Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 54801 | 26 July 2020 08:10:00 | The following was received via email from Westinghouse: On July 25, 2020, at approximately 1100 EDT, a Westinghouse employee performing routine work in the pelleting area passed out due to a personal medical emergency. Site emergency first responders responded per plant procedures and training until Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel arrived. The employee was transported to an offsite medical facility accompanied by a plant health physics technician due to the potential for radioactive contamination based on the work location of the employee. There was no release to the environment and no process or plant equipment involved. Surveys taken at the hospital and of all emergency response equipment and response personnel revealed no contamination. (All removable contamination from the Westinghouse employee was returned to the facility.) The Columbia plant is a licensed Part 70 facility subject to 10CFR70 Subpart H. The licensee has notified state and local county governments. |
| ENS 53266 | 16 March 2018 11:16:00 | On March 15, 2018 during an NRC inspection of the Solvent Extraction area, an inspector identified a potential credible scenario which is not adequately addressed in the applicable Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE). Plant Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) staff reviewed the issue and at 1130 (EDT) determined that, based on the available information, the scenario did not appear to be properly analyzed in the CSE and thus the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). The scenario is associated with the Uranium Recovery and Recycle System (URRS) 706 hood operation. The process performed in the 706 hood is the transfer of low concentration residues into a container for disposal at a Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) facility. There was no actual event, and no impact to public health and safety, the workers, or the environment. The issue revolves around the lack of a specific analysis controlling the handling, transport and replacement of the container, a 55 gallon drum, used in that process. A criticality event for the scenario of an inadvertent container handling upset was identified as incredible in the safety basis documents. However, the accident sequence does not meet the definition of incredible as defined in the license application, and thus appears to be an improperly analyzed scenario. While not properly documented, unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would have to occur to result in a criticality accident. Procedural controls and process barriers which are in place were not identified as Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) for this scenario. There are, however, passive and administrative IROFS in place for other chemical, fire and criticality safety accident sequences that can be applied to this scenario. These IROFS include requirements for mechanical integrity and spill protection techniques to preclude significant loss of uranium bearing liquid material that would have to accumulate in an improperly handled container. Examples of existing IROFS that control process leaks include SOLX-903 and WASH-119, degradation resistant design to prevent leakage from tanks/vessels; SOLX-503, structural integrity of piping; ADUHNP-901, flange guards; ADUHFS-507 and SOLX-505, valve alignments to prevent spills; and DPH-104, piping integrity. In addition, there is annual training and testing on the proper handling of non-favorable geometry containers. The hood and associated container were removed from service while the scenario is being evaluated. Issue Report 2018-7306 was entered into our Corrective Action Program, and an extent of condition was performed. Based on the extent of condition, the cylinder wash area has been identified for additional evaluation.
Based on evaluation of the extent of condition, a similar scenario was identified with the wet combustible trash system in the Uranium Recovery and Recycle System (URRS) area. This event report is updated to include a 24 Hour Event Notification for the wet combustible trash system based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.' The issue revolves around the lack of a specific analysis controlling the handling and transport of containers, 55 gallon drums, used in the wet combustible trash process. A cylinder wash operation is in the area where the wet combustible trash drums are used. Cylinder wash operations were shutdown to preclude significant loss of uranium bearing liquid material that would have to accumulate in an improperly handled drum. Similar procedural controls, process barriers and IROFS from other accident sequences can be applied to this scenario. Wet combustible trash collection may continue since the potential source of liquid material (cylinder wash) has been shut down. Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS (via email). |
| ENS 53026 | 19 October 2017 10:03:00 | 24 Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70.50(b)(1) for an unplanned contamination event that requires access to the contaminated area to be restricted for more than 24 hours, by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area. On October 18, 2017 at approximately 1005 EDT, while operators were unloading a LR-230 container of liquid uranyl nitrate, the liquid offload hose became disconnected from the container fitting. The event resulted in a uranyl nitrate exposure to one operator and a release in the offloading area. The estimated quantity of spilled solution was 6-8 gallons. The operator used the emergency shower and was cleared by Health Physics and Medical personnel. Operations and Health Physics personnel cleaned up the spill of low-enriched uranyl nitrate. While decontamination efforts are essentially complete, efforts continue to assure there is no smearable contamination. This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL). |
| ENS 52440 | 16 December 2016 09:27:00 | On December 15, 2016, a grid area employee was moving containers in the plating room, where his finger was pinched between two containers. He was taken to the emergency room where he was treated for an injury to the tip of his left ring finger. The event did not involve special nuclear material or contamination and is classified as an industrial safety incident. This concurrent report is being made under Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A because a 24 hour report was made to the South Carolina Department of Labor (at 0700 EST on 12/16/16) per 29CFR1904.39. The employee was not admitted to a hospital and was sent home after treatment. The licensee has notified NRC Region II. |
| ENS 52090 | 14 July 2016 18:49:00 | On July 13, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that scrubber clean-out material, found in the S-1030 scrubber transition section during the annual maintenance shutdown that occurred in late May, potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition. (IROFS (Items Relied on for Safety) VENT-S1030-110) requires annual inspection and removal of significant solids buildup in the transition section. Upon inspection, significant buildup was found, and the ductwork was opened to permit extensive cleanout. 36 containers of material with a total gross weight of 210.4 kg was removed from the inlet transition during the cleanout on May 28th to May 29th. Grab samples were subsequently taken from each container and analyzed for uranium concentration. On July 13th, the EH&S department was made aware that the grab sample results averaged 47.8% U. Although the exact uranium mass cannot be determined until the material is dissolved and representatively sampled, available evidence suggests that the mass limit of 29 kg U in the inlet transition was exceeded. The 29 kg U limit is based on an optimally moderated, fully reflected spherical geometry which very conservatively bounds the conditions in the inlet transition of the scrubber. IROFS remained to limit the quantity of uranium available to the scrubber (IROFS VENT-S1030-101, -102, -103 & -104), which are physical barriers designed to minimize uranium in the airflow entering the transition area. Continuous liquid spraying in the inlet transition section to limit solids accumulation (IROFS VENT-S1030-109) was also in place. The inlet transition and scrubber were thoroughly cleaned, and the uranium bearing solids were placed into favorable geometry containers. Also, the inspection and cleanout of the transition frequency was increased to monthly. Based on available but degraded IROFS, this accident sequence was unlikely. Therefore, this mass accident sequence does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. The actual configuration remained safe at all times. Also, no external conditions affected the event. Immediate Corrective Actions: NRC Region II personnel, who were onsite at the CFFF (Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility), were made aware of the discovery. The Conversion area was shutdown to plan for a second extensive scrubber clean-out to validate that the accumulation of solids is a slow buildup over time. The last extensive cleanout was performed in 2009. An extent of condition was performed to determine if other scrubbers potentially had significant uranium buildup. Inspection data indicated that this material accumulation issue was limited to the S-1030 scrubber. This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #100397353.
Onsite chemical analysis confirmed that uranium mass limit for the scrubber transition piece was exceeded. The accumulated material contained 87 kgs of Uranium. The Criticality Safety Evaluation for this system was revised and implemented on July 20, 2016 to add Items Relied on For Safety to prevent recurrence of a mass exceedance while the causal analysis and additional corrective actions are completed. Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.
On July 31, 2016, it was determined by the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that clean-out material found in the S-1030 scrubber packing and floor also potentially exceeded the uranium mass limit for the scrubber criticality safety evaluation. Over years of operations, the same available but degraded mass prevention and inspection/clean-out IROFS did not prevent exceedance of the mass limit. This report is being upgraded to a 1 Hour Event Notification based on 10CFR70 Appendix A(a)(4). There was no consequence to the public, the workers or the environment. The scrubber process will remain in a safe shutdown mode until further investigation and corrective actions are completed. Notified R2DO (Rose), IRD (Grant), NMSS EO (Kotzalas) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
On August 6, 2016 at 1700, it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that residual material located within the abandoned S-1056 scrubber was sampled and confirmed to contain Uranium. 24 Hour Event Notification based on 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' The S-1056 is an out-of-service scrubber. When operational, it scrubbed the acid fumes from the Conversion area. It currently is an unanalyzed system without IROFS or controls. The reported volume of approximately 15 kg is well within safety margins. It was taken out of service in 2002, when the S-1030 scrubber replaced it. The material in the S-1056 was discovered as an extent of condition for the S-1030 event. The discovery and sampling were documented in Redbook 71409. At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment. The licensee notified the NRC Regional Inspector (Lopez). Notified the R2DO (Suggs), R2RA (Haney) and NMSS Events Notification Group via email.
On August 23, 2016, during the extent of condition for this S-1030 scrubber system event, a review of inspection video for the S-1030 ductwork in Conversion identified material accumulation in an elbow which potentially could exceed the uranium mass limit for the elbow section (36.5 kgU). This report is being updated based on a potential to meet the 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) in the ductwork. There was no consequence to the public, the workers or the environment. The scrubber process will remain in a safe shutdown mode until further investigation and corrective actions are completed. The Region IV Project Managers were notified. Notified the R2DO (Michel), IRDMOC (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification Group (via email).
24-Hour Event Notification based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.' On September 15, 2016 at 1204 EDT, it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that residual material was located within the abandoned 3A/3B ventilation system. Based on gamma radiation surveys, the material contains Uranium. The 3A/3B system was taken out of service in 2002, when the S-1030 scrubber replaced it. When operational, it removed chemical fumes and particulate matter from the Conversion area. The material in the system was discovered as an extent of condition for the S-1030 event. When taken out of service, the system was isolated from the introduction of any additional material and/or moderator. However, because the system is out of service, it is considered an unanalyzed system without IROFS or controls. The reported depth of material in the duct appears well within analyzed safety margins for similar systems. At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment. UPDATED INFORMATION FROM AUGUST 23, 2016 NOTIFICATION: This notification also serves to update previously reported information provided on August 23, 2016 where a review of inspection video for the S-1030 ductwork in Conversion identified material accumulation in an elbow which potentially could exceed the uranium mass limit for the elbow section (36.5 kg U). This report was made based on a potential to meet the 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) in the ductwork. The material was removed from the ductwork and weighed. The total weight of the material removed was 5.5 kgs in the elbow and 3.0 kgs in a horizontal section of the duct, which is well below the mass limit in the safety basis. Therefore, the information from the August 23, 2016 potential report is retracted. Notified the R2DO (Walker) and NMSS Events Notification Group (via email).
On October 4, 2016 at approximately 1700 EDT, while performing housekeeping and cleanout activities on the out of service 3A and 3B ductwork, degradation was discovered in an area not routinely or readily accessed in the bottom of the out of service filter house system. This discovery was made while performing clean-out activities covered under a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). The work was stopped, and Health Physics (HP) performed contamination surveys of the area. The degraded area was sealed and isolated. No additional radiological controls were needed, and access to the area was not restricted. No degradation was found in other out of service systems on the roof. A comprehensive extent of condition is ongoing. There was no actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or to the environment during this time. Notified the R2DO (Bonser) and NMSS Event Notification Group (via email).
On August 17, 2017 at 11:17 a.m., it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that additional residual material located within the out of service S-1056 scrubber was found. Material in this out of service system was previously reported on August 7, 2016. The material was removed and placed into favorable geometry storage. The material has been quantified and determined to contain less than 80 grams of uranium, which is well within safety margins. This information is being reported in accordance with the 24 Hour Event Notification criterion: 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.' The buildup was not visible until dismantling the abandoned equipment for removal from the roof. Demolition and removal has already been completed for ventilation system filter houses 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B and 7A. The discovery and sampling were documented in Redbook 72846 and in CAPAL 100488919. At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment. The licensee discussed this report with NRC Region 2 (Vukovinsky and Michel). Notified the R2DO (Sykes) and NMSS Event Notification Group (via email). |
| ENS 51660 | 17 January 2016 07:22:00 | A plant employee discovered a fire in the mechanical factory strap plating room and activated the fire alarm. At 0529 EST, the licensee notified the Richland County Fire Department. The fire was extinguished and the Alert declaration was terminated at 0709 EST. No radioactive materials were involved and no injuries were reported. The licensee notified the State and R2 (Michel). Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, DHS NICC, EPA EOC, FEMA NWC (via email), FDA EOC (via email) and Nuclear SSA (via email).
Upon further review and investigation by the licensee, it was determined that the fire was extinguished within 15 minutes. As such, no Alert declaration was required. Based on these facts, the licensee has retracted this event notification. The licensee has notified their R2 Senior PM (Carmen Riviera-Crespo). Notified R2DO (McCoy). Notified NMSS (Erlanger, Moore) and IRD (Stapleton, Gott) via email. |
| ENS 51425 | 25 September 2015 12:09:00 | On September 25, 2015 at roughly 0430 EDT, four employees were in the work area when high temperature water and steam released from a wash operation in the Final Assembly Area. The cause of the water/steam release is unknown at this time, and a comprehensive investigation is underway. The area is in a safe, shutdown state, and is roped off to preserve the scene. The event did not involve any special nuclear material or contamination and is classified as an industrial safety incident. Three of the four employees were affected by the high temperature water/steam and were transported by ambulance to the hospital for treatment. This concurrent report is being made under Paragraph c of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A because in-patient hospitalization requires a 24 hour report to the South Carolina Department of Labor. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2. |