 1441. The fire was from oil soaked lagging on the engine turbocharger. The insulation was removed and the engine exhaust header was inspected. The damage was limited to only the lagging. The room has been ventilated using the Engine room fans and has been cleared of all of the smoke. The Emergency Director terminated the event at 1532 (EDT on 3/20/14). The Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3RA (Pederson), NRR (Dorman), R3DO (Lara), IRD (Grant), IRD (Morris), DHS SWO, DOE, FEMA, HHS, NICC, USDA, EPA, FDA, and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Tennant). Notified NuclearSSA via email only.

At 1254 (EST) on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.

• * * RETRACTION FROM PAUL GRESH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0931 EDT ON 4/4/14 * * *

The Fermi 2 Engineering staff has completed a comprehensive evaluation of the momentary mispositioning of the Division 2 EECW system overide switch initially reported on February 6, 2014. The evaluation determined that HPCI room temperature would remain below the HPCI room steam leak detection isolation logic setpoint in the unlikely event that the momentary mispositioning resulted in the temporary interruption of the cooling water flow to the HPCI system room cooler. Over the brief period of time for which EECW would have been unavailable to support the effective operation of the room cooler, its function was not necessary for HPCI to perform its required safety functions. Therefore, event notification 49801 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl).