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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 46469 | 9 December 2010 12:53:00 | At 0815 Eastern Standard Time on December 6, 2010, TVA Construction Contractor, Bechtel, notified the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), in accordance with 29 CFR 1904.39, that a Bechtel employee had suffered a fatality from an apparent heart attack, while working on the Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction completion project. This information was also provided to Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (TOSHA). This event had no consequences to the health and safety of the public, other onsite workers, or the environment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The employee's heart attack happened while he was operating a fork lift at the Parts/Receiving area. Offsite responders were called to the scene, however, the employee was unresponsive to their actions. Employee was transported to the Rhea County Hospital where he was pronounced dead. |
| ENS 45827 | 8 April 2010 17:26:00 | Action F of LCO 3.8.1, 'AC Sources - Operating,' was entered at 20:57 EDT April 7, 2010 for the 2A-A and the 2B-B diesel generators (DGs) being inoperable. Action F has a two hour allowed outage time (AOT). The DGs were determined to be inoperable due to incorrectly implemented wiring changes made by personnel performing construction work on Watts Bar Unit 2. The impact of the change is that during (an) actual or simulated ESF actuation signal, if the diesel is in test mode, and the output breaker is closed in parallel with the board supply breakers, the DG would not return to a 'ready to load' state meaning the output breaker would not have opened as designed for this condition. This function is tested as required on an 18 month frequency as a part of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.17. The wiring changes which affected the DGs were made in accordance with Unit 2 Work Order (WO) 09-954447 and 09-954448. The WOs as developed would not have an impact on Unit 1 operations. A review of the Unit 1 Operator Logs from January 1, 2010 to present, did not find any entries establishing the Unit 2 work had been authorized by Unit 1. The proper technical specification entry would have been Action 8 of LCO 3.8.1 for this activity. Entry into Action B of LCO 3.8.1 requires the implementation of several actions including a verification of the operability of the offsite circuits. Since these Technical Specification required actions were not complied with, WBN is providing this 24-hour notification in accordance with Section 2.G of the Watts Bar Unit 1 Facility Operating License. During the review of work performed by Unit 2 it was identified that the wiring was initially lifted on January 6. 2010. At the time of this report, actions have been taken to restore the wiring to its appropriate configuration on both of the DG circuits. 2B-B DG wiring was restored at 22:18 on April 7, 2010 and the 2B-B DG was declared operable. Action F of LCO 3.8.1 was exited at this time and Action B was entered for the 2A-A DG (14 day AOT). 2A-A DG circuitry was restored at 00:37 on April 8, 2010, and all LCO actions were exited. This event has been entered into TVA's corrective action program and actions are being initiated to establish the reason the leads were incorrectly lifted and to verify that no other similar wiring issues exist. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * RETRACTION FROM WES DANIEL TO PETE SNYDER AT 1646 ON 5/10/10 * * * The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 diesel generators (DGs) were not inoperable. The Unit 2 DGs were initially declared inoperable because of an inappropriate wiring change that disabled a DG output breaker trip in the event of an actual or simulated ESF actuation signal while the DG is in test mode and the output breaker is closed in parallel with the board supply breakers. Because Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3-8.1.17 required verification of this function for the Unit 1 DGs, and TVA was uncertain of the impact of the loss of this function to the Unit 2 DGs, TVA conservatively declared the Unit 2 DGs inoperable because they would not be able to meet this SR. Upon review TVA determined that it was proper to exclude this surveillance requirement for the Unit 2 DGs. Since SR 3.8.1.17 only applies to Unit 1 DGs, inability of Unit 2 DGs to meet this requirement is not a basis for inoperability. TVA has concluded that the Unit 2 DGs and offsite power sources were operable, and WBN was in compliance with its Technical Specifications throughout the period that the wiring change was installed. Therefore, this event was not reportable under WBN License (NPF-90) Condition 2.G, 10 CFR 50.72, or 10 CFR 50.73. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| ENS 45331 | 7 September 2009 22:02:00 | This report documents a condition in which WBN (Watts Bar Nuclear) Unit 1 met the criteria to declare a NOUE (Notification of Unusual Event) based on RCS (Reactor Coolant System) unidentified leakage. Prior to declaration, the event was terminated thus no declaration was made. This event is reportable within one hour as an acceptable alternative to reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i) - declaration of any of the emergency classes specified in the licensees approved emergency plan. During tagout installation in support of planned maintenance on the cation bed flush valve (1-FLV-62-921) in the CVCS/Letdown system, isolation boundary valve leakage of approximately 80 gpm was present for approximately three minutes. The leakage was terminated by reclosing opened vent (1-VTV-62-917) and drain valves (1-DRV-62-920). Cation Bed Inlet (l-ISV-62-915) and Outlet (1-ISV-62-916) and all other boundary valve isolations were verified to be in the correct, closed position per the tagout instructions. This RCS leakage was directed to the Tritiated Drain Collector Tank, thus all leakage was contained within plant systems and no radiological releases resulted. A work order will be initiated to troubleshoot and repair the faulty isolation valve. This amount of leakage is in excess of the amount specified in WBN Emergency Plans for declaration of an NOUE based on >10 gpm unidentified leakage per EAL 2.5. Prior to declaration, the event was terminated, thus no declaration was made. The State of Tennessee and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Event Notice 45331 reported a condition in which WBN Unit 1 conservatively determined it met the criteria to declare a NOUE based on RCS unidentified leakage. Prior to declaration, the event was terminated thus no declaration was made. Based upon further review and discussion with others in the industry, the NOUE criterion cited, EAL 2.5, applies to specific sources of excessive RCS leakage. The source of the leakage discussed in the event has been confirmed as CVCS leakage, not RCS leakage. An action to clarify the basis and scope of this EAL is being pursued within TVA's Corrective Action Program. Therefore, Event Notice 45331 is being retracted. The NRC resident has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Blamey). |
| ENS 45215 | 21 July 2009 14:15:00 | A non-licensed supervisory contractor employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |